t 


THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 
OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 

SCHOOL  OF  LAW 
GIFT  OF 

John  Adams 


T,  H;  FLOOD  &  CO 


ILLINOIS 

WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  LAW 

Legislative      -       Judicial      -       Administrative 
Defenses  Barred  in  Extra  Hazardous  Enterprises 


AND 


Statutes    Regulating    Employers 

INCLUDING  SAFETY  ACTS  RELATED  TO  COMPEN- 
SATION ACT  AND   STATUTES  ENFORCED  BY 
STATE  FACTORY  INSPECTOR 


ACT  AS  AMENDED— Ended— Annotated 

SUPREME  COURT— Opinions  re  Act 

APPELLATE  COURT— Opinions— Abstracts  of  Decisions 

AMERICAN  COURTS— Federal— State— Digest  of  Cases— Interpretations 

ENGLISH  COURTS— Ruling  Cases— Citations— Excerpts 
INDUSTRIAL  BOARD— Digest  of  Rulings— Opinions— Notes 

INDUSTRIAL  BOARD— Rules  of  Procedure 
INDUSTRIAL  BOARD— Forms  of  Practice— Reports— Notices 

TABLES — Computation — Injury  Losses — Life  Expectancy 
REVIEW — Compensation  Legislation — Law  of  "Master  and  Servant," 

"Negligence" 

STA  TUTES— Safety— Health— Structural— Occupational  Disease— Hours 
of  Service — Child  Labor,  etc. 


JOHN  A.  WALGREN 

•m 

of  the  Chicago  Bar 

Editor 
'Federal  Employers'  Liability  Act  Manual,"  etc. 


T.  H.  FLOOD  &  CO.,  Publishers 
CHICAGO 


T 


Copyright,  1916 

By 
T.  H.   FLOOD  A  CO. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 


Workmen's  Compensation  Act  of  TUtnofo 1, 7 

Supreme  Court— Opinions 44, 116, 149 

Appellate  Court — Opinions — Abstracts 45, 99, 163 

Digest  of  Decisions 140-269 

Illinois:    Supreme  Court — Appellate  Court — Indus- 
trial Board. 

American  Courts — Federal — State. 
English  Courts — Ruling  Cases — Citations. 

Industrial  Board — Rules  of  Procedure 270 

Forms  of  Practice 277 

Districts  .. ., 313 

Tables — Present  Value  Computation 393 

Life  Expectancy 315 

Disability  Degrees 314 

Accidental  Insurance 315 

Certiorari — Forms — Praecipe — Scire  Facias — Writ 395 

Review — Compensation  Legislation — Law  of  Master  and 

Servant — Negligence 316 

Works  of  Reference 333 

Safety  Act  . . . 335 

Structural  Act 354 

Occupational  Disease  Act 361 

Blower  Act 368 

Noxious  Fumes  Act 371 

Garment  Manufacture  Act 373 

Butterine  and  Ice  Cream  Manufacture  Act 375 

Hours  of  Service  of  Women  Act 377 

Child  Labor  Act 379 

Wash  Room  Act 389 

Miscellaneous  Acts 391 

Index  .  .  .397 


WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACT. 

AN  ACT  to  promote  the  general  welfare  of  the  People  of 
this  State  by  providing  compensation  for  accidental  in- 
juries or  death  suffered  in  the  course  of  employment 
within  this  State;  providing  for  the  enforcement  and 
administering  thereof,  and  a  penalty  for  its  violation, 
and  repealing  an  Act  entitled,  "An  Act  to  promote  the 
general  welfare  of  the  people  of  this  State  by  provid- 
ing compensation  for  accidental  injuries  or  death  suf- 
fered in  the  course  of  employment,"  approved  June 
10,  1911,  in  force  May  1,  1912. 

AN  ACT  to  amend  Section  3,  Sec.  7,  Sec.  8,  Sec.  9,  Sec.  12, 
Sec.  13,  Sec.  14,  Sec.  16,  Sec.  19,  Sec.  21  and  Sec.  26, 
of  an  Act  entitled  "An  Act  to  promote  the  general  wel- 
fare of  the  People  of  this  State  by  providing  compen- 
sation for  accidental  injuries  or  death  suffered  in  the 
course  of  employment  within  this  State;  providing  for 
the  enforcement  and  administering  thereof  and  a  pen- 
alty for  its  violation;  and  repealing  an  Act  entitled 
"An  Act  to  promote  the  general  welfare  of  the  People 
of  this  State  by  providing  compensation  for  accidental 
injuries  or  death  suffered  in  the  course  of  employ- 
ment/' approved  June  28,  1911,  and  in  force  May  1, 
1912;  approved  June  28,  1913,  and  in  force  July  1, 
1913  ;  and  adding  thereto  a  new  Section 


BEIEF. 

Dates  of  enactments  : 

Act  of  1911:  approved  June  10,  1911;  in  force  May  1, 

1912. 

Laws  1911,  p.  315;  Rev.  Stat.  1912;  Ch.  48,  §  126. 
Act  of  1913:  approved  June  28,  1913;  in  force  July  1, 

1913. 

Laws  1913,  p.  336;  House  Bill  No.  841. 


2  WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACT 

Act  of  1915:  approved  June  28, 1915. 

Laws  1915,  p.  400;  Senate  Bill  No.  66. 

Injuries  compensated. — Accidental  injuries  arising 
out  of  and  in  the  course  of  employment  causing  perma- 
nent disfigurement,  disability  of  over  6  working  days,  or 
death. 

Industries  covered. — The  building  trades;  construc- 
tion, excavating,  and  electrical  work;  transportation; 
mining  and  quarrying;  work  with  or  about  explosives, 
molten  metals,  injurious  gases  or  vapors,  or  corrosive 
acids,  and  all  enterprises  in  which  the  law  requires  pro- 
tective devices,  provided  the  employer  elects.  Other  em- 
ployers may  elect,  but  forfeit  no  defenses  if  they  do  not. 
Compulsory  as  to  State  and  its  municipalities. 

Persons  compensated. — Private  employment :  All  em- 
ployees. Public  employment:  All  persons  employed  by 
the  State,  county,  municipality,  etc.,  except  officials. 

Burden  of  payment. — Entire  cost  rests  on  the  em- 
ployer. 

Compensation  for  death : 

(a)  To  persons  wholly  dependent  or  to  lineal  heirs 
to  whose  support  the  employee  had  contribu- 
ted within  4  years,  a  sum  equal  to  4  years' 
earnings,  not  less  than  $1,650  nor  more  than 
$3,500. 

(b)  If  only  dependent  collateral  heirs  survive, 
such  a  percentage  of  the  above  sum  as  the  sup- 
port rendered  during  the  last  two  years  was 
of  the  earnings  of  the  deceased. 

(c)  If  no  dependents,  a  burial  benefit  not  exceed- 
ing $150. 

Compensation  for  disability : 

(a)  Medical  and  surgical  aid  for  not  over  8  weeks, 
not  over  $200  in  value. 

(b)  For  total  disability,  beginning  with  eighth  day 
(second  day  of  permanent),  a  weekly  sum 
equal  to  one-half  the  employee's  earnings,  $6 


WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACT  3 

minimnm,  $12  maximum,  during  disability  or 
until  payments  equal  a  death  benefit;  there- 
after, if  the  disability  is  permanent,  a  sum  an- 
nually equal  to  8  per  cent  of  a  death  benefit, 
but  not  less  than  $10  per  month. 

(c)  For  permanent  partial  disability,  one-half  the 
loss  of  earning  capacity,  not  more  than  $12 
per  week. 

(d)  For   certain   specific   injuries    (mutilations, 
etc.),  a  benefit  of  50  per  cent  of  weekly  wages 
for  fixed  periods. 

(e)  For  serious  and  permanent  disfigurement,  not 
causing  incapacity  and  not  otherwise  compen- 
sated, a  sum  not  exceeding  one-fourth  the 
death  benefits. 

No  payments  are  to  extend  beyond  8  years,  ex- 
cept in  case  of  permanent  total  incapacity. 
Lump-sum  payments  for  either  death  or  disa- 
bility may  be  substituted  by  the  Industrial 
Board  for  periodic  payments. 

Revision  of  benefits. — Medical  examination  may  be 
had  not  oftener  than  every  4  weeks.  The  Industrial 
Board  may,  on  request,  review  installment  payments 
within  18  months  after  the  award  or  agreement  thereon. 
Insurance. — The  employer  may  insure  or  maintain  a 
benefit  system,  but  may  not  reduce  his  liabil/ty  under  the 
Act. 

Security  fo  payments. — In  case  of  insolvency,  awards 
constitute  liens  upon  all  property  of  the  employer  within 
the  county,  paramount  to  all  other  claims,  except  wages, 
taxes,  mortgages,  or  trust  deeds. 

Employers  must  furnish  proof  of  ability  to  pay,  or 
give  security,  insure,  or  make  other  provision  for  secur- 
ity of  payment.  The  rights  of  an  insolvent  employer  to 
insurance  indemnities  are  subrogated  to  injured  em- 
ployees. 

Settlement  of  disputes. — Disputes  are  determined  by 


4  WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACT 

the  Industrial  Board  through  an  arbitrator  or  arbitra- 
tion committee,  subject  to  review  by  the  Board.  Ques- 
tions of  law  may  be  reviewed  by  the  courts. 

§  1  Employer  may  elect  whether  he  accepts  provisions  of  Act — No- 
tices by  employer  and  employee  of  election  to  accept,  not 
to  accept,  and  to  withdraw. 

§  2  Presumption  of  acceptance  in  extra-hazardous  employments — 
except  upon  notice  given. 

§  3  Non-acceptance  in  extra-hazardous  employments  precludes  cer- 
tain common  law  defenses — These  enumerated. 

§    4    "Employer"  construed. 

§    5    "Employee"  construed. 

§    6    Act,  where  operative,  excludes  other  remedies. 

§  7  Amount  of  compensation  for  injury  resulting  in  death — Bene- 
ficiaries denned — To  whom  installments  payable. 

§  8  Amount  of  compensation  for  injury  not  resulting  in  death — 
First  aid — Attendance — Temporary  total  incapacity — Dis- 
figurement— Partial  incapacity — Schedule  for  losses — Fin- 
ger— Toe — Hand — Arm — Foot — Leg — Eye — Any  two— Com- 
plete disability — Death  before  total  payments — Maximum 
limit — Incompetency — Conservator. 

§    9     Lump  sun — Petition — Rejection. 

§  10  Basis  for  computing  compensation — Annual  earnings — Grade  of 
employment — Same  class  of  employment — Throughout 
working  days  of  year — Part  of  year — Average  earnings  of 
same  class — Day's  work — Subsequent  injury — Calculating 
amount  of  installments. 

§  11    Act  measure  of  responsibility. 

§  12  Employee  to  submit  to  examination — In  presence  of  bis  own 
physician — Refusal  suspends  payments — Duty  of  physician 
when  patient  likely  to  die. 

§  13    Industrial  Board  created — Appointment  and  terms  of  members. 

§  14  Salaries  of  members  and  arbitrators — Assistants — Expenses — 
Seal. 

§  15    Jurisdiction — Duties. 

§  16  Rules  and  orders  deemed  prima  facie  valid — Oaths — Subpoenas 
— Examination  of  witnesses — Service  of  writs — Refusal — 
Attachment  proceedings — Stenographer — Transcript— Fee 
— Board  to  determine  reasonableness  of  all  fees  for  ser- 
vices performed  under  Act. 

§  17  Blank  forms — Free — Record  of  withdrawals — Proceedings,  or- 
ders, awards. 

§  18    Board  to  determine  all  disputed  questions. 

§  19  Disputed  questions  of  law  and  fact — Board  to  designate  arbi- 
trator— Committee  of  arbitration  for  permanent  incapacity 
or  death — Petition — Appointment  of  members — Fee  of 
twenty  dollars  with  request  for  committee — Failure  to  de- 


WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACT  5 

posit — Investigation — In  vicinity — Decision — Petition  for 
review — Agreed  statement  of  facts — Stenographic  report — 
Authentication — Extension — Examination  by  Board's  phy- 
sician— Board  to  review  fees  of  physicians  and  attorneys — 
Employee  persisting  in  insanitary  and  injurious  practices 
— Refusing  treatment — Review  by  Board — Special  finding 
— Request  for  review — Procedure — Decision  otherwise  con- 
clusive— Certiorari  to  Circuit  Court  for  reviewing  questions 
of  law — Service — Scire  facias — Suit  in  chancery — Twenty 
days  limit — Judgment — Remanding — Judgment  of  Circuit 
Court  reviewed  by  writ  of  error  to  Supreme  Court  to  op- 
erate as  supersedeas — Decision  of  two  members  sufficient 
— Judgment  of  Circuit  Court  on  certified  copy  of  Board's 
decision — To  tax  costs  and  attorney's  fees  on  non-payment 
— Appeal — Bond  for  stay — Review  by  Board  where  disabil- 
ity has  recurred,  increased,  diminished  or  ended — Employee 
to  have  one  day's  notice  for  each  hundred  miles  and  five 
cents  per  mile — Name  and  address  for  service  of  notices  to 
be  filed  with  Board — Service  with  Board. 

§  20    Board  to  report  to  Governor — Bulletins — Reports. 

§  21  Claim,  payment,  award  or  decision  not  to  be  subject  to  lien,  at- 
tachment or  debt — Claim  paramount  in  insolvency — Excep- 
tions— Right  to  payments  extinguished  by  death — Except 
where  beneficiary  leaves  dependents. 

§  22  Agreement  with  employee  within  seven  days  after  injury  pre- 
sumed fraudulent. 

§  23    Waiver  of  compensation  void. 

§  24  Notice  of  accident  within  30  days — Mental  incapacity — Defects 
of  notice — Contents — Employer  knowing  facts — Claim  to  be 
made  within  six  months — Written  claim  after  payments 
stopped. 

§  25  Employer  relieved  from  liability  by  deposit  of  commuted  value 
of  compensation  with  State  Treasurer  or  bank,  or  by  pur- 
chase of  annuity. 

§  26  Employer  to  file  sworn  statement  of  financial  ability  to  pay 
normal  compensation  on  request  by  Board,  or  furnish  se- 
curity, or  insure,  or  make  other  provision — On  failure,  to 
be  liable  within  or  without  Act  at  employee's  option — Publi- 
cation of  notice. 

§  27  Insurance  and  relief  departments  not  to  be  affected  where  full 
compensation  provided — Insuring  against  compensation  al- 
lowed— Contracts  whereby  employee  pays  premium  void. 

§  28    Subrogation  of  employee  in  insolvency. 

§  29  Where  third  party  liable  for  damages  for  injury  or  death  to 
employee  under  Act — Employer  subrogated — Where  de- 
fendant not  within  Act — Employer  to  be  re-imbursed  by 
employee  out  of  recovery,  or  subrogated. 


6  WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACT 

§  30  Employer  to  report  to  Board  accidental  injuries  and  payments 
— Items  of  report — Only  report  to  State  required. 

§  31  "Employer"  to  include  party  contracting  to  have  performed  for 
him  hazardous  employment,  unless  requiring  liability  to  be 
insured — Fraudulent  schemes  for  evading  responsibility. 

§  32  Act  not  to  affect  right  of  action  existing  at  time  of  taking  effect 
— Repeal  or  invalidating  of  provisions — Intervening  period 
not  to  affect  time  limit  for  commencing  actions — Controver- 
sies under  preceding  Act. 

§  33  Neglect,  refusal,  failure,  violation  of  provisions — Misdemeanor 
— Fine. 

§  33%     Act  may  be  cited  "Workmen's  Compensation  Act." 

§  34    Invalidity  of  portion  not  to  affect  remainder. 

§  35    Act  of  1911  repealed. 


WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACT  7 

SECTION  1.  EMPLOYER  MAY  ELECT  WHETHER  HE  ACCEPTS 
PROVISIONS  OF  ACT  FOR  COMPENSATION  FOR  INJURIES  TO  EM- 
PLOYEE— ELECTION  OF  EMPLOYEE — NOTICES.  Be  it  enacted 
by  the  People  of  the  State  of  Illinois,  represented  in  the 
General  Assembly:  That  any  employer  in  this  State  may 
elect  to  provide  and  pay  compensation  for  accidental  in- 
juries sustained  by  any  employee  arising  out  of  and  in 
the  course  of  the  employment  according  to  the  provisions 
of  this  Act,  and  thereby  relieve  himself  from  any  liability 
for  the  recovery  of  damages,  except  as  herein  provided. 

(a)  Election  by  an  employer  to  provide  and  pay  com- 
pensation according  to  the  provisions  of  this  Act  shall 
be  made  by  the  employer  filing  notice  of  such  election 
with  the  Industrial  Board. 

(b)  Every  employer  within  the  provisions  of  this  Act 
who  has  elected  to  provide  and  pay  compensation  accord- 
ing to  the  provisions  of  this  Act  shall  be  bound  thereby 
as  to  all  his  employees  covered  by  this  Act  until  January 
1st  of  the  next  succeeding  year  and  for  terms  of  each 
year  thereafter.    Provided,  any  such  employer  may  elect 
not  to  provide  and  pay  the  compensation  herein  provided 
for  accidents  resulting  in  either   injury   or   death   and 
occurring  after  the  expiration  of  any  such  calendar  year 
by  filing  notice  of  such  election  with  the  Industrial  Board 
at  least  sixty  days  prior  to  the  expiration  of  any  such 
calendar  year,  and  by  posting  such  notice  at  a  conspic- 
uous place  in  the  plant,  shop,  office,  room,  or  place  where 
such  employee  is  employed,  or  by  personal  service,  in 
written  or  printed  form,  upon  such  employee,  at  least 
sixty  days  prior  to  the  expiration  of  any  such  calendar 
year. 

(c)  In  the  event  any  employer  elects  to  provide  and 
pay  the  compensation  provided  in  this  Act,  then  every 
employee  of  such  employer,  as  a  part  of  his  contract  of 
hiring  or  who  may  be  employed  at  the  time  of  the  taking 
effect  of  this  Act  and  the  acceptance  of  its  provisions  by 
the  employer,  shall  be  deemed  to  have  accepted  all  the 


8  WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACT 

provisions  of  this  Act  and  shall  be  bound  thereby  unless 
within  thirty  days  after  such  hiring  or  after  the  taking 
effect  of  this  Act,  and  its  acceptance  by  the  employer,  he 
shall  file  a  notice  to  the  contrary  with  the  Industrial 
Board,  whose  duty  it  shall  be  to  immediately  notify  the 
employer,  and  if  so  notified,  the  employer  shall  not  be 
deprived  of  any  common  law  or  statutory  defenses  exist- 
ing but  for  this  Act ;  and  until  such  notice  to  the  contrary 
is  given  to  the  employer,  the  measure  of  liability  of  the 
employer  shall  be  determined  according  to  the  compen- 
sation provisions  of  this  Act:  Provided,  however,  that 
any  employee  may  withdraw  from  the  operation  of  this 
Act  upon  filing  a  written  notice  of  withdrawal  at  least  ten 
days  prior  to  January  1st  of  any  year  with  the  Industrial 
Board,  whose  duty  it  shall  be  to  immediately  notify  the 
employer  by  registered  mail,  and,  if  so  notified,  the  em- 
ployer shall  not  be  deprived  of  any  common  law  or  statu- 
tory defenses  existing  but  for  this  Act,  and  until  such 
notice  to  the  contrary  is  given  to  the  employer,  the  meas- 
ure of  liability  of  the  employer  shall  be  determined  ac- 
cording to  the  compensation  provisions  of  this  Act. 

(d)  Any  employer  or  employee  may,  without  preju- 
dice to  any  existing  right  or  claim,  withdraw  his  election 
to  reject  this  Act  by  giving  thirty  days'  written  notice  in 
such  manner  and  form  as  may  be  provided  by  the  Indus- 
trial Board. 

§  2.  PRESUMPTION  IN  EXTRA-HAZARDOUS  OCCUPATIONS — 
NOTICE  OF  NON-ELECTION.  Every  employer  enumerated  in 
section  3,  paragraph  (b),  shall  be  conclusively  presumed 
to  have  filed  notice  of  his  election  as  provided  in  section 
1,  paragraph  (a),  and  to  have  elected  to  provide  and  pay 
compensation  according  to  the  provisions  of  this  Act, 
unless  and  until  notice  in  writing  of  his  election  to  the 
contrary  is  filed  with  the  Industrial  Board  and  unless 
and  until  the  employer  shall  either  furnish  to  his  em- 
ployee personally  or  post  at  a  conspicuous  place  in  the 
plant,  shop,  office,  room  or  place  where  such  employee  is 


WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACT  9 

to  be  employed,  a  copy  of  said  notice  of  election  not  to 
provide  and  pay  compensation  according  to  the  provis- 
ions of  this  Act ;  which  notice  of  non-election  if  filed  and 
posted  as  herein  provided,  shall  be  effective  until  with- 
drawn ;  and  such  notice  of  non-election  may  be  withdrawn 
as  provided  in  this  Act. 

§  3.  NON-ELECTION — DEFENSES — ABROGATED,  (a)  In 
any  action  to  recover  damages  against  an  employer,  en- 
gaged in  any  of  the  occupations,  enterprises  or  busi- 
nesses enumerated  in  paragraph  (b)  of  this  section,  who 
shall  elect  not  to  provide  and  pay  compensation  to  any 
employee,  according  to  the  provisions  of  this  Act,  it  shall 
not  be  a  defense,  that : 

First — The  employee  assumed  the  risks  of  the  em- 
ployment ; 

Second — The  injury  or  death  was  caused  in  whole  or 
in  part  by  the  negligence  of  a  fellow-servant ;  or 

Third — The  injury  or  death  was  proximately  caused 
by  the  contributory  negligence  of  the  employee. 

(b)  The  provisions  of  paragraph  (a)  of  this  section 
shall  only  apply  to  an  employer  engaged  in  any  of  the 
following  occupations,  enterprises  or  businesses,  namely : 

1.  The  building,  maintaining,  removing,  repairing  or 
demolishing  of  any  structure,  except  as  provided  in  sub- 
section 8  of  this  section ; 

2.  Construction,  excavating  or  electrical  work,  except 
as  provided  in  sub-section  8  of  this  section. 

3.  Carriage  by  land  or  water  and  loading  or  unload- 
ing in  connection  therewith ; 

4.  The  operation  of  any  warehouse  or  general  or  ter- 
minal store  houses ; 

5.  Mining,  surface  mining  or  quarrying; 

6.  Any  enterprise  in  which  explosive  materials  are 
manufactured,  handled  or  used  in  dangerous  quantities ; 

7.  In  any  enterprise  wherein  molten  metal,  or  explo- 
sive or  injurious  gases  or  vapors,  or  inflammable  vapors 


10  WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACT 

or  fluids,  or  corrosive  acids,  are  manufactured,  used,  gen- 
erated, stored  or  conveyed  in  dangerous  quantities ; 

8.  In  any  enterprise  in  which  statutory  or  municipal 
ordinance  regulations  are  now  or  shall  hereafter  be  im- 
posed for  the  regulating,  guarding,  use  or  the  placing  of 
machinery  or  appliances,  or  for  the  protection  and  safe- 
guarding of  the  employees  or  the  public  therein ;  each  of 
which  occupations,  enterprises  or  businesses  are  hereby 
declared  to  be  extra-hazardous :  Provided,  nothing  con- 
tained herein  shall  be  construed  to  apply  to  any  work, 
employment,  or  operations  done,  had  or  conducted  by 
farmers  and  others  engaged  in  farming,  tillage  of  the 
soil,  or  stock  raising,  or  to  those  who  rent,  demise,  or 
lease  land  for  any  of  such  purposes,  or  to  any  one  in 
their  employ  or  to  any  work  done  on  a  farm,  or  country 
place,  no  matter  what  kind  of  work,  or  service  is  being 
done  or  rendered.  (As  amended  by  an  Act  approved 
June  28, 1915,  in  force  July  1, 1915. 

$  4.  "EMPLOYER"  CONSTRUED.  The  term  "employer" 
as  used  in  this  Act  shall  be  construed  to  be : 

First — The  State  and  each  county,  city,  town,  town- 
ship, incorporated  village,  school  district,  body  politic, 
or  municipal  corporation  therein. 

Second— Every  person,  firm,  public  or  private  cor- 
poration, including  hospitals,  public  service,  eleemosy- 
nary, religious  or  charitable  corporations  or  associations 
who  has  any  person  in  service  or  under  any  contract  for 
hire,  express  or  implied,  oral  or  written,  and  who,  at  or 
prior  to  the  time  of  the  accident  to  the  employee  for 
which  compensation  under  this  Act  may  be  claimed,  shall 
in  the  manner  provided  in  this  Act  have  elected  to  be- 
come subject  to  the  provisions  of  this  Act,  and  who  shall 
not,  prior  to  such  accident,  have  effected  a  withdrawal  of 
such  election  in  the  manner  provided  in  this  Act. 

§  5.  "EMPLOYEE"  CONSTRUED.  The  term  "employee" 
as  used  in  this  Act  shall  be  construed  to  mean : 

First — Every  person  in  the   service   of  the   State, 


WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACT  11 

county,  city,  town,  township,  incorporated  village  or 
school  district,  body  politic,  or  municipal  corporations 
therein,  under  appointment,  or  contract  of  hire,  express 
or  implied,  oral  or  written,  except  any  official  of  the 
State,  or  of  any  county,  city,  town,  township,  incorpora- 
ted village,  school  district,  body  politic  or  municipal  cor- 
poration therein;  and  except  any  employee  thereof  for 
whose  accidental  injury  or  death  arising  out  of  and  in 
the  course  of  his  employment  compensation  or  a  pension 
shall  be  payable  to  him,  his  personal  representative, 
beneficiaries  or  heirs,  from  any  pension  or  benefit  fund  to 
which  the  State,  or  any  county,  city,  town,  township,  in- 
corporated village,  school  district,  body  politic  or  muni- 
cipal corporation  therein  contributes  in  whole  or  in  part : 
Provided,  that  one  employed  by  a  contractor  who  has 
contracted  with  the  State,  or  a  county,  city,  town,  town- 
ship, incorporated  village,  school  district,  body  politic  or 
municipal  corporation  therein,  through  its  representa- 
tives, shall  not  be  considered  as  an  employee  of  the  State, 
county,  city,  town,  township,  incorporated  village,  school 
district,  body  politic  or  municipal  corporation  which 
made  the  contract. 

Second — Every  person  in  the  service  of  another  un- 
der any  contract  of  hire,  express  or  implied,  oral  or  writ- 
ten, including  aliens,  and  minors  who  are  legally  permit- 
ted to  work  under  the  laws  of  the  State,  who,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  this  Act,  shall  be  considered  the  same  and  have 
the  same  power  to  contract,  receive  payments  and  give 
quittances  therefor,  as  adult  employees,  but  not  includ- 
ing any  person  whose  employment  is  but  casual  or  who  is 
not  engaged  in  the  usual  course  of  the  trade,  business, 
profession  or  occupation  of  his  employer :  Provided,  that 
employees  shall  not  be  included  within  the  provisions  of 
this  Act  when  excluded  by  the  laws  of  the  United  States 
relating  to  liability  of  employers  to  their  employees  for 
personal  injuries  where  >  such  laws  are  held  to  be  exclu- 
sive. 


12  WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACT 

§  6.  REMEDY  EXCLUSIVE.  No  common  law  or  statutory 
right  to  recover  damages  for  injury  or  death  sustained 
by  any  employee  while  engaged  in  the  line  of  his  duty  as 
such  employee  other  than  the  compensation  herein  pro- 
vided shall  be  available  to  any  employee  who  is  covered 
by  the  provisions  of  this  Act,  to  any  one  wholly  or  par- 
tially dependent  upon  him,  the  legal  representatives  of 
his  estate,  or  any  one  otherwise  entitled  to  recover  dam- 
ages for  such  injury. 

§  7.  AMOUNT  OF  COMPENSATION  FOR  INJURY  RESULTING 
IN  DEATH.  The  amount  of  compensation  which  shall  be 
paid  for  an  injury  to  the  employee  resulting  in  death 
shall  be  : 

(a)  If  the  employee  leaves  any  widow,  child  or  child- 
ren whom  he  was  under  legal  obligation  to  support  at  the 
time  of  his  injury,  a  sum  equal  to  four  times  the  average 
annual  earnings  of  the  employee,  but  not  less  in  any 
event  than  one  thousand  six  hundred  fifty  dollars  and  not 
more  in  any  event  than  three  thousand  five  hundred  dol- 
lars.   Any  compensation  payments  other  than  necessary 
medical,  surgical  or  hospital  fees  or  services  shall  be  de- 
ducted in  ascertaining  the  amount  payable  on  death. 

(b)  If  no  amount  is  payable  under  paragraph  (a)  of 
this  section  and  the  employee  leaves  any  widow,  child, 
parent,  grandparent  or  other  lineal  heir,  to  whose  sup- 
port he  had  contributed  within  four  years  previous  to 
the  time  of  his  injury,  a  sum  equal  to  four  times  the 
average  annual  earnings  of  the  employee,  but  not  less  in 
any  event  than  one  thousand  six  hundred  fifty  dollars 
and  not  more  in  any  event  than  three  thousand  five  hun- 
dred dollars.  Any  compensation  payments  other  than  nec- 
essary medical,  surgical  or  hospital  fees  or  services  shall 
be  deducted  in  ascertaining  the  amount  payable  on  death. 

(c)  If  no  amount  is  payable  under  paragraph  (a)  or 
(b)  of  this  section  and  the  employee  leaves  collateral 
heirs  dependent  at  the  time  of  the  injury  to  the  employee 
upon  his  earnings,  such  a  percentage  of  the  sum  provided 


WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACT  13 

in  paragraph  (a)  of  this  section  as  the  average  annual 
contributions  which  the  deceased  made  to  the  support  of 
such  collateral  dependent  heirs  during  the  two  years  pre- 
ceding the  injury  bears  to  his  average  annual  earnings 
during  such  two  years. 

(d)  If  no  amount  is  payable  under  paragraph  (a)  or 
(b)  or  (c)  of  this  section,  a  sum  not  to  exceed  one  hund- 
red and  fifty  dollars  for  burial  expenses. 

(e)  All  compensation  except  for  burial  expenses,  pro- 
vided for  in  this  section  to  be  paid  in  case  injury  results 
in  death,  shall  be  paid  in  installments  equal  to  one-half 
the  average  earnings,  at  the  same  intervals  at  which  the 
wages  or  earnings  of  the  employee  were  paid;  or  if  this 
shall  not  be  feasible,  then  the  installments  shall  be  paid 
weekly:  Provided,  such  compensation  may  be  paid  in  a 
lump  sum  upon  petition  as  provided  in  section  9  of  this 
Act. 

(f )  The  compensation  to  be  paid  for  injury  which  re- 
sults in  death,  as  provided  in  this  section,  shall  be  paid 
at  the  option  of  the  employer  either  to  the  personal  rep- 
resentative of  the  deceased  employee  or  to  his  beneficiar- 
ies, and  shall  be  distributed  to  the  heirs  who  formed  the 
basis  for  determining  the  amount  of  compensation  to  be 
paid  by  the  employer,  the  distributees '  share  to  be  in  the 
proportion  of  their  respective  dependency  at  the  time  of 
the  injury  on  the  earnings  of  the  deceased:    Provided, 
that,  in  the  judgment  of  the  court  appointing  the  personal 
representative,  a  child's  distributive  share  may  be  paid 
to  the  parent  for  the  support  of  the  child.    The  payment 
of  compensation  by  the  employer  to  the  personal  repre- 
sentative of  the  deceased  employee  shall  relieve  him  of 
all  obligations  as  to  the  distribution  of  such  compensa- 
tion so  paid.    The  distribution  by  the  personal  represen- 
tative of  the  compensation  paid  to  him  by  the  employer 
shall  be  made  pursuant  to  the  order  of  the  court  appoint- 
ing him.     (As  amended  by  an  Act  approved  June  28, 
1915;  in  force  July  1,1915. 


14  WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACT 

§  8.  AMOUNT  OF  COMPENSATION  FOB  INJURY  NOT  RE- 
SULTING IN  DEATH.  The  amount  of  compensation  which 
shall  be  paid  to  the  employee  for  an  injury  not  resulting 
in  death  shall  be : 

(a)  The  employer  shall  provide  necessary  first  aid, 
medical,  surgical  and  hospital  services ;  also  medical,  sur- 
gical and  hospital  services  for  a  period  not  longer  than 
eight  weeks,  not  to  exceed,  however,  the  amount  of  $200. 
The  employee  may  elect  to  secure  his  own  physician,  sur- 
geon or  hospital  services  at  his  own  expense. 

(b)  If  the  period  of  temporary  total  incapacity  for 
work  lasts  for  more  than  six  working  days,  compensa- 
tion equal  to  one-half  the  earnings,  but  not  less  than  $6.00 
nor  more  than  $12.00  per  week,  beginning  on  the  eighth 
day  of  such  temporary  total  incapacity,  and  continuing 
as  long  as  the  temporary  total  incapacity  lasts,  but  not 
after  the  amount  of  compensation  paid  equals  the  amount 
which  would  have  been  payable  as  a  death  benefit  under 
paragraph  (a),  section  7,  if  the  employee  had  died  as  a 
result  of  the  injury  at  the  time  thereof,  leaving  heirs  sur- 
viving as  provided  in  said  paragraph  (a),  section  7. 

(c)  For  any  serious  and  permanent  disfigurement  to 
the  hand,  head  or  face,  the  employee  shall  be  entitled  to 
compensation  for  such  disfigurement,  the  amount  to  be 
fixed  by  agreement  or  by  arbitration  in  accordance  with 
the  provisions  of  this  Act,  which  amount  shall  not  exceed 
one-quarter  of  the  amount  of  the  compensation  which 
would  have  been  payable  as  a  death  benefit  under  para- 
graph (a),  section  7,  if  the  employee  had  died  as  a  result 
of  the  injury  at  the  time  thereof,  leaving  heirs  surviving, 
as  provided  in  said  paragraph  (a),  section  7;    Provided, 
that  no  compensation  is  payable  under  paragraphs  (d), 
(e)  or  (f)  of  this  section:    And  provided,  further,  that 
when  the  disfigurement  is  to  the  hand,  head  or  face  as  a 
result  of  an  injury,  for  which  injury  compensation  is  not 
payable  under  paragraph  (d),  (e)  or  (f)  of  this  section, 


WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACT  16 

compensation  for  such  disfigurement  may  be  had  under 
this  paragraph. 

(d)  If,  after  the  injury  has  been  sustained,  the  em- 
ployee as  a  result  thereof  becomes  partially  incapacita- 
ted from  pursuing  his  usual  and  customary  line  of  em- 
ployment, he  shall,  except  in  the  cases  covered  by  the 
specific  schedule  set  forth  in  paragraph  (e)  of  this  sec- 
tion, receive  compensation,  subject  to  the  limitations  as 
to  time  and  maximum  amounts  fixed  in  paragraphs  (b) 
and  (h)  of  this  section,  equal  to  one-half  of  the  difference 
between  the  average  amount  which  he  earned  before  the 
accident,  and  the  average  amount  which  he  is  earning 
or  is  able  to  earn  in  some  suitable  employment  or  busi- 
ness after  the  accident.    In  the  event  the  employee  re- 
turns to  the  employment  of  the  employer  in  whose  service 
he  was  injured,  the  employee  shall  not  be  barred  from 
asserting  a  claim  for  compensation  under  this  Act :  Pro- 
vided, notice  of  such  claim  is  filed  with  the  Industrial 
Board  within  eighteen  months  after  he  returns  to  such 
employment,  and  the  said  board  shall  immediately  send 
to  the  employer,  by  registered  mail,  a  copy  of  such  notice. 

(e)  For  injuries  in  the  following  schedule,  the  em- 
ployee shall  receive  in  addition  to  compensation  during 
the  period  of  temporary  total  incapacity  for  work  result- 
ing from  such  ihjuiy,  in  accordance  with  the  provisions 
of  paragraphs  (a)  and  (b)  of  this  section,  compensation, 
for  a  further  period,  subject  to  the  limitations  as  to  time 
and  amounts  fixed  in  paragraphs  (b)  and  (h)  of  this  sec- 
tion, for  the  specific  loss  herein  mentioned,  as  follows, 
but  shall  not  receive  any  compensation  under  any  other 
provisions  of  this  Act : 

For  the  loss  of  a  thumb,  or  the  permanent  and  com- 
plete loss  of  its  use,  fifty  per  centum  of  the  average 
weekly  wage  during  sixty  weeks : 

For  the  loss  of  a  first  finger,  commonly  called  the  in- 
dex finger,  or  the  permanent  and  complete  loss  of  its  use, 


16  WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACT 

fifty  per  centum  of  the  average  weekly  wage  during  ttir- 
ty-five  weeks ; 

For  the  loss  of  a  second  finger,  or  the  permanent  and 
complete  loss  of  its  use,  fifty  per  centum  of  the  average 
weekly  wage  during  thirty  weeks ; 

For  the  loss  of  a  third  finger,  or  the  permanent  and 
complete  loss  of  its  use,  fifty  per  centum  of  the  average 
weekly  wage  during  twenty  weeks ; 

For  the  loss  of  a  fourth  finger,  commonly  called  the 
little  finger,  or  the  permanent  and  complete  loss  of  its 
use,  fifty  per  centum  of  the  average  weekly  wage  during 
fifteen  weeks ; 

The  loss  of  the  first  phalange  of  the  thumb,  or  of  any 
finger,  shall  be  considered  to  be  equal  to  the  loss  of  one- 
half  of  such  thumb,  or  finger,  and  compensation  shall  be 
one-half  the  amounts  above  specified ; 

The  loss  of  more  than  one  phalange  shall  be  consid- 
ered as  the  loss  of  the  entire  finger  or  thumb :  Provided, 
however,  that  in  no  case  shall  the  amount  received  for 
more  than  one  finger  exceed  the  amount  provided  in  this 
schedule  for  the  loss  of  a  hand ; 

For  the  loss  of  a  great  toe,  fifty  per  centum  of  the 
average  weekly  wage  during  thirty  weeks ; 

For  the  loss  of  one  toe  other  than  the  great  toe,  fifty 
per  centum  of  the  average  weekly  wage  during  ten 
weeks,  and  for  the  additional  loss  of  one  or  more  toes 
other  than  the  great  toe,  fifty  per  centum  of  the  average 
weekly  wage  during  an  additional  ten  weeks. 

The  loss  of  the  first  phalange  of  any  toe  shall  be  con- 
sidered to  be  equal  to  the  loss  of  one-half  of  such  toe,  and 
compensation  shall  be  one-half  of  the  amount  above  spec- 
ified. 

The  loss  of  more  than  one  phalange  shall  be  consid- 
ered as  the  loss  of  the  entire  toe. 

For  the  loss  of  a  hand,  or  the  permanent  and  com- 
plete loss  of  its  use,  fifty  per  centum  of  the  average 
weekly  wage  during  two  hundred  and  fifty  weeks ; 


WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACT  17 

For  the  loss  of  an  arm,  or  the  permanent  and  com- 
plete loss  of  its  use,  fifty  per  centum  of  the  average 
weekly  wage  during  two  hundred  weeks ; 

For  the  loss  of  a  foot,  or  the  permanent  and  complete 
loss  of  its  use,  fifty  per  centum  of  the  average  weekly 
wage  during  one  hundred  and  twenty-five  weeks ; 

For  the  loss  of  a  leg,  or  the  permanent  and  complete 
loss  of  its  use,  fifty  per  centum  of  the  average  weekly 
wage  during  one  hundred  and  seventy-five  weeks ; 

For  the  loss  of  the  sight  of  an  eye,  fifty  per  centum 
of  the  average  weekly  wage  during  one  hundred  weeks ; 

The  loss  of  both  hands,  or  both  arms,  or  both  feet,  or 
both  legs,  or  both  eyes,  or  of  any  two  thereof,  shall  con- 
stitute total  and  permanent  disability,  to  be  compensated 
according  to  the  compensation  fixed  by  paragraph  (f )  of 
this  section:  Provided,  that  these  specific  cases  of  total 
and  permanent  disability  shall  not  be  construed  as  ex- 
cluding other  cases. 

(f )  In  case  of  complete  disability,  which  renders  the 
employee  wholly  and  permanently  incapable  of  work, 
compensation  equal  to  50  per  cent  of  his  earnings,  but  not 
less  than  $6.00  nor  more  than  $12.00  per  week,  commenc- 
ing on  the  day  after  the  injury  and  continuing  until  the 
amount  paid  equals  the  amount  which  would  have  been 
payable  as  a  death  benefit  under  paragraph  (a),  section 
7,  if  the  employee  had  died  as  a  result  of  the  injury  at 
the  time  thereof,  leaving  heirs  surviving,  as  provided  in 
said  paragraph  (a),  section  7,  and  thereafter  a  pension 
during  life  annually  equal  to  8  per  cent  of  the  amount 
which  would  have  been  payable  as  a  death  benefit  under 
paragraph  (a),  section  7,  if  the  employee  had  died  as  a 
result  of  the  injury  at  the  time  thereof,  leaving  heirs  sur- 
viving, as  provided  in  said  paragraph  (a),  section  7. 
Such  pension  shall  not  be  less  than  $10.00  per  month  and 
shall  be  payable  monthly. 

(g)  In  case  death  occurs  as  a  result  of  the  injury  be- 
fore the  total  of  the  payments  made  equals  the  amount 


18  WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACT 

payable  as  a  death  benefit,  then  in  case  the  employee 
leaves  any  widow,  child  or  children,  parents,  grandpar- 
ents or  other  lineal  heirs,  entitled  to  compensation  under 
section  7,  the  difference  between  the  compensation  for 
death  and  the  sum  of  payments  made  to  the  employee 
shall  be  paid,  at  the  option  of  the  employer,  either  to  the 
personal  representative  or  to  the  beneficiaries  of  the  de- 
ceased employee,  and  distributed,  as  provided  in  para- 
graph (f )  of  section  7,  but  in  no  case  shall  the  amount 
payable  under  this  paragraph  be  less  than  $500.00. 

(h)  In  no  event  shall  the  compensation  to  be  paid  ex- 
ceed fifty  per  centum  of  the  average  weekly  wage  or  ex- 
ceed $12.00  per  week  in  amount ;  nor,  except  in  cases  of 
complete  disability,  as  defined  above,  shall  any  payments 
extend  over  a  period  of  more  than  eight  years  from  the 
date  of  the  accident.  In  case  an  injured  employee  shall 
be  incompetent  at  the  time  when  any  right  or  privilege 
accrues  to  him  under  the  provisions  of  this  Act,  a  con- 
servator or  guardian  may  be  appointed,  pursuant  to  law, 
and  may,  on  behalf  of  such  incompetent,  claim  and  exer- 
cise any  such  right  or  privilege  with  the  same  force  and 
effect  as  if  the  employee  himself  had  been  competent  and 
had  claimed  or  exercised  said  right  or  privilege ;  and  no 
limitations  of  time  by  this  Act  provided  shall  run  so  long 
as  said  incompetent  employee  is  without  a  conservator  or 
guardian. 

(i)  All  compensations  provided  in  paragraphs  (b), 
(c),  (d),  (e)  and  (f)  of  this  section,  other  than  cases  of 
pension  for  life,  shall  be  paid  in  installments  at  the  same 
intervals  at  which  the  wages  or  earnings  of  the  employee 
were  paid  at  the  time  of  the  injury,  or  if  this  shall  not  be 
feasible,  then  the  installments  shall  be  paid  weekly.  (As 
amended  by  an  Act  approved  June  28, 1915 ;  in  force  July 
1, 1915. 

§  9.  LUMP  SUM.  Any  employer  or  employee  or  bene- 
ficiary who  shall  desire  to  have  such  compensation,  or 
any  unpaid  part  thereof,  paid  in  a  lump  sum,  may  peti- 


WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACT  19 

tion  the  Industrial  Board,  asking  that  such  compensation 
be  so  paid,  and  if,  upon  proper  notice  to  the  interested 
parties  and  a  proper  showing  made  before  such  board, 
it  appears  to  the  interest  of  the  parties  that  such  compen- 
sation be  so  paid,  the  board  may  order  the  commutation 
of  the  compensation  to  an  equivalent  lump  sum,  which 
commutation  shall  be  an  amount  which  will  equal  the 
total  sum  of  the  probable  future  payments  capitalized  at 
their  present  value  upon  the  basis  of  interest  calculated 
at  three  per  centum  per  annum  with  annual  rests :  Pro- 
vided, that  in  cases  indicating  complete  disability  no  pe- 
tition for  a  commutation  to  a  lump  sum  basis  shall  be  en- 
tertained by  the  Industrial  Board  until  after  the  expira- 
tion of  six  months  from  the  date  of  the  injury,  and  where 
necessary,  upon  proper  application  being  made,  a  guard- 
ian, conservator  or  administrator,  as  the  case  may  be, 
may  be  appointed  for  any  person  under  disability  who 
may  be  entitled  to  any  such  compensation,  and  an  em- 
ployer bound  by  the  terms  of  this  Act,  and  liable  to  pay 
such  compensation,  may  petition  for  the  appointment  of 
the  public  administrator,  or  a  conservator,  or  guardian, 
where  no  legal  representative  has  been  appointed  or  is 
acting  for  such  party  or  parties  so  under  disability. 
Either  party  may  reject  an  award  of  a  lump  sum  pay- 
ment of  compensation,  except  an  award  for  compensation 
under  section  7  or  paragraph  (e)  of  section  8  or  for  the 
injuries  defined  in  the  last  paragraph  of  paragraph  (e)  of 
section  8  as  constituting  total  and  permanent  disability, 
by  filing  his  written  rejection  thereof  with  the  said  board 
within  ten  days  after  notice  to  him  of  the  award,  in  which 
event  compensation  shall  be  payable  in  installments  as 
herein  provided.  (As  amended  by  Act  approved  June 
28, 1915 ;  in  force  July  1, 1915. 

§  10.  BASIS  FOB  COMPUTING  COMPENSATION.  The  basis 
for  computing  the  compensation  provided  for  in  sections 
7  and  8  of  the  Act  shall  be  as  follows : 

(a)  The  compensation  shall  be  computed  on  the  basis 


20  WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACT 

of  the  annual  earnings  which  the  injured  person  received 
as  salary,  wages  or  earnings  if  in  the  employment  of  the 
same  employer  continuously  during  the  year  next  pre- 
ceding the  injury. 

(b)  Employment  by  the  same  employer  shall  be  taken 
to  mean  employment  by  the  same  employer  in  the  grade 
in  which  the  employee  was  employed  at  the  time  of  the 
accident,  uninterrupted  by  absence  from  work  due  to  ill- 
ness or  any  other  unavoidable  cause. 

(c)  If  the  injured  person  has  not  been  engaged  in  the 
employment  of  the  same  employer  for  the  full  year  im- 
mediately preceding  the  accident,  the  compensation  shall 
be  computed  according  to  the  annual  earnings  which  per- 
sons of  the  same  class  in  the  same  employment  and  same 
location,  (or  if  that  be  impracticable,  of  neighboring  em- 
ployments of  the  same  kind)  have  earned  during  such 
period. 

(d)  As  to  employees  in  employments  in  which  it  is  the 
custom  to  operate  throughout  the  working  days  of  the 
year,  the  annual  earnings,  if  not  otherwise  determinable, 
shall  be  regarded  as  300  times  the  average  daily  earnings 
in  such  computation. 

(e)  As  to  employees  in  employments  in  which  it  is  the 
custom  to  operate  for  a  part  of  the  whole  number  of 
working  days  in  each  year,  such  number,  if  the  annual 
earnings  are  not  otherwise  determinable,  shall  be  used 
instead  of  300  as  a  basis  for  computing  the  annual  earn- 
ings :  Provided,  the  minimum  number  of  days  which  shall 
be  so  used  for  the  basis  of  the  year's  work  shall  not  be 
less  than  200. 

(f )  In  the  case  of  injured  employees  who  earn  either 
no  wage  or  less  than  the  earnings  of  adult  day  laborers 
in  the  same  line  of  employment  in  that  locality,  the  yearly 
wage  shall  be  reckoned  according  to  the  average  annual 
earning  of  adults  of  the  same  class  in  the  same  (or  if  that 
is  impracticable  then  of  neighboring)  employments. 

(g)  Earnings,  for  the  purpose  of  this  section,  shall  be 


WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACT  21 

based  on  the  earnings  for  the  number  of  hours  commonly 
regarded  as  a  day's  work  for  that  employment,  and  shall 
exclude  overtime  earnings.  The  earnings  shall  not  in- 
clude any  sum  which  the  employer  has  been  accustomed 
to  pay  the  employee  to  cover  any  special  expense  entailed 
on  him  by  the  nature  of  his  employment. 

(h)  In  computing  the  compensation  to  be  paid  to  any 
employee,  who,  before  the  accident  for  which  he  claims 
compensation,  was  disabled  and  drawing  compensation 
under  the  terms  of  this  Act,  the  compensation  for  each 
subsequent  injury  shall  be  apportioned  according  to  the 
proportion  of  incapacity  and  disability  caused  by  the  re- 
spective injuries  which  he  may  have  suffered. 

(i)  To  determine  the  amount  of  compensation  for  each 
installment  period,  the  amount  per  annum  shall  be  ascer- 
tained pusuant  hereto,  and  such  amount  divided  by  the 
number  of  installment  periods  per  annum. 

§  11.  COMPENSATION  MEASURE  OF  RESPONSIBILITY  EM- 
PLOYER ASSUMED  UNDER  ACT.  The  compensation  herein 
provided,  together  with  the  provisions  of  this  Act,  shall 
be  the  measure  of  the  responsibility  which  the  employer 
has  assumed  for  injuries  or  death  that  may  occur  to  em- 
ployees in  his  employment  subject  to  the  provisions  of 
this  Act. 

§  12  CLAIMANT  TO  SUBMIT  TO  EXAMINATIONS.  An  em- 
ployee entitled  to  receive  disability  payments  shall  be  re- 
quired, if  requested  by  the  employer,  to  submit  himself, 
at  the  expense  of  the  employer,  for  examination  to  a  duly 
qualified  medical  practitioner  or  surgeon  selected  by  the 
employer,  at  a  time  and  place  reasonably  convenient  for 
the  employee,  as  soon  as  practicable  after  the  injury,  and 
also  one  week  after  the  first  examination  and  thereafter 
at  intervals  not  oftener  than  once  every  fonr  weeks, 
which  examination  shall  be  for  the  purpose  of  determin- 
ing the  nature,  extent  and  probable  duration  of  the  in- 
jury received  by  the  employee,  and  for  the  purpose  of 
ascertaining  the  amount  of  compensation  which  may  be 


22  WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACT 

due  the  employee  from  time  to  time  for  disability  accord- 
ing to  the  provisions  of  this  Act :  Provided,  however,  that 
such  examination  shall  be  made  in  the  presence  of  a  duly 
qualified  medical  practitioner  or  surgeon  provided  and 
paid  for  by  the  employee,  if  such  employee  so  desires.  In 
all  cases  where  the  examination  is  made  by  a  surgeon  en- 
gaged by  the  employer  and  the  injured  employee  has  no 
surgeon  present  at  such  examination,  it  shall  be  the  duty 
of  the  surgeon  making  the  examination  at  the  instance  of 
the  employer  to  deliver  to  the  injured  employee,  upon  his 
request  or  that  of  his  representative,  a  statement  in  writ- 
ing of  the  condition  and  extent  of  the  injury  to  the  same 
extent  that  said  surgeon  reports  to  the  employer.  If  the 
employee  refuses  so  to  submit  himself  to  examination  or 
unnecessarily  obstructs  the  same,  his  right  to  compensa- 
tion payments  shall  be  temporarily  suspended  until  such 
examination  shall  have  taken  place,  and  no  compensation 
shall  be  payable  under  this  Act  for  such  period.  It  shall 
be  the  duty  of  surgeons  treating  an  injured  employee 
who  is  likely  to  die  and  treating  him  at  the  instance  of 
the  employer  to  have  called  in  another  surgeon,  to  be  des- 
ignated and  paid  for  by  either  the  injured  employee  or  by 
the  person  or  persons  who  would  become  his  beneficiary 
or  beneficiaries,  to  make  an  examination  before  the  death 
of  such  injured  employee.  (As  amended  by  an  Act  ap- 
proved June  28, 1915,  in  force  July  1, 1915. 

§  13.  INDUSTRIAL  BOARD  CREATED — APPOINTMENT — 
TERM  OF  OFFICE.  There  is  hereby  created  a  board  which 
shall  be  known  as  the  Industrial  Board,  to  consist  of 
three  members  to  be  appointed  by  the  Governor,  by  and 
with  the  consent  of  the  Senate,  one  of  whom  shall  be  a 
representative  citizen  of  the  employing  class  operating 
under  this  Act,  and  one  of  whom  shall  be  a  representative 
citizen  chosen  from  among  the  employees  operating  un- 
der this  Act,  and  one  of  whom  shall  be  a  representative 
citizen  not  identified  with  either  the  employing  or  em- 
ployee classes,  and  who  shall  be  designated  by  the  Grov- 


WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACT  28 

ernor  as  chairman.  Appointment  of  members  to  places 
on  the  first  board,  or  to  fill  vacancies  on  said  board  may 
be  made  during  recesses  of  the  Senate,  but  shall  be  sub- 
ject to  confirmation  by  the  Senate  at  the  next  ensuing 
session  of  the  Legislature.  The  term  of  office  of  members 
of  this  board  shall  be  six  years,  expiring  on  January  31 
of  the  odd  years,  except  that  when  first  constituted  one 
member  shall  be  appointed  for  two  years,  one  for  four 
years,  and  one  for  six  years.  Thereafter  one  member 
shall  be  appointed  every  second  year  for  the  full  term  of 
six  years.  Not  more  than  two  members  of  the  board 
shall  belong  to  the  same  political  party.  (As  amended 
by  an  Act  approved  June  28, 1915 ;  in  force  July  1,  1915. 

§  14.  SALARY — SECRETARY — CLERKS — SEAL.  The  salary 
of  each  of  the  members  of  the  board  so  appointed  by  the 
Governor  shall  be  five  thousand  dollars  ($5,000.00)  per 
year.  The  board  shall  appoint  a  secretary  and  shall  em- 
ploy such  assistants  and  clerical  help  as  may  be  neces- 
sary. The  salary  of  the  arbitrators  designated  by  the 
board  shall  be  at  the  rate  of  eighteen  hundred  dollars 
($1,800.00)  per  year.  The  members  of  the  board  and  the 
arbitrators  shall  have  reimbursed  to  them  their  actual 
traveling  expenses  and  disbursements  made  or  incurred 
by  them  in  the  discharge  of  their  official  duties  while 
away  from  their  places  of  residence  in  the  performance 
of  their  duties.  The  board  shall  provide  itself  with  a  seal 
for  the  authentication  of  its  orders,  awards,  and  proceed- 
ings, upon  which  shall  be  inscribed  the  words,  ''Industrial 
Board — Illinois — Seal."  (As  amended  by  an  Act  ap- 
proved June  28, 1915 ;  in  force  July  1,  1915. 

§  15.  JURISDICTION — DUTIES.  The  Industrial  Board 
shall  have  jurisdiction  over  the  operation  and  adminis- 
tration of  this  Act,  and  said  board  shall  perform  all  the 
duties  imposed  upon  it  by  this  Act,  and  such  further 
duties  as  may  hereinafter  be  imposed  by  law  and  the 
rules  of  the  board  not  inconsistent  therewith. 

$  16.     RULES  AND  ORDERS — RPOCEDURE — POWERS.     The 


24  WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACT 

board  may  make  rules  and  orders  for  carrying  out  the 
duties  imposed  upon  it  by  law,  which  rules  and  orders 
shall  be  deemed  prima  facie  reasonable  and  valid ;  and  the 
process  and  procedure  before  the  board  shall  be  as  simple 
and  summary  as  reasonably  may  be.  The  board,  or  any 
member  thereof,  or  any  arbitrator  designated  by  said 
board  shall  have  the  power  to  administer  oaths,  subpoena 
and  examine  witnesses,  to  issue  subpoenas  duces  tecum 
requiring  the  production  of  such  books,  papers,  records 
and  documents  as  may  be  evidence  of  any  matter  under 
inquiry,  and  to  examine  and  inspect  the  same  and  such 
places  or  premises  as  may  relate  to  the  question  in  dis- 
pute. Said  board,  or  any  member  thereof,  or  any  arbi- 
trator designated  by  said  board,  shall,  on  written  request 
of  either  party  to  the  dispute,  issue  subpoenas  for  the  at- 
tendance of  such  witnesses  and  production  of  such  books, 
papers,  records,  and  documents  as  shall  be  designated  in 
said  applications,  providing  however,  that  the  parties  ap- 
plying for  such  subpoena  shall  advance  the  officer  and 
witness  fees  provided  for  in  suits  pending  in  the  circuit 
court.  Service  of  such  subpoenas  shall  be  made  by  any 
sheriff  or  constable  or  other  person.  In  case  any  person 
refuses  to  comply  with  an  order  of  the  board  or  subpoena 
issued  by  it  or  any  member  thereof,  or  any  arbitrator 
designated  by  said  board,  or  to  permit  an  inspection  of 
places  or  premises,  or  to  produce  any  books,  papers,  rec- 
ords, or  documents,  or  any  witness  refuses  to  testify  to 
any  matter  regarding  which  he  may  be  lawfully  interro- 
gated, the  County  Court  of  the  county  in  which  said  hear 
ing  or  matter  is  pending,  on  application  of  any  member 
of  the  board  or  any  arbitrator  designated  by  the  board, 
shall  compel  obedience  by  attachment  proceedings,  as  for 
contempt,  as  in  a  case  of  disobedience  of  the  require 
ments  of  a  subpoena  from  such  court  on  a  refusal  to  tes- 
tify therein. 

The  board  at  its  expense  shall  provide  a  stenographer 
to  take  the  testimony  and  record  of  proceedings  at  the 


WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACT  25 

hearings  before  an  arbitrator,  committee  of  arbitration, 
or  the  board,  and  said  stenographer  shall  furnish  a  trans- 
cript of  such  testimony  or  proceedings  to  any  person  re- 
questing it  upon  payment  to  him  therefor  of  five  cents 
per  one  hundred  words  for  the  original  and  three  cents 
per  one  hundred  words  for  each  copy  of  such  transcript. 

The  board  shall  have  the  power  to  determine  the  rea- 
sonableness and  fix  the  amount  of  any  fee  or  compensa- 
tion charged  by  any  person  for  any  service  performed  in 
connection  with  this  Act,  or  for  which  payment  is  to  be 
made  under  this  Act  or  rendered  in  securing  any  right 
under  this  Act.  (As  amended  by  an  Act  approved  June 
28, 1915 ;  in  force  July  1, 1915. 

§  17.  BLANK  FORMS — BOOKS — RECORDS.  The  board 
shall  cause  to  be  printed  and  furnish  free  of  charge  upon 
request  by  any  employer  or  employee  such  blank  forms 
as  it  shall  deem  requisite  to  facilitate  or  promote  the  ef- 
ficient administration  of  this  Act,  and  the  performance 
of  the  duties  of  the  board ;  it  shall  provide  a  proper  rec- 
ord in  which  shall  be  entered  and  indexed  the  name  of 
any  employer  who  shall  file  a  notice  of  declination  or 
withdrawal  under  this  Act,  and  the  date  of  the  filing 
thereof;  and  a  proper  record  in  which  shall  be  entered 
and  indexed  the  name  of  any  employee  who  shall  file  such 
a  notice  of  declination  or  withdrawal,  and  the  date  of  the 
filing  thereof ;  and  such  other  notices  as  may  be  required 
by  the  terms  and  intendment  of  this  Act ;  and  records  in 
which  shall  be  recorded  all  proceedings,  orders  and 
awards  had  or  made  by  the  board,  or  by  the  arbitration 
committees,  and  such  other  books  or  records  as  it  shall 
deem  necessary,  all  such  records  to  be  kept  in  the  office 
of  the  board. 

§  18.  BOARD  TO  DETERMINE  QUESTIONS.  All  questions 
arising  under  this  Act,  if  not  settled  by  agreement  of  the 
parties  interested  therein,  shall,  except  as  otherwise  pro- 
vided, be  determined  by  the  Industrial  Board. 


26  WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACT 

§  19.  DISPUTED  QUESTIONS  OF  LAW  OB  FACT — ARBITRATOR 
—COMMITTEE — DECISION — PETITION  FOB  REVIEW — PHYSICIAN 
— DECISION  OF  BOARD REVIEW  BY  SUPREME  COUBT CEBCUIT 

COUBT    TO    BENDER    JUDGMENT — REVIEW    AFTER    AWARD — AD- 

DBESS  TO  BE  FILED — NOTICE.  Any  disputed  questions  of 
law  or  fact  upon  which  the  employer  and  employee  or 
personal  representative  cannot  agree,  shall  be  deter- 
mined as  herein  provided. 

(a)  It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  Industrial  Board,  upon 
notification  that  the  parties  have  failed  to  reach  an 
agreement,  to  designate  an  arbitrator :  Provided,  that  if 
the  compensation  claimed  is  for  a  partial  permanent  or 
total  permanent  incapacity  or  for  death,  then  the  dis- 
pute may,  at  the  election  of  either  party,  be  determined 
by  a  committee  of  arbitration,  which  election  for  a  de- 
termination by  a  committee  shall  be  made  by  petitioner 
filing  with  the  board  his  election  in  writing  with  his  peti- 
tion or  by  the  other  party  filing  with  the  board  his  elec- 
tion in  writing  within  five  days  of  notice  to  him  of  the 
filing  of  the  petition,  and  thereupon  it  shall  be  the  duty 
of  the  Industrial  Board,  upon  either  of  the  parties  having 
filed  their  election  for  a  committee  of  arbitration  as 
above  provided,  to  notify  both  parties  to  appoint  their 
respective  representatives  on  the  committee  of  arbitra- 
tion. The  board  shall  designate  an  arbitrator  to  act  as 
chairman,  and  if  either  party  fails  to  appoint  its  mem- 
ber on  the  committee  within  seven  days  after  notification 
as  above  provided,  the  board  shall  appoint  a  person  to 
fill  the  vacancy  and  notify  the  parties  to  that  effect.  The 
party  filing  his  election  for  a  committee  of  arbitration 
shall  with  his  election  deposit  with  the  board  the  sum 
of  twenty  dollars,  to  be  paid  by  the  board  to  the  arbitra- 
tors selected  by  the  parties  as  compensation  for  their 
services  as  arbitrators,  and  upon  a  failure  to  deposit  as 
aforesaid,  the  election  shall  be  void  and  the  determina- 
tion shall  be  by  an  arbitrator  designated  by  the  board. 


WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACT  27 

The  members  of  the  committee  of  arbitration  appointed 
by  either  of  the  parties  or  one  appointed  by  the  board  to 
fill  a  vacancy  by  reason  of  the  failure  of  one  of  the  par- 
ties to  appoint,  shall  not  be  a  member  of  the  board  or  an 
employee  thereof. 

(b)  The  arbitrator  or  committee  of  arbitration  shall 
make  such  inquiries  and  investigations  as  he  or  they  shall 
deem  necessary,  and  may  examine  and  inspect  all  books, 
papers,  records,  places,  or  premises  relating  to  the  ques- 
tions in  dispute,  and  hear  such  proper  evidence  as  the 
parties  may  submit.  The  hearings  before  the  arbitrator 
or  committee  of  arbitration  shall  be  held  in  the  vicinity 
where  the  injury  occurred,  after  ten  days'  notice  of  the 
time  and  place  of  such  hearing  shall  have  been  given  to 
each  of  the  parties  or  their  attorneys  of  record.  The  de- 
cision of  the  arbitrator  or  committee  of  arbitration  shall 
be  filed  with  the  Industrial  Board,  which  board  shall  im- 
mediately send  to  each  party  or  his  attorney  a  copy  of 
such  decision,  together  with  a  notification  of  the  time 
when  it  was  filed,  and  unless  a  petition  for  a  review  is 
filed  by  either  party  within  fifteen  days  after  the  receipt 
by  said  party  of  the  copy  of  said  decision  and  notification 
of  time  when  filed,  and  unless  such  party  petitioning  for 
a  review  shall  within  twenty  days  after  the  receipt  by 
him  of  the  copy  of  said  decision,  file  with  the  board  either 
an  agreed  statement  of  the  facts  appearing  upon  the 
hearing  before  the  arbitrator  or  committee  of  arbitra- 
tion, or  if  such  party  shall  so  elect,  a  correct  stenographic 
report  of  the  proceedings  at  such  hearings,  then  the  de- 
cision shall  become  the  decision  of  the  Industrial  Board : 
Provided,  that  such  Industrial  Board  may  for  sufficient 
cause  shown  grant  further  time,  not  exceeding  thirty 
days,  in  which  to  petition  for  such  review  or  to  file  such 
agreed  statement  or  stenographic  report.  Such  agreed 
statement  of  facts  or  correct  stenographic  report,  as  the 
case  may  be,  shall  be  authenticated  by  the  signatures  of 


28  WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACT 

the  parties  or  their  attorneys  and  in  the  event  they  do  not 
agree  as  to  the  correctness  of  the  stenographic  report  it 
shall  be  authenticated  by  the  signature  of  the  arbitrator 
designated  by  the  board. 

(c)  The  Industrial  Board  may  appoint,  at  its  ex- 
pense, a  duly  qualified,  impartial  physician,  to  examine 
the  injured  employee  and  report  to  the  board.    The  fee 
for  this  service  shall  not  exceed  five  dollars  and  traveling 
expenses,  but  the  board  may  allow  additional  reasonable 
amounts  in  extraordinary  cases.    The  fees  and  the  pay- 
ment thereof  of  all  attorneys  and  physicians  for  services 
authorized  by  the  board  under  this  Act,  shall,  upon  re- 
quest of  either  the  employer  or  the  employee  or  the  bene- 
ficiary affected,  be  subject  to  the  review  and  decision  of 
the  Industrial  Board. 

(d)  If  any  employee  shall  persist  in  insanitary  or 
injurious  practices  which  tend  to  either  imperil  or  re- 
tard his  recovery  or  shall  refuse  to  submit  to  such  med- 
ical or  surgical  treatment  as  is  reasonably  essential  to 
promote  his  recovery,  the  board  may,  in  its  discretion, 
reduce  or  suspend  the  compensation  of  any  such  injured 
employee. 

(e)  If  a  petition  for  review  and  agreed  statement  of 
facts  or  stenographic  report  is  filed,  as  provided  herein, 
the  Industrial  Board  shall  promptly  review  the  decision 
of  the  arbitrator  or  committee  of  arbitration  and  all  ques- 
tions of  law  or  fact  which  appear  from  the  said  state- 
ment of  facts  or  stenographic  report,  and  such  additional 
evidence  as  the  parties  may  submit.    After  such  hearing 
upon  review,  the  board  shall  file  in  its  office  its  decision 
thereon,  and  shall  immediately  send  to  each  party  or  his 
attorney  a  copy  of  such  decision  and  a  notification  of  the 
time  when  it  was  filed.    Such  review  and  hearing  may  be 
held  in  its  office,  or  elsewhere,  as  the  board  may  deem  ad- 
visable: Provided,  the  board  shall  give  ten  days'  notice 
of  the  time  and  place  thereof  to  the  parties  or  their  at- 


WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACT  29 

torneys.  In  any  case  the  board  in  its  decision  may  in  its 
discretion  find  specially  upon  any  question  or  questions 
of  law  or  fact  which  shall  be  submitted  in  writing  by 
either  party,  whether  ultimate  or  otherwise.  Any  party 
may,  within  twenty  days  after  the  receipt  of  notice  of  the 
board's  decision,  or  within  such  further  time,  not  exceed- 
ing thirty  days,  as  the  board  may  grant,  file  with  the 
board  either  an  agreed  statement  of  the  facts  appearing 
upon  the  hearing,  or,  if  such  party  shall  so  elect,  a  correct 
stenographic  report  of  the  additional  proceedings  pre- 
sented before  the  board,  in  which  report  the  party  may 
embody  a  correct  statement  of  such  other  proceedings  in 
the  case  as  such  party  may  desire  to  have  reviewed,  such 
statement  of  facts  or  stenographic  report  to  be  authen- 
ticated by  the  signatures  of  the  parties  or  their  attor- 
neys, and  in  the  event  that  they  do  not  agree,  then  the 
authentication  of  such  stenographic  report  shall  be  by  the 
signature  of  the  chairman  of  the  board.  The  applications 
for  adjustment  of  claim  and  other  documents  in  the  na- 
ture of  pleadings  filed  by  either  party,  together  with  the 
decisions  of  the  arbitrator  and  of  the  Industrial  Board, 
and  the  statement  of  facts  or  stenographic  reports  here- 
inbefore provided  for  in  paragraphs  (b)  and  (c)  shall  be 
the  record  of  the  proceedings  of  said  board,  and  shall  be 
subject  to  review  as  hereinafter  provided. 

(f)  The  decision  of  the  Industrial  Board,  acting 
within  its  powers,  according  to  the  provisions  of  para- 
graph (e)  of  this  section,  and  of  the  arbitrator  or  com- 
mittee of  arbitration,  where  no  review  is  had  and  his  or 
their  decision  becomes  the  decision  of  the  Industrial 
Board  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  this  section, 
shall,  in  the  absence  of  fraud,  be  conclusive  unless  re- 
viewed as  in  this  paragraph  hereinafter  provided. 

(1)  The  Circuit  Court  of  the  county  where  any  of 
the  parties  defendant  may  be  found  shall  by  writ  of  cer- 
tiorari  to  the  Industrial  Board  have  power  to  review  all 


30  WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACT 

questions  of  law  presented  by  such  record.  Such  writ 
shall  be  issued  by  the  clerk  of  such  court  upon  praecipe. 
Service  upon  any  member  of  the  Industrial  Board  or  the 
secretary  thereof  shall  be  service  on  the  board,  and  serv- 
ice upon  other  parties  in  interest  shall  be  by  scire  facias, 
or  service  may  be  made  upon  said  board  and  other  par- 
ties in  interest  by  mailing  notice  of  the  commencement 
of  the  proceedings  and  the  return  day  of  the  writ  to  the 
office  of  said  board  and  the  last  known  place  of  residence 
of  the  other  parties  in  interest  at  least  ten  days  before 
the  return  day  of  said  writ;  or  (2)  any  party  in  interest 
may  commence  a  suit  in  chancery  in  the  Circuit  Court 
of  the  county  where  any  of  the  parties  defendant  may  be 
found  to  review  the  decision  of  the  board  only  for  errors 
of  law  appearing  on  the  said  record  of  the  said  board. 
Such  suit  by  writ  of  certiorari  or  in  chancery  shall  be 
commenced  within  twenty  days  of  the  receipt  of  notice 
of  the  decision  of  the  board. 

The  court  may  confirm  or  set  aside  the  decision  of  the 
arbitrator  or  committee  of  arbitration  or  Industrial 
Board.  If  the  decision  is  set  aside  and  the  facts  found  in 
the  proceedings  before  the  board  are  sufficient,  the  court 
may  enter  such  decision  as  is  justified  by  law,  or  may  re- 
mand the  cause  to  the  Industrial  Board  for  further  pro- 
ceedings, and  may  state  the  questions  requiring  further 
hearing,  and  give  such  other  instructions  as  may  be 
proper. 

Judgments,  orders  and  decrees  of  the  Circuit  Court 
under  this  Act  shall  be  reviewed  only  by  the  Supreme 
Court  upon  writ  of  error.  Upon  motion,  the  trial  court 
shall  enter  of  record  a  certificate  that  the  cause  is,  or  is 
not,  in  his  opinion,  one  proper  to  be  reviewed  by  the  Su- 
preme Court.  Upon  filing  with  the  clerk  of  the  Supreme 
Court  a  certified  copy  of  such  a  certificate  that  the  cause 
is  one  proper  to  be  reviewed,  writ  of  error  shall  issue. 
If  the  trial  court  certifies  that  the  cause  is  not  one  proper 


WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACT  31 

to  be  reviewed,  the  Supreme  Court,  in  its  discretion,  may, 
nevertheless,  order  that  a  writ  of  error  issue.  A  writ  of 
error,  when  issued,  shall  operate  as  a  supersedeas. 

The  decision  of  any  two  members  of  a  committee  of 
arbitration  or  of  the  Industrial  Board  shall  be  considered 
the  decision  of  such  committee  or  board,  respectively. 

(g)  Either  party  may  present  a  certified  copy  of  the 
decision  of  the  Industrial  Board,  when  no  proceedings 
for  review  thereof  have  been  taken,  or  of  the  decision 
of  such  arbitrator  or  committee  of  arbitration  when  no 
claim  for  review  is  made,  or  of  the  decision  of  the  In- 
dustrial Board  after  hearing  upon  review,  providing  for 
the  payment  of  compensation  according  to  this  Act,  to 
the  Circuit  Court  of  the  county  in  which  such  accident 
occurred  or  either  of  the  parties  are  residents,  where- 
upon such  court  shall  render  a  judgment  in  accordance 
therewith;  and  in  case  where  the  employer  does  not  in- 
stitute proceedings  for  review  of  the  decision  of  the  In- 
dustrial Board  and  refuses  to  pay  compensation  accord- 
ing to  the  award  upon  which  such  judgment  is  entered, 
the  court  shall,  in  entering  judgment  thereon,  tax  as  costs 
against  him  the  reasonable  costs  and  attorney  fees  in  the 
arbitration  proceedings  and  in  the  court  entering  the 
judgment,  for  the  person  in  whose  favor  the  judgment  is 
entered,  which  judgment  and  costs,  taxed  as  herein  pro- 
vided shall,  until  and  unless  set  aside,  have  the  same  ef- 
fect as  though  duly  rendered  in  an  action  duly  tried  and 
determined  by  said  court,  and  shall,  with  like  effect,  be 
entered  and  docketed.  The  Circuit  Court  shall  have 
power,  at  any  time,  upon  application,  to  make  any  such 
judgment  conform  to  any  modification  required  by  any 
subsequent  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  upon  appeal, 
or  as  the  result  of  any  subsequent  proceedings  for  re 
view,  as  provided  in  this  Act. 

Judgment  shall  not  be  entered  until  fifteen  days*  no- 
tice of  the  time  and  place  of  the  application  for  the  en- 


32  WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACT 

try  of  judgment  shall  be  served  upon  the  employer  by 
filing  such  notice  with  the  Industrial  Board ;  which  board 
shall,  in  case  it  has  on  file  the  address  of  the  employer  or 
the  name  and  address  of  its  agent,  upon  whom  notices 
may  be  served,  immediately  send  a  copy  of  the  notice  to 
the  employer  or  such  designated  agent ;  and  no  judgment 
shall  be  entered  in  the  event  the  employer  shall  file  with 
the  said  board  its  bond,  with  good  and  sufficient  surety 
in  double  the  amount  of  the  award,  conditioned  upon  the 
payment  of  said  award  in  the  event  the  said  employer 
shall  fail  to  prosecute  with  effect  proceedings  for  review 
of  the  decision,  or  the  said  decision,  upon  review,  shall  be 
affirmed. 

(h)  An  agreement  or  award  under  this  Act,  provid- 
ing for  compensation  in  installments,  may  at  any  time 
within  eighteen  months  after  such  agreement  or  award 
be  reviewed  by  the  Industrial  Board  at  the  request  of 
either  the  employer  or  the  employee,  on  the  ground  that 
the  disability  of  the  employee  has  subsequently  recurred, 
increased,  diminished  or  ended ;  and  on  such  review,  com- 
pensation payments  may  be  re-established,  increased,  di- 
minished or  ended :  Provided,  that  the  board  shall  give 
fifteen  days'  notice  to  the  parties  of  the  hearing  for  re- 
view: And  provided,  further,  any  employee,  upon  any 
petition  for  such  a  review  being  filed  by  the  employer, 
shall  be  entitled  to  one  day's  notice  for  each  one  hundred 
miles  necessary  to  be  traveled  by  him  in  attending  the 
hearings  of  the  board  upon  said  petition  and  three  days 
in  addition  thereto,  and  such  employee  shall,  at  the  dis- 
cretion of  the  board,  also  be  entitled  to  five  cents  per 
mile  necessarily  traveled  by  him  in  attending  such  hear- 
ing, not  to  exceed  a  distance  of  300  miles,  to  be  taxed  by 
the  board  as  costs  and  deposited  with  the  petition  of  the 
employer. 

(i)  Each,  party,  upon  taking  any  proceedings  or  steps 
whatsoever  before  any  abritrator,  committee  of  arbitra- 


WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACT  33 

tion,  industrial  board  or  court,  shall  file  with  the  Indus- 
trial Board  his  address,  or  the  name  and  address  of  an 
agent  upon  whom  all  notices  to  be  given  to  such  party 
shall  be  served,  either  personally  or  by  registered  mail 
addressed  to  such  party  or  agent  at  the  last  address  so 
filed  with  the  Industrial  Board:  Provided,  that  in  the 
event  such  party  has  not  filed  his  address,  or  the  name 
and  address  of  an  agent,  as  above  provided,  service  of 
any  notice  may  be  had  by  filing  such  notice  with  the  In- 
dustrial Board.  (As  amended  by  Act  approved  June  28, 
1915 ;  in  force  July  1, 1915. 

§  20.  INDUSTRIAL,  BOARD  TO  REPORT  TO  GOVERNOR.  The 
Industrial  Board  shall  report  in  writing  to  the  Governor 
on  the  30th  day  of  June,  annually,  the  details  and  results 
of  its  administration  of  this  Act,  in  accordance  with  the 
terms  of  this  Act,  and  may  prepare  and  issue  such  spe- 
cial bulletins  and  reports  from  time  to  time  as  in  the 
opinion  of  the  board,  seems  advisable. 

§  21.  AWARD  NOT  SUBJECT  TO  LJEN — LIEN  WHERE  EM- 
PLOYER INSOLVENT — DEATH.  No  payment,  claim,  award  or 
decision  under  this  Act  shall  be  assignable  or  subject  to 
any  lien,  attachment  or  garnishment,  or  be  held  liable  in 
any  way  for  any  lien,  debt,  penalty  or  damages.  In  case 
of  insolvency  of  the  employer,  every  decision  of  the  In- 
dustrial Board  for  compensation  under  this  Act  shall, 
upon  the  filing  of  a  certified  copy  of  the  decision  with  the 
recorder  of  deeds  of  the  county,  constitute  a  lien  upon  all 
property  of  the  employer  within  said  county,  paramount 
to  all  other  claims  or  liens,  except  for  wages  and  taxes, 
and  mortgages  or  trust  deeds,  and  such  liens  shall  be  en- 
forced by  order  of  the  court.  Any  right  to  receive  com- 
pensation hereunder  shall  be  extinguished  by  the  death 
of  the  person  or  persons  entitled  thereto,  subject  to  the 
provisions  of  this  Act  relative  to  compensation  for  death 
received  in  the  course  of  employment:  Provided)  that 
upon  the  death  of  a  beneficiary,  who  is  receiving  compen- 


4 


34  WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACT 

sation  provided  for  in  section  7,  leaving  surviving  a  par- 
ent, sister  or  brother  of  the  deceased  employee,  at  a  time 
of  his  death  dependent  upon  him  for  support,  who  were 
receiving  from  such  beneficiary  a  contribution  to  sup- 
port, then  that  proportion  of  the  compensation  of  the 
beneficiary  which  would  have  been  paid  but  for  the  death 
of  the  beneficiary,  but  in  no  event  exceeding  said  unpaid 
compensation,  which  the  contribution  of  the  beneficiary 
to  the  dependent's  support  within  one  year  prior  to  the 
death  of  the  beneficiary  bears  to  the  compensation  of  the 
beneficiary  within  that  year,  shall  be  continued  for  the 
benefit  of  such  dependents,  notwithstanding  the  death  of 
the  beneficiary.  (As  amended  by  Act  approved  June  28, 
1915;  in  force  July  1, 1915. 

§  22.  CONTRACT  WITHIN  SEVEN  DAYS  AFTER  INJURY  PRE- 
SUMED FRAUDULENT.  Any  contract  or  agreement  made  by 
any  employer  or  his  agent  or  attorney  with  any  employee 
or  any  other  beneficiary  of  any  clam:  under  the  provi- 
sions of  this  Act  within  seven  days  after  the  injury  shall 
be  presumed  to  be  fraudulent. 

§  23.  WAIVER  OF  PROVISIONS  MUST  BE  APPROVED  BY  IN- 
DUSTRIAL BOARD.  No  employee,  personal  representative, 
or  beneficiary  shall  have  power  to  waive  any  of  the  pro- 
visions of  this  Act  in  regard  to  the  amount  of  compen- 
sation which  may  be  payable  to  such  employee,  personal 
representative  or  beneficiary  hereunder  except  after  ap- 
proval by  the  Industrial  Board. 

§  24.  NOTICE  OF  ACCIDENT.  No  proceedings  for  com- 
pensation under  this  Act  shall  be  maintained  unless  no- 
tice of  the  accident  has  been  given  the  employer  as  soon 
as  practicable,  but  not  later  than  30  days  after  the  acci- 
dent. In  cases  of  mental  incapacity  of  the  employee,  no- 
tice must  be  given  within  six  months  after  such  accident. 
No  defect  or  inaccuracy  of  such  notice  shall  be  a  bar  to 
the  maintenance  of  proceedings  by  arbitration  or  other- 
wise by  the  employee,  unless  the  employer  proves  that  he 


WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACT  35 

is  unduly  prejudiced  in  such  proceedings  by  such  defect 
or  inaccuracy.  Notice  of  the  accident  shall  in  substance 
apprise  the  employer  of  the  claim  of  compensation  made 
and  shall  state  the  name  and  address  of  the  employee  in- 
jured, the  approximate  date  and  place  of  the  accident,  if 
known,  and  in  simple  language  the  cause  thereof;  which 
notice  may  be  served  personally  or  by  registered  mail, 
addressed  to  the  employer  at  his  last  known  residence  or 
place  of  business :  Provided,  that  the  failure  on  the  part 
of  any  person  entitled  to  such  compensation  to  give  such 
notice  shall  not  relieve  the  employer  from  his  liability 
for  such  compensation,  when  the  facts  and  circumstances 
of  such  accident  are  known  to  such  employer,  his  agent 
or  vice  principal  in  the  enterprise.  No  proceedings  for 
compensation  under  this  Act  shall  be  maintained  unless 
claim  for  compensation  has  been  made  within  six  months 
after  the  accident,  or  in  the  event  that  payments  have 
been  made  under  the  provisions  of  this  Act,  unless  writ- 
ten claim  for  compensation  has  been  made  within  six 
months  after  such  payments  have  ceased. 

§    25.     HOW  EMPLOYER  MAY  BE  RELIEVED  OF  LIABILITY  FOR 

COMPENSATION.  Any  employer  against  whom  liability 
may  exist  for  compensation  under  this  Act,  may,  with  the 
approval  of  the  Industrial  Board,  be  relieved  therefrom 
by: 

(a)  Depositing  the  commuted  value  of  the  total  un- 
paid compensation  for  which  such  liability  exists,  com- 
puted at  three  per  centum  per  annum  in  the  same  man- 
ner as  provided  in  section  9,  with  the  State  Treasurer, 
or  county  treasurer  in  the  county  where  the  accident  hap- 
pened, or  with  any  State  or  National  bank  or  trust  com- 
pany doing  business  in  this  State,  or  in  some  other  suit- 
able depository  approved  by  the  Industrial  Board :  Pro- 
vided, that  any  such  depository  to  which  such  compensa- 
tion may  be  paid  shall  pay  the  same  out  in  installments  as 
in  this  Act  provided,  unless  such  sum  is  ordered  paid  in, 


36  WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACT 

and  is  commuted  to,  a  lump  sum  payment  in  accordance 
with  the  provisions  of  this  Act. 

(b)  By  the  purchase  of  an  annuity,  in  an  amount  of 
compensation  due  or  computed,  under  this  Act  within  the 
limitation  provided  by  law,  in  any  insurance  company 
granting  annuities  and  licensed  or  permitted  to  do  busi- 
ness in  this  State,  which  may  be  designated  by  the  em- 
ployer, or  the  Industrial  Board. 

§  26.    PROVISION  TO  BE  MADE  BY  EMPLOYER  ELECTING  TO 

PAY  COMPENSATION APPROVAL  OF  INDUSTRIAL  BOARD — WHEN 

PROVISION  NOT  MADE  OR  NOT  APPROVED "NORMAL  LIABIL- 
ITY," HOW  MEASURED,  (a)  An  employer  who  elects  to  pro- 
vide and  pay  the  compensation  provided  for  in  this  Act, 
shall,  within  ten  (10)  days  of  receipt  by  the  employer  of 
a  written  demand  by  the  Industrial  Board,  (1)  file  with 
the  board  a  sworn  statement  showing  his  financial  ability 
to  pay  the  compensation  provided  for  in  this  Act,  normal- 
ly required  to  be  paid,  or  (2)  furnish  security,  indemnity 
or  a  bond  guaranteeing  the  payment  by  the  employer  of 
the  compensation  provided  for  in  this  Act,  normally  re- 
quired to  be  paid,  or  (3)  insure  to  a  reasonable  amount 
his  normal  ability  to  pay  such  compensation  in  some  cor- 
poration, association  or  organization  authorized,  licensed 
or  permitted  to  do  such  insurance  business  in  this  State, 
or  (4)  make  some  other  provisions  for  the  securing  of  the 
payment  of  compensation  provided  for  in  this  Act,  nor- 
mally required  to  be  paid,  and  shall,  within  twenty  (20) 
days  of  the  receipt  of  such  written  demand,  furnish  to  the 
board  evidence  of  his  compliance  with  one  of  the  above 
alternatives:  Provided,  that  the  sworn  statement  of 
financial  ability,  or  security,  indemnity  or  bond,  or 
amount  of  insurance  or  other  provision,  filed,  furnished, 
carried  or  made  by  the  employer,  as  the  case  may  be, 
shall  be  subject  to  the  approval  of  the  board,  upon  the 
approval  of  which  the  board  shall  send  to  the  employer 
written  notice  of  its  approval  thereof:  And  provided, 


WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACT  37 

further,  that  demand  shall  not  be  made  upon  the  em- 
ployer by  the  board  oftener  than  once  in  any  calendar 
year. 

(b)  If  no  sworn  statement  or  no  security,  indemnity 
or  bond,  or  no  insurance,  is  filed,  furnished  or  carried,  or 
other  provisions  made  by 'the  employer  within  ten  (10) 
days  of  receipt  by  the  employer  of  the  written  demand 
provided  for  in  paragraph  (a),  or  if  the  statement,  se- 
curity, indemnity,  bond  or  amount  of  insurance  filed,  fur- 
nished or  carried,  or  other  provision  made  by  the  em- 
ployer, as  provided  in  paragraph  (a),  shall  not  be  ap- 
proved by  the  board,  and  written  notice  of  such  non-ap- 
proval shall  be  given  to  the  employer  and  the  employer 
shall  not  comply  with  one  of  the  alternatives  of  para- 
graph (a)  of  this  section  within  ten  (10)  days  after  the 
receipt  by  the  employer  of  such  written  notice  of  non- 
approval,  then  the  employer  shall  be  liable  for  compen- 
sation to  any  injured  employee,  or  his  personal  repre- 
sentative, according  to  the  terms  of  this  Act,  or  for  dam- 
ages in  the  same  manner  as  if  the  employer  had  elected 
not  to  accept  this  Act,  at  the  option  of  such  employee,  or 
his  personal  representative:  Provided,  such  option  is 
exercised  and  written  notice  thereof  is  given  to  the  em- 
ployer within  thirty  (30)  days  after  the  accident  to  such 
employee ;  otherwise,  the  employer  shall  be  liable  only  for 
the  compensation  payable  according  to  the  provisions  of 
this  Act:  And  provided,  further,  that  if  at  any  time 
thereafter  the  employer  shall  comply  with  any  of  the  al- 
ternatives of  paragraph  (a),  then  as  to  all  accidents  oc- 
curring after  the  said  compliance,  the  employer  shall  only 
be  liable  for  compensation  according  to  the  terms  of  this 
Act:  And  provided,  further,  that,  upon  the  failure  of 
any  employer  to  comply  with  the  provisions  of  this  sec- 
tion, the  Industrial  Board  may,  for  the  purpose  of  fur- 
nishing notice  to  the  employees  of  such  employer,  pub- 
lish the  fact  of  such  failure  by  such  employer  in  any 


38  WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACT 

newspaper  having  a  general  circulation  in  the  county 
where  such  employer  does  business.  (As  amended  by 
an  Act  approved  June  28, 1915 ;  in  force  July  1, 1915. 

§  27.  ACT  NOT  TO  AFFECT  EXISTING  INSURANCE  NOB  PRE- 
VENT  EMPLOYER  FROM  INSURING NOR  EMPLOYEE  FROM  IN- 
SURING FOR  ADDITIONAL  BENEFITS,  (a)  This  Act  shall  not 
affect  or  disturb  the  continuance  of  any  existing  insur- 
ance, mutual  aid,  benefit,  or  relief  association  or  depart- 
ment, whether  maintained  in  whole  or  in  part  by  the  em- 
ployer or  whether  maintained  by  the  employees,  the  pay- 
ment of  benefits  of  such  association  or  department  being 
guaranteed  by  the  employer  or  by  some  person,  firm  or 
corporation  for  him :  Provided,  the  employer  contributes 
to  such  association  or  department  an  amount  not  less 
than  the  full  compensation  herein  provided,  exclusive  of 
the  cost  of  the  maintenance  of  such  association  or  de- 
partment and  without  any  expense  to  the  employee.  This 
Act  shall  not  prevent  the  organization  and  maintaining 
under  the  insurance  laws  of  this  State  of  any  benefit  or  in- 
surance company  for  the  purpose  of  insuring  against  the 
compensation  provided  for  in  this  Act,  the  expense  of 
which  is  maintained  by  the  employer.  This  Act  shall  not 
prevent  the  organization  or  maintaining  under  the  in- 
surance laws  of  this  State  of  any  voluntary  mutual  aid, 
benefit  or  relief  association  among  employees  for  the  pay- 
ment of  additional  accident  or  sick  benefits. 

(b)  No  existing  insurance,  mutual  aid,  benefit  or  re- 
lief association  or  department  shall,  by  reason  of  any- 
thing herein  contained  be  authorized  to  discontinue  its 
operation  without  first  discharging  its  obligations  to  any 
and  all  persons  carrying  insurance  in  the  same  or  entitled 
to  relief  or  benefits  therein. 

(c)  Any  contract,  oral,  written  or  implied,  of  em- 
ployment providing  for  relief  benefit,  or  insurance  or  any 
other  device  whereby  the  employee  is  required  to  pay  any 
premium  or  premiums  for  insurance  against  the  compen- 


39 

sation  provided  for  in  this  Act  shall  be  null  and  void,  and 
any  employer  withholding  from  the  wages  of  any  em- 
ployee any  amount  for  the  purpose  of  payinng  any  such 
premium  shall  be  guilty  of  a  misdemeanor  and  punish- 
able by  a  fine  of  not  less  than  ten  dollars  nor  more  than 
one  thousand  dollars,  or  imprisonment  in  the  county  jail 
for  not  more  than  six  months,  or  both,  in  the  discretion 
of  the  court. 

§  28.  INSOLVENT  EMPLOYER — SUBROGATION.  Any  per- 
son, who  shall  become  entitled  to  compensation  under  the 
provisions  of  this  Act,  shall,  in  the  event  of  his  inability 
to  recover  such  compensation  from  the  employer  on  ac- 
count of  his  insolvency,  be  subrogated  to  all  the  rights 
of  such  employer  against  any  insurance  company,  asso- 
ciation or  insurer  which  may  have  insured  such  employer 
against  loss  growing  out  of  the  compensation  required 
by  the  provisions  of  this  Act  to  be  paid  by  such  employer, 
and,  in  such  event  only,  the  said  insurance  company,  as- 
sociation, or  insurer  shall  become  primarily  liable  to  pay 
to  the  employee  or  his  personal  representative  the  com- 
pensation required  by  the  provisions  of  this  Act  to  be 
paid  by  such  employer. 

§  29.  WHERE  THIRD  PARTY  LIABLE.  Where  an  injury 
or  death  for  which  compensation  is  payable  by  the  em- 
ployer under  this  Act  was  not  proximately  caused  by  the 
negligence  of  the  employer  or  his  employees,  and  was 
caused  under  circumstances  creating  a  legal  liability  for 
damages  in  some  person  other  than  the  employer  to  pay 
damages,  such  other  person  having  also  elected  to  be 
bound  by  this  Act,  then  the  right  of  the  employee  or  per- 
sonal representative  to  recover  against  such  other  per- 
son shall  be  subrogated  to  his  employer  and  such  em- 
ployer may  bring  legal  proceedings  against  such  other 
person  to  recover  the  damages  sustained,  in  an  amount 
not  exceeding  the  aggregate  amount  of  compensation 
payable  under  this  Act,  by  reason  of  the  injury  or  death 


40  WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACT 

.5  Vs^ 

of  such  employee.    Where  the  injury  or  death  for  which 

compensation  is  payable  under  this  Act  was  not  proxi- 
mately  caused  by  the  negligence  of  the  employer  or  his 
employees  and  was  caused  under  circumstances  creating 
a  legal  liability  for  damages  on  the  part  of  some  person 
other  than  the  employer  to  pay  damages,  such  other  per- 
son having  elected  not  to  be  bound  by  this  Act,  then  legal 
proceedings  may  be  taken  against  such  other  person  to 
recover  damages  notwithstanding  such  employer's  pay- 
ment of  or  liability  to  pay  compensation  under  this  Act,  \ 
but  in  such  case  if  the  action  against  such  other  person  is 
brought  by  the  injured  employee  or  his  personal  repre- 
sentative and  judgment  is\  obtained  and  paid,  or  settle- 
ment is  made  with  such  other  person,  either  with  or  with- 
out suit,  then  from  the  amount  received  by  such  employee 
or  personal  representative  there  shall  be  paid  to  the  em- 
ployer the  amount  of  compensation  paid  or  to  be  paid  by 
Mm  to  such  employee  or  his  personal  representative: 
Provided,  that  if  the  injured  employee  or  his  personal 
representative  shall  agree  to  receive  compensation  from 
the  employer  or  to  institute  proceedings  to  recover  the 
same  or  accept'  from  the  employer  any  payment  on  ac- 
count of  such  compensation,  such  employer  shall  be  sub- 
rogated  to  all  the  rights  of  such  employee  or  personal  rep- 
resentative and  may  maintain,  or  in  case  an  action  has  al- 
ready been  instituted,  may  continue  an  action  either  in  the 
name  of  the  employjpe  or  personal  representative  or  in  his 
own  name  against  such  other  person  for  recovery  of 
damages  to  which  but  for  this  section  the  said  employee  or 
personal  representative  would  be  entitled,  but  such  em- 
ployer shall  nevertheless  pay  over  to  the  injured  em- 
ployee or  personal  representative  all  sums  collected  from 
such  other  person  by  judgment  or  otherwise  in  excess  of 
the  amount  of  such  compensation  paid  or  to  be  paid  un- 
der this  Act' and  all  costs,  attorneys '  fees  and  reasonable 
expenses  incurred  by  such  employer  in  making  such  col- 
lection and  enforcing  such  liability.  ^ 


WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACT  41 

§  30.  REPORT  OF  ACCIDENT,  ETC.,  BY  EMPLOYER  TO  IN- 
DUSTRIAL BOARD.  It  shall  be  the  duty  of  every  employer 
within  the  provisions  of  this  Act  to  send  to  the  Industrial 
Board  in  writing  an  immediate  report  of  all  accidental 
injuries  arising  out  of  or  in  the  course  of  the  employment 
and  resulting  in  death ;  it  shall  also  be  the  duty  of  every 
such  employer  to  report  between  the  15th  and  the  25th  of 
each  month  to  the  Industrial  Board  all  accidental  injuries 
for  which  compensation  has  been  paid  under  this  Act, 
which  injuries  entail  a  loss  to  the  employee  of  more  than 
one  week's  time,  and  in  case  the  injury  results  in  perma- 
nent disability,  a  further  report  shall  be  made  as  soon  as 
it  is  determined  that  such  permanent  disability  has  re- 
sulted or  will  result  from  such  injury.  All  reports  shall 
state  the  date  of  the  injury,  including  the  time  of  day  or 
night,  the  nature  of  the  employer's  business,  the  name, 
address,  the  age,  sex,  conjugal  condition  of  the  injured 
person,  the  specific  occupation  of  the  injured  person,  the 
direct  cause  of  the  injury  and  the  nature  of  the  accident, 
the  character  of  the  injury,  the  length  of  disability,  and, 
in  case  of  death,  the  length  of  disability  before  death,  the 
wages  of  the  injured  person,  whether  compensation  has 
been  paid  to  the  injured  person,  or  to  his  legal  represent- 
atives or  his  heirs  or  next  of  kin,  the  amount  of  conipen 
sation  paid,  the  amount  paid  for  physicians,'  surgeons' 
and  hospital  bills,  and  by  whom  paid,  and  the  amount 
paid  for  funeral  or  burial  expenses,  if  known.  The  mak- 
ing of  reports  as  provided  herein  shall  release  the  em- 
ployer covered  by  the  provisions  of  this  Act  from  mak- 
ing such  reports  to  any  other  officer  of  the  State. 

§  31.  CONTRACT  FOR  EXTRA-HAZARDOUS  WORK — BOTH  PAR- 
TIES LIABLE.  Any  person,  firm  or  corporation,  who  under- 
takes to  do  or  contracts  with  others  to  do,  or  have  done 
for  him,  them  or  it,  any  work  enumerated  as  extra-haz- 
ardous in  paragraph  (b),  section  3,  requiring  employ- 
ment of  employees  in,  on  or  about  the  premises  where  he, 
they  or  it,  as  principal  or  principals,  contract  to  do  such 


42  WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACT 

work,  or  any  part  thereof,  and  does  not  require  of  the 
person,  firm  or  corporation  undertaking  to  do  such  work 
for  said  principal  or  principals,  that  such  person,  firm  or 
corporation  undertaking  to  do  such  work  shall  insure  his, 
their  or  its  liability  to  pay  the  compensation  provided  in 
this  Act  to  his,  their  or  its  employees  and  any  such  per- 
son, firm  or  corporation  who  creates  or  carries  into  oper- 
ation any  fraudulent  scheme,  artifice  or  device  to  enable 
him,  them  or  it  to  execute  such  work  without  such  person, 
firm  or  corporation  being  responsible  to  the  employee, 
his  personal  representative  or  beneficiary  entitled  to  such 
compensation  under  the  provisions  of  this  Act,  such  per- 
son, firm  or  corporation  shall  be  included  in  the  term 
"employer"  and  with  the  immediate  employer  shall  be 
jointly  and  severally  liable  to  pay  the  compensation  here- 
in provided  for  and  be  subject  to  all  the  provisions  of  this 
Act. 

§   32.      ACT    NOT    RETROACTIVE CLAIM    UNDER    PREVIOUS 

ACT.  No  right  of  action  for  damages,  at  common  law  or 
under  any  other  statute,  existing  at  the  time  of  the  tak- 
ing effect  of  this  Act,  shall  be  affected  by  this  Act. 

If  the  provisions  of  this  Act  relating  to  compensation 
for  injuries  to  or  death  of  employees  shall  be  repealed  or 
adjudged  invalid  or  unconstitutional,  the  period  inter- 
vening between  the  occurrence  of  an  injury  or  death  and 
such  repeal  or  final  adjudication  of  invalidity,  shall  not 
be  computed  as  a  part  of  the  time  limited  by  law  for  the 
commencement  of  any  action  relating  to  such  injury  or 
death,  but  the  amount  of  any  compensation  which  may 
have  been  paid  for  any  such  injury  shall  be  deducted 
from  any  judgment  for  damages  recovered  on  account 
of  such  injury.  Any  claim,  disagreement  or  controversy 
existing  or  arising  under  "An  Act  to  promote  the  gen- 
eral welfare  of  the  People  of  this  State,  by  providing 
compensation  for  accidental  injuries  or  death  suffered  in 
the  course  of  employment,"  approved  June  10,  1911,  in 
force  May  1,  1912,  shall  be  adjusted  in  accordance  with 


WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACT  43 

the  provisions  of  said  Act  notwithstanding  the  repeal 
thereof,  or  may,  by  agreement  of  the  parties,  be  adjusted 
in  accordance  with  the  method  of  procedure  provided  in 
this  Act  for  the  adjustment  of  differences,  jurisdiction  to 
adjust  such  differences  so  submitted  by  the  parties  being 
hereby  conferred  upon  the  Industrial  Board  or  commit- 
tee of  arbitration  provided  for  in  this  Act. 

§  33.  PENALTIES.  Any  wilful  neglect,  refusal,  or  fail- 
ure to  do  the  things  required  to  be  done  by  any  section, 
clause,  or  provision  of  this  Act,  on  the  part  of  the  per- 
sons herein  required  to  do  them,  or  any  violation  of  any 
of  the  provisions  or  requirements  hereof,  or  any  attempt 
to  obstruct  or  interfere  with  any  court  officer,  or  any 
other  person  charged  with  the  duty  of  administering  or 
enforcing  the  provisions  of  this  Act,  shall  be  deemed  a 
misdemeanor,  punishable  by  a  fine  of  not  less  than  $10.00 
nor  more  than  $500.00  at  the  discretion  of  the  court. 

§  331/2.  CITING  ACT.  This  Act  May  be  cited  as  the 
Workmen's  Compensation  Act.  (Added  by  an  Act  ap- 
proved June  28, 1915. 

§  34.  PARTIAL  INVALIDITY.  The  invalidity  of  any  por- 
tion of  this  Act  shall  in  no  way  affect  the  validity  of  any 
other  portion  thereof  which  can  be  given  effect  without 
such  invalid  part. 

§  35.  REPEAL  OF  ACT  or  1911.  That  an  Act  to  promote 
the  general  welfare  of  the  State  of  Illinois  by  providing 
compensation  for  accidental  injuries  or  death  suffered  in 
the  course  of  employment,  approved  June  10,  1911,  in 
force  May  1, 1912,  be,  and  the  same  is,  hereby  repealed. 


WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACT 

of  the 
State  of  Illinois 

Construed  in 

OPINIONS 

by  the 
SUPREME  COURT 

SPECIFIC  NOTES  AND  REFERENCES  IN  DIGEST  AND  INDEX 

Deibeikis  v  The  Link-Belt  Company,  Vol.  261, 

Page  454;  104  N.  E.  211. 

Constitutionality  of  Act — Police  power — Class  legis- 
lation- Common  law  rules — Defenses — Deprivation  of 
property — Search  and  seizure — Trial  by  jury — Elective 

feature — Declaration  of  public  policy 46 

Strom  v  Postal  Telegraph  Cable  Co.,  271 — 544. 

Constitutionality  of  Act — Defenses  barred 126 

Uphoff  v  Industrial  Board,  271—312. 
Act  of  1913 — Farm  laborers  excluded — "Enterprise" 
construed — Extra-hazardous    occupations — Decision    of 

Industrial  Board  acting  within  powers 75 

Frey  v  Kerens-Donnewald  Coal  Co.,  271 — 121. 
Constitutionality  of  Act — Printing  of  bill — Award  for 

paralysis 87 

Dragovich  v  Iroquois  Iron  Company,  269 — 478. 
Constitutionality  of  Act — Printing  of  amendments  to 
bill — Course    of     employment — Verdict    for    compen- 
sation      81 

Staley,  Admx.  v  Illinois  Central  R.  Co.,  268— 

356. 

Act  excluded  by  Federal  Employers '  Liability  Law- 
Interstate  commerce  91 

Court er  v  Simpson  Construction  Co.,  264 — 488. 
Review  by  certiorari  of  Circuit  Courts  of  decisions  of 
Industrial  Board — Jurisdiction  of  Supreme  Court  inhib- 
ited by  Constitution  68 


OPINIONS  BY  THE  APPELLATE  COURT  45 

Diets  v  Biff  Muddy  Coal  &  Iron  Co.,  263—480. 
Constitutionality  of  Act — Elective  feature — Defenses 
barred — Automatic  election  by  employer  and  employee 

in  extra-hazardous  occupations 60 

Crooks  v  Tazewell  Coal  Co.,  263—343. 
Constitutionality  of  Act — Defenses  barred — Contrib- 
utory negligence  reducing  damages — Action  at  law  by  em- 
ployee          51 

Opinions  filed  in  1916  on  pp.  116-139  and  p.  149. 
APPELLATE  COURT 

Nosil  v  Ellis  Stamp  Co.,  191—538. 
Act  as  defense — Waiver  by  affidavit  of  merits  of  new 
defense. 

Krisman  v  Johnston  City  &c  Co.,  190 — 612. 
Presumption  of  law  as  to  employer  and  employee  be- 
ing within  Act — Proof  of  notice  of  non-acceptance .     112 

Synkus  v  Big  Muddy  &cCo.,  190—602. 
Notice  of  non-acceptance  of  Act  in  force  until  with- 
drawn— Burden  of  proof  of  notice — Defenses  barred. 
French  v  Cloverleaf  Mining  Co.,  190 — 400. 

Non-acceptance  of  Act — Defenses  barred 113 

Giachas  v  Cable  Co.,  190—285. 

Computation  of  compensation  under  Act — Loss  of 
arm — Offer  of  employment. 

Bateman  v  Carterville  &c  Coal  Co.,  188 — 357. 
Non-acceptance  of  Act — Proof — Notice  valid  till  with- 
drawn— Mining  and  safety  Acts. 

Favro  v  Superior  Coal  Co.,  188—203. 
Non-acceptance  by  employer — Employee's  right  of 
election    precluded — Allegations — Mining    and    Safety 
Acts. 

Brown  v  City  of  Decatur,  188 — 147. 
Term    "Structure"    in    Act — Waterworks    plant- 
Course  of  employment 99 

Price  v  Cloverleaf  Coal  Mining  Co.,  188 — 27. 
Non-acceptance  of  Act — Allegation  of  negligence  nec- 
essary— Defenses  barred — Contributory  negligence  re- 
ducing damages — Mining  and  Safety  Acts — Instruction 


46  OPINIONS  BY  THE  APPELLATE  COURT 

Waiters  v  Krochler  Mfg.  Co.,  187—348. 
Amount    of    compensation — Disfigurement — Injuries 
to  fingers. 

Forrest  v  Roper  Furniture  Co.,  187 — 504. 
Factory  and  Safety  Acts — Loss  of  sight  of  eye — Proof 
of  safety  device  on  market. 

Matecny  v  Vierling  Steel  Works,  187 — 448. 
Beneficiaries — Dependent  heirs — Lump  sum  award — 

Cessation  of  payments  on  death  of  beneficiary 105 

Knopp  v  American  Car  &  Foundry  Co.,  186 — 
605. 

Course  of  employment — Interference  by  bystander — 
Injury  to  hand  from  trip  hammer. 

Staley  v  Illinois  Central  R.  Co.,  186 — 593. 
Mode  of  instituting  suit  under  Act — Lump  sum  award 
— Federal  Employers'  Liability  Act  (Reversed  by  Su- 
preme Court). 

Burnes  v  Swift  &  Co.,  186—460. 
Safety  Acts — "Intentional  omission"  in  Act  of  1911. 
Stevenson  v  Illinois  Watch  Case  Co.,  186 — 418. 
Dependents — Proof     of — Disfigurement — Injury     to 
fingers. 

Joseph  Deibeikis  v  The  Link  Belt  Company 
261  111.  Sup.  455. 

Feb.  24,  1914. 

MB.  CHIEF  JUSTICE  COOK  delivered  the  opinion  of  the 
court. 

"This  appeal  brings  in  question  the  constitutionality 
of  the  original  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  of  this 
state  (Laws  of  1911,  p.  315).  This  Act  has  been  repealed 
by  the  present  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  (Laws  of 
1913,  p.  335),  but  the  facts  upon  which  this  action  is  based 
arose  under  the  former  Act  and  are  governed  by  it. 

"Appellant,  Joseph  Deibeikis,  was  an  employee  of 
the  Link  Belt  Company,  appellee.  On  January  31,  1913, 
appellant  brought  his  action  on  the  case  against  appellee 
to  recover  for  injuries  which  it  was  alleged  he  had  sus- 


OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT  47 

tained  while  employed  in  appellee's  machine  shop.  To 
the  declaration  appellee  pleaded  the  general  issue  and  a 
special  plea,  in  which  it  is  set  forth  that  before  the  alleged 
grievances  mentioned  in  the  declaration  had  been  com- 
mitted both  appellant  and  appellee  had  elected  to  be  gov- 
erned by  the  terms  of  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act ; 
that  the  appellee  had  posted  the  required  notice  and  had 
done  all  that  the  Act  required  of  it ;  that  appellant  had 
accepted  certain  sums  of  money  ui.der  the  Act  and  that 
appellee  was  ready  to  pay  any  further  sums  due;  that 
appellant  was  governed  by  the  terms  of  that  Act  and 
should  adjust  his  grievances  thereunder,  instead  of  bring- 
ing his  action  on  the  case.  To  the  special  plea  appellant 
filed  a  general  and  special  demurrer,  in  which  it  was  as- 
signed that  the  Workmen's  Compenation  Act  of  1911 
was  invalid  and  contrary  to  the  constitution  of  Illinois. 
The  demurrer  was  overruled,  and  appellant  having  elect- 
ed to  stand  by  his  demurrer,  judgment  was  entered 
against  him  for  costs,  and  this  appeal  was  perfected. 

"It  will  be  necessary,  in  order  to  intelligently  discuss 
the  questions  raised,  to  set  out  a  portion  of  the  Act  of 
1911.    The  first  three  sections  are  as  follows." 
(The  provisions  of  the  remaining  sections  are  thereupon 
briefly  referred  to.) 

"  Counsel  for  appellant  have  not  made  any  extensive 
argument  in  support  of  any  of  the  points  urged,  having 
contented  themselves  with  simply  stating  the  points  made. 
The  matter  is  so  presented  that  it  has  been  somewhat 
difficult  to  determine  the  exact  grounds  upon  which  coun- 
sel rely  for  reversal.  As  we  understand  the  points  made, 
the  grounds  relied  upon  are  that  the  Act  is  unconstitu- 
tional for  the  following  reasons:  (1)  It  is  not  a  proper 
exercise  of  the  police  power;  (2)  it  is  class  legislation; 
(3)  it  delegates  judicial  powers ;  (4)  it  vests  the  judiciary 
with  executive  powers;  (5)  it  deprives  appellant  of  the 
right  of  trial  by  jury;  (6)  it  subjects  appellant  to  un- 
reasonable search;  (7)  it  deprives  appellant  of  his  right 


48  OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT 

to  contract  and  of  his  natural  right  of  waiver.  The  valid- 
ity of  certain  sections  of  the  Act  is  questioned  upon  the 
ground  that  they  violate  Section  13  of  Article  4  of  the 
Constitution.  The  question  of  the  validity  of  these  par- 
ticular sections  is  not  involved  in  this  appeal,  for  the 
reason  that  it  does  not  appear  from  the  record  that  any 
right  of  appellant  is  affected  by  them;  hence  that  ques- 
tion will  not  be  discussed  or  determined  in  this  case,  but 
will  be  reserved  to  such  time,  if  any,  when  a  ease  shall 
arise  wherein  the  question  is  necessarily  involved. 

"Statutes  similar  to  the  one  here  under  discussion  have 
been  passed  in  various  states  of  the  union,  and  in  a  num- 
ber of  those  states  the  courts  have  decided  some  of  the 
questions  here  raised  by  appellant  contrary  to  his  conten- 
tions. Among  these  cases  are  Borgnis  v  Folk  Co.,  147 
Wis.  327 ;  State  v  Creamer,  85  Oh.  St.  349 ;  Sexton  v  New- 
ark District  Telegraph  Co.,  86  Atl.  Rep.  (N.  J.)  461 ;  opin- 
ion of  Justices,  209  Mass.  607. 

"Taking  up  the  points  raised  by  appellant  in  the 
order  in  which  they  have  been  set  out  above,  we  are  un- 
able to  see  where  it  can  be  contended  that  this  Act  is  an 
attempt  to  exercise  the  police  power.  It  will  be  observed 
that  the  Act  is  elective,  and  that  no  employer  or  employee 
is  compelled  to  accept  or  come  within  its  provisions  un- 
less he  chooses  to  do  so.  Therefore,  unless  the  employer 
or  the  employee  elects  to  come  within  the  provisions  of 
the  Act  he  is  not  affected  by  any  of  the  provisions  thereof. 
This  is  subject,  however,  to  one  exception.  Under  the 
conditions  specified  in  said  section  1  an  employer  is  de- 
prived of  the  common  law  defenses  of  assumed  risk,  con- 
tributory negligence,  and  that  the  injury  or  death  was 
caused,  in  whole  or  in  part,  by  the  negligence  of  a  fellow- 
servant.  To  deprive  an  employer,  under  such  circum- 
stances, of  the  right  to  assert  those  defenses,  is  not  an 
exercise  of  the  police  power,  but  is  merely  a  declaration 
by  the  legislature  of  the  public  policy  of  the  state  in  that 
regard.  The  right  of  the  legislature  to  abolish  those  de 


OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT  49 

fenses  cannot  be  seriously  questioned.  The  rules  of  law 
relating  to  the  defenses  of  contributory  negligence,  as- 
sumption of  risk  and  the  effect  of  negligence  of  a  fellow- 
servant  were  established  by  the  courts  and  not  by  our 
constitution,  and  the  legislature  may  modify  them  or 
abolish  them  entirely  if  it  sees  fit  to  do  so.  Borgnis  v 
Folk;  Opinion  of  Justices ;  State  v  Creamer,  supra;  Mon- 
don  v  New  York,  New  Haven  and  Hartford  Railroad  Co., 
223  U.  S.  1. 

"The  classification  made  by  section  2  of  the  Act  is  not 
questioned  or  attacked  in  any  way,  but  appellant  seems 
to  rely  upon  sections  21  and  22  as  constituting  class  legis- 
lation. 

"The  classification  in  section  2  seems  to  be  a  perfectly 
valid  and  reasonable  one.  If  it  is  valid  and  reasonable 
there  appears  no  ground  upon  which  to  challenge  the 
validity  of  sections  21  and  22.  These  sections  merely 
limit  an  'employee'  as  the  term  is  used  in  that  Act,  to  in- 
clude any  one  who  may  be  occupying  a  mere  clerical  posi- 
ards  of  carrying  on  any  employment  or  enterprise  enu- 
merated in  section  2.  These  sections  are  meant  to  ex- 
clude and  one  who  may  be  occupying  a  mere  clerical  posi- 
tion and  whose  work  is  such  that  he  is  not  subject  to  any 
of  the  hazards  of  the  general  business  in  which  the  em- 
ployer is  engaged.  This  is  a  proper  and  reasonable  classi- 
fication and  does  not  violate  any  inhibition  of  our  consti- 
tution. 

"It  is  contented  that  section  3  makes  an  improper 
classification,  in  that  it  deprives  the  employee  of  his  com- 
mon law  remedies,  while  the  employer  is  permitted  to  re- 
tain them.  This  is  clearly  a  misapprehension,  as  the  pro- 
viso in  that  section  enlarges  the  remedy  of  the  employee 
and  correspondingly  restricts  that  of  the  employer.  By 
this  proviso,  in  case  an  employee  receives  an  injury  as 
the  result  of  the  intentional  omission  of  the  employer  to 
comply  with  statutory  safety  requirements,  the  employer, 
although  having  elected  to  come  within  the  provisions  of 


50  OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT 

the  Act,  cannot  avail  himself  of  anything  in  the  Act  to 
affect  his  liability  under  such  circumstances. 

"The  other  objections  urged  may  all  be  answered  by 
the  statement  that  the  Act  is  elective  and  not  compulsory. 
Were  the  Act  deprived  of  its  elective  feature  and  made 
compulsory  upon  every  employer  and  employee  engaged 
in  the  enterprises  enumerated  in  section  2  very  different 
and  more  serious  questions  would  be  presented.  Being 
elective,  the  Act  does  not  become  effective  as  to  any  em- 
ployer or  employee  unless  such  employer  or  employee 
chooses  to  come  within  its  provisions. 

"Having  once  elected  to  come  within  the  provisions  of 
the  Act,  so  long  as  such  election  remains  in  force,  the 
Act  is  effective  as  to  the  party  or  parties  making  the 
election,  and  in  case  an  employer  or  employee  both  elect 
to  come  within  the  provisions  of  the  Act,  the  Act  itself 
then  becomes  a  part  of  the  contract  of  employment  and 
can  be  enforced  as  between  the  parties  as  such. 

"Under  this  view,  it  can  not  be  said  that  by  this  Act 
judicial  power  is  delegated  to  boards  of  arbitrators  con- 
trary to  the  provisions  of  our  constitution. 

"Parties  to  a  contract  may  make  valid  and  binding 
agreements  to  submit  questions  in  dispute  or  any  dis- 
agreement that  may  arise  to  a  board  of  arbitrators  com- 
posed of  persons  or  tribunals  other  than  the  regularly 
organized  courts,  and  such  agreements  will  be  enforced. 
Pacand  v  Waite,  218  111.  138.  By  electing  to  accept  the 
provisions  of  this  Act,  the  employer  and  employee  there- 
by agree  to  settle  by  arbitration  any  dispute  that  may 
arise  between  them  in  reference  to  compensation  for  in- 
jury. 

"While  the  right  to  trial  by  jury  is  guaranteed  under 
our  constitution,  it  is  a  right  that  any  one  may  waive  if  he 
shall  see  fit,  and  by  electing  to  come  within  the  provisions 
of  the  law  an  employer  or  employee  elects,  in  the  first  in- 
stance, to  submit  any  dispute  that  may  arise  to  a  board  of 
arbitrators  without  the  intervention  of  any  court  or  jury. 


OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT  51 

''It  will  be  observed  that  the  Act  does  not  make  the 
finding  and  award  of  the  board  of  arbitrators  selected 
under  its  provisions  final.  Either  party  feeling  aggrieved 
at  the  award  has  the  right  to  appeal  to  a  court  of  record, 
where  the  matter  is  heard  ' de  novo,'  and  where  either 
party  has  the  right  to  demand  a  trial  by  jury. 

"It  will  thus  be  seen  that  even  though  the  employee 
should  elect  to  come  within  the  provisions  of  the  Act  he 
is  not  wholly  deprived  of  a  trial  by  jury. 

"It  is  contended  that  section  9  also  deprives  the  em- 
ployee of  his  liberty  and  property;  that  section  10  vio- 
lates the  inhibition  against  unreasonable  search  and  seiz- 
ures ;  and  tha£  sections  11  and  13  deprive  the  employer  of 
his  right  to  contract  and  of  his  natural  right  of  waiver. 

"These  contentions  are  fully  answered  by  the  state- 
ment that  the  employee  is  not  compelled  to  submit  to  the 
provisions  of  the  Act,  but  has  the  power  to  elect  whether 
or  not  he  will  come  within  its  terms  and  be  bound  by  them. 
If  any  of  the  provisions  of  the  Act  are  objectionable  to 
him  he  is  not  required  to  subject  himself  to  the  Act.  If 
he  does  elect  to  do  so  he  can  not  be  heard  to  complain 
that  the  contract  he  has  voluntarily  entered  into  is  an  un- 
satisfactory one. 

"Tine  Act  is  not  subject  to  the  objections  urged,  and 
the  judgment  of  the  Circuit  Court  is  accordingly  af- 
firmed." 

(Decision  unanimous.) 

Louis  Crooks  v  Tazewell  Coal  Company 
263  111.  Sup.  343. 

April  23,  1914. 

MR.  JUSTICE  CARTER  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  court. 

"This  was  an  action  on  the  case  in  the  Circuit  Court 
of  Tazewell  county  by  Louis  Crooks,  the  appellee,  against 
the  Tazewell  Coal  Company,  appellant,  to  recover  dam- 
ages for  an  injury  claimed  to  have  been  sustained  by  him 
on  May  28,  1912,  while  in  the  employ  of  appellant  in  its 


52  OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT 

coal  mine  near  the  city  of  Pekin  in  said  county.  The  dec- 
laration consists  of  two  counts.  The  first  count  alleges 
the  use  and  operation  of  the  mine  by  appellant ;  its  equip- 
ment; the  employment  of  appellee  and  appellant's  duty 
to  furnish  him  with  a  safe  place  in  which  to  work;  the 
failure  to  furnish  and  provide  such  a  place,  and  that  by 
reason  thereof  appellee,  while  in  the  exercise  of  due  care 
for  his  own  safety,  was  injured,  etc.  The  second  count 
is  the  same  as  the  first,  with  the  further  allegation  that 
the  appellant  knew  of  the  dangerous  and  unsafe  condition 
and  promised  to  remove  the  same,  and  that  the  appellee, 
relying  upon  such  promise,  continued  in  the  employ  of  the 
appellant.  The  specific  negligence  charged  was  the  fail- 
ure of  appellant  to  construct  a  certain  entry  of  sufficient 
height  and  width  to  permit  the  moving  of  cars  through 
the  same  without  rubbing  the  sides  or  ceiling,  and  in  per- 
mitting the  bottom  of  said  entry  to  become  congested  and 
unsafe  from  coal  and  other  materials  scraped  off  the  top 
of  loaded  cars  hauled  through  and  along  the  entry.  Each 
of  the  counts  also  contains  the  allegation  that  appellant 
elected  not  to  come  under  the  Act  commonly  known  as 
the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  of  1911,  in  force  May 
1,  1912 ;  that  it  had  filed  a  notice  with  the  State  Bureau 
of  Labor  statistics  of  such  election,  and  that  it  refuses  to 
provide  and  pay  compensation  to  its  employees  in  accord- 
ance with  the  provisions  of  said  Act  for  injuries  accident- 
ally suffered  by  them  while  in  its  employ.  Appellant  filed 
a  plea  of  general  issue  to  each  count,  and  on  the  issue 
thus  formed  the  cause  proceeded  to  trial,  resulting  in  a 
judgment  in  favor  of  the  appellee  for  $3,000.  Appellant 
prayed  and  perfected  an  appeal  to  the  Appellate  Court 
for  the  Third  District,  which,  on  motion  of  appellee,  was 
certified  the  cause  to  this  court  for  the  reason  a  constitu- 
tional question  was  involved. 

''Numerous  errors  are  assigned  by  appellant,  which 
resolve  themselves  into  the  following  contentions:  (1) 
That  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  of  1911,  in  force 


OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT  53 

May  1,  1912,  is  unconstitutional  and  void,  in  that  it  de- 
prives appellant  of  its  property  without  due  process  of 
law,  and  also  deprives  it  of  the  equal  protection  of  the 
law  with  all  other  citizens  of  this  state;  (2)  that  an  em- 
ployee who  has  elected  to  accept  the  provisions  of  that 
Act  must  bring  his  action  under  and  as  directed  by  it  and 
is  limited  in  his  recovery  to  the  compensation  provided 
by  that  Act,  and  that  the  same  cannot  be  recovered  by 
him  in  an  action  on  the  case  such  as  the  one  at  bar;  (3) 
that  the  jury  were  erroneously  instructed  as  to  the  law 
of  the  case;  (4)  that  the  trial  court  erred  in  its  ruling  on 
the  admission  and  exclusion  of  evidence,  and  (5)  that  the 
verdict  of  the  jury  is  contrary  to  the  law  and  the  evidence 
and  the  damages  awarded  are  excessive. 

"Appellant,  the  Tazewell  Coal  Company,  is  a  cor- 
poration engaged  in  the  mining  of  coal  in  what  is  called 
a  shaft  mine,  near  Pekin,  in  Tazewell  county.  The  main 
shaft  is  approximately  one  hundred  and  sixty  feet  in 
depth.  From  the  bottom  of  this  main  shaft  various  tun- 
nels, called  entries,  lead  to  the  several  rooms  from  which 
the  coal  is  mined.  These  entries  are  about  twelve  feet 
in  width  and  four  and  one-half  feet  high.  Appellee  was 
injured  in  what  is  known  as  the  tenth  south  entry,  be- 
tween rooms  19  and  20  on  this  entry.  The  coal  as  mined 
at  the  room  is  loaded  into  cars  about  four  feet  two  inches 
in  width,  eight  feet  in  length  and  two  feet  in  depth.  These 
are  hauled  back  and  forth  by  mules  and  run  on  a  track  of 
two  rails  laid  along  the  floor  of  the  entry.  Appellee  was 
a  mule  driver,  twenty-four  years  of  age,  and  had  twelve 
years'  experience  at  driving  and  working  in  the  mines. 
He  had  been  in  the  employ  of  appellant  four  days  at  the 
time  of  his  injury.  The  first  two  days  were  spent  in 
greasing  and  spragging  cars.  On  May  27,  1912,  under 
the  direction  of  the  driver  boss  he  went  to  work,  along 
with  one  Hawkins,  in  the  tenth  entry,  and  in  passing  the 
place  where  he  was  injured  he  noticed  that  the  entry  was 
low,  gob  (or  slate  and  rock  refuse)  piled  alongside  the 


54  OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT 

entry  and  coal  on  the  track  between  the  rails.  The  clear- 
ance at  this  point  between  the  top  of  the  car  and  the  top 
of  the  entry  was  about  seven  inches  and  about  seventeen 
inches  along  the  sides.  On  the  morning  the  plaintiff  was 
injured,  May  28,  he  started  on  the  trip,  following  another 
mule  driver  (Hawkins)  along  this  entry,  and  saw  on  the 
track  and  at  the  sides  of  the  entry  debris  and  lumps  of 
coal  large  enough  to  obstruct  the  car  wheels,  and  he  com- 
plained to  the  driver  boss  (Ryan)  about  the  dirty  road 
and  the  low  roof  in  the  entry  at  this  place.  He  also 
claims  to  have  been  present  at  a  conversation  between 
Hawkins  and  the  mine  boss  (Williams),  which  occurred 
about  nine  o'clock  on  the  day  of  his  injury,  in  which 
Hawkins  told  Williams  he  wanted  a  shovel  to  clean  the 
coal  off  at  this  place,  as  it  was  in  such  condition  that  one 
was  liable  to  get  hurt  there  or  killed,  and  that  the  mine 
boss  told  them  to  go  ahead — that  he  knew  the  place  was 
bad  and  he  would  have  it  fixed  just  as  soon  as  he  could 
get  time.  This  conversation  is  denied  by  Eyan  and  Wil- 
liams. In  making  the  drive  the  appellee  stood,  as  was 
customary,  with  one  foot  on  the  bumper  at  the  front  of 
the  car  and  the  other  on  the  chain  by  which  the  mule  was 
hitched  to  the  car,  with  his  right  hand  on  the  mule  and 
his  left  on  the  car.  He  commenced  work  that  morning 
at  7:30  o'clock  and  was  injured  about  12:30.  He  was 
riding,  at  the  time,  on  the  front  end  of  a  car  in  a  trip  of 
three  cars,  and  his  left  foot  caught  on  a  chunk  of  coal 
that  had  been  scraped  off  or  had  dropped  from  a  preced- 
ing car  and  pulled  him  off  the  car.  He  fell  in  front  of  the 
car  and  the  car  ran  onto  him  and  partially  over  him.  He 
caught  the  butt-stick  or  single-tree  with  which  the  mule 
was  hitched  to  the  chain  attached  to  the  car  and  pulled 
himself  from  under  the  car  but  was  knocked  down  again, 
but  finally  succeeded  in  getting  upon  the  car  and  rode 
thereon  in  the  same  manner  as  before  he  was  injured,  a 
distance  of  about  seven  hundred  feet,  out  to  the  main  en- 
try, where  he  was  assisted  to  the  shaft  and  to  the  surface 


OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT  55 

of  the  ground  and  to  his  home.  The  medical  examination 
disclosed  that  he  had  a  sprained  left  ankle  and  the  arch 
of  the  left  foot  was  broken — that  is,  the  ligaments  from 
the  bones  in  the  top  of  the  foot  were  torn  loose.  At  the 
time  of  the  trial,  four  months  after  the  injury,  the  foot 
was  still  discolored  and  swollen  and  he  was  unable  to  use 
it.  He  was  confined  to  his  bed  about  two  weeks  and  sub- 
sequently walked  with  crutches  up  to  the  time  of  the  trial. 
The  doctor  who  attended  him  testified  that  the  injury  is 
permanent.  At  the  time  of  the  injury  appellee  was  re- 
ceiving $2.84  a  day  for  eight  hours  work. 

"It  is  assigned  for  error  that  the  Workmen's  Com- 
pensation Act  is  unconstitutional.  In  Deibeikis  v  Link 
Belt  Co.,  261  111.  454,  this  court  sustained  the  constitution- 
ality of  the  Act  as  a  whole,  and  we  do  not  deem  it  neces- 
sary again  to  discuss  that  question.  Our  opinion  in  that 
case  not  having  been  published  at  the  time  this  cause  was 
transferred  from  the  Appellate  Court,  the  case  is  prop- 
erly here.  It  was  there  pointed  out  as  provided  in  the 
Act,  that  the  Act  tyas  not  mandatory  but  elective,  and 
that  when  both  the  employer  and  employee  come  under 
the  Act  and  subject  to  its  provisions  the  Act  becomes  a 
part  of  the  contract  of  employment  and  enforcible  be- 
tween the  parties  as  such;  that  if  the  employer  elects  not 
to  come  within  the  provisions  of  the  Act  and  files  the 
proper  notice  witL  the  State  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics 
he  is  not  subject  thereto,  with  one  exception,  viz :  that  he 
forfeits  his  right  to  interpose  the  common  law  defenses 
of  assumed  risk,  fellow-servant  and  contributory  negli- 
gence, except  that  the  latter  might  be  shown  for  the  pur- 
pose of  reducing  the  damages;  that  these  rules  of  law 
were  established  by  the  courts  and  not  by  the  constitution 
and  might  be  modified  or  repealed  or  abolished  entirely 
by  the  legislature.  Appellant  does  not  attempt  to  point 
out  any  particular  section  or  sections  of  the  Act  as  being 
unconstitutional  and  void,  and  the  decision  in  Deibeikis  v 
Link  Belt  Co.,  supra,  is  therefore  conclusive  as  to  the  con- 
stitutionality  of  the  Act  as  a  whole. 


56  OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT 

"As  to  appellant's  second  contention,  we  held  in  the 
Deibeikis  case,  supra,  that  the  relation  between  employer 
and  employee,  when  both  accept  the  provisions  of  the  Act, 
is  one  of  contract,  of  which  said  contract  the  said 
law  is  a  part,  but  if  either  elects  not  to  come  under  the 
law,  and  so  notifies  the  proper  authorities,  then  there  is 
no  such  contract.  Where  the  employer  has  exercised  the 
right  of  election,  the  employee,  in  seeking  redress  for  in- 
juries sustained,  is  not  bound  by  such  contractual  rela- 
tion and  accordingly  is  not  limited  in  his  recovery  to  the 
compensation  provided  by  the  Act.  He  cannot  be  said  to 
be  bound  by  a  contract  that  has  never  been  made.  Where 
both  the  employer  and  the  employee  have  elected  to  come 
within  and  be  bound  by  the  provisions  of  the  Act,  then, 
in  seeking  redress  under  it,  the  action  must  be  brought 
pursuant  to  and  in  accord  with  its  terms  and  provisions, 
but  when  the  employer  has  elected  not  to  be  bound  by 
the  Act  then  the  parties  are  remitted  to  their  action  at 
law  and  are  governed  in  all  respects  by  the  rules  and 
principles  of  law  applicable  to  such  actions,  except,  alone, 
as  to  the  matter  of  assumed  risk,  fellow-servant  and  con- 
tributory negligence.  Appellant  cannot  insist  that  ap- 
pellee be  bound  by  all  the  provisions  of  a  law  which  ap- 
pellant has  elected  not  to  be  bound  by.  There  was  there- 
fore no  error  in  permitting  appellee  to  show  that  appel- 
lant had  elected  not  to  come  under  the  Act,  nor  in  giving 
the  instructions  on  behalf  of  the  appellee  which  were 
drawn  up  on  the  theory  that  the  defenses  of  assumed 
risk,  fellow-servant  and  contributory  negligence  were  not 
available,  except  that  the  latter  might  be  shown  for  the 
purpose  of  reducing  the  damages.  Nor  was  it  error  to 
refuse  the  instructions  of  appellant  which  were  based 
upon  the  above  named  defenses. 

"The  instructions,  so  far  as  they  relate  to  the  Act  in 
question,  were  a  correct  exposition  of  the  law  as  appli- 
cable to  the  fact?  in  this  case. 

"The  giving  of  certain  instructions  is  assigned  as  er- 


OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT  57 

ror  on  the  ground  that  they  ignore  the  proposition  that 
under  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  appellee's  con- 
tributory negligence  should  be  considered  as  reducing 
damages. 

"The  jury  were  in  another  instruction,  however,  in- 
structed that  if  the  defendant  had  elected  not  to  provide 
and  pay  the  compensation  to  injured  employees  under 
the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  it  cannot  escape  lia- 
bility for  injuries,  if  any  are  shown  by  the  evidence,  sus- 
tained by  the  plaintiff  arising  out  of  and  in  the  course  of 
employment,  even  though  they  believe,  from  the  evidence, 
that  such  injuries,  if  any  are  shown,  were  proximately 
caused  by  the  contributory  negligence  of  the  plaintiff, 
and  the  jury  were  instructed  that  in  such  case  the  con- 
tributory negligence,  if  any  is  shown  by  the  evidence, 
should  be  considered  by  them  in  reducing  the  amount  of 
damages.  The  same  charge  was  contained  in  other  in- 
structions. On  this  point  the  jury  were  correctly  in- 
structed. 

"The  admission  of  evidence  complained  of  was  simply 
the  evidence  necessary  to  show  that  appellant  had  re- 
jected the  provisions  of  the  Workmen's  Compensation 
Act,  and  hence  could  not  set  up  the  defenses  of  assumed 
risk,  fellow-servant  or  contributory  negligence,  except 
that  contributory  negligence  could  be  shown  by  way  of 
lessening  the  damages.  If  the  law  is  valid — and  we  have 
held  that  it  is — then  this  evidence  was  proper.  The  court, 
on  objection,  refused  to  admit  certain  evidence  offered  on 
behalf  of  the  appellant,  being  that  of  certain  employees 
who  testified  as  mining  experts.  The  appellant  offered  to 
prove  by  these  witnesses  that  the  mine  was  completely 
and  properly  equipped,  constructed  and  operated,  to  con- 
tradict the  evidence  of  appellee  and  other  witnesses  as  to 
the  condition  of  the  entry  where  he  was  injured.  In  a 
certain  class  of  cases,  expert  evidence  is  proper  to  show 
the  effect  of  certain  conditions,  but  the  sole  question  in 
this  case  was  whether  or  not  the  alleged  entry  in  question 


68  OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT 

had  become  obstructed  with  debris  so  that  it  was  unsafe 
for  the  purposes  of  appellee's  employment.  Other  em- 
ployees of  the  appellant  testified  in  its  behalf,  as  to  the 
actual  condition  of  the  entry  at  the  time  of  the  accident, 
but  expert  evidence  or  the  opinion  of  witnesses  as  to  the 
condition  of  the  mine  generally,  or  even  as  to  the  condi- 
tion of  the  entry  at  the  place  where  appellee  was  injured, 
or  the  probable  effect  of  such  condition,  would  not  be 
competent  as  against  the  evidence  of  witnesses  who  testi- 
fied as  to  the  actual  conditions,  nor  do  we  think  such  evi- 
dence would  be  material  in  this  case. 

"Appellant  also  contends  that  the  verdict  of  the  jury 
and  the  judgment  are  contrary  to  the  law  and  evidence 
and  that  the  verdict  and  judgment  are  excessive.  The  in- 
jury to  appellee  was  of  such  a  nature  that  it  is  difficult 
for  a  court  and  jury  exactly  to  fix  the  measure  of  dam- 
ages, and  it  is  more  difficult  for  a  court  of  review  to  pass 
on  a  contention  that  such  damages  are  excessive.  The 
extent  of  appellee's  injury  covers  a  wide  range  of  possi- 
bilities. The  physician  who  attended  him  longest  and 
who  seems  to  have  a  better  knowledge  of  the  nature  and 
extent  of  the  injury,  testified  that  the  injury  is  perma- 
nent. Appellee  suffered  a  sprain  to  his  ankle,  from  which 
he  had  practically  recovered  at  the  time  of  the  trial,  four 
months  after  the  accident.  This  part  of  the  injury  is  un- 
important in  estimating  the  amount  of  the  damages.  As 
to  the  other  injury,  the  broken  arch  of  the  foot,  the  evi- 
dence, except  that  of  the  physician  above  mentioned,  is 
silent  as  to  its  probable  or  ultimate  effect.  It  is  difficult 
to  tell  whether  it  is  an  injury  from  which  the  appellee 
will  recover  in  a  few  months  or  will  recover  the  full  use 
of  his  foot  by  the  use  of  mechanical  appliances,  or 
whether  he  will  be  a  cripple  for  life.  In  the  latter  event 
the  damages  would  not  be  excessive.  A  motion  was  made 
for  a  continuance  on  account  of  the  absence  of  a  material 
witness,  and  in  the  affidavit  for  the  continuance  by  appel- 
lant it  was  set  out  that  said  witness  would  testify,  if 


present,  that  appellee  at  a  time  after  the  commencement 
of  the  suit,  and  prior  to  the  September  term,  1913,  of 
court  while  passing  the  home  of  witness  was  attacked  by 
a  dog,  and  that  appellee  became  frightened,  threw  away 
his  crutches,  and  ran  from  the  dog  as  though  he  were  not 
injured  and  suffering  pain.    The  affidavit  was  admitted 
for  the  purpose  of  avoiding  a  continuance.    This  evidence 
is  denied  by  appellee.     Had  appellant  been  under  the 
terms  of  the  Workmen's   Compensation  Act  appellee 
could  have  recovered  only  about  thirty  per  cent  of  the 
amount  of  the  judgment  had  he  been  totally  incapacitated 
for  two  years.    In  Consolidated  Coal  Company  v  Shep- 
ard,  220  HI.  123,  it  was  held  that  a  judgment  for  $2,000 
recovered  for  an  injury  to  the  foot  and  ankle  of  a  man 
twenty-eight  years  of  age,  which  incapacitated  him  from 
working  for  thirty-eight  days,  and  the  use  of  his  foot  be- 
ing to  some  extent  permanently  impaired,  was  held  to  be 
not  excessive.   In  Town  of  Cicero  v  Bartelme,  212  HI.  256, 
it  was  held  that  a  judgment  for  $3,500  for  a  transverse 
fracture  of  the  knee-cap,  producing  a  permanent  injury, 
was  not  excessive;  and  in  Chicago,  Rock  Island  and 
Pacific  Railway  Company  v  Steckman,  224  HI.  500,  it 
was  held  that  a  judgment  for  $3,000  was  not  excessive 
where  the  plaintiff,  a  laborer,  received  serious  and  pain- 
ful injuries  in  one  of  his  legs  and  where  his  capacity  for 
work  was  reduced.    Appellee,  on  the  trial,  exhibited  the 
injured  foot  to  the  court  and  jury,  and  the  evidence  of 
one  of  the  physicians  was  based,  in  part,  on  seeing  the 
foot  at  the  time  of  the  trial.    No  evidence  was  offered  by 
appellant,  by  physicians  or  otherwise,  to  show  the  nature 
and  extent  of  the  injury.    In  any  court,  the  amount  of 
damages,  if  any,  is  largely  a  question  for  the  jury  and 
must  be  left  to  their  sound  discretion.  Springfield  Consol- 
idated Railway  Company  v  Hoeffner,  175  111.  634. 

"Such  a  judgment  will  not  be  set  aside  on  appeal  un- 
less the  amount  is  unreasonable  or  plainly  the  result  of 
passion  or  prejudice.  North  Chicago  Street  Railroad 


60  OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT 

Company  v  Zeiger,  182  111.  9;  Western  Underwriters'  As- 
sociation v  Haukins,  224  id.  304.  On  the  whole,  we  are 
unable  to  say  that  the  judgment  was  so  excessive  as  to 
warrant  a  reversal  for  that  cause. 

"For  the  reasons  given,  the  judgment  of  the  Circuit 
Court  will  be  affirmed.'* 

(Judgment  Affirmed.) 

Douglas  Dietz  v  The  Big  Muddy  Coal  and  Iron  Company 

263  111.  480. 

April  23,  1914. 

"This  is  an  action  of  case,  in  which  all  of  the  three 
counts  of  the  declaration  charge  common  law  negligence. 
The  first  and  second  counts  are  in  substance  the  same, 
but  the  third  or  additional  count  alleges  that  the  injury 
occurred  in  a  different  manner.  All  of  the  counts  allege 
that  appellant  was  operating  a  coal  mine  in  Williamson 
County,  on  April  21,  1913,  and  had  prior  thereto  elected 
not  to  provide  and  pay  compensation  to  injured  em- 
ployees under  the  Statute  of  1911  known  as  the  Work- 
men's Compensation  Act;  that  appellee  was  on  said  date 
an  employee  of  appellant  in  the  capacity  of  a  black- 
smith's helper  and  was  working  in  and  about  the  mine 
of  appellant;  that  appellee  had  accepted  all  the  provis- 
ions of  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  and  was  at  that 
time  bound  thereby.  The  declaration  charges  in  the  first 
and  second  counts  that  appellant  negligently  ordered  ap- 
pellee to  put  a  bolt  through  a  certain  platform  which  was 
immediately  above  a  certain  chute  and  by  which  bolt  said 
chute  was  to  be  suspended;  that  appellant  knew  or 
should  have  known,  that  the  place  where  appellee  was  re- 
quired to  stand  in  order  to  obey  the  said  order  was  a  dan- 
gerous place  for  the  performance  of  said  work ;  that  there 
was  no  safe  place  where  the  appellee  could  stand  while 
inserting  said  bolt,  but  to  carry  out  the  order  he  was  re- 
quired to  stand  upon  the  end  of  said  chute  of  metal 
and  reach  with  both  hands  above  his  head  and  stand  upon 


OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT  61 

his  toes  without  any  brace  to  steady  or  support  himself, 
and  that  while  thus  attempting  to  insert  the  said  bolt, 
standing  upon  the  slanting  metal  of  the  chute,  he  lost  his 
balance  and  slipped  and  fell,  causing  the  injuries  com- 
plained of.  Appellant  filed  a  plea  of  not  guilty,  and  a 
trial  before  a  jury  resulted  in  a  verdict  in  favor  of  appel- 
lee for  $1,500,  for  which  amount  the  trial  court,  after 
overruling  a  motion  for  a  new  trial,  entered  judgment. 

"The  constitutionality  of  the  Workmen's  Compensa- 
tion Act  of  1911  being  involved,  the  Circuit  Court  of  Jack- 
son county  allowed  an  appeal,  which  has  been  duly  per- 
fected direct  to  this  court. 

"At  the  term  at  which  the  cause  was  submitted  to  the 
court  an  opinion  was  filed  in  Deibeikis  v  Link  Belt  Co., 
261  111.  454,  in  which  tine  constitutionality  of  the  above 
Act  was  considered  and  sustained;  but  since  that  opin- 
ion had  not  been  published  at  the  time  this  appeal  was 
perfected  the  case  was  properly  brought  before  this  court. 
The  questions  raised  by  appellant  as  to  the  validity  of 
the  Act  were  considered  and  decided  in  that  case  and  it 
is  not  necessary  to  re-state  our  views. 

1  'While  appellant  has  devoted  considerable  space  in 
its  brief  to  a  discussion  of  the  sufficiency  of  the  evidence 
to  sustain  the  averment  in  the  declaration  that  appellant 
had  elected  not  to  comply  with  the  Workmen's  Compen- 
sation Act,  on  the  oral  argument  counsel  for  appellant 
conceded  that  it  was  not  at  the  time  of  the  alleged  injury, 
and  never  had  been,  operating  under  said  Act,  so  that 
in  the  disposition  of  the  questions  here  involved  it  will  be 
assumed  as  a  fact  that  appellant  had  not  elected  to  pay 
compensation  for  injuries  in  accordance  with  said  Act. 

"Appellant  contends  that  if  the  defense  of  assumed 
risk  is  available  to  it,  the  circumstances  of  the  injury 
complained  of  are  such  as  to  entitle  appellant  to  a  direct- 
ed verdict  in  its  favor,  for  the  reason  that,  as  a  matter  of 
law,  appellee  assumed  the  risk  of  injury  from  slipping 
upon  the  inclined  metal  chute  upon  which  he  was  stand- 


62  OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT 

ing  at  the  time  he  fell.  Without  reference  to  what  view 
we  might  take  of  this  question  if  the  Workmen's  Compen- 
sation Act  were  not  involved,  we  will  consider  and  deter- 
mine the  question  in  view  of  that  legislation. 

"Appellant  contends  that  under  the  proper  construc- 
tion to  be  given  to  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  the 
defenses  of  assumed  risk,  fellow-servant  and  contribu- 
tory negligence  are  not  affected  by  the  Act  as  to  em- 
ployers who  have  never  elected  to  pay  compensation  in 
accordance  with  the  provisions  thereof. 

"Its  contention  is  that  those  defenses  are  only  lost 
to  such  employers  as  have  elected  to  go  under  and  be 
governed  by  the  Act  and  afterwards  elect  not  to  be  gov- 
erned by  said  Act,  and  then  only  as  to  such  employees  as 
had  before  that  time  elected  to  be  governed  by  the  pro- 
visions of  the  said  Act.  Appellant  contends  that  there  is 
no  method  provided  in  the  Statute  by  which  the  employee 
can  elect  to  be  governed  by  the  Act  unless  the  employer 
has  previously  exercised  his  right  of  election  and  deter- 
mined to  be  governed  by  the  Act.  This  last  proposition 
we  regard  as  a  correct  interpretation  of  the  Act.  It  was 
manifestly  not  the  intention  of  the  legislature  to  put  it 
in  the  power  of  the  employee  to  compel  the  employer  to 
adopt  the  Act  without  regard  to  the  employer's  own 
wishes  in  the  matter.  We  find  no  provision  in  the  Act 
which  confers  upon  the  employee  the  right  to  elect  to  be 
governed  by  the  Act  in  his  relations  to  an  employer  who 
has  rejected  the  Act.  We  see  no  reason  why  this  should 
be  so,  although  appellee  has  alleged  in  his  declaration 
that  appellant  was  not  under  the  Act  and  that  he  was  gov- 
erned thereby.  The  latter  part  of  this  proposition  was 
simply  an  averment  of  a  legal  impossibility.  This  aver- 
ment, however,  may  be  regarded  as  mere  surplusage  and 
of  no  legal  consequence  whatever. 

"Both  parties  to  this  cause  seem  to  be  under  the  im- 
pression that  in  some  way  appellee  must  be  regarded  as 
under  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  in  order  to  cut 


OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT  63 

off  the  common  law  defenses  above  referred  to.  This  is 
clearly  a  misapprehension  of  the  meaning  of  the  Act  it- 
self. A  single  provision  of  the  Act  is  all  that  is  neces- 
sary to  be  referred  to  to  answer  the  contention  that  ap- 
pellee is  himself  under  the  Act.  Section  3  of  the  Act  pro- 
vides that  'no  common  law  or  statutory  right  to  recover 
damages  for  injuries  or  death  sustained  by  any  employee 
while  engaged  in  the  line  of  his  duty  as  such  employee, 
other  than  the  compensation  herein  provided,  shall  be 
available  to  any  employee  who  has  accepted  the  provis- 
ions of  this  Act,  or  to  any  one  wholly  or  partially  depend- 
ent upon  him,  or  legally  responsible  for  his  estate.'  If 
this  Statute  means  what  it  says,  then  if  appellee  is  under 
the  provisions  of  the  Act  he  has  no  standing  whatever  to 
recover  damages  for  his  injury  except  as  provided  for  in 
said  Act,  either  under  the  common  law  or  the  statute.  If 
the  appellee  is  under  the  Act,  how  can  he,  in  view  of  the 
Statute  above  quoted,  maintain  his  action? 

"The  legislature  has  by  language  too  clear  for  con- 
struction taken  away  the  common  law  action  as  to  all  em- 
ployees who  have  elected  to  be  governed  by  said  Act.  The 
existence  or  non-existence  of  the  common  law  defenses 
depends  upon  the  status  of  the  employer  in  respect  to 
the  Act  and  not  the  status  of  the  employee. 

"Section  1  of  the  Act  of  1911  provides  that  'if,  how- 
ever, any  such  employer  shall  elect  not  to  provide  and 
pay  the  compensation  to  any  employee  who  has  elected 
to  accept  the  provisions  of  this  Act  according  to  the  pro- 
visions of  this  Act,  he  shall  not  escape  liability  for  in- 
juries sustained  ]ay  such  employee,  arising  out  of  and  in 
the  course  of  his  employment  because  (1)  the  employee 
assumed  the  risks  of  the  employer's  business;  (2)  the  in- 
jury or  death  was  occasioned  in  whole  or  in  part  by  the 
negligence  of  a  fellow-servant;  (3)  the  injury  or  death 
was  proximately  caused  by  the  contributory  negligence  if 
the  employee,'  etc.  The  difficulty  in  understanding  the 
above  provisions  results  from  the  language  'to  any  em- 


64 

ployee  who  has  elected  to  accept  the  provisions  of  this 
Act.  It  is  a  difficult  matter  to  determine  the  meaning 
the  legislature  intended  to  convey  by  the  use  of  this  lan- 
guage. 

"Plainly,  the  legislature  in  passing  this  Act  intended 
to  provide  a  scheme  by  which  the  class  of  employers  with- 
in its  provisions  should  pay  compensation  for  injuries  re- 
ceived by  employees  without  reference  to  the  manner  in 
which  the  injury  was  received.  The  value  of  the  legisla- 
tion would  necessarily  depend  upon  the  extent  to  which 
employers  elected  to  operate  thereunder,  and  as  an  in- 
ducement to  employers  to  be  governed  by  said  Act  those 
within  its  provisions  who  rejected  the  same  forfeited  the 
right  to  the  enumerated  defenses,  and  these  defenses  are 
lost  without  regard  to  the  status  of  the  employee.  Any 
other  construction  would  lead  to  an  absurd  result  as  the 
employee  can  not  be  under  the  Act  while  his  employer  is 
not  under  it.  It  is  therefore  necessary  that  the  employer 
should  have  elected  to  be  governed  by  the  Act  before  the 
employee  can  avail  himself  of  its  benefits. 

Still  it  is  said  the  common  law  defenses  are  only  lost 
to  employers  not  under  the  Act  in  favor  of  employees  who 
are  under  it.  The  result  of  this  reasoning  would  be  that 
the  common  law  defenses  would  not  be  lost  to  the  employ- 
er in  any  case,  unless  we  take  the  view  suggested  by  ap- 
pellant that  they  are  lost  in  those  rare  and  exceptional 
cases  where  the  employer  has  been  under  the  Act  and 
elected  to  abandon  it,  that  his  abandonment  of  the  Act 
would  not  take  the  then  employees  out  from  the  provis- 
ions of  the  Act,  and  in  that  case,  if  any  such  case  ever 
happened,  the  common  law  defenses  would  be  lost. 

"But  it  must  not  be  overlooked  in  this  connection,  if 
we  suppose  that  to  be  the  meaning  of  the  law,  that  the 
common  law  defenses  are  only  lost  by  the  employer  in 
favor  of  an  employee  who,  by  being  under  the  Act,  has 
lost  his  right  to  bring  a  common  law  action  under  section 
3.  It  was  manifestly  the  intention  of  the  legislature  to 


OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT  65 

make  the  Act  applicable  to  all  the  employers  within  the 
enumerated  employments,  unless  and  until  notice  in  writ- 
ing of  their  election  to  the  contrary  is  filed  with  the  State 
Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics.  All  of  the  employees  to  whom 
the  Act  applied  were  likewise  automatically  made  sub- 
ject to  the  law.  Both  the  employer  and  the  employee  in 
the  specified  employments  became  subject  to  the  Act 
without  any  affirmative  action  on  their  part. 

"The  elective  feature  of  the  Act  is  to  be  exercised 
to  avoid  being  governed  thereby,  and  not  to  cause  the  Act 
to  be  applied  in  any  given  case.  Section  1  provides  that 
if  the  employer  shall  elect  not  to  provide  and  pay  the 
compensation  provided  by  the  Act  he  shall  lose  his  com- 
mon law  defenses.  It  will  be  noted  that  it  is  a  negative 
election,  and  not  an  affirmative  election  that  is  to  be  ex- 
ercised both  by  the  employer  and  employee.  When  the 
entire  scope  of  the  legislation  is  considered  it  is  manifest 
that  the  legislature  intended  thaf  the  Act  should  be  effec- 
tive as  to  all  employers  in  the  specified  employments,  and 
their  employees  unless  the  notice  prescribed  was  given. 
If  we  assume  the  law  to  be  in  force  as  against  an  em- 
ployer and  his  employees  *at  the  time  the  Act  took  effect, 
then  the  language  in  section  1  under  consideration  will 
be  better  understood. 

"If  the  phrase,  'any  employee  who  has  elected  to  ac- 
cept the  provisions  of  this  Act, '  be  read  by  interpolating 
two  negatives  the  meaning  will  be  clear.  The  phrase 
would  then  read,  'Any  employee  who  has  not  elected  to 
not  accept  the  provisions  of  this  Act. '  The  language  as 
it  stands  in  the  Act  seems  to  imply  that  some  affirmative 
act  was  necessary  on  the  part  of  the  employee  to  bring 
him  within  its  provisions,  and  herein  lies  the  difficulty  of 
construing  the  Act. 

"In  thus  construing  this  Act  we  are  not  going  beyond 
the  latitude  allowed  courts  in  the  construction  of  involved 
clauses,  where  it  is  necessary  to  interpolate  words  or 
clauses  or  strike  out  redundant  and  unnecessary  language 


66  OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT 

in  order  to  give  effect  to  the  general  legislative  intent  as 
the  same  appears  from  a  consideration  of  the  whole  scope 
of  the  act.  It  is  always  necessary,  first,  to  understand 
the  subject  of  an  act  and  the  object  to  be  accomplished 
by  it.  Once  the  subject  matter  is  clearly  ascertained  and 
the  general  legislative  purpose  discovered,  a  key  is  there- 
by furnished  which  will  enable  one  to  correctly  interpret 
all  of  the  constituent  and  subordinate  elements  found  in 
the  act.  Words  may  be  modified,  altered,  or  supplied  so 
as  to  obviate  any  repugnancy  with  the  general  legislative 
intention.  (Sutherland  on  Stat.  Const,  sec  347,  and  cases 
there  cited.) 

"Lust,  in  his  comment  on  the  Workmen's  Compensa- 
tion Law  of  Illinois,  published  in  1912,  points  out  that  the 
suggestion  that  (as  there  is  in  the  Act  no  provision  by 
which  employees,  without  the  prior  affirmative  act  of  the 
employer,  can  accept  the  Act)  even  if  the  employer 
should  file  a  notice  that  he  elected  not  to  provide  and  pay 
compensation  he  would  not  be  deprived  of  his  common 
law  defenses,  was  first  raised  by  William  Duff  Haynie  in 
a  letter  addressed  to  the  Illinois  Manufacturers '  Associa- 
tion, but  Mr.  Lust  does  not  lend  his  approval  to  that  view. 
(See  Lust's  Workmen's  Compensation  Law,  7,  8.) 

"It  necessarily  follows  from  the  views  we  have  ex- 
pressed that  appellant  can  not  rely  on  the  defense  that  the 
injury  complained  of  resulted  from  a  risk  assumed  by 
appellee.  There  is  no  contention  here  that  the  injury 
was  the  result  of  the  negligence  of  a  fellow  servant,  and 
even  if  there  were,  it  would  not  be  availing. 

"Appellant  also  makes  the  point  that  the  court  errone- 
ously permitted  the  fact  to  go  to  the  jury  that  appellant 
was  a  poor  man  and  had  a  family  dependent  upon  him 
for  support.  This  information  came  out  in  the  following 
manner :  When  appellee  was  on  the  stand  he  testified  to 
the  nature  and  extent  of  his  injuries  and  the  time  when 
he  became  able  to  return  to  work.  On  cross-examination 
appellant's  counsel  asked  appellee  if  he  did  not,  as  a  mat- 


OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT  67 

ter  of  fact,  go  to  work  at  a  date  prior  to  the  time  when  he 
stated  that  he  was  able  to  work,  and  in  answer  to  this  in- 
quiry appellee  said  that  he  did,  in  fact,  go  to  work  before 
he  was  well,  and  explained,  in  substance,  that  his  reason 
for  doing  so  was  that  he  was  without  any  means  to  suj>- 
port  his  wife  and  children  and  for  that  reason  had  to  go 
to  work.  We  think  that  the  testimony  was  proper  to  ex- 
plain the  apparent  inconsistency  in  appellee's  statement 
that  he  was  not  able  to  go  to  work  and  yet  did  in  fact 
commence  work. 

"Appellant  has  urged  some  other  objections  in  rela- 
tion to  the  proof  offered  tending  to  show  that  appellant 
had  given  notice  that  it  would  not  be  governed  by  the 
Workmen's  Compensation  Act.  These  objections  are, 
however,  of  no  importance  in  view  of  the  admissions  of 
appellant,  on  oral  argument,  that  it  was  not,  and  never 
had  been,  operating  under  said  Act. 

"Appellant's  main  contention  on  the  merits  of  this 
controversy  are  that  the  Act  of  1911  is  unconstitutional. 
This  contention  has  been  fully  answered  by  this  court  in 
Deibeikis  v  Link  Belt  Co.,  supra. 

' i  It  is  also  contended  that  if  said  Act  is  constitutional 
it  should  be  so  construed  as  not  to  deprive  appellant  of 
its  common  law  defenses.  This  contention  has  had  the 
consideration  which  we  think  its  importance  demands, 
with  the  result  that  we  cannot  accept  appellant's  view*  as 
to  the  proper  interpretation  of  the  Act  in  question. 

"Substantially  all  of  the  other  points  appellant  has 
urged  in  its  able  and  exhaustive  brief  are  related  to  and 
result  from  the  insistence  of  appellant  upon  its  two  prin- 
cipal contentions.  There  are  some  other  minor  matters 
suggested  and  urged  by  appellant  as  reasons  why  the 
judgment  below  should  be  reversed,  and  these  have  all 
had  our  consideration,  and  we  find  none  of  them  of  suffi- 
cient importance  to  justify  an  extension  of  this  opinion 
to  discuss  them.  The  judgment  of  the  Circuit  Court  of 
Jackson  county  is  affirmed. ' '  (Judgment  Affirmed. ) 


68  OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT 

Amanda  E.  Courter  v  The  Simpson  Construction  Co. 
264  IU.  Sup.  488. 

MR.  JUSTICE  FARMER  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  court. 

' '  This  case  comes  to  this  court  for  review  upon  a  writ 
of  certiorari  under  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  of 
1913. 

"George  B.  Courter,  a  carpenter,  was  employed  by 
and  began  work  for  the  Simpson  Construction  Company 
on  July  22,  1913,  on  a  building  in  course  of  construction 
at  No.  3921  Michigan  Avenue,  in  the  city  of  Chicago.  On 
July  23  he  was  injured  by  stepping  on  a  rusty  nail  and 
died  from  lock-jaw  resulting  from  the  injury  July  30. 
Courter  left  surviving  him  a  wife,  from  whom  he  was 
divorced,  and  a  son  seventeen  or  eighteen  years  old.  They 
filed  a  statement  of  the  accident  to  and  the  death  of 
George  B.  Courter  with  the  Industrial  Board  of  Illinois 
and  requested  such  action  be  taken  as  the  law  authorized. 
The  widow  and  the  Simpson  Construction  Company  were 
each  notified  by  the  Board  to  appoint  a  representative  on 
a  committee  of  arbitration  within  seven  days,  which  they 
did,  and  the  persons  so  appointed,  together  with  a  per- 
son designated  by  the  Board,  heard  the  case  as  a  commit- 
tee of  arbitration.  Said  committee  of  arbitration  decided 
the  widow,  as  guardian  of  the  minor  son,  was  entitled  to 
recover  of  the  company  $8.41  per  week  for  a  period  of 
two  hundred  and  eight  weeks  from  July  23,  1913.  The 
decision  was  filed  with  the  Industrial  Board,  and  upon 
notice  of  its  having  been  filed  being  given,  the  applicant, 
Amanda  E.  Courter,  guardian,  filed  a  petition  for  re- 
view. Thereafter,  proper  notice  having  been  given,  the 
matter  was  heard  by  the  Industrial  Board  and  a  decision 
rendered  and  filed,  finding  that  $8.41  per  week  was  one- 
half  of  the  amount  of  the  weekly  wages  of  George  B. 
Courter  while  employed  by  the  Simpson  Construction 
Company ;  that  the  widow  was  the  guardian  of  the  person 
of  the  surviving  son,  and  was  entitled  to  receive  from 
said  Simpson  Construction  Company  $8.41  per  week  for 


OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT  69 

a  period  of  four  hundred  and  sixteen  weeks  from  July  23, 
1913;  that  the  guardian  was  entitled  to  receive  the 
money  until  the  ward  became  of  age,  after  which  he  was 
entitled  to  receive  it.  To  review  the  decision  of  the  In- 
dustrial Board  the  Simpson  Construction  Company 
sued  out  a  writ  of  certiorari  under  the  provisions  of  the 
Workmens'  Compensation  Act  of  1913. 

"The  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  provides  for  the 
payment  by  employers  who  elect  to  accept  the  provisions 
of  the  Act,  of  compensation  for  accidental  injuries  to  em- 
ployees arising  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  their  employ- 
ment, such  compensation  to  relieve  the  employer  from 
liability  for  the  recovery  of  damages  except  such  as  pro- 
vided in  the  Act.  Section  1  fixes  the  maximum  compen- 
sation for  an  injury  resulting  in  the  death  of  an  employee 
leaving  a  widow,  child  or  children  whom  he  was  under 
legal  obligation  to  support  at  the  time  of  his  injury,  at 
$3,500. 

"By  Section  13  a  board  is  created  of  three  members, 
to  be  appointed  by  the  governor,  known  as  an  Industrial 
Board,  which  is  given  jurisdiction  over  the  operation 
and  administration  of  the  Act;  and  all  questions  arising 
under  said  Act,  if  not  settled  by  agreement  of  the  parties 
interested,  shall,  except  as  otherwise  provided  therein, 
be  determined  by  the  Industrial  Board. 

The  Act  makes  it  the  duty  of  said  Board,  upon  notice 
that  the  parties  have  failed  to  agree,  to  notify  the  parties 
to  each  appoint  a  representative  on  a  committee  of  arbi- 
tration. The  Board  shall  designate  one  of  its  members, 
or  an  agent  appointed  by  it,  to  act  as  chairman.  The 
committee  of  arbitration  shall  hear  and  decide  the  con- 
troversy and  file  its  decision  with  the  Industrial  Board, 
which  Board  is  required  immediately  to  send  each  party 
a  copy  of  the  decision,  together  with  notice  of  the  time 
when  it  was  filed. 

"A  petition  for  review  may  be  filed  by  either  of  the 
parties  with  the  Industrial  Board  within  fifteen  days 


70  OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT 

after  receipt  of  a  copy  of  the  decision  and  notice  when 
it  was  filed,  unless  further  time  is  given  by  the  Board, 
and  the  party  petitioning  for  review  is  required,  within 
twenty  days  from  the  filing  of  the  decision,  to  file  with 
the  Board  either  an  agreed  statement  of  the  facts  appear- 
ing upon  the  hearing  before  the  committee  of  arbitration 
or  a  correct  stenographic  report  of  the  proceedings  at 
such  hearing. 

"When,  on  a  petition  for  review,  an  agreed  state- 
ment of  facts  or  correct  stenographic  report  is  filed  with 
tne  Industrial  Board,  said  Board  shall  review  the  deci- 
sion of  the  committee  of  arbitration.  Said  Board  is  re- 
quired to  announce  and  file  in  its  office  the  decision  and 
immediately  send  each  party  a  copy  of  it,  together  with 
notice  of  the  time  when  it  was  filed. 

"Clause  (/)  of  section  19  of  the  Act  reads  as  follows: 
*  *  *  It  is  under  this  clause  of  the  Statute  the  writ  of 
certiorari  was  issued. 

*  *  The  sole  ground  upon  which  the  writ  is  sought  to  be 
sustained  are,  that  there  was  no  evidence  to  support  the 
findings  of  the  Industrial  Board  that  Courter  came  to  his 
death  as  the  result  of  an  accidental  injury  which  arose 
out  of  and  in  the  course  of  his  employment,  and  that  the 
award  was  excessive. 

1 1  The  guardian  of  the  ward,  in  whose  favor  the  award 
was  made,  challenges  the  constitutionality  of  this  pro- 
vision of  the  Act,  authorizing  the  Supreme  Court  to  issue 
a  writ  of  certiorari  for  a  review  of  the  decision  of  the  In- 
dustrial Board.  The  basis  of  this  contention  is  that  the 
Statute  purports  to  confer  original  jurisdiction  upon 
this  court  to  issue  a  writ  of  certiorari  in  violation  of  sec- 
tion 2  of  article  6  of  the  Constitution,  which  expressly 
limits  the  original  jurisdiction  of  this  court  to  cases  re- 
lating to  the  revenue,  mandamus  and  habeas  corpus.  We 
are  of  the  opinion  that  this  objection  to  the  validity  of 
that  part  of  the  Act  which  authorizes  this  court  to  issue 


OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT  71 

a  certiorari  to  review  the  decisions  of  the  Industrial 
Board  must  be  sustained. 

"We  might  well  limit  this  decision  to  a  determination 
of  that  question,  alone,  but  for  reasons  so  obvious  as  not 
to  require  specification  it  is  of  great  public  importance 
that  questions  of  procedure  under  the  Act  shall  be  set- 
tled and  understood  as  early  as  possible,  and  we  think 
that  we  may  without  propriety  express  our  views  not 
only  upon  the  specific  question  raised  but  also  upon  ques- 
tions of  procedure  which  though  not  primarily  necessary 
to  a  determination  of  the  specific  question,  as  so  nearly 
related  to  and  connected  with  it  that  they  may  be  passed 
upon  in  this  connection.  If  we  were  to  decide  merely 
that  the  provisions  of  the  Act  authorizing  a  review  of 
the  decisions  of  the  Board  by  writ  of  certiorari  issued 
out  of  this  court  is  invalid,  it  might  involve  other  pro- 
visions, or  possibly  the  whole  Act,  in  uncertainty,  because 
it  would  then  contain  no  express  provision  for  a  court 
review  of  the  decisions  of  the  Board. 

"As  many  as  twenty-two  states  of  the  union  have 
adopted  Workmen's  Compensation  Acts.  The  basic  prin- 
ciples of  all  of  them  are  the  same  but  they  are  by  no 
means  similar  in  the  methods  provided  for  administering 
the  Act.  In  most  of  the  states  the  Act  makes  some  pro- 
vision for  a  court  review  of  the  decisions  of  the  Board, 
though  their  provisions  in  this  respect  are  very  dissim- 
ilar, and  in  a  few  states  no  express  provision  is  made  for 
a  court  review  of  the  action  of  the  Board.  *  *  * 

"Paragraph  (g)  of  section  19  authorizes  either  party, 
where  no  proceedings  are  had  for  a  review  of  the  deci- 
sions of  the  Board,  to  present  a  certified  copy  of  the  de- 
cision to  the  Circuit  Court  of  the  county  where  the  acci- 
dent occurred,  and  thereupon  such  court  shall  render 
judgment  in  accordance  therewith. 

"The  Circuit  Court  rendering  the  judgment  is  given 
power  at  any  time,  upon  application  for  that  purpose,  to 
make  the  judgment  conform  'to  any  modification  required 


72  OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT 

by  any  subsequent  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  on  ap- 
peal, or  as  the  result  of  any  subsequent  proceedings  for 
review  as  provided  in  this  Act,'  but  no  provision  is  made 
for  the  review  of  the  judgment  of  the  Circuit  Court,  by 
appeal  or  otherwise,  by  the  Supreme  Court.  The  only 
express  provision  made  by  the  Act  for  a  review  of  the 
decisions  of  the  Industrial  Board  is  paragraph  (/)  of 
section  19.  That  paragraph  purports  to  authorize  the 
Supreme  Court  to  review  questions  of  law  involved  in 
the  decisions  of  the  Board  'by  certiorari,  mandamus  or 
by  any  other  method  permissible  under  the  rules  and 
practice  of  said  court  or  the  laws  of  this  state.'  As  the 
writ  of  certiorari  is  not  issued  in  aid  of  or  to  protect  our 
appellate  jurisdiction,  and  as  this  court  has  no  original 
jurisdiction  in  certiorari,  and  as  jurisdiction  in  such  cases 
cannot  be  conferred  by  an  Act  of  the  legislature,  the  pro- 
vision of  the  Act  authorizing  the  review  of  the  decisions 
of  the  Industrial  Board  upon  a  writ  of  certiorari  issued 
by  this  court  for  that  purpose  is  invalid. 

"We  might  rest  our  decision  here  were  it  not  for  the 
importance  of  an  early  determination  whether  the  par- 
ties to  an  award  under  the  Act  may  have  a  review  of  the 
decisions  of  the  Board  to  the  extent  of  determining 
whether  the  Board  had  acted  illegally  or  without  juris- 
diction. To  deny  a  court  review  of  those  questions  would 
violate  the  due  process  of  law  provision  of  the  Constitu- 
tion. Where  the  parties  voluntarily  elect  to  come  within 
and  be  governed  by  the  provisions  of  the  Act,  it  may  be 
well  they  waive  any  constitutional  right  to  trial  by  jury, 
and  the  action  of  the  Board,  'within  its  powers,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  fraud,  be  conclusive.'  The  Industrial  Board  has 
no  jurisdiction  to  apply  the  Act  to  persons  or  corpora- 
tions who  are  not  subject  to  its  provisions  nor  to  an  acci- 
dent not  within  the  provisions  of  the  Act.  If  it  did  so  it 
would  not  be  'acting  within  its  powers'  and  it  would  seem 
essential  that  there  must  be  some  remedy  for  a  review  by 
some  proper  court  of  the  question  whether  the  Board 


OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT  73 

acted  within  its  powers.  No  valid  provision  having  been 
made  in  the  Act  for  such  a  review,  it  does  not  follow  that 
none  can  be  had. 

"We  have  no  doubt  the  Circuit  Courts  have  jurisdic- 
tion to  issue  the  common  law  writ  of  certiorari  to  review 
the  decisions  of  the  Board  for  the  purpose  of  determining 
whether  it  had  jurisdiction  or  whether  it  had  exceeded  its 
powers  and  acted  illegally  (citations).  It  may  also  be 
that  when  application  is  made  to  the  Circuit  Court  to 
have  judgment  entered  on  the  award  that  the  court  would 
have  power  to  inquire  whether  the  Board  acted  within  its 
powers,  but  whether  it  would  or  not,  this  question  may  be 
reviewed  by  the  Circuit  Courts  by  the  common  law  writ 
of  certiorari. 

"Legislation  of  this  character  is  of  recent  develop- 
ment. The  provisions  if  the  Acts  of  the  states  having 
adopted  such  legislation  upon  the  questions  here  under 
consideration  are  very  dissimilar  and  we  have  been  un- 
able to  find  much  help  from  adjudicated  cases  in  other 
jurisdictions.  The  case  most  in  point  is  a  Wisconsin  case. 
The  Wisconsin  Act  is  in  many  respects  similar  to  the 
Illinois  Act,  but  the  method  for  review  of  the  decisions  of 
the  Board  is  not  the  same.  The  constitutionality  of  the 
Wisconsin  Act  was  passed  upon  and  sustained  by  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  that  state  in  Borgnis  v  Folk  Co.,  147  Wis. 
327. 

*  *  The  Wisconsin  Act  provides  that  the  finding  of  facts 
made  by  the  Board,  'acting  within  its  powers/  shall,  in 
the  absence  of  fraud,  be  conclusive  and  shall  only  be  re- 
viewed in  the  manner  herein  provided,  which,  in  brief,  is 
by  the  party  aggrieved  commencing  an  action  for  that 
purpose  in  the  Circuit  Court  of  Dave  county  within  twen- 
ty days  from  the  date  of  the  award.  Said  court  was  given 
power,  on  the  hearing,  to  confirm  or  set  aside  the  award, 
but  it  was  only  authorized  to  set  it  aside  where  the  Board 
had  acted  without  or  in  excess  of  its  power,  where  the 
award  was  procured  by  fraud,  and  where  the  findings  of 


74  OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT 

fact  by  the  Board  did  not  support  the  award.  Appeals 
from  judgments  were  allowed  to  the  Supreme  Court  in 
the  manner  provided  for  appeals  in  other  cases  from 
judgments  of  the  Circuit  Courts.  The  court  passed  upon 
the  objections  that  the  Act  vested  judicial  power  in  a 
body  which  was  not  a  court  and  that  it  violated  the  con- 
stitutional guaranty  of  due  process  of  law,  and  held  the 
Board  (or  industrial  commission  as  it  is  called  in  the 
Wisconsin  Act),  was  not  a  court;  that  it  was  an  adminis- 
trative body  or  arm  of  the  government,  empowered,  in 
the  administration  of  the  law,  to  ascertain  some  facts 
and  apply  the  existing  law  thereto,  in  doing  which  it 
acted  quasi-judicially  but  was  not  vested  with  judicial 
power  in  a  constitutional  sense.  It  was  further  held  that 
the  decision  of  such  a  Board  may  lawfully  be  made  con- 
clusive when  it  is  acting  within  its  jurisdiction ;  that  the 
Board  could  not  conclusively  determine  its  own  jurisdic- 
tion, but  that  question  is  open  for  review  by  the  courts, 
and  if  the  law  provides  no  appeal  from  the  decisions  of 
the  Board,  the  questions  whether  it  had  acted  within  or 
had  exceeded  its  jurisdiction  are  open  to  examination  by 
and  decision  of  the  proper  court  by  writ  of  certiorari. 

"The  Simpson  Construction  Company  contend  that 
the  decision  in  People  v  Superior  Court,  234  111.  186,  that 
this  court  can  only  issue  a  writ  of  certiorari  as  auxiliary 
to  or  in  aid  of,  or  to  protect,  its  appellate  jurisdiction  is 
no  longer  the  law  since  the  amendment  of  1909  to  the 
Practice  Act,  authorizing  a  review  of  decisions  of  the 
Appellate  Court  by  writ  of  certiorari  issued  out  of  this 
court.  Previous  to  the  amendment  of  1909  appellate  jur- 
isdiction to  review  judgments  of  the  Appellate  Court  had 
been  provided  for  by  legislative  enactment.  In  fact,  pro- 
vision for  such  review  by  this  court  was  made  by  the 
legislature  upon  the  establishment  of  the  Appellate 
Court,  and  that  jurisdiction  has  been  exercised  contin- 
uously since  that  time.  The  amendment  of  1909  did  not 
take  from  the  Supreme  Court  its  jurisdiction  to  review 


OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT  75 

judgments  of  the  Appellate  Court,  but  changed  the 
method  of  review  by  appeals  and  writs  of  error  to  writs 
of  certiorari.  No  new  jurisdiction  was  conferred  upon 
the  court,  but  the  method  of  exercising  its  appellate  juris- 
diction, in  cases  where  such  jurisdiction  had  been  con- 
ferred by  law,  was  changed.  The  1909  amendment  was 
merely  a  change  in  practice,  providing  for  the  writ  of 
certiorari  in  aid  of  or  as  the  means  by  which  the  court 's 
appellate  jurisdiction  should  be  exercised.  The  Act  pro- 
vided that  in  cases  brought  to  this  court  by  certiorari  the 
court  shall  have  the  same  power  and  authority  to  review 
the  case  and  with  like  effect,  as  if  it  had  been  carried  up 
by  appeal  or  writ  of  error.  In  the  case  now  before  us 
appellate  jurisdiction  is  not  given  this  court,  or  any  other 
court,  to  review  the  decisions  of  the  Industrial  Board, 
and  it  can  only  be  reviewed  by  a  court  having  jurisdiction 
to  issue  the  common  law  writ  of  certiorari,  and  in  this 
state  only  Circuit  Courts  have  such  jurisdiction. 

4 'Our  conclusion  is  that  this  court  has  no  jurisdiction 
to  entertain  this  case,  and  the  writ  is  therefore  dis- 
missed." 

(Writ  Dismissed.) 

Frank  Uphoff  v  The  Industrial  Board  of  Illinois 
271  HI.  Sup.  312. 

Feb.  Z,  1918. 

MB.  JUSTICE  CARTER  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  court. 

"In  August,  1913,  plaintiff  in  error,  Frank  Uphoff, 
employed  the  defendant  in  error,  B.  C.  Bruner,  to  help 
build  a  broom-corn  shed  on  Uphoff 's  farm,  near  Mattoon, 
Illinois. 

"While  Bruner  was  working  on  this  structure,  a  piece 
of  metal  flew  from  the  hammer  he  was  using  and  struck 
his  eye,  destroying  its  sight. 

"He  filed  a  petition  with  the  Industrial  Board  of  Illi- 
nois asking  that  damages  be  awarded  him  for  the  loss  of 
his  eye  under  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  of  1913. 
The  arbitration  committee  appointed  by  the  Industrial 


76  OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT 

Board  nnder  that  Act  awarded  him  $1442,  for  his  in- 
jury, and  this  award  was  affirmed  by  the  majority  of  the 
Industrial  Board.  Uphoff  thereafter  filed  a  petition  in 
the  Superior  Court  of  Cook  county  for  a  writ  of  certior- 
ari.  Under  that  writ  the  proceedings  of  the  Industrial 
Board  were  reviewed  and  an  order  entered  sustaining 
said  proceedings.  This  writ  of  error  was  then  sued  out. 
Counsel  for  plaintiff  in  error  contend  that  the  Industrial 
Board  was  without  jurisdiction  as  to  an  injury  of  the 
character  of  the  one  here  in  question.  The  evidence 
shows  that  Uphoff  had  been  engaged  in  farming  for  the 
past  eighteen  years;  that  Bruner  had  worked  as  a  car- 
penter for  about  thirty  years ;  that  the  building  that  he 
was  working  on  was  a  broom-corn  shed,  32  by  24  feet  and 
\iy<2,  feet  high,  requiring  for  its  construction  the  services 
of  four  men  for  about  ten  days.  Bruner  had  been  em- 
ployed by  Uphoff  for  no  certain  time  but  apparently  to 
continue  the  work  until  the  building  was  constructed.  The 
accident  happened  during  the  seventh  day  of  his  employ- 
ment. He  received  thirty  cents  an  hour  and  was  expected 
only  to  do  carpenter  work.  He  had  never  worked  for  Up- 
hoff before. 

"Section  1  of  the  Workmen 's  Compensation  Act  pro- 
vides that  any  employer  may  elect  to  provide  and  pay 
compensation  for  accidental  injuries  sustained  by  em- 
ployees arising  in  the  course  of  employment  and  thereby 
release  himself  from  all  other  liability. 

"It  is  conceded  here  that  plaintiff  had  given  no  notice 
to  the  Industrial  Board  of  his  acceptance  of  the  provi- 
sions of  said  Act.  He  therefore  cannot  be  held  liable 
thereunder  unless  it  can  be  shown  that  he  is  one  of  the 
class  of  employers  who  are  held  liable  under  the  Act  even 
though  they  have  elected  to  come  under  it.  While  the  en- 
tire Act  must  be  read  in  order  to  understand  its  intent 
and  meaning,  certain  sections  must  be  particularly  con- 
strued in  order  to  reach  a  proper  conclusion  in  this  case. 

"Paragraph  (b)  of  section  3  of  said  Act  reads:  *  *  * 


OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT  77 

"Section  4  defines  what  shall  be  understood  by  the 
term  'employer'  in  said  Act.  There  is  nothing  in  said 
section  which  will  throw  especial  light  on  the  question 
here  involved.  If  that  section  were  construed  alone,  Up- 
hoff  might  be  considered  an  employer  coming  within  the 
provisions  of  said  Act.  Section  5  provides  that  'the 
term  "employee"  as  used  in  the  Act  shall  be  construed  to 
mean  *  *  *  Second — Every  person  in  the  service  of  an- 
other under  any  contract  of  hire,  express  or  implied,  oral 
or  written  *  *  *  but  not  including  any  person  whose  em- 
ployment is  but  casual  or  who  is  not  engaged  in  the  usual 
course  of  the  trade,  business,  profession  or  occupation  of 
his  employer.' 

"The  intention  of  the  law-maker  is  the  law.  This  in- 
tention is  to  be  gathered  from  the  necessity  or  reason  of 
the  enactment  and  the  meaning  of  the  words,  enlarged  or 
restricted  according  to  their  real  intent.  In  construing  a 
statute  the  courts  are  not  confined  to  the  literal  meaning 
of  the  words.  A  thing  within  the  intention  is  regarded 
within  the  statute  though  not  within  the  letter.  A  thing 
within  the  letter  is  not  within  the  statute  if  not  also  with- 
in the  intention.  When  the  intention  can  be  collected  from 
the  statute,  words  may  be  modified  or  altered  so  as  to 
obviate  all  inconsistency  with  such  intention.  (Hoyne  v 
Danisch,  264  111.  467.)  When  great  inconvenience  or  ab- 
surd consequences  will  result  from  a  particular  construc- 
tion that  construction  should  be  avoided,  unless  the  mean- 
ing of  the  legislature  be  so  plain  and  manifest  that  avoid- 
ance is  impossible.  (People  v  Wren,  4  Scam.  269.)  The 
courts  are  bound  to  presume  that  absurd  consequences 
leading  to  great  injustice  were  not  contemplated  by  the 
legislature,  and  a  construction  should  be  adopted  that  it 
may  be  reasonable  to\  presume  was  contemplated.  (2 
Lewis  Sutherland  on  Stat.  Const.  §  489 ;  People  v  City  of 
Chicago,  152  111.  546 ;  Canal  Comrs.  v  Sanitary  District, 
184  id.  597.)  A  statute  is  passed  as  a  whole  and  not  in 
parts  or  sections;  hence  each  part  or  section  should  be 


78  OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT 

construed  in  connection  with  every  other  part  or  section. 
In  order  to  get  the  real  intention  of  the  legislature,  at- 
tention must  not  be  confined  to  the  one  section  to  be  con- 
strued. Warner  v  King,  267  111.  82,  and  cited  cases. 

"Numerous  authorities  from  other  jurisdictions,  con- 
struing Workmen's  Compensation  Acts,  have  been  cited 
and  frequent  references  have  been  made  to  Acts  in  other 
jurisdictions.  Both  counsel  have  cited  authorities  which, 
it  is  argued,  support  the  conclusion  contended  for.  The 
wording  of  our  Statute  is  so  different  on  the  question 
here  under  consideration  that  the  other  acts  or  decisions 
could  have  very  little  weight  as  to  the  proper  construc- 
tion to  be  here  given  and  further  reference  to  them  is  un- 
necessary. 

"Manifestly,  from  the  reading  of  the  above  quoted 
sections  of  the  Act,  some  employers  were  not  intended 
to  be  included  in  the  Act  unless  they  elected  to  be  so. 
Clearly,  under  the  quoted  sections,  read  in  connection 
with  the  remainder  of  the  Act,  farm  laborers,  engaged  in 
general  farming  would  not  be  covered  by  the  Act  unless 
the  farmer  elected  to  accept  the  Act  under  the  provisions 
of  section  1. 

"It  is  contended  by  counsel  for  defendants  in  error 
that  plaintiff  in  error  must  be  held  to  come  under  the 
provisions  of  the  Act  under  Subdivision  1  of  paragraph 
(b)  of  Section  3,  as  the  broom-corn  shed  would  be  in- 
cluded in  the  provisions  of  that  section  in  the  building 
'of  any  structure.'  This  could  only  be  true  if  it  were 
held  that  in  so  building  such  broom-corn  shed  the  farmer 
was  engaged  in  an  occupation,  enterprise  or  business  and 
was  engaged  in  the  usual  course  of  his  'trade,  business, 
profession  or  occupation/  and  that  the  employment  was 
not  casual.  It  is  also  plain  that  the  legislature  only  in- 
tended to  include  under  paragraph  (b)  any  such  occupa- 
tions, enterprises  or  businesses  of  the  employer  when 
they  were  properly  considered  to  be  'extra-hazardous.' 
It  is  true  that  the  clause  in  subdivision  8  of  said  para- 


OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT  79 

graph  (b)  calling  all  of  these  trades,  businesses,  enter- 
prises or  occupations  extra-hazardous  was  inserted  for 
the  purpose  of  making  clear  what  was  considered  extra- 
hazardous,  but  it  is  also  clear  that  the  legislature  did  not 
intend  to  include  work  that  everyone  knows  is  not  extra- 
hazardous  or  even  hazardous. 

"It  is  not  seriously  contended  by  counsel  that  the 
mere  building  of  this  crib  could  be  properly  classed  as  the 
business  or  occupation  of  plaintiff  in  error,  but  it  is  ear- 
nestly urged  that  it  could  properly  be  considered  under 
the  term  'enterprise.'    An  enterprise  is  'an  undertaking 
of  hazard;  an  arduous  attempt.'    (15  Cyc.  1053,  and  cited 
cases.)    Lexicographers  define  an  enterprise  as  'an  un- 
dertaking; something  projected  and  attempted;  an  at- 
tempt or  project,  particularly  an  undertaking  of  some  im- 
portance or  one  requiring  boldness,  energy  or  persever- 
ance ;  an  arduous  or  hazardous  attempt,  as,  a  warlike  en- 
terprise. '    The  building  of  this  shed  might  be  classed  un- 
der the  head  of  something  projected  or  attempted,  but 
hardly  as  an  important  undertaking  requiring  courage 
or  energy  or  one  that  was  arduous  or  hazardous.    To  say 
that  the  word  'enterprise'  covered  the  building  of  any 
structure,  however  small,  would  lead,  in  some  instances, 
to  absurd  consequences.    A  chicken  coop  or  dog  kennel 
ten  feet  square  and  four  or  five  feet  high  would  be  a 
'structure'  in  a  technical  sense  of  the  term,  but  it  would 
hardly  be  contended  that  such  a  structure  was  within  the 
meaning  of  this  Act,  according  to  the  intent  of  the  legis- 
lature.   'Carriage  by  land/  under  subdivision  3  of  said 
paragraph  (6),  in  the  strict,  literal  meaning  of  the  term 
might  require  that  it  include  the  hauling  of  grain  by  team 
and  wagon  from  the  farm  to  the  elevator.    Surely  that 
was  not  within  the  legislative  intention.    The  word  'ex- 
cavating/ under  subdivision  2  of  said  paragraph  (b), 
might  cover,  technically,  the  digging  of  a  post-hole  on  a 
farm,  but  it  was  certainly  never  so  intended.    It  is  plain 
from  the  use  of  the  word  'enterprise'  in  other  subdivi- 


80  OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT 

sions  of  said  paragraph  (b)  that  it  was  intended  to  mean  a 
work  of  some  importance  that  might  properly  be  consid- 
ered arduous  or  hazardous.  The  building  of  this  sort  of 
a  structure  was  hardly  more  hazardous  than  the  building 
of  a  dog  kennel  or  chicken  coop  or  the  building  of  an  or- 
dinary board  fence  for  the  farm.  From  any  fair  con- 
struction of  the  Act  the  legislature  never  intended  to  call 
working  on  every  farm  structure,  no  matter  how  small, 
as  extra-hazardous. 

"In  the  oral  argument  of  this  case  it  was  suggested 
that  in  1915  the  legislature  amended  the  Workmen's  Com- 
pensation Act  so  as  to  make  it  absolutely  clear  that  none 
of  the  employees  of  farmers  should  be  included  in  the 
Act  unless  the  farmer  so  elected.  Each  counsel  argued 
that  the  fact  that  the  legislature  so  amended  the  original 
Act  tended  to  support  the  construction  contended  for  by 
him  as  to  the  original  Act.  We  do  not  think  any  fair 
argument  can  be  drawn  from  this  amendment  in  support 
of  either  construction  contended  for,  and  nothing  we 
have  said  here  is  intended  to  have  any  bearing  on  the 
construction  that  should  be  given  to  the  Act  thus 
amended. 

' '  Counsel  for  defendant  in  error  Bruner  contend  that 
the  decision  of  the  Industrial  Board  under  this  Statute 
is  decisive  of  this  question  and  cannot  be  inquired  into 
by  the  courts.  This  contention  cannot  be  supported.  The 
decision  of  the  Industrial  Board  is  only  binding  when  it 
is  acting  within  its  powers.  This  court  said  in  Courier  v 
Simpson  Construction  Co.,  264  111.  488,  that  'the  Indus- 
trial Board  has  no  jurisdiction  to  apply  the  Act  to  per- 
sons or  corporations  who  are  not  subject  to  its  provisions 
nor  to  an  accident  not  within  the  provisions  of  the  Act/ 
and  that  if  it  did  so  the  remedy  was  in  the  courts.  (See 
also,  to  the  same  effect,  Borgnis  v  Folk  Co.,  147  Wis. 
327.)  In  view  of  what  we  have  already  said,  it  is  clear 
that  the  Industrial  Board  was  without  jurisdiction  in  the 
matter. 


OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT  81 

"The  judgment  of  the  Superior  Court  is  reversed  and 
the  cause  remanded,  with  directions  to  set  aside  and  hold 
for  naught  the  finding  of  the  Industrial  Board." 

(Reversed  and  Remanded  with  directions.) 

Dragovich,  Administrator  v  The  Iroquois  Iron  Co. 
269  111.  Sup.  479. 

October,  1915. 

MB.  JUSTICE  CARTER  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  court. 

"This  was  a  proceeding  to  recover  compensation  un- 
der the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  of  1911,  for  the 
death  of  Frank  M.  Markusic.  The  case  was  tried  in  the 
Circuit  Court  of  Cook  county  on  an  appeal  from  a  report 
or  reward  of  the  board  of  arbitrators,  rendered  in  ac- 
cordance with  Section  10  of  said  Compensation  Act.  On 
the  trial  in  the  Circuit  Court,  a  judgment  for  $3,500  was 
entered  in  favor  of  appellee,  payable  in  installments,  in 
accordance  with  the  terms  of  the  statute.  From  that 
judgment  this  appeal  was  taken  direct  to  this  court  on  the 
ground  that  said  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  is  uncon- 
stitutional. 

"On  a  hearing  in  the  Circuit  Court  the  journals  of 
the  House  and  the  Senate  were  introduced,  and  it  is  ar- 
gued from  them  that  it  does  not  appear  that  twenty-three 
amendments  to  said  bill  were  printed  before  the  final 
passage  of  the  bill.  The  Senate  journal  shows  that  the 
bill  was  introduced,  amended  and  passed.  The  House 
journal  shows  that  the  bill  was  received  from  the  Senate 
and  having  been  printed  and  read  the  first  time  was  re- 
ferred to  a  committee ;  that  the  committee  afterwards  re- 
ported the  bill  back  with  twenty-three  amendments,  with 
a  recommendation  that  the  amendments  be  adopted  and 
that  the  bill  as  amended  do  pass.  Thereafter  the  bill 
was  ordered  to  a  second  reading,  and  upon  such  reading 
the  committee's  amendments  were  offered  and  adopted. 
The  journal  priceeds:  '  There  being  no  further  amend- 


82  OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT 

ments,  the  foregoing  amendments,  numbered  1  to  23  in 
elusive,  were  ordered  printed  and  engrossed/  The  bill 
was  then  ordered  to  a  third  reading.  The  committee  on 
enrolled  and  engrossed  bills  reported  that  the  House 
amendments  had  been  correctly  engrossed,  and  later  the 
record  shows  that  the  bill  was  taken  up,  read  at  large  a 
third  time  and  passed  by  a  vote  of  98  yeas  to  2  nays. 

"The  Senate  journal  shows  that  two  days  later  the 
bill  was  taken  up  in  the  Senate  and  the  question  then  be- 
ing, '  shall  the  Senate  concur  with  the  House  of  Represen- 
tatives in  the  adoption  of  the  following  amendments  (1 
to  23)  to  the  bill?'  and  the  yeas  and  nays  being  taken,  it 
was  decided  in  the  affirmative  by  a  vote  of  35  yeas,  nays  1. 

' '  Counsel  for  appellant  argues  that  under  the  rulings 
of  this  court  in  Neiberger  v  McCullough,  253  111.  Sup.  312, 
and  McAuliffe  v  O'Connell,  258  id.  186,  this  law,  on  ac- 
count of  the  minutes  of  the  journal,  must  be  held  uncon- 
stitutional ;  that  it  is  necessary,  in  order  to  hold  it  consti- 
tutional, to  find  in  the  journal  affirmative  evidence  that 
the  amendments  were  actually  printed  before  the  final 
vote.  *  *  * 

"We  have  repeatedly  held  that  where  the  constitu- 
tionality of  a  law  is  involved,  every  presumption  must  be 
indulged  and  every  reasonable  doubt  resolved  in  favor  of 
its  validity.  It  is  a  familiar  doctrine  of  this  court  that 
laws  will  not  be  declared  unconstitutional  unless  it  is 
clearly  proved  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  that  the  re- 
quirements of  the  organic  law  have  not  been  observed. 
(People  v  Brady,  268  111.  Sup.  578,  and  cases  cited;  Peo- 
ple v  Henning  Co.,  260  id.  554;  Home  Ins.  Co.  v  Swigert, 
104  id.  653.)  This  same  rule  applies  to  the  constitution- 
ality of  a  law  when  any  defect  is  claimed  in  its  passage. 
*  *  * 

"The  constitution  does  not  require  that  the  legislative 
journal  shall  show  affirmatively  that  the  bill  or  its  amend- 
ments have  been  printed.  *  *  * 

"The  journal  shows  that  the  amendments  were  or- 


OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT  83 

dered  printed.  Nothing  appears  on  the  journal  to  indi- 
cate that  the  order  was  not  complied  with,  and  it  must 
be  presumed,  under  this  rule,  that  these  amendments 
were  actually  printed  before  the  final  passage  of  the  bill. 
Not  only  did  the  journal  show  that  these  amendments 
were  ordered  printed,  but  the  rules  of  both  the  Senate 
and  the  House  required  that  all  amendments  should  be 
printed  before  being  passed.  By  an  unbroken  line  of  de- 
cisions this  court  has  held  that  the  presumption  must  be 
that  a  public  officer  has  pursued  the  course  pointed  out 
by  law  and  has  performed  his  duty,  until  the  contrary  is 
shown.  *  *  *  The  law  must  therefore  be  held  constitu- 
tional. 

"Counsel  for  appellant  further  argues  that  even 
though  the  law  be  held  constitutional,  appellee  could  not 
recover  under  the  Compensation  Act  as  the  record  does 
not  show  that  he  was  injured  while  in  the  course  of  his 
employment  by  the  appellant. 

"The  evidence  shows  that  the  deceased,  Markusic, 
had  been  in  the  employ  of  appellant,  The  Iroquois  Iron 
Company,  for  a  number  of  years,  doing  different  kinds 
of  work  about  appellant's  plant,  sometimes  in  the  build- 
ings and  sometimes  on  the  dock.  On  December  24,  1912, 
he  was  working  in  the  shop  of  appellant,  assisting  in 
making  some  safety  appliances.  Max  Gornick,  with  two 
or  three  other  men,  was  working  in  the  same  shop,  re- 
pairing steam  engines  under  the  floor,  and  for  this  pur- 
pose some  of  the  steel  plates  forming  the  floor  had  been 
taken  up,  thereby  leaving  an  opening  or  hole,  in  which 
was  accumulated  a  quantity  of  hot  water  from  which 
were  escaping  vapor  and  steam,  making  it  impossible  for 
a  person  approaching  the  opening  from  where  Markusic, 
deceased,  was  working,  to  see  the  hole.  Gornick,  while 
engaged  in  this  work,  slipped  and  fell  into  the  opening 
and  into  the  hot  water  and  screamed  for  help,  crying  out 
in  Croatian,  which  was  the  native  language  of  Markusic 
— 'For  good  God!  pull  me  out,  people!  pull  me  out!'  At 


84  OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT 

this  cry,  the  testimony  is,  Markusic  dropped  his  work 
and  ran  toward  the  place  from  which  the  cry  came.  The 
steam  and  vapor  coming  from  the  water  so  obscured  the 
opening  that  he  fell  into  the  hole  and  was  so  badly  scald- 
ed that  he  died  from  the  effects  two  days  later.  Gornick 
was  being  assisted  out  by  others  just  as  Markusic  fell  in. 
The  distance  from  where  deceased  was  working  to  the 
place  where  the  accident  occurred  is  estimated  by  wit- 
nesses to  be  from  100  to  150  feet.  In  traveling  between 
the  two  points  he  would  have  to  go  about  50  or  75  feet 
south  and  then  about  50  feet  west  around  a  boiler.  The 
place  of  the  accident  could  not  be  seen,  apparently,  from 
the  place  where  deceased  worked. 

"Section  1  of  the  Act  requires  that  compensation  may 
be  had  for  accidental  injuries  sustained  by  any  employee 
'arising  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  the  employment/  etc. 
From  the  facts  already  stated,  counsel  for  appellant  ar- 
gues that  it  was  not  shown  that  the  accident  arose  out 
of  and  in  the  course  of  deceased's  employment. 

"This  provision  of  the  Statute  has  never  been  con- 
strued by  this  court  but  somewhat  similar  acts  have  been 
construed  by  the  courts  in  other  jurisdictions.  Under 
these  authorities  it  is  clear  that  it  is  the  duty  of  an  em- 
ployer to  save  the  lives  of  his  employees,  if  possible,  when 
they  are  in  danger  while  in  his  employment,  and  there- 
fore it  is  the  duty  of  a  workman  in  his  employ,  when  ac- 
casion  presents  itself,  to  do  what  he  can  to  save  the  lives 
of  his  fellow-employees  when  all  are  at  the  time  working 
in  the  line  of  their  employment.  Any  other  rule  of  law 
would  be  not  only  inhuman  but  unreasonable  and  uneco- 
nomical, and  would,  in  the  end,  result  in  financial  loss  to 
employers  on  account  of  injuries  to  their  employees. 
From  every  point  of  view  it  was  the  duty  of  deceased,  as 
a  fellow  employee,  in  the  line  of  his  duty  to  his  employer, 
to  attempt  to  save  the  life  of  his  fellow-employee  under 
the  circumstances  here  shown.  That  he  failed  in  his  at- 


OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT  85 

tempt  does  not  in  the  slightest  degree  change  the  legal 
situation. 

"The  reasoning  of  the  following  cases  tends  to  sup- 
port this  conclusion :  Bees  v  Thomas,  1-4,  W.  C.  C.  C.  9 ; 
Matthews  v  Bedworth,  1  id.  124;  London  &  Edinburgh 
Shipping  Co.  v  Brown,  42  Scottish  L.  B.  357. 

''Counsel  insist  that  there  is  no  proof  in  the  record 
that  Gornick,  the  man  who  first  fell  into  the  hot  water, 
was  working  in  the  line  of  his  employment  at  the  time  of 
the  accident.  The  burden  of  furnishing  evidence  from 
which  the  inference  can  be  legitimately  drawn  that  the 
death  of  the  employee  was  caused  by  an  accident ( arising 
out  of  and  in  the  course  of  the  employment,'  rested  upon 
the  claimant.  Bryant  v  Fissell,  86  Atl.  Rep.  (N.  J.)  458. 
We  think  the  evidence  clearly  shows  that  Gornick  was  at 
work  in  the  line  of  his  employment  at  the  time  he  fell  into 
the  opening,  and  that  on  principle  and  authority,  under 
the  circumstances  shown  here,  it  must  be  held  that  the 
deceased,  Markusic,  was  working  in  the  line  of  his  em- 
ployment, under  this  Statute,  at  the  time  he  was  injured. 

"Counsel  for  appellant  further  insists  that  the  ver- 
dict of  the  jury  was  not  sufficient  to  sustain  the  judgment. 
The  verdict  read:  'We  the  jury  find  the  issues  in  favor  of 
the  petitioner  and  that  he  is  entitled  to  recover  compen- 
sation. '  Counsel  argues  that  the  jury  should  have  found 
the  amount  of  compensation  and  from  whom  the  adminis- 
trator was  entitled  to  recover.  With  this  we  do  not  agree. 
It  is  quite  customary  for  verdicts,  even  in  common  law 
cases,  to  recite,  'We,  the  jury,  find  the  issues  in  favor  of 
the  plaintiff,'  etc.,  without  stating  that  the  recovery  shall 
be  against  the  defendant.  We  see  no  reason  why  it  was 
necessary  in  this  case  for  the  jury  to  state  against  whom 
the  verdict  was  rendered.  There  was  only  one  defendant, 
and  if  the  petitioner  was  to  receive  compensation  at  all 
it  must  be  from  the  defendant. 

"Section  4  of  this  Statute  provides  that  if  the  em- 
ployee leaves  a  widow,  child  or  children  to  whose  sup- 


86  OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT 

port  he  had  contributed  within  five  years  previous  to  his 
death,  the  compensation  shall  be  'a  sum  equal  to  four 
times  the  average  annual  earnings  of  the  employee/  but 
not  less,  in  any  event,  than  $3,500.  (Kurd's  Stat.  1911,  p. 
1138.) 

"The  proof  showed,  without  contradiction,  that  the 
deceased  left  a  widow  and  minor  child.  It  was  stipulated 
during  the  trial  that  the  average  weekly  wages  of  the  de- 
ceased for  more  than  a  year  prior  to  his  death  were 
$19.25  and  that  he  had  contributed  to  the  support  of  his 
wife  and  children  within  five  years  preceding  his  death. 

' '  The  Act  provides  that  the  matters  shall  be  first  sub- 
mitted to  arbitration,  as  was  done  in  this  case,  and  fur- 
ther provides,  in  section  10,  that  either  party  shall  have 
the  right  to  appeal  from  such  report  or  award  to  the  Cir- 
cuit Court,  as  was  done  in  this  case,  and  'upon  such  ap- 
peal the  questions  in  dispute  shall  be  heard  de  novo, '  etc. 

"There  was  no  question  in  dispute  as  to  the  amount 
of  the  annual  earnings  of  the  deceased.  From  the  record 
it  is  manifest  that  the  amount  that  should  be  recovered 
was  not  in  any  way  in  dispute  before  the  jury.  The  chief, 
if  not  the  only,  question  in  dispute  was  whether  or  not 
the  administrator  was  entitled  to  recover  anything  for 
the  death  of  the  deceased. 

"The  stipulation  fixed  the  annual  weekly  earnings; 
the  verdict  found  the  petitioner  entitled  to  compensa- 
tion ;  and  the  statute  fixed  the  method ;  therefore,  the  de- 
termination of  the  amount  was  a  mere  mathematical  op- 
eration, which  was  performed  by  the  court  in  entering 
the  judgment.  Even  in  a  common  law  action  a  verdict 
will  not  be  reversed  for  mere  informalities  where  they 
do  not  affect  the  merits  of  the  case  and  justice  has  been 
done.  Bates  v  Williams,  43  111.  Sup.  494 ;  Bacon  v  Schep- 
•flin,  185  id.  122. 

"In  Hall  v  First  Nat 'I  Bank,  133  111.  Sup.  234,  in  dis- 
cussing a  question  somewhat  similar,  in  principle,  to  that 
here,  the  court  said  (p.  243) : 


OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT  87 

"  'The  form  of  the  verdict  was,  "We,  the  jury,  find 
the  issues  for  the  plaintiff,"  no  damages  being  assessed 
by  them.  The  reason  for  this  appears  to  be  that  the  de- 
fendants had  suffered  judgment  to  go  against  them  by 
default  and  the  court  thereupon  assessed  the  damages 
and  rendered  final  judgment.  On  a  motion  by  the  de- 
fendants to  set  aside  the  default  and  for  leave  to  plead, 
the  court  stayed  proceedings  on  the  judgment  and  al- 
lowed the  defendants  to  plead,  but  refused  to  set  aside 
the  judgment,  allowing  it  to  stand  as  security  for  plain- 
tiff until  the  trial  of  the  issues  presented  by  the  pleas.  If 
the  defendants  failed  to  establish  their  defense  judgment 
was  to  stand.  Under  such  circumstances  the  verdict  of 
the  jury  was  not  erroneous  in  form  or  substance  as  the 
question  of  damages  was  not  submitted  to  them/  That 
case,  on  this  point,  was  quoted  with  approval  in  Dulle  v 
Lolly,  167  111.  Sup.  485.  The  reasoning  in  those  cases 
fully  supports  the  conclusion  that  this  verdict,  on  the 
facts  found  in  this  record,  was  sufficient  to  support  the 
judgment.  It  might  have  been  proper  to  have  made  the 
verdict  more  specific,  but  the  informalities  in  no  way 
affect  the  merits  of  the  case. 

"We  find  no  reversible  error  in  the  record.  The  judg- 
ment of  the  Circuit  Court  will  be  affirmed." 

Frey  v  Kerens-Donnewald  Coal  Co. 
271  111.  Sup.  121. 

December,  1915. 

"Plaintiff  was  employed  during  the  year  1912  as  a 
miner  in  the  coal  mine  of  defendant,  located  at  Wiorden, 
Illinois.  Both  he  and  the  coal  company  had  elected  to  be 
bound  by  the  provisions  of  the  Workmen's  Compensa- 
tion Act  of  1911,  in  force  May  1, 1912.  On  November  22, 
1912,  while  engaged  in  mining  coal  in  said  mine,  plaintiff 
was  knocked  down  and  injured  by  a  mine  prop.  Being 
incapacitated  for  work  he  was  paid  compensation  by  the 
defendant  company  at  the  rate  of  $1.42  per  day  up  to  No- 
vember 15,  1913,  making  a  sum  total  of  $489.88. 


88  OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT 

"He  filed  his  petition  in  the  county  court  of  Madison 
county  asking  for  the  appointment  of  an  arbitrator  to 
fix  the  amount  of  compensation  to  be  paid  to  him  under 
the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act,  which  the  court  did. 
The  plaintiff  and  the  defendant  each  named  an  arbitrator 
and  two  of  said  arbitrators  made  a  report  finding  that  the 
plaintiff  was  entitled  to  compensation  at  the  rate  of  $12 
per  week  for  29  2-3  weeks  or  a  total  of  $3,500,  less  $489.88 
paid  him  by  the  defendant. 

"Defendant  then  filed  its  petition  in  the  Circuit  Court 
and  asked  to  have  the  award  of  the  arbitrators  reviewed 
under  the  provisions  of  said  Act.  A  jury  was  waived, 
and  on  a  trial  before  the  court  November  25,  1914,  the 
Circuit  Court  made  the  same  findings  as  the  arbitrators, 
that  the  plaintiff  was  permanently  injured  and  totally 
disabled,  as  aforesaid,  and  that  he  was  entitled  to  recover 
from  the  defendant  for  his  full  compensation  the  sum 
of  $3,500,  less  said  amount  paid  by  it,  or  $3,010.12,  pay- 
able at  the  rate  of  $12  per  week ;  that  as  no  payment  had 
been  made  by  the  defendant  since  November  15, 1913,  the 
defendant  should  then  pay  $636  cash,  that  being  the  sum 
due  since  said  last  date  at  $12  per  week,  and  that  the 
remainder  of  $2,374.12  be  paid  at  the  rate  of  $12  per  week, 
beginning  with  the  date  of  the  judgment.  This  writ  of 
error  is  presented  by  the  defendant  to  reverse  the  judg- 
ment. 

'  *  Only  two  grounds  are  urged  by  the  defendant  for  a 
reversal  of  the  judgment:  (1)  That  there  is  no  evidence 
in  the  record  sufficient  to  justify  the  award  of  the  com- 
pensation to  the  plaintiff  upon  the  ground  that  he  was 
injured  while  in  the  course  of  his  employment,  because 
his  paralysis  was  not  due  to  his  said  injury;  (2)  that  said 
Act  of  1911  was  never  legally  passed  by  the  General  As- 
sembly, because  the  bill,  with  its  amendments,  was  not 
printed,  as  required  by  the  Constitution,  before  its  final 
passage  in  the  House. 

"First — The  record  in  this  case  shows  a  stipulation 


OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT  89 

by  the  parties  to  this  proceeding  that  plaintiff  was  in- 
jured while  working  for  the  defendant,  in  the  course  of 
his  employment.  Plaintiff  testified  that  the  prop  in  ques- 
tion struck  him  on  the  side  of  the  head,  midway  between 
the  top  of  his  ear  and  the  center  of  the  top  of  his  head, 
while  he  was  mining  coal  for  the  defendant  in  its  said 
mine,  and  knocked  him  about  fifteen  feet  against  the  rib 
of  coal;  that  the  top  of  his  head  was  affected  and  his 
skull  fractured;  that  he  worked  seven  or  eight  days  there- 
after, and  on  Sunday  morning,  while  he  was  reading  a 
newspaper,  he  got  so  he  couldn't  walk  and  his  wife  put 
him  to  bed ;  that  he  was  taken  to  the  hospital  in  Granite 
City,  where  they  took  out  pieces  of  his  skull  and  some 
'bruised  blood;'  that  the  injury  caused  all  his  strength 
to  leave  him  and  that  he  can't  use  his  right  hand  or  his 
right  leg,  and  that  the  right  side  of  his  body  is  paralyzed; 
that  he  then  had  no  better  use  of  his  limbs  than  he  had 
three  months  after  the  injury,  and  has  not  been  able  to  do 
any  work  since  he  was  paralyzed  and  sometimes  can 
scarcely  walk. 

"It  was  stipulated  that  his  average  earnings  for  the 
year  previous  to  his  injury  were  three  dollars  per  day. 

* '  Drs.  Ely,  McBrien  and  Ferguson  testified  for  plain- 
tiff and  all  of  them  qualified  as  expert  physicians  of  more 
than  fifteen  years '  practice  in  medicine  and  surgery.  All 
of  them  testified  that  plaintiff  had  paralysis  in  the  right 
leg  and  arm  and  suffered  from  a  pain  in  the  left  side  of 
the  head,  where  the  blow  was  received. 

"Dr.  McBrien  testified  that  he  had  made  a  careful 
examination  of  the  plaintiff's  head  and  found  a  dent 
pressure  over  the  place,  on  the  left  side  of  his  head,  where 
he  said  he  had  been  struck  with  a  prop  or  block  of  wood 
in  the  mine;  that  he  assisted  in  trephining  his  skull  at 
the  place  he  was  hurt,  took  out  a  piece  of  bone  and  re- 
lieved the  pressure,  and  found  the  bone  dark  and  discol- 
ored but  was  not  sure  that  he  found  a  blood  clot ;  that  the 
operation  was  successful  in  opening  up  and  relieving  the 


90  OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT 

pressure ;  that  he  was  improved  some  but  cannot  use  the 
right  side  of  his  body  much  and  drags  it  and  in  his  con- 
dition could  not  perform  any  hard  labor.  He  gave  it  as 
his  opinion  that  his  condition  was  due  to  an  injury  to  the 
skull  caused  by  a  blow  and  that  it  is  permanent. 

"Dr.  Ferguson  testified  that  in  his  judgment  the 
plaintiff's  condition  was  due  to  the  injury  or  blow  on  his 
head.  He  also  testified  that  the  fact  that  plaintiff  worked 
every  day  after  the  injury  would  increase  his  chances  of 
producing  a  hemorrhage  in  the  brain  if  the  injury  was 
such  as  to  have  destroyed  the  vessels  weakened  by  the 
blow;  also,  that  if  plaintiff  continued  to  work  for  eight 
days  following  that  blow  without  being  impaired  from  his 
work  that  might  lead  him  to  believe  other  causes  might 
have  acted  later.  Dr.  Ely  testified  that  he  examined  the 
plaintiff  and  thought  the  cause  of  his  paralysis  was  due 
to  a  hemorrhage. 

"The  foregoing  evidence  amply  sustains  the  findings 
of  the  court.  The  defendant  offered  no  evidence  to  con- 
tradict the  four  witnesses  aforesaid,  and  they  are  all  the 
witnesses  who  testified  on  this  branch  of  the  case. 

"Second — For  the  purpose  of  proving  that  the  Work- 
men's Compensation  Act  of  1911  was  not  legally  passed 
by  the  General  Assembly  the  defendant  produced  before 
the  court  two  large  volumes  certified  by  James  A.  Rose, 
Secretary  of  State,  to  be  true  copies  of  the  original  jour- 
nals, respectively  of  the  Senate  and  House  of  the  Forty- 
seventh  General  Assembly  of  Illinois.  The  fly-leaves  and 
a  number  of  pages  in  each  of  said  volumes  were  intro- 
duced, which  purported  to  show  the  introduction  of  Sen- 
ate Bill  No.  283  by  Mr.  Henson  and  various  proceedings 
in  the  House  and  Senate,  relating  to  the  passage  of  the 
bill,  which,  as  finally  passed,  is  what  is  known  as  the 
Workmen's  Compensation  Act  of  1911.  The  entire  evi- 
dence introduced  by  the  defendant  failed  to  make  the 
proper  proof  that  said  bill  was  not  printed  before  its 
final  passage  in  the  House.  The  presumption  is  in  favor 


OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT  91 

of  the  validity  of  the  Act,  and  it  can  only  be  overcome  by 
clear  and  convincing  proof  so  as  to  satisfy  the  court,  be- 
yond a  reasonable  doubt,  of  its  invalidity.  (People  v 
Joyce,  246  111.  124.)  To  prove  that  a  bill  was  not  printed 
before  its  final  passage  by  the  House,  not  only  the  entire 
record  of  the  bill  in  the  journal  of  the  House,  from  its 
introduction  to  its  final  passage,  should  be  put  in  evi- 
dence, but  it  should  also  further  appear  from  the  evidence 
of  some  one  who  has  examined  the  entire  contents  of  the 
journal,  that  the  pages  introduced  in  evidence  constitute 
the  complete  record  of  the  proceedings  in  the  House  with 
reference  to  the  bill.  The  proof  in  this  particular  was  not 
shown  to  be,  and  does  not  purport  to  be,  the  complete 
record  in  the  House  journal  with  reference  to  the  intro- 
duction and  passage  of  the  bill. 

"The  contention  of  the  defendant,  however,  that  the 
Act  is  invalid  because  the  House  journal  does  not  show 
that  the  bill  was  printed  before  its  final  passage,  cannot 
be  sustained  in  any  event,  as  this  court  has  passed  upon 
that  very  question  and  has  held  that  the  journal  of  the 
House  contains  evidence  that  the  bill  was  printed~before 
its  final  passage,  and  that  the  Act  was  legally  passed. 

Dragovich  v  Iroquois  Iron  Co..  269  111.  Sup.  478. 
"The  judgment  of  the  Circuit  Court  is  affirmed." 

Laura  Staley  v  Illinois  Central  Railroad  Company 
268  IU.  Sup.  356. 

June  24,  1915. 

Opinion  by  MB.  JUSTICE  CARTER. 

"This  is  a  proceeding  under  the  Workmen's  Compen- 
sation Law  of  this  state  (Laws  1911,  page  315),  com- 
menced by  petition  filed  by  plaintiff  in  error  in  the  Cir- 
cuit Court  of  Marion  county  for  compensation  for  the 
death  of  her  husband,  who  was  run  over  and  killed  by  one 
of  defendant  in  error's  switch  engines  in  its  yards,  near 
Centralia,  Illinois. 


92  OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT 

"The  defendant  in  error  was  served  with  notice  and 
after  certain  amendments  had  been  made,  filed  an 
amended  answer,  wherein  it  set  up  that  the  cause  stated 
in  the  petition  was  not  comprehended  within  the  meaning 
of  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  but  was  within  the 
scope  and  meaning  of  the  Federal  Employers'  Liability 
Act. 

"The  trial  court  found  in  favor  of  plaintiff  in  error 
and  entered  judgment  in  her  favor  for  $3,500,  payable  in 
a  lump  sum. 

"From  this  judgment  defendant  in  error  appealed  to 
the  Appellate  Court.  That  court  affirmed  the  judgment 
of  the  trial  court  except  that  it  was  held  that  under  the 
Workmen's  Compensation  Act  it  should  not  be  for  the 
full  amount  of  $3,500  but  should  have  been  commuted  at 
its  present  value.  Plaintiff  in  error  thereupon  brought 
the  case  to  this  court  by  petition  for  'certiorari.' 

"Several  questions  are  raised  and  argued  in  the 
briefs.  It  is  first  necessary  to  consider  and  decide  the 
question  whether  there  can  be  a  recovery  in  this  cause 
under  the  Illinois  Workmen's  Compensation  Act,  so- 
called,  or  whether  the  case  is  comprehended  within  the 
meaning  and  scope  of  the  Federal  Employers'  Liability 
Act  and  recovery  can  only  be  had  under  this  last  named 
law. 

"If  the  position  of  defendant  in  error  on  this  point, 
raised  by  filing  cross-errors  in  this  court,  is  sustained, 
it  will  be  unnecessary  to  consider  the  other  questions  in- 
volved. 

"Counsel  for  defendant  in  error  insist  in  their 
amended  answer  that  plaintiff  in  error's  intestate  was 
engaged,  at  the  time  of  his  fatal  injury,  in  inter-state  com- 
merce and  that  therefore  the  Federal  Employers'  Liabil- 
ity Act  controls,  superseding  all  state  laws  upon  the  sub- 
ject. 

"The  evidence  showed  that  the  deceased  was  working 
on  the  day  of  the  injury  (March  28, 1913)  in  defendant  in 


OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT  93 

error's  switch  or  terminal  yards,  near  Gentralia,  Illinois, 
as  a  machinist,  his  duty  being  to  repair  a  switch  engine 
in  the  yards.  He  was  sent  by  his  superior  officer  to  re- 
pair the  whistle  rod  on  an  engine  engaged  in  switching 
and  handling  inter-state  commerce.  As  he  went  down  a 
switch  track  he  saw  the  engine  coming  toward  him  and 
stepped  out  of  its  way  onto  another  track  immediately  in 
front  of  another  moving  engine,  by  which  he  was  knocked 
down  and  killed  instantly.  The  last  named  engine  was 
also  engaged  in  switching  all  classes  of  freight,  inter- 
state  as  well  as  intra-state.  Counsel  for  defendant  in 
error  contend,  and  counsel  for  plaintiff  in  error  concede, 
that  the  deceased  was  at  the  time  of  the  accident  engaged 
in  inter-state  commerce.  On  the  evidence  as  presented 
in  the  record  before  us  no  other  conclusion  can  be  reached 
under  the  holdings  of  the  United  States  Supreme  Court. 
Pedersen  &c  R.  R.  v  Delaware  &c  R.  R.,  229  U.  S.  146; 
St.  Louis  &c  Ry.  v  Seale,  229  U.  S.  156;  Missouri  &c  Ry. 
v  U.  S.,  231  U.  S.  112. 

"The  Federal  Employers'  Liability  Act  will  therefore 
control  if  it  covers  the  identical  subject  matter  or  the 
same  field  as  that  covered  by  the  Illinois  Workmen's 
Compensation  Act. 

"Counsel  argue  at  length  as  to  whether  the  Work- 
men's Compensation  Act  imposes  a  direct  burden  upon 
inter-state  commerce.  In  our  judgment  that  is  not  the 
decisive  question  here.  The  general  principles  governing 
the  exercise  of  Federal  authority,  when  inter-state  com- 
merce is  affected,  have  been  firmly  established  by  the 
decisions  of  the  United  States  Supreme  Court.  The 
power  of  congress  to  regulate  commerce  among  the  sev 
eral  states  is  supreme  and  plenary  under  the  Constitution. 
The  reservation  to  the  states  to  legislate  on  questions  af- 
fecting inter-state  commerce  is  only  of  that  authority 
which  is  consistent  with  and  not  opposed  to  the  grant  of 
congress,  which  extends  to  every  instrumentality  or 
agency  by  which  inter-state  commerce  may  be  carried 


94  OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT 

on.  The  decisions  hold  that  with  respect  to  certain  sub- 
jects embraced  within  the  grant  of  the  Constitution  which 
are  of  such  a  nature  as  to  demand  that  if  regulated  at  all 
their  regulation  should  be  prescribed  by  single  authority, 
the  power  of  congress  is  exclusive,  while  in  other  matters 
admitting  of  diversity  of  treatment,  according  to  the 
special  requirements  of  local  conditions,  'the  states  may 
act  within  their  respective  jurisdictions  until  congress 
sees  fit  to  act,  and  when  congress  does  act,  the  exercise  of 
its  authority  overrides  all  conflicting  state  legislation. 
(Simpson  v  Shepard,  230  U.  S.  352.)  The  doctrine  that 
the  states  can  not,  under  any  guise,  impose  direct  burdens 
upon  inter-state  commerce  forms  the  basis  of  the  forego- 
ing classification. 

"Within  certain  limitations  there  remains  to  the 
states,  until  congress  acts,  a  wide  range  for  the  exercise 
of  the  power  appropriate  to  territorial  jurisdiction,  al- 
though inter-state  commerce  may  be  affected.  Included 
within  these  limitations  are  those  matters  of  a  local  na- 
ture as  to  which  it  is  impossible  to  derive  from  the  consti- 
tutional provisions  an  intention  that  they  should  go  un- 
controlled pending  Federal  legislation.  It  is  therefore 
'  competent  for  the  state  to  govern  its  internal  commerce, 
to  provide  local  improvements,  to  create  and  regulate 
local  facilities,  to  adopt  protective  measures  of  a  reason- 
able character  in  the  interest  of  the  health,  safety,  morals 
and  welfare  of  its  people,  although  inter-state  commerce 
may  incidentally  or  indirectly  be  involved.  (Simpson  v 
Shepard,  supra.)  It  is  unnecessary  for  us  to  refer  to  or 
discuss  the  various  decisions  touching  this  question.  Many 
of  them  are  referred  to  and  considered  and  this  general 
doctrine  discussed  at  length  in  the  case  from  which  we 
have  just  quoted.  The  question  in  the  case  before  us  is 
not  whether  the  deceased  was  engaged  in  inter-state  com- 
merce at  the  time  of  the  accident,  for  that  is  conceded. 
Neither  is  it  necessarily  the  question  whether  the  Work- 
men's  Compensation  Act  affected  directly  and  substan- 


OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT  95 

tially  an  instrument  of  commerce.  The  argument  of  coun- 
sel for  plaintiff  in  error  that  the  Workmen  'a  Compensa- 
tion Act  affects  the  employee  '  solely  as  a  member  of  so- 
ciety and  not  as  an  instrument  of  society/  and  is  there- 
fore within  the  police  power  of  the  state,  can  not  be  sus- 
tained if  congress  has  by  legislation  acted  on  the  *  sub- 
ject matter*  or  in  the  'same  field'  (as  those  terms  are 
understood  in  the  decisions)  as  that  covered  by  the  Illi- 
nois Workmen's  Compensation  Act. 

' '  Counsel  in  their  briefs  state  that  the  particular  ques- 
tion here  presented  has  never  been  considered  or  decided 
by  any  court,  either  state  or  Federal.  We  have  been  un- 
able to  find  any  decision  of  a  court  of  final  review  where 
such  question  has  been  under  consideration.  But  see  as 
bearing  on  this  question  in  'nisi  prius'  and  intermediate 
courts  of  review  the  following : 

"Rounscwille  v  Central  R.  R.,  37  N.  J.  L.  J.  295. 

"Smith  v  Industrial  Ace.  Com.  of  Col.,  147  Pac. 
Eep.  600. 

"Winfield  v  N.  Y.  Central  &c  R.  R.,  153  N.  Y. 

Sup.  499.    *  *  ' 

"( After  quoting  the  Federal  Act  and  reviewing  nu- 
merous Federal  decisions  the  court  proceeds) : 

"  'We  have  referred  to  and  commented  on  practically 
every  decision  of  the  United  States  Supreme  Court  bear- 
ing upon  this  question.  The  decisions  from  other  courts 
could  not  be  controlling  and,  at  most,  only  persuasive. 
Counsel  on  the  one  hand  argue  that  under  the  fair  con- 
struction of  the  Federal  Employers'  Liability  Act  as  con- 
strued by  these  decisions  the  Act  covers  the  field  of  liabil- 
ity of  common  carriers  by  railroad  for  all  injuries  occur- 
ring in  inter-state  commerce,  whether  or  not  there  has 
been  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  employer,  while  coun- 
sel on  the  other  hand  contend  that  the  act  covers  only 
liability  of  common  carriers  in  inter-state  commerce 
when  there  has  been  such  negligence.  It  is  clear  that 
there  can  be  no  recovery  under  the  Federal  Employers' 


96  OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT 

Liability  Act,  properly  construed,  in  the  absence  of  neg- 
ligence on  the  part  of  the  employer,  as  that  term  is  used 
in  the  statute  and  in  the  decisions  construing  the  same. 
But  if  the  question  of  negligence  alone  determines  the  ap- 
plicability of  the  Federal  law,  then,  before  it  can  be  held 
that  such  law  is  applicable,  there  must  be  a  final  adjudica- 
tion as  to  whether  the  injury  resulted  from  negligence. 
Obviously,  congress  legislated  on  more  than  the  subject 
of  negligence.  It  legislated  on  that  but  also  on  the  amount 
of  recovery,  and  superseded  all  state  laws  on  that  sub- 
ject as  shown  by  the  decisions  already  cited.  It  also  leg- 
islated on  the  subject  of  limitation  when  the  action  should 
be  begun.  It  also  legislated  as  to  what  persons  could  re- 
cover under  the  Federal  Act  and  when  an  action  would 
survive  the  death  of  an  injured  person ;  also  on  the  sub- 
ject of  assumed  risk  and  contributory  negligence.  *  *  *  : 

"The  field  of  liability  as  to  employees  injured  while 
engaged  in  inter-state  commerce  on  railroads  is  occupied 
exclusively  by  the  Federal  Employers'  Liability  Act — 
and  that,  too,  regardless  of  the  negligence  or  lack  of  neg- 
ligence of  either  party  of  the  litigation.  Beyond  question 
the  Federal  Employers'  Liability  Act  superseded,  as  to 
injuries  of  employees  engaged  on  railroads  in  inter-state 
commerce,  all  statute  or  common  law  in  force  in  the  state 
of  Illinois  previous  to  the  passage  of  the  Workmen's 
Compensation  Act.  That  was  the  precise  holding  in 
Wabash  R.  R.  Co.  v  Hayes,  234  U.  S.  86. 

"The  legislature,  in  passing  the  Illinois  Workmen's 
Compensation  Act  of  1911,  intended  that  wherever  it  was 
in  force  it  should  supersede  all  other  state  statutes  and 
the  common  law  as  to  the  liability  of  employers  for  in- 
juries to  employees,  for  section  1  of  said  Act  provides, 
among  other  things,  that  any  employer  having  elected  to 
come  within  its  provisions  will  'thereby  relieve  himself 
from  any  liability  for  the  recovery  of  damages  except  as 
herein  provided.'  The  United  States  Supreme  Court 
takes  that  view  of  a  similar  compensation  act  in  the  state 


OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT  97 

of  Ohio  in  Jeffrey  Mfg.  Co.  v  Blogg,  235  U.  S.  571,  in 
which  case,  referring  to  that  state  Act,  the  court  said : 

"  'It  is  one  of  the  laws  which  has  become  more  or  less 
common  in  the  states,  and  aims  to  substitute  a  method  of 
compensation,  Toy  means  of  investigation  and  hearing  be- 
fore a  board,  for  what  was  regarded  as  an  unfair  and  in- 
adequate system,  based  upon  the  statutes  or  the  common 
law.' 

''The  Illinois  legislature,  in  passing  the  Act  here  in 
question,  clearly  understood  that  certain  injuries  occur- 
ring in  inter-state  commerce  should  not  be  within  the  pro- 
vision of  the  Act,  for  in  section  2  it  is  provided  that  it 
should  apply  'in  the  business  of  carriage  by  land  or  wa- 
ter, *  '  *  except  as  to  carriers  which  shall  be  construed 
to  be  excluded  heref rom  by  the  laws  of  the  United  States 
relating  to  liability  to  their  employees  for  personal  in- 
juries suffered  while  engaged  in  inter-state  commerce, 
where  such  laws  are  held  to  be  exclusive  of  all  state  regu- 
lations providing  compensation  for  accidental  injuries  or 
death  suffered  in  the  course  of  employment.'  This  pro- 
vision tends  strongly  to  show  that  the  state  legislature 
did  not  intend  to  place  within  the  provisions  of  the  Work- 
men 's  Compensation  Act  all  injuries  that  occurred  on 
railroads  in  Illinois,  whether  the  injured  person  was  en- 
gaged in  intra-state  or  inter-state  commerce. 

' '  Counsel  for  plaintiff  in  error  argue  that  many  of  the 
injuries  on  railroads,  while  engaged  in  inter-state  com- 
merce, occur  without  any  negligence  on  the  part  of  any 
one,  and  that  therefore  the  conclusion  here  reached  will 
leave  many  injured  employees — or,  if  the  injury  causes 
death,  their  relatives — without  any  opportunity  for  com- 
pensation, and  is  contrary  to  the  spirit  of  the  times, 
which  demands  humane  legislation  covering  this  subject. 
That  argument  may  well  be  addressed  to  the  Federal  con- 
gress. This  court  must  confine  itself  to  the  proper  con- 
struction and  operation  of  this  Act  and  can  not  consider 
the  evils  which  it  is  claimed  will  arise  from  the  execution 


98  OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT 

of  the  Federal  Employers '  Liability  Act,  however  real 
those  evils  may  be. 

' '  It  is  suggested  but  not  argued  in  the  briefs  of  coun- 
sel for  plaintiff  in  error,  that  the  rights  and  liabilities 
under  the  two  acts  here  in  question  are  in  a  sense  cumu- 
lative, and  that  the  payment  of  compensation  under  the 
state  Act  would  not  bar  an  action  under  the  Federal  Act, 
under  the  reasoning  of  the  United  States  court  in  Phila- 
delphia &cR.R.v  Schubert,  224  U.  S.  603,  and  other  like 
cases.  Can  the  Workmen 's  Compensation  Law  of  Illi- 
nois, requiring  compensation  to  be  paid  to  employees  by 
employers  for  injuries,  be  fairly  included  within  the 
terms  of  section  5  of  the  Federal  Employers'  Liability 
Act? 

''Workmen's  Compensation  and  Industrial  Insurance 
Laws  had  not  been  adopted  in  any  of  the  states  of  this 
country  in  1908,  at  the  time  the  Employers'  Federal  Lia- 
bility Law  went  into  effect.  The  first  state  Act  of  that 
kind  was  passed  in  June,  1910,  by  the  state  of  New  York. 
Since  then  at  least  21  other  states  have  passed  such  laws. 

"Congress,  therefore,  did  not  have  Workmen's  Com- 
pensation Acts  particularly  in  mind  when  it  drafted  the 
Federal  Liability  Law. 

"It  is  true  this  court  has  held  that  when  parties  have 
elected  to  come  under  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act 
of  this  state  the  provisions  of  that  Act  thereby  become 
a  part  of  the  contract  of  employment  (Deibeikis  v  Link- 
Belt  Co.,  261  111.  454),  and  therefore  that  contract  might 
be  included  in  the  terms  'any  contract,'  referred  to  in 
the  first  part  of  said  section  5 ;  but  the  contract  referred 
to  in  that  section  is  one  that  has  been  entered  into  for 
the  purpose  of  enabling  the  carrier  'to  exempt  itself 
from  liability  created'  by  the  Federal  Act.  Surely  it  can 
not  be  reasonably  held  that  the  Workmen's  Compensa- 
tion Act  is  a  contract  entered  into  for  that  purpose. 

"The  words  'insurance  relief,'  'benefit'  or  'indem- 
nity' would,  none  of  them,  in  the  connection  in  which 


OPINIONS  BY  THE  APPELLATE  COURT  99 

they  are  used,  seem  to  include  the  Workmen's  Compensa- 
tion Act.  While  that  Act  is  based  upon  the  same  general 
principles  as  workmen's  benefit  insurance,  it  would  hard- 
ly be  supposed  that  congress,  in  said  section  5,  intended 
to  cover  such  a  compensation  act  as  the  one  here  under 
consideration. 

"As  already  stated,  the  Federal  Act  in  a  certain  sense 
in  some  cases  at  least,  requires  the  master  to  be  an  in- 
surer of  the  safety  of  his  employees,  the  same  as  does  the 
Workmen's  Compensation  Act.  Having  in  mind  the  his- 
tory of  the  legislation,  both  Federal  and  state,  on  the 
questions  here  under  consideration,  we  can  reach  no 
other  conclusion,  under  the  wording  of  said  section  5, 
than  that  the  Illinois  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  was 
not  intended  to  be  included  by  congress  within  any  of  the 
exceptions  stated  in  said  section. 

"What  has  already  been  said  heretofore  in  this  opin- 
ion with  reference  to  the  intent  of  the  Illinois  legislature 
in  passing  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  practically 
demonstrates  that  that  body  did  not  intend  the  remedy 
thereunder  to  be  in  any  sense  cumulative  to  the  remedy 
provided  for  in  the  Federal  Act.  Congress  could  include 
Workmen's  Compensation  Acts  within  the  exception  pro- 
vided for  in  said  section  5  but  has  not  yet  seen  fit  so  to  do. 

"The  judgments  of  the  Appellate  and  Circuit  Courts 
must  be  reversed  and  the  cause  remanded." 

Brown  v  City  of  Decatur 
188  IU.  App.  147. 

"This  is  an  appeal  from  a  judgment  of  the  Circuit 
Court  of  Macon  county  on  an  appeal  in  that  court  from 
an  award  of  arbitrators  appointed  under  the  provisions 
of  the  Act  of  June  10,  1911,  commonly  called  the  Illinois 
Workmen's  Compensation  jfyct. 

"The  arbitrators  awarded  appellant  compensation  in 
the  sum  of  $2,496.  On  an  appeal  from  said  award,  to  the 
Circuit  Court  on  a  trial  *de  novo'  the  judgment  of  the 


100  OPINIONS  BY  THE  APPELLATE  COURT 

court  reversed  the  award  of  the  arbitrators  and  dis- 
missed appellant's  claim. 

"Appellant's  intestate  was  killed  October  19,  1912, 
and  subsequently  appellant  presented  her  petition  to  the 
County  Court,  as  provided  by  said  Act,  asking  the  court 
to  appoint  an  arbitrator  to  act  with  the  arbitrators  ap- 
pointed by  herself  and  by  her  intestate's  employer.  The 
court  appointed  an  arbitrator  and  the  three  arbitrators 
proceeded  to  hear  the  matters  in  dispute  and  filed  its  re- 
port with  the  Secretary  of  the  State  Bureau  of  Labor  Sta- 
tistics, which  report  awarded  to  appellant  the  said  sum 
as  the  amount  of  compensation  to  be  paid  to  her  under 
said  Act  for  the  death  of  her  intestate.  *  *  * 

' '  There  is  no  apparent  conflict  as  to  the  facts,  but  the 
principal  contentions  of  appellee  are  that  the  employment 
of  the  deceased  was  not  one  of  the  employments  covered 
by  the  Act  and  that  his  death  was  not  caused  by  the  sort 
of  injury  for  which  the  Act  allows  compensation,  that  is, 
that  it  did  not  arise  rout  of  his  employment.'  It  is  also 
suggested  that  appellee  was  not  an  employer  maintaining 
a  structure  within  the  meaning  of  the  Act. 

"Appellee  is  a  municipal  corporation  and  operate* 
its  own  filtration  plant  and  water  system.  It 

would  require  a  most  strained  and  unreasonable  construc- 
tion to  hold  that  the  maintenance  of  water  mains  in  con- 
nection with  a  water  works  plant  would  not  be  the  main- 
taining of  a  structure.  The  word  structure  commonly 
means  anything  that  is  built  or  constructed,  and  that  it 
was  the  intention  of  the  legislature  that  such  should  be 
its  definition  in  the  construction  of  this  Act  there  can  be 
no  doubt. 

"It  is  conceded  that  the  injury  occurred  in  the  course 
of  the  employment  of  plaintiff's  intestate,  but  it  is  in- 
sisted by  appellee  that  it  did  not  arise  out  of  said  employ- 
ment. The  Illinois  Act  is  substantially  adopted  from  the 
English  Acts  of  1897  and  1906  (Stat.  60,  61,  Viet.  Ch.  37 ; 
Stat.  6  Edw.  7,  Ch.  57),  and  it  will  be  presumed  tliat  the 


OPINIONS  BY  THE  APPELLATE  COURT  101 

construction  given  to  them  by  the  English  courts  is  to  be 
applied  to  the  Illinois  Act  unless  such  construction  is  in- 
consistent with  the  spirit  and  policy  of  the  laws  of  this 
state.  *  *  * 

"The  generic  classification  of  the  injuries  for  which 
an  employer  is  liable  under  the  Act  is  those  that  are  re- 
ceived in  the  course  of  employment,  but  these  are  limited 
and  restricted  to  such  as  also  arise  out  of  the  employ- 
ment. It  is  conceivable  that  in  many  instances  it  might 
be  difficult  to  determine  the  distinction  between  injuries 
received  in  the  course  of  employment  and  those  that  arise 
out  of  such  employment. 

"The  injury  received  in  this  case  was  caused  by  an 
agency  beyond  the  control  of  the  employer  (a  train).  The 
first  question  which  naturally  presents  itself  for  consid- 
eration is,  was  the  deceased  at  the  time  of  the  injury  in 
the  performance  of  an  act  incidental  to  his  employment. 
He  was  proceeding  to  the  hand  car  for  the  purpose  of 
putting  on  his  rubber  boots.  He  had  been  directed  by 
the  foreman  to  bring  his  rubber  boots  with  him.  *  *  * 
Deceased  saw  Walmsley's  shoes  and  coat  on  the  hand 
car,  which  was  about  ten  steps  away,  and  as  it  was  the 
only  object  on  which  he  could  sit,  while  he  put  on  his 
boots,  unless  he  sat  upon  the  ground  between  the  tracks, 
he  was  not  acting  out  of  the  sphere  of  his  employment  in 
attempting  to  go  to  the  hand  car  for  said  purpose.  The 
act  he  was  doing  at  the  time  was  incidental  to  and  in  the 
furtherance  of  the  duties  to  his  employer. 

''Some  of  the  English  cases  have  given  a  very  liberal 
construction  to  the  question  of  what  acts  of  employees 
are  incidental  to  their  employment.  In  the  case  of  Keen- 
an  v  Flemington  Coal  Co.,  5  Fraser  164,  a  miner  quit 
work  temporarily  to  get  a  drink  at  a  boiler.  There  were 
two  ways  of  reaching  the  boiler,  one  a  safe  and  usual  way 
and  the  other  a  dangerous  way.  He  chose  the  dangerous 
way  and  in  returning  was  killed.  Compensation  was  al- 
lowed and  it  was  held  that  a  man  does  not  cease  to  be  in 


102  OPINIONS  BY  THE  APPELLATE  COURT 

the  course  of  his  employment  every  time  he,  for  some 
necessary  reason,  leaves  his  work,  and  that  it  was  a  nec- 
essary reason  for  stopping  work  to  get  a  drink  of  water, 
because  when  a  man  feels  thirsty  it  hinders  him  from 
working  with  vigor. 

"In  the  case  of  Wilson  v  McLaughlin,  Sess.  Gas.  529, 
a  workman  was  employed  to  load  and  unload  trucks 
hauled  by  a  traction  engine.  While  riding  in  one  of  them, 
and  when  under  the  influence  of  liquor,  he  dropped  his 
pipe  and  in  getting  down  to  pick  it  up  he  was  run  over. 
Compensation  was  allowed  and  it  was  held  that  he  was 
doing  a  thing  which  a  man  while  working  may  reasonably 
do.  *A  workman  of  this  sort  may  reasonably  smoke,  he 
may  reasonably  drop  his  pipe,  and  he  may  reasonably 
pick  it  up  again,  and  it  was  held  that  his  attempt  to  get 
the  pipe  was  merely  an  incident  in  the  day's  work. 

"It  is  urged  that  going  to  the  hand  car  to  put  on  his 
boots  was  a  mere  act  of  convenience  for  the  personal 
benefit  of  the  deceased.  Counsel  confuses  the  act  itself 
with  the  manner  in  which  he  was  doing  it.  If  he  was  at- 
tempting to  perform  an  act  incidental  to  the  duties  of 
his  employment,  it  matters  not  that  he  took  a  more  con- 
venient way  of  doing  it  than  was  necessary. 

"Keenan  v  Flemington  Coal  Co.,  5  Fraser  164; 
"Astley  v  Evans,  5  K.  B.  1036; 
"Evans  &  Co.  v  Astley,  A.  C.  674. 

"Compensation  has  also  been  allowed  when  the  em- 
ployee has  been  injured  while  performing  his  duties  in  a 
manner  in  direct  disobedience  to  his  orders.  In  Harding 
v  Brynddu  Colliery  Co.,  2  K.  B.  747,  a  miner  was  directed 
to  drill  a  hole  from  a  stall  above  into  a  stall  below  to  al- 
low gas  to  escape.  The  stall  below  was  boarded  up  as 
dangerous.  He  was  unable  to  drill  the  hole  from  the  up- 
per stall  and  asked  permission  to  go  into  the  lower  stall 
to  tap  in  order  to  expedite  the  work.  Permission  was  re- 
fused, and  he  deliberately  disobeyed,  went  into  the  dan- 


OPINIONS  BY  THE  APPELLATE  COURT  103 

gerous  stall  and  was  injured.  Compensation  was  al- 
lowed. 

"In  Con/way  v  Pumpkerston  Oil  Co.,  Sc.  Sess.  Gas. 
660,  a  miner  in  direct  disobedience  to  orders  went  into  an 
entry  filled  with  gas  to  get  a  pick  which  he  had  left  there 
the  previous  day  and  was  injured.  Compensation  was 
allowed  and  it  was  held  that  he  was  fetching  a  pick  for 
the  work  in  which  he  was  engaged  and  was  working  with- 
in the  general  sphere  of  his  employment. 

"In  Whitehead  v  Reader,  2  K.  B.  48,  the  injured  em- 
ployee was  a  carpenter,  part  of  whose  duty  it  was  to 
sharpen  tools  at  a  grind  stone  operated  by  machinery. 
He  had  been  forbidden  to  touch  the  machinery.  The  driv- 
ing belt  slipped  and  in  trying  to  adjust  it  he  received  the 
injury  complained  of.  Compensation  was  allowed  and  it 
was  held  that  he  was  performing  an  act  incidental  to  his 
master's  business  and  was  not  idling  or  doing  something 
which  was  clearly  beyond  the  scope  of  his  employment. 
It  is  further  contended  that  being  struck  by  the  engine 
while  crossing  the  tracks  was  a  risk  shared  by  all  man- 
kind and  was  not  such  a  hazard  as  was  incidental  to  his 
employment.  Kisks  incidental  to  the  employment  do  not 
mean  such  as  are  peculiar  to  the  employment  in  question 
as  distinguished  from  other  employments. 

"In  Warner  v  Couchman,  1  K.  B.  351,  it  was  said: 
'The  law  does  not  say  "arising  out  of  his  employment 
and  out  of  that  employment  alone. ' '  Other  employments 
have  nothing  whatever  to  do  with  the  question.7  If  the 
risk  was  such  that  by  reason  of  the  work  in  which  he  was 
engaged,  in  the  place  where  he  was  engaged  and  in  the 
manner  in  which  he  was  compelled  to  perform  that  work, 
he  was  more  readily  exposed  to  it  than  the  public  gener- 
ally, then  it  was  abnormal  and  incidental  to  his  employ- 
ment. *  *  * 

"The  English  authorities  have  also  given  a  liberal 
construction  to  this  phase  of  the  question. 

"In  the  case  of  Pierce  v  Provident  Clothing  Co.,  1  K. 


104  OPINIONS  BY  THE  APPELLATE  COUKT 

B.  997,  a  canvasser  in  a  London  district  was  killed  on  the 
streets  by  an  electric  car  while  riding  a  bicycle.  He  was 
permitted  to  ride  a  bicycle  by  his  employer,  but  not  re- 
quired to  do  so.  Compensation  was  allowed  on  the 
ground  that  his  duties  necessarily  involved  his  spending 
a  great  part  of  the  day  in  the  streets,  and  he  was,  beyond 
all  doubt,  much  more  exposed  to  the  risks  of  the  street 
than  ordinary  members  of  the  public. 

"Under  a  substantially  similar  state  of  facts,  com- 
pensation was  allowed  in  the  case  of  M'Neice  v  Singer 
Sew.  Machine  Co.,  Sc.  Sess.  Cas.  12.  To  the  same  effect 
is  Millar  v  Refuge  Assurance  Co.,  Sc.  Sess.  Cas.  37.  In 
Challis  v  London  &c  Ry.,  2  K.  B.  154,  a  locomotive  engin- 
eer was  injured  by  a  stone  thrown  by  a  mischievous  boy 
from  a  bridge  below  which  the  train  was  passing.  Com- 
pensation was  allowed  on  the  ground  that  it  was  a  mat- 
ter of  common  knowledge  and  experience  that  a  train  in 
motion  has  great  attraction  for  mischievous  boys,  and 
that  it  was  a  risk  incidental  to  the  employment. 

"In  Anderson  v  Balfour,  2  Ir.  Rep.  497,  a  gamekeeper 
was  attacked  by  a  poacher.  Compensation  was  allowed 
on  the  ground  that  it  was  matter  of  common  knowledge 
that  hostility  exists  between  gamekeepers  and  poachers 
and  that  one  of  the  risks  attached  to  the  occupation  of 
gamekeeper  was  the  risk  of  this  sort  of  injury. 

"In  Nisbet  v  Rayne  &  Burne,  2  K.  B.  689,  a  cashier 
was  murdered  on  a  train  while  carrying  money  to  a  col- 
liery to  pay  the  men.  Compensation  was  allowed  on  the 
ground  that  the  man  was  exposed  to  the  special  risk  as- 
sumed by  cashiers,  who  are  known  to  carry  considerable 
sums  of  money  on  regular  days  by  the  same  route  to  the 
same  place,  of  being  robbed. 

"In  Andrew  v  Failsworth  Industrial  Society,  2  K.  B. 
32,  a  bricklayer  on  a  scaffold  thirty  feet  above  the  ground 
was  struck  by  lightning  during  a  thunder-storm.  Com- 
pensation was  allowed  on  the  ground  that  the  position  of 


105 

the  bricklayer  was  a  very  exposed  one  and  on  account  of 
the  elevation  from  the  ground  the  risk  was  appreciably 
greater  than  the  normal  risk. 

"In  Dames  v  Gillespie,  105  L.  T.  494,  the  first  officer 
of  a  vessel  in  a  West  Indian  port  received  a  sunstroke 
while  superintending  the  loading  of  a  cargo.  He  was 
compelled  to  stand  on  the  steel  deck  of  the  vessal  for  a 
long  time  exposed  to  the  full  glare  of  the  sun,  and  com- 
pensation was  allowed  on  the  ground  that  it  was  an  ab- 
normal risk. 

"In  Morgan  v  Owners  S.  S.  Zenaida,  2  B.  W.  C.  C.  19, 
a  common  seaman  on  a  vessel  in  a  Mexican  port  was  or- 
dered over  the  side  to  paint  a  ship.  He  protested  on  ac- 
count of  the  excessive  heat,  but  was  ordered  to  continue. 
Compensation  was  allowed  because  the  risk  was  abnor- 
mal. We  have  not  attempted  to  comment  upon  or  differ- 
entiate between  all  the  cases  that  have  been  cited  in  the 
briefs,  but  we  are  of  the  opinion  that  not  only  from  the 
principles  of  construction  enumerated  from  the  cases 
mentioned,  but  from  a  plain,  common  sense  view  of  the 
Act  and  the  facts  in  this  case,  that  at  the  time  of  the  in- 
jury appellant's  intestate  was  in  the  performance  of  an 
act  incidental  to  the  duties  of  his  employment,  and  that 
the  risk  which  caused  his  death  was  also  incidental  to  his 
employment.  The  cause  is  remanded  with  directions  to 
enter  judgment  on  the  award  of  the  arbitrators  as  con- 
tained in  said  report. 

Matecny,  Administrator  v  Vierting  Steel  Works 
187  IU.  App.  488. 

July  2,  1914. 

"This  appeal  is  taken  from  a  judgment  of  the  Super- 
ior Court  of  Cook  county,  ordering  a  lump  sum  payment 
under  the  Act  approved  June  10, 1911,  and  in  force  May 
1,  1912,  commonly  known  as  the  Workmen's  Compensa- 
tion Law.  Joseph  Matecny,  an  employee  of  the  appel- 
lant, was  fatally  injured  in  July,  1912,  in  the  course  of 


106  OPINIONS  BY  THE  APPELLATE  COURT 

his  employment,  the  injuries  sustained  arising  out  of 
said  employment.  Both  the  appellant  and  the  deceased 
were  subject  to  the  provisions  of  said  Compensation  Law, 
and  the  administrator  of  the  estate  of  Matecny  brought 
these  proceedings  for  the  purpose  of  securing  the  death 
benefits  due  and  to  become  due  under  the  law  in  a  lump 
sum,  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  section  5y2  of 
the  Act.  The  deceased  left  surviving  him  as  his  only 
heirs  at  law,  his  mother,  Mary  Matecny,  and  five  brothers 
and  sisters.  The  mother  at  the  time  these  proceedings 
were  commenced  was  fifty-eight  years  of  age,  an  invalid 
unable  to  work  and  support  herself  and  requiring  an  at- 
tendant to  care  for  her.  The  deceased  had  contributed  to 
her  support  within  five  years  previous  to  the  time  of  his 
death,  but  none  of  the  brothers  and  sisters  were  depend- 
ent upon  the  earnings  of  the  deceased.  It  was  agreed  that 
the  total  amount  of  compensation  due  and  to  become  due 
under  the  Act  was  $1,861.60,  payable  in  bi-weekly  install- 
ments of  $8.95  and  that  the  present  worth  of  the  sum 
named  payable  in  such  installments  with  interest  com- 
puted at  five  per  cent  per  annum  was  $1,551.34.  The 
facts,  above  stated,  and  all  matters  of  fact  material  to 
the  issues  set  up  in  the  petition  were  stipulated  between 
the  parties,  and  upon  a  hearing  by  the  court  without  a 
jury  the  facts  so  stipulated  were  found  by  the  court, 
which  also  found  that  it  was  to  the  best  interests  of  the 
parties  that  the  entire  compensation  be  paid  in  a  lump 
sum,  and  judgment  was  entered  for  the  appellee  for 
$1,551.34.  *  *  * 

"There  were  four  propositions  of  law  submitted  to 
the  court  and  marked  *  refused, '  as  follows : 

"  '1.  The  court  holds  as  a  matter  of  law  that  the 
word  beneficiaries  as  used  in  section  4-e  of  the  Act  refers 
to  lineal  heirs  and  collateral  heirs  dependent  upon  de- 
ceased's earnings  referred  to  in  paragraphs  a  and  b  of 
the  same  section. 

"  '2.    The  court  holds  as  matter  of  law  that  in  this 


OPINIONS  BY  THE  APPELLATE  COURT  107 

case  the  sole  beneficiary  entitled  to  receive  compensation 
under  section  4  of  the  Act,  is  the  mother  of  the  deceased. 
"  *3.  The  court  holds  as  matter  of  law  that  where  an 
employee  sustains  an  injury  which  results  in  death  un- 
der circumstances  which  require  the  employer  to  pay 
compensation  under  the  provisions  of  the  Act,  and  leaves 
a  mother  to  whose  support  he  has  contributed  within  five 
years  previous  to  the  time  of  his  death,  and  collateral 
heirs  who  were  not  dependent  upon  his  earnings,  as  his 
sole  heirs  at  law,  the  weekly  payments  provided  in  section 
4-d  are  payable  to  the  administrator  during  the  lifetime 
of  the  mother,  and  if  the  mother  shall  die  before  the  pay- 
ments provided  by  sections  4-a  and  4-d  are  completed, 
the  employer  shall  not  be  liable  to  make  further  payment 
after  the  death  of  the  mother. 

"  '4.  The  court  holds  as  a  matter  of  law  that  where 
an  employee  sustains  injuries  which  result  in  his  death, 
under  circumstances  which  require  the  employer  to  pay 
compensation  under  the  terms  of  the  Act,  and  leaves  sur- 
viving him  a  mother  to  whose  support  he  has  contributed 
within  five  years  previous  to  the  time  of  his  death,  and 
collateral  heirs,  who  were  not  dependent  upon  his  earn- 
ings, as  his  sole  heirs  at  law,  and  where  said  mother  was 
at  the  time  of  the  injury  and  death  58  years  of  age  and 
an  invalid,  the  court  will  not  order  the  compensation  pro- 
vided by  section  4-a  of  the  said  Act  to  be  paid  in  a  lump 
sum  under  the  provisions  of  section  5^  of  said  Act. '  *  * 

"The  first  question  for  us  to  decide  is:  Is  the  com- 
pensation received  by  the  administrator,  under  the  law, 
payable  by  the  administrator  to  the  mother  alone,  or  do 
the  non-dependent  brothers  and  sisters  participate  in 
the  amount  received?  In  determining  this  question,  we 
must  look  to  the  entire  Act  and  ascertain,  if  possible,  the 
intent  and  purpose  of  the  legislature  in  enacting  the  law. 
'It  is  always  necessary,  first,  to  understand  the  subject 
of  an  act  and  the  object  to  be  accomplished  by  it.  Once 
the  subject  matter  is  clearly  ascertained  and  the  general 


108  OPINIONS  BY  THE  APPELLATE  COURT 

legislative  purpose  discovered,  a  key  is  thereby  fur- 
nished which  will  enable  one  to  correctly  interpret  all  of 
the  constituent  and  subordinate  elements  found  in  the 
Act.'  Diets  v  Big  Muddy  Coal  &  Iron  Co.,  263  III  480. 

"  'It  is  an  elementary  rule  of  construction  that  all 
parts  of  a  statute  must  be  considered  together  and  not 
each  by  itself.'  *  *  *  The  several  provisions  of  the 
statute  should  be  construed  together  in  the  light  of  the 
purpose  and  objects  of  the  Act,  so  as  to  give  effect  to  the 
main  intent,  even  though  in  so  doing  particular  provis- 
ions are  not  construed  according  to  their  literal  meaning. ' 

"The  title  of  the  Act  is  significant:  'An  Act  to  pro- 
mote the  general  welfare  of  the  People  of  the  State  by 
providing  compensation  for  accidental  injuries  or  death 
suffered  in  the  course  of  employment. '  Section  4  of  the 
Act  is  the  one  that  designates  the  beneficiaries  in  case  of 
the  death  of  the  employee.  In  the  first  sentence  of  this 
section  and  in  paragraphs  d  and  e  of  the  same  section,  in 
speaking  of  the  amount  that  the  employer  shall  pay,  it 
is  called  compensation.  Some  of  the  meanings  of  the 
word  'compensation'  as  defined  by  the  Century  dictionary 
are  as  follows:  'That  which  is  given  or  received  as  an 
equivalent,  as  for  services,  debt,  want,  loss,  or  suffering ; 
indemnity;  recompense;  amends;  requital.  That  which 
supplies  the  place  of  something  else,  or  makes  good  a  de- 
ficiency, or  makes  amends.' 

"If  paragraph  e  of  section  4  were  not  in  the  Act  it 
would  be  very  plain  to  whom  the  payments  of  compensa- 
tion are  to  be  made.  The  appellee  relies  upon  paragraph 
e  to  sustain  his  contention  that  the  administrator  must 
distribute  the  compensation  received  by  him  to  the  heirs 
of  the  deceased  employee,  according  to  the  Illinois  statute 
of  descent  and  distribution  of  personal  property.  Under 
paragraphs  a  and  b,  the  compensation  would  be  paid  only 
to  the  heirs  to  whose  support  the  deceased  had  contrib- 
uted. Paragraph  c  provides  that  the  employer  shall  only 
be  required  to  pay  funeral  expenses  to  the  administrator, 


OPINIONS  BY  THE  APPELLATE  COURT  109 

in  case  the  employee  leaves  no  dependent  heirs.  This 
paragraph  is  an  important  one  in  the  interpretation  of 
the  intent  and  purpose  of  the  Act.  After  a  very  careful 
study  of  the  entire  Act,  in  the  light  of  the  rule  laid  down 
by  our  Supreme  Court,  we  have  reached  the  conclusion 
that  the  intent  and  purpose  of  the  Act  is  to  make  compen- 
sation, in  part  at  least,  to  the  injured  workman,  for  the 
pecuniary  loss  sustained  by  him ;  or  in  case  of  his  death, 
caused  by  injuries  sustained  by  him  in  the  course  of  em- 
ployment, to  compensate,  in  part  at  least,  his  heirs,  to 
whose  support  he  had  contributed  during  his  life  time, 
for  the  pecuniary  loss  sustained  by  them  through  the 
death  of  the  said  workman.  The  purpose  of  the  law  (as 
we  construe  it)  can  only  be  carried  out  by  making  all  pay- 
ments due  under  the  law  payable  to  the  injured  workman 
or  in  case  of  his  death  from  injuries  sustained  by  him  in 
the  course  of  his  employment,  to  those  to  whose  support 
he  had  contributed  during  his  lifetime. 

"In  refusing  the  first  proposition  of  law  submitted  by 
the  appellant,  the  trial  court  interpreted  the  word  'bene- 
ficiaries' in  paragraph  e  as  meaning  all  the  heirs  of  the 
deceased,  regardless  of  whether  they  were  dependent  or 
not.  We  cannot  agree  with  this  interpretation.  Such  a 
construction,  in  our  judgment,  does  violence  to  the  plain 
purpose  and  spirit  of  the  Act  and  it  would  work  a  grave 
injustice  in  this  and  many  other  cases  arising  under  the 
Act.  The  word  'beneficiary'  means  'one  for  whose  bene- 
fit a  trust  is  created,  a  "cestui  que  trust." 

"Keeping  in  mind  the  purpose  of  the  Act,  it  is  not 
difficult  to  interpret  paragraph  e.  The  beneficiaries  con- 
templated by  the  paragraph  are  the  particular  heirs  who 
have  suffered  pecuniary  loss  by  reason  of  the  cutting  off 
of  the  wages  of  the  deceased  employee.  These  are  the 
heirs  who  are  entitled  to  the  compensation  under  the  Act. 
Paragraph  e  simply  describes  the  method  of  determining 
the  respective  shares  of  the  dependent  heirs  in  the  trust 
fund  in  the  hands  of  the  administrator. 


110  OPINIONS  BY  THE  APPELLATE  COURT 

"The  present  case  illustrates  what  might  follow  if  the 
appellee's  interpretation  of  paragraph  e  were  adopted. 
The  deceased  left  an  invalid  mother  dependent  upon  him 
for  support;  he  also  left  five  brothers  and  sisters,  none 
of  whom  were  dependent  upon  his  earnings  for  support 
and  who  suffered  no  pecuniary  loss  by  reason  of  his 
death.  If  the  appellee  is  correct  in  his  interpretation  of 
paragraph  e,  the  five  brothers  and  sisters  would  receive 
five-sevenths  of  the  sum  payable  by  appellant  to  the  ad- 
ministrator, and  they  would  receive  the  same  solely  by 
reason  of  the  fact  that  the  deceased  employee  left  a 
mother  dependent  upon  him  for  support.  It  is  conceded 
that  if  it  were  not  for  the  fact  that  the  deceased  employee 
left  surviving  him  a  mother  dependent  upon  him  for  sup- 
port, the  administrator  could  recover  nothing  against  the 
appellant  in  this  case.  We  are  satisfied  that  the  mother 
is  entitled  to  the  entire  compensation  that  the  appellant 
must  pay  under  the  Act.  It  follows  from  what  we  have 
said  that  the  court  erred  in  refusing  the  first  and  second 
propositions  of  law  submitted  by  the  appellant. 

"The  appellant  claims  that  under  section  11  of  the 
Act,  the  payments  cease  upon  the  death  of  the  dependent 
person  or  persons  entitled  to  receive  them,  and  that  in  the 
present  case  the  appellant  would  not  be  obligated  to  make 
further  payments  to  the  administrator  after  the  death  of 
the  mother.  The  appellee  contends  that,  even  if  it  be  held 
that  the  mother  was  the  sole  beneficiary,  still  her  right 
to  the  entire  compensation  became  vested  upon  the  death 
of  Joseph  Matecny,  and  the  appointment  of  an  adminis- 
trator for  his  estate,  and  that  this  right  would  survive 
her  death  and  inure  to  the  benefit  of  her  estate.  After  a 
careful  consideration  of  this  question,  we  have  arrived 
at  the  conclusion  that  the  contention  of  appellant  is  cor- 
rect, and  that  the  obligation  of  the  appellant  to  pay  com- 
pensation to  the  administrator  would  be  extinguished  on 
the  death  of  the  mother.  We  do  not  believe  that  the  Act 
contemplates  that  the  employer  shall  pay  any  money  to 


OPINIONS  BY  THE  APPELLATE  COURT  111 

non-dependent  heirs.  It  follows  from  what  we  have  said 
that  the  court  erred  in  refusing  to  hold  the  third  proposi- 
tion of  law  submitted  by  appellant. 

"It  is  apparent  from  the  action  of  the  trial  court  in  re- 
fusing the  first,  second  and  third  propositions  of  law  sub- 
mitted to  him  by  appellant,  that  the  court  interpreted  the 
law  to  mean  that,  in  addition  to  the  mother,  the  five 
brothers  and  sisters  were  beneficiaries  under  the  Act,  and 
that  the  employer  was  obligated  to  continue  the  payments 
provided  by  section  4,  after  the  death  of  the  mother. 

"In  the  view  of  the  law  taken  by  the  trial  court,  the 
death  of  the  mother  would  have  no  controlling  effect  on 
the  payments  by  appellant.  The  fact  that  the  mother  was 
fifty-eight  years  of  age,  and  an  invalid  unable  to  work 
and  support  herself,  requiring  that  some  one  should  at- 
tend to  and  take  care  of  her,  was  merely  a  circumstance 
to  be  considered,  together  with  the  fact  that  there  were 
five  young  brothers  and  sisters  of  the  deceased  employee, 
in  determining  whether  the  appellant  should  be  ordered 
to  pay  the  entire  compensation  in  lump  sum.  Section  5y2 
allows  the  court  to  order  the  employer  to  pay  the  com- 
pensation, or  any  part  thereof,  in  a  lump  sum,  where  it 
appears  to  the  best  interest  of  the  parties  that  such  com- 
pensation be  so  paid.  Plainly  the  law  contemplates  that 
the  court,  in  passing  upon  the  question  of  the  payment  of 
the  compensation  in  a  lump  sum,  shall  regard  the  rights 
of  the  employer  as  well  as  the  rights  of  the  beneficiaries. 
The  appellant  concedes  that,  under  the  stipulated  facts 
in  this  case,  the  court  would  have  been  justified  in  order- 
ing the  appellant  to  pay  a  portion  of  the  compensation  in 
a  lump  sum,  as  provided  in  section  5^,  but  it  strenuously 
insists  that  it  was  exceedingly  unfair,  and  not  to  the  best 
interests  of  the  appellant,  under  the  facts  of  the  case,  that 
it  should  be  compelled,  on  the  filing  of  the  petition  by  the 
administrator,  to  pay  the  entire  compensation  in  a  lump 
sum.  The  appellant  insists  that  (in  the  absence  of  a 
lump  snm  order)  it  was  obligated  to  make  the  payments 


112  OPINIONS  BY  THE  APPELLATE  COURT 

in  installments,  extending  over  a  period  of  eight  years, 
and  that  the  court  could  not,  with  any  reasonable  degree 
of  certainty,  foresee  that  the  mother  could  live  so  long, 
in  view  of  her  age  and  the  precarious  condition  of  her 
health,  and  that  the  trial  court  failed  to  give  proper  effect 
to  these  important  facts  in  passing  upon  the  petition  of 
the  appellee. 

"If  we  are  correct  in  our  interpretation  of  the  law, 
it  follows  that  the  trial  court,  in  passing  upon  the  petition 
in  this  case,  adopted  an  erroneous  theory  of  the  law,  and 
we  cannot  say,  under  the  facts  of  the  case,  that  this  error 
did  not  work  to  the  prejudice  of  the  appellant. 

"Had  the  court  interpreted  the  law  as  we  do,  it  might 
very  well,  under  the  particular  circumstances  in  this 
case,  have  refused  to  order  the  appellant  to  pay  more 
than  a  part  of  the  compensation  in  a  lump  sum." 

(Reversed  and  Remanded.) 


Krisman  v  Johnston  City  Coal  Company 
190  HI  App.  612. 

"At  the  time  the  injury  complained  of  occurred,  the 
Act  providing  for  compensation  for  accidental  injuries  or 
death,  approved  June  10, 1911,  was  in  force  and  the  same 
applied  to  the  business  in  which  appellant  and  appellee 
were  engaged.  *  *  *  It  appears  (from  section  3)  to  be 
a  presumption  of  law  that  both  appellant  and  appellee 
were  covered  by  the  provisions  of  said  Act,  unless  it 
should  appear  that  one  or  both  of  them  had  filed  an  elec- 
tion to  the  contrary  with  the  State  Bureau  of  Labor  Sta- 
tistics, as  provided  by  law.  Diets  v  Big  Muddy  Coal  & 
Iron  Co.,  263  111.  480.  There  was  no  allegation  in  the  dec- 
laration that  the  parties  were  not  under  the  provisions  of 
the  Act,  and  no  proof  offered  to  show  that  appellee,  had 
filed  the  notice  required  to  exempt  him  therefrom.  The 
record  does  show,  however,  that  counsel  for  appellee 


OPINIONS  BY  THE  APPELLATE  COURT  113 

said:  'I  desire  to  introduce  plaintiff 's  Exhibit  A  in  evi- 
dence which  is  a  certified  copy  of  the  official  notice  given 
by  the  defendant  to  the  State  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics, 
in  which  they  refuse  to  operate  under  the  provisions  of 
the  Compensation  Act  of  the  State  of  Illinois.' 

"Counsel  for  appellant  objected  to  the  introduction 
of  this  exhibit  for  a  number  of  reasons,  among  others, 
that  it  was  not  properly  certified  or  proven  and  the  court 
sustained  the  objection  and  the  exhibit  was  not  admitted 
in  evidence.  The  instrument  sought  to  be  introduced  is 
not  preserved  in  the  record  for  our  inspection,  so  that  we 
have  no  means  of  determining  whether  the  ruling  of  the 
court  upon  this  question  was  proper  or  not  and  therefore 
it  must  be  presumed  that  the  instrument  was  properly 
excluded.  Appellant  must  also  be  presumed  to  be  satis- 
fied with  the  ruling  of  the  trial  court  in  this  regard  as  he 
has  filed  no  cross-errors.  Appellant  upon  the  trial  of- 
fered no  proof  upon  this  question.  We  are  therefore 
bound  by  the  Act  to  hold  that  under  the  proofs  produced 
in  this  case  the  parties  were  covered  by  the  provisions  of 
said  Compensation  Act  and  that  therefore  this  suit  for 
damages  cannot  be  sustained. 

"The  judgment  will  accordingly  be  reversed  and  the 
cause  remanded  with  directions  to  the  court  below  to 
give  leave  to  appellee  to  amend  his  declaration  by  alle- 
gations charging  that  appellant  was  at  the  time  of  the 
injury  transacting  its  business  under  said  Compensation 
Act,  so  that  evidence  may  properly  be  introduced  by  him 
upon  that  question,  or  to  dismiss  the  suit  without  preju- 
dice to  his  right  to  proceed  under  said  Act. ' ' 

John  French  v  The  Cloverleaf  Coal  Mining  Company 
190  111.  App.  400. 

October    16,    1914. 

"This  is  an  action  on  the  case  begun  by  appellee 
against  appellant  to  the  January  term,  1913,  of  the  Mont- 
gomery County  Circuit  Court  to  recover  damages  for 


114  OPINIONS  BY  THE  APPELLATE  COURT 

personal  injuries  suffered  by  appellee  while  working  as  a 
shot  firer  in  appellant 's  coal  mine.  The  declaration  con- 
tains two  counts,  both  averring  common  law  negligence. 
Each  count  avers  that  the  appellant  was  operating  a  coal 
mine  in  Montgomery  county ;  that  appellee  was  employed 
therein  as  a  shot  firer;  that  the  appellant  had  elected 
not  to  accept  the  provisions  of  the  Compensation  Act  in 
force  May  1,  1912,  and  was  thereby  deprived  of  the  de- 
fenses of  assumed  risk;  that  the  injury  was  caused  in 
whole  or  in  part  by  the  negligence  of  a  fellow-servant 
and  proximately  caused  by  the  contributory  negligence 
of  appellee,  except  that  such  contributory  negligence 
shall  be  considered  in  reducing  the  amount  of  damages; 
that  appellee  had,  as  an  employee  of  appellant,  elected 
to  accept  the  provisions  of  said  Act ;  that  in  the  under- 
ground works  of  said  mine  were  divers  roadways,  cross- 
cuts and  rooms ;  that  on  September  16, 1912,  appellee  was 
engaged  in  rooms  3,  4,  5,  6  and  7  off  a  certain  entry,  and 
while  engaged  as  a  shot  firer,  after  placing  a  shot  in  room 
7,  appellee  started  to  room  number  4,  where  he  encoun- 
tered an  obstruction  of  three  cars  which  appellant  had 
negligently  placed  there,  with  gob  on  either  side,  which 
appellant  had  negligently  placed,  wholly  obstructing  the 
travel  of  appellee,  and  while  so  delayed,  a  shot  exploded 
and  thereby  appellee  was  injured. 

"The  second  count  contains  the  further  averment  that 
after  appellee  had  ignited  certain  shots  and  started  to 
retire  to  a  place  of  safety  he  encountered  an  obstruction, 
consisting  of  cars  with  gob  on  either  side  thereof,  negli- 
gently placed  and  permitted  to  remain,  whereby  appellee 
was  delayed. 

"A  demurrer  to  both  counts  of  the  declaration  was 
overruled.  The  appellant  then  filed  a  plea  of  not  guilty. 
On  a  trial  before  a  jury  a  verdict  for  $1,029.16  was  re- 
turned in  favor  of  appellee,  on  which  judgment  was  ren- 
dered. 

"It  is  insisted  that  the  court  erred  in  overruling  the 


OPINIONS  BY  THE  APPELLATE  COURT  115 

demurrer  for  the  reason  the  Compensation  Act  is  uncon- 
stitutional. The  Supreme  Court  has  held  the  Act  is  con- 
stitutional. Deibeikis  v  Link-Belt  Co.,  261  111.  Sup.  454; 
Dietz  v  Big  Muddy  Coal  &  Iron  Co.,  263  111.  Sup.  480;  and 
if  the  Act  had  not  been  passed  on,  the  appellant  by  ap- 
pealing to  this  court  has  waived  that  question. 

"Luken  v  Lake  Shore  &c  Ry.,  248  111.  377. 

"It  is  also  contended  that  the  evidence  does  not  sus- 
tain the  finding  in  favor  of  appellee  for  the  reason  that 
the  evidence  does  not  show  the  negligence  of  appellant 
was  the  proximate  cause  of  the  injury.  The  evidence 
shows  that  there  were  loaded  coal  cars  standing  in  the 
neck  of  rooms  6  and  7  and  that  there  was  gob  piled  on 
both  sides  of  the  cars  in  the  neck  of  room  6,  which  was 
18  inches  high  at  the  wheels  and  sloped  back  to  the  rib, 
where  it  was  4  feet  high,  and  that  this  obstruction  would 
delay  a  person  trying  to  get  out  of  the  room  in  a  hurry. 
Appellee  had  lighted  the  fuse  to  the  shots  and  had  then 
run  to  the  mouth  of  the  room,  where,  having  to  crawl 
over  the  gob  to  get  out,  he  was  delayed  until  the  shot  ex- 
ploded and  a  piece  of  the  rock  struck  him  on  the  right 
side  of  his  face.  If  the  cars  had  not  obstructed  the  neck 
of  the  room,  or  the  gob  had  not  hindered  him  so  that  he 
had  to  crawl  over  it,  he  would  have  been  out  of  the  neck  of 
the  room  before  the  explosion  occurred.  We  think  it  was 
a  question  for  the  jury  whether  the  negligence  of  the  de- 
fendant was  or  was  not  the  proximate  cause  of  the  in- 
jury. The  evidence  sustains  the  finding  in  favor  of  ap- 
pellee. 

"It  is  also  argued  that  appellee  can  only  recover  the 
compensation  that  is  provided  for  by  the  Act.  The  ap- 
pellant elected  not  to  pay  compensation  under  the  Act. 
The  effect  of  that  election  by  appellant  is  to  relegate  ap- 
pellee to  a  suit  at  law  for  his  damages  measured  by  the 
law  as  if  it  existed  prior  to  the  Act,  except  that  contribu- 
tory negligence,  if  any  of  appellee,  shall  be  considered  in 


116  OPINIONS  BY  THE  APPELLATE  COURT 

reduction  of  damages.    There  was  no  error  in  permitting 
appellee  to  prove  his  daily  wages. 

"It  is  contended  that  the  court  erred  in  refusing  the 
second  refused  instruction  requested  by  appellant.  The 
first  part  of  the  instruction  was  fully  given  in  both  appel- 
lant's  second  and  third  given  instructions,  and  the  re- 
mainder of  the  refused  instruction,  which  tells  the  jury 
'  that  the  plaintiff  must  prove  by  a  preponderance  of  the 
evidence  that  the  said  negligent  act  was  the  direct  and 
proximate  cause  of  the  injury/  is  fully  given  in  appel- 
lant's thirteenth,  which  tells  the  jury  that  'the  damages 
to  be  recovered  in  an  action  must  always  be  the  natural 
and  proximate  consequences  of  the  wrongful  act  com- 
plained of;  *  *  *  that  to  entitle  the  plaintiff  to  recover  in 
this  case  the  damages  claimed  must  be  the  direct  conse- 
quences of  the  act  complained  of.  The  relation  of  cause 
and  effect  must  be  shown  to  exist  between  the  act  com- 
plained of  and  the  injury.'  There  is  no  error  either  in 
giving  or  refusing  instructions. 

"It  is  also  insisted  that  the  judgment  is  excessive. 
The  evidence  shows  that  appellee  is  forty-four  years  of 
age,  that  he  was  earning  $4.72  a  day,  that  both  his  uppet 
and  lower  jaws  were  broken,  four  teeth  were  knocked  out 
and  seven  pieces  of  bone  extracted ;  he  was  out  of  work 
nine  weeks,  confined  to  his  bed  two  weeks,  suffered  in- 
tense pain  and  had  a  doctor's  bill  of  about  $75. 

"We  cannot  say  that  the  judgment  is  excessive  or  that 
it  should  be  set  aside  because  the  damages  were  calcu- 
lated down  to  cents.  The  judgment  is  affirmed. 

(Affirmed.)" 

Przykopenski  v  Citizens'  Coal  Mining  Co. 
270  111.  Sup.  275. 

"The  trial  court  having  held  that  the  Act  was  not 
passed  in  the  method  required  by  the  Constitution,  and 
was  therefore  unconstitutional  and  void,  the  plaintiff 


OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT  117 

filed  two  additional  counts  charging  negligence.  The 
court  says : — 

"The  right  of  appellant  to  raise  the  question  of  the 
constitutionality  of  the  Statute  on  this  appeal  was  not 
waived  by  filing  the  two  additional  counts.  We  have 
held  in  Dragovich  v  Iroquois  Iron  Co.,  269  111.  478,  that 
the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  of  1911  was  not  in- 
valid by  reason  of  the  method  or  manner  of  its  passage 
by  the  General  Assembly.  The  error  of  the  court  in  hold- 
ing the  Act  invalid  necessitates  a  reversal  of  the  judg- 
ment in  this  case,  and  it  is  unnecessary  to  discuss  any 
other  questions  raised  upon  this  record. 

"The  judgment  is  reversed  and  the  cause  remanded, 
with  directions  to  the  trial  court  to  overrule  the  demur- 
rer to  the  second,  third  and  fifth  counts. ' ' 

The  People  ex  rel  Carrie  L.  Munn  et  al  v  John  P. 
McGoorty,  Judge 
270  111.  Sup.  610. 

MB.  JUSTICE  CRAIG  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  court. 

"The  petitioners,  on  motion  duly  made,  were  granted 
leave  to  file  in  this  court  an  original  petition  for  a  writ  of 
mandamus  to  compel  the  respondent,  a  judge  of  the  Cir- 
cuit Court  of  Cook  county,  to  set  aside  and  vacate  a  cer- 
tain order  entered  by  him  denying  the  prayer  of  the  pe- 
titioners for  an  appeal  to  the  Appellate  Court  for  the 
First  District  from  a  final  order  and  judgment  entered 
by  the  respondent,  while  sitting  as  judge  of  said  Circuit 
Court  and  to  compel  the  respondent  to  grant  said  prayer 
for  an  appeal  to  said  Appellate  Court.  Eespondent  has 
filed  a  general  demurrer  to  the  petition,  and,  taking  such 
averments  thereof  as  are  well  pleaded  to  be  true,  it  ap- 
pears from  the  petition  that  on  November  10,  1914,  Con- 
rad Casparson  received  injuries  by  inhaling  fumes  or 
gases  emanating  from  a  fire  caused  by  burning  moving 
picture  film  scraps,  composed  of  celluloid,  from  which  he 
died  the  day  following.  Alma  M.  Casparson,  adminis- 


118  OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT 

tratrix  of  estate  of  said  Conrad  Casparson,  deceased, 
brought  proceedings  before  the  State  Industrial  Board 
under  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  of  1913,  to  re- 
cover compensation  under  said  Act  because  of  the  fatal 
injuries  alleged  to  have  been  received  by  said  deceased 
while  in  the  employ  of  the  petitioners.  The  Industrial 
Board  on  March  5,  1915,  rendered  its  order  or  decision 
against  the  petitioners  and  in  favor  of  said  Alma  M.  Cas- 
parson, administratrix.  On  the  same  day  the  petitioners 
filed  in  the  Circuit  Court  of  Cook  county  their  petition 
for  a  writ  of  certiorari,  praying  that  said  writ  be  di- 
rected to  said  Industrial  Board  commanding  said  Board 
to  certify  and  bring  into  court  a  full,  true  and  complete 
transcript  of  the  records  and  files  connected  with  said 
proceedings,  and  that  said  court,  upon  the  production 
thereof,  examine  and  inquire  into  the  record  of  the  pro- 
ceedings and  the  decision  of  said  Board,  and  if  said  pro- 
ceedings were  found  illegal  or  unauthorized  by  law,  that 
the  same  be  quashed  and  set  aside.  Later  a  motion  was 
made  by  the  respondent  to  said  writ  of  certiorari  to 
quash  the  same,  which  motion,  on  hearing,  was  on  Aug- 
ust 24,  1915,  sustained  by  the  court  and  the  petition  for 
certiorari  dismissed,  and  it  was  further  ordered  that  the 
decision  and  award  of  the  Industrial  Board  be  confirmed 
and  that  Alma  M.  Casparson,  administratrix  of  the  es- 
tate of  Conrad  Casparson,  deceased,  have  and  recover 
from  the  petitioners  $3,500 — the  amount  of  the  award 
made  by  said  Industrial  Board — and  that  she  have  exe- 
cution therefor.  From  this  order  the  petitioners  in  the 
certiorari  proceeding  prayed  an  appeal  to  the  Appellate 
Court  for  the  first  district,  which  prayer  for  an  appeal 
was  denied  by  the  court.  Thereupon  said  petitioners 
moved  the  court  to  vacate  and  set  aside  the  order  deny- 
ing said  prayer  for  an  appeal  to  the  Appellate  Court, 
which  motion  was  denied  and  the  petitioners  by  their 
counsel  excepted.  The  court  thereupon  fixed  the  amount 
of  the  bond  to  review  said  judgment,  said  bond  to  be  filed 


OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT  119 

within  thirty  days,  and  ordered  that  the  petitioners  be 
allowed  sixty  days  within  which  to  file  their  bill  of  excep- 
tions. 

"The  respondent  bases  his  action  in  denying  an  ap- 
peal to  the  Appellate  Court  on  the  provisions  on  the 
clause  (/)  of  section  19  of  the  Workmen's  Compensation 
Act,  as  amended  in  1915,  which  is  as  follows  :*  *  *  (p  29, 
ante). 

"The  relators  contend  that  under  the  law  an  appeal 
lies  to  the  Appellate  Court  from  final  orders  and  judg- 
ments of  the  Circuit  Courts  in  all  suits  and  proceedings 
at  law,  except  those  reviewable  directly  by  the  Supreme 
Court,  under  and  by  virtue  of  section  8  of  the  Appellate 
Court  Act  (Kurd's  Stat.  1913,  p.  681),  as  supplemented 
and  modified  by  sections  91  and  118  of  the  Practice  Act 
(Hurd's  Stat.  1913,  pp.  1873,  1878) ;  that  a  certiorari 
proceeding  is  a  common  law  action,  and  an  appeal  lies  to 
the  Appellate  Court  from  all  judgments  and  final  orders 
entered  therein  unless  some  question  is  involved  which 
gives  the  Supreme  Court  jurisdiction  of  such  appeal.  Ac- 
cordingly it  is  claimed  that  clause  (f )  of  section  19  of  the 
amendment  to  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  above 
set  out  is  in  violation  of  and  in  conflict  with  section  29 
of  article  6  of  the  Constitution  of  1870,  which  is  as  fol- 
lows: 'All  laws  relating  to  courts  shall  be  general  and  of 
uniform  operation,  and  the  organization,  jurisdiction, 
powers,  proceedings  and  practice  of  all  courts,  of  the 
same  class  or  grade,  so  far  as  regulated  by  law,  and  the 
force  and  effect  of  the  process,  judgments  and  decrees  of 
such  courts,  severally,  shall  be  uniform. '  The  argument 
is,  that  a  statute  which  seeks  to  deny  the  right  to  an  ap- 
peal to  the  Appellate  Court  from  the  final  orders  and 
judgments  of  the  Circuit  Courts  of  this  state  in  certiorari 
proceedings  which  are  instituted  to  review  the  records, 
orders,  etc.,  of  inferior  tribunals  other  than  the  said  In- 
dustrial Board,  is  in  violation  of  and  in  conflict  with  said 
section  29  of  article  6  of  the  Constitution. 


120  OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT 

"Section  11  of  article  6  of  the  Constitution  provides 
that  after  the  year  1874  Appellate  Courts  of  uniform  or- 
ganization and  jurisdiction  may  be  created  in  districts 
formed  for  that  purpose,  Ho  which  such  appeals  and 
writs  of  error  as  the  General  Assembly  may  provide 
may  be  prosecuted  from  Circuit  and  other  courts/  Sec- 
tion 12  provides  that  the  Circuit  Courts  shall  have  origi- 
nal jurisdiction  of  'all  causes  in  law  and  equity.'  In  pur- 
suance of  the  provisions  contained  in  said  Section  11  the 
legislature  passed  an  act  in  1877  establishing  Appellate 
Courts.  Section  8  of  that  Act,  as  amended  in  1887,  pro- 
vides: 'The  said  Appellate  Courts  created  by  this  Act 
shall  exercise  appellate  jurisdiction  only,  and  have  juris- 
diction of  all  matters  on  appeal,  or  writs  of  error  from 
the  final  judgments,  orders  or  decrees  of  any  of  the  Cir- 
cuit Courts,  or  the  Superior  Court  of  Cook  county,  or 
County  Courts,  or  from  the  City  Courts  in  any  suit  or 
proceeding  at  law,  or  in  chancery,  other  than  criminal 
cases,  not  misdemeanors,  and  cases  involving  a  franchise 
or  freehold  or  the  validity  of  a  statute  (Kurd's  Stat. 
1913,  p.  681).  By  section  1  of  the  Practice  Act  of  1907,  it 
is  provided  that  'appeals  shall  lie  to  and  writs  of  error 
from  the  Appellate  Court  or  Supreme  Court,  as  may  be 
allowed  by  law,  to  review  the  final  judgments,  orders  or 
decrees  of  any  of  the  Circuit  Courts,  the  Superior  Court 
of  Cook  county,  the  County  Courts  or  the  City  Courts  and 
other  courts  from  which  appeals  and  to  which  writs  of 
error  may  be  allowed  by  law,  in  any  suit  or  proceeding  at 
law  or  in  chancery.  Appeals  or  writs  of  error  in  this 
section  allowed  shall  be  subject  to  the  limitations  by  this 
Act  provided  and  to  the  conditions  imposed  by  law' 
(Hurd's  Stat.  1913,  p.  1873).  The  limitations  and  con- 
ditions thus  referred  to  are  contained  in  section  118  of 
the  same  Act,  which  provides  that  'appeals  from  and 
writs  of  error  to  Circuit  Courts,  the  Superior  Court  of 
Cook  county,  the  Criminal  Court  of  Cook  county,  County 
Courts  and  City  Courts,  in  all  criminal  cases  below  the 


OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT  121 

grade  of  felony  shall  be  taken  directly  to  the  Appellate 
Court,  and  in  all  criminal  cases  above  the  grade  of  misde- 
meanors and  cases  in  which  a  franchise  or  freehold  or 
the  validity  of  a  statute  or  a  construction  of  the  Consti- 
tution is  involved,  and  in  cases  in  which  the  validity  of 
a  municipal  ordinance  is  involved  and  in  which  the  trial 
judge  shall  certify  that  in  his  opinion  the  public  interest 
so  requires,  and  in  all  cases  relating  to  revenue,  or  in 
which  the  state  is  interested,  as  a  party  or  otherwise, 
shall  be  taken  directly  to  the  Supreme  Court  *  (Kurd's 
Stat.  1913,  p.  1878). 

"Generally  speaking,  it  appears  from  the  foregoing 
Acts  that  the  legislature  has  conferred  upon  the  Appel- 
late Court  jurisdiction  in  all  appeals  from  the  Circuit 
Courts,  except  in  certain  classes  of  cases. 

"Among  other  cases  relied  on  by  the  petitioners  in 
this  proceeding  is  Sixby  v  Chicago  City  Ry.  Co.,  260  III 
478,  in  which  we  held  that  section  20  of  the  Municipal 
Court  Act,  which  required  the  Supreme  Court  and  the 
Appellate  Court  to  take  judicial  notice  of  the  rules  of  the 
Municipal  Court,  is  contrary  to  section  29  of  article  6  of 
the  Constitution  for  the  reason  that  the  Supreme  Court 
and  Appellate  Court  are  not  required  to  take  judicial  no- 
tice of  the  rules  of  any  other  court  than  the  Municipal 
Court,  and  that  the  section,  therefore,  was  lacking  in  the 
uniformity  of  procedure  and  practice  required  by  the 
Constitution  for  such  enactments.  In  Hoffman  v  Paradis, 
259  111.  Ill,  it  was  held  that  the  provision  of  the  Munici- 
pal Court  Act  which  requires  writs  of  error  to  reverse 
judgments  of  the  Municipal  Court  in  fourth  class  cases 
to  be  sued  out  within  thirty  days  from  date  of  the  entry 
of  the  judgment  is  in  conflict  with  section  29  of  article  6 
of  the  Constitution.  For  the  same  reason  the  section  of 
the  Municipal  Court  Act  which  requires  writs  of  error 
to  review  judgments  for  taxes  in  fourth  class  cases  to  be 
sued  out  of  the  Appellate  Court  was  held  unconstitutional 
in  People  v  Hibernian  Banking  Ass'n,  245  HI.  522,  be- 


122  OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT 

cause  under  the  general  Practice  Act  writs  of  error  to  re- 
view judgments  for  taxes  entered  by  any  court  other  than 
the  Municipal  Court  are  required  to  be  sued  out  of  this 
court.  In  People  v  Cosmopolitan  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  246  111. 
442,  it  was  held  that  section  25  of  the  Municipal  Court 
Act,  in  so  far  as  it  authorized  writs  of  error  from  the 
Appellate  Court  to  the  Municipal  Court  in  cases  relating 
to  the  revenue  or  where  the  state  is  interested,  as  a  party 
or  otherwise,  was  unconstitutional  and  such  writs  of  er- 
ror must  be  sued  out  of  the  Supreme  Court  under  section 
118  of  the  Practice  Act.  In  all  of  these  cases  there  was 
an  attempt  by  the  legislature  to  prescribe  a  procedure  in 
reviewing  suits  at  law  from  the  Municipal  Court  different 
from  the  procedure  for  the  review  of  similar  suits  from 
other  but  similar  courts  of  record,  and  there  is  a  marked 
distinction  between  such  cases  and  cases  arising  in  purely 
statutory  proceedings,  in  which  the  legislature  may  pro- 
vide for  an  appeal  or  review  and  the  manner  thereof,  or 
may  provide  that  there  be  no  appeal  or  review. 

"There  would  be  great  force  in  the  contention  of  the 
petitioners  if  the  writ  of  certiorari  that  may  be  issued 
by  the  Circuit  Court  in  cases  arising  under  the  Work- 
men's Compensation  Act  were  the  common  law  writ  of 
certiorari.  So  far  as  the  writ  issued  in  this  case  is  con- 
cerned, it  was  the  common  law  writ  and  was  issued  by  the 
court  under  its  common  law  powers,  as  it  was  issued  be- 
fore the  amendment  to  the  Workmen's  Compensation 
Act  went  into  effect.  In  Courier  v  Simpson  Construction 
Co.,  264  HI.  488,  it  was  held  that  Circuit  Courts  have  jur- 
isdiction to  issue  the  common  law  writ  of  certiorari  to  re- 
view the  decisions  of  the  Industrial  Board  provided  for 
in  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act.  After  the  writ 
had  been  issued,  and  before  the  Circuit  Court  rendered 
its  decision,  the  amendment  embraced  in  clause  (f),  su- 
pra, went  into  effect,  and,  if  valid  in  its  provisions  as  to 
reviewing  the  decisions  of  the  Circuit  Courts,  must  gov- 
ern, in  this  case  the  same  as  if  the  Circuit  Court  had  is- 


OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT  123 

sued  a  writ  of  certiorari  to  the  Industrial  Board  under 
the  provisions  of  the  Act.  There  can  be  no  vested  right 
in  any  particular  remedy  or  any  special  mode  of  admin- 
istering it.  Dobbins  v  First  Nat.  Bank  of  Peoria,  112 
111.  553 ;  Woods  v  Soncy,  106  Fid.  407. 

"There  is  no  question  but  that  the  legislature  has  the 
power,  in  a  purely  statutory  proceeding,  to  provide 
whether  an  appeal  in  such  proceeding  shall  be  taken  to 
the  Supreme  Court  or  Appellate  Court  (Allerton  v  Hop- 
kins, 160  111.  448).  In  that  case  it  is  said,  on  page  453  of 
the  opinion,  quoting  from  the  case  of  Hall  v  Thode,  75 
111.  173 :  '  These  proceedings  are  purely  statutory,  having 
no  vigor  outside  of  the  statute,  and  it  is  an  unvarying 
principle  that  the  requirements  of  the  statute  must  gov- 
ern and  control  them.  By  section  123  of  chapter  46,  title 
"elections/'  (Rev.  Stat.  1874),  it  is  provided: 

"  'In  all  cases  of  contested  elections  in  the  Circuit 
Courts  or  County  Courts  appeals  may  be  taken  to  the  Su- 
preme Court  in  the  same  manner  and  upon  like  conditions 
as  is  provided  by  law  for  taking  appeals  in  cases  in  chan- 
cery from  the  Circuit  Courts. '  Here  is  a  specific  remedy 
provided  in  a  specific  case — not  one  arising  in  the  usual 
course  of  litigation,  but  exceptional.  It  is  a  familiar  prin- 
ciple in  such  cases,  where  the  organic  or  statute  law  has 
given  specific  remedy,  that  remedy  must  be  pursued. 
In  contested  elections  before  a  County  Court  the  remedy, 
and  the  only  one,  to  correct  a  supposed  error  in  the  judg- 
ment is  by  appeal,  and  this  remedy  can  alone  be  invoked. 
This  proceeding  not  being  according  to  the  course  of  the 
common  law,  but  statutory,  merely,  must  be  governed  by 
the  law  prescribed  for  such  proceedings/ 

"While  it  is  true  that  the  writ  of  certiorari  is  a  com- 
mon law  writ  and  the  Circuit  Court  derives  its  power,  in 
some  cases,  to  issue  such  writ  not  from  the  statute  but 
some  cases,  to  issue  such  writ  not  from  the  statute,  but 
the  writ  of  certiorari  may  be  issued  in  certain  cases,  and 
the  proceedings  and  practice  where  the  court  issues  the 


124  OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT 

writ  in  such  cases  are  provided  for,  as,  for  instance,  in 
the  Justice  and  Constable  Act  (Kurd's  Stat.  1913,  p.  79), 
it  is  provided  in  paragraph  188  (p.  1535),  that  upon  the 
return  of  said  writ  such  proceedings  shall  be  had  thereon 
as  in  cases  of  appeal.  'The  purpose  of  a  common  law 
writ  of  certiorari  is  to  bring  the  entire  record  of  an  in- 
ferior tribunal  before  the  court  to  determine  whether 
such  tribunal  has  proceeded  according  to  law,  and  the 
trial  is  to  be  had  solely  from  an  inspection  of  the  record. 
The  court  cannot  consider  any  matter  not  appearing  of 
record,  and  if  the  want  of  jurisdiction  or  illegality  ap- 
pear from  the  record  the  proper  judgment  is  that  the 
proceeding  is  quashed,  but  if  the  proceeding  be  regular 
the  petition  must  be  dismissed  and  the  writ  quashed,  and 
these  are  the  only  judgments  that  can  be  entered  in  this 
procedure.'  (Sanner  v  Union  Drainage  District,  175  111. 
575.)  In  the  case  of  People  v  Wilkinson,  13  HI.  660,  it  is 
said,  on  page  662  of  the  opinion,  with  reference  to  the 
power  of  Circuit  Courts  to  issue  writs  of  certiorari;  'It 
is  a  common  law  power  and  is  vested  in  our  Circuit 
Courts,  which  in  this  state  are  the  highest  courts  of  orig- 
inal jurisdiction  and  answer  to  the  court  of  king's  bench 
in  England,  unless  it  is  taken  away  by  statute.  There  is 
certainly  no  express  statute  which  deprives  these  courts 
of  this  jurisdiction,  nor  is  there  any  which  takes  it  away 
by  implication.  It  is  true,  we  have  a  statute  which  pro- 
vides for  the  issuing  of  a  writ  called  a  certiorari,  but 
that  writ  can  scarcely  be  said  to  have  any  analogy  to  the 
common  law  writ  of  the  same  name.  The  common  law 
writ  only  removes  the  record  of  the  inferior  court,  and 
upon  that  record,  alone,  can  the  questions  be  raised.  The 
determination  of  the  questions  of  fact  by  the  inferior 
court  are  held  conclusive,  while  our  statutory  writ  re- 
moves the  entire  case  into  the  Circuit  Court  and  opens 
for  re-examination  all  questions,  both  of  law  and  fact. 
Indeed,  it  is  but  another  mode  of  taking  an  appeal  from 
the  judgment  of  a  justice  of  the  peace  to  the  Circuit  Court 


OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT  125 

and  it  can  only  be  directed  to  justices  of  the  peace,  while 
the  common  law  suit,  as  we  have  seen,  may  be  sent  to  all 
inferior  tribunals  and  jurisdictions,  whether  they  be 
courts  of  justice  or  tribunals  of  special  and  more  limited 
authority,  and  whether  an  appeal  be  allowed  from  their 
determination  or  not. ' 

"When  a  writ  of  certiorari  is  issued  by  the  Circuit 
Court  to  review  the  proceedings  of  the  State  Industrial 
Board  under  the  provisions  of  clause  (f )  of  section  19  of 
the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act,  the  court  has  the 
power  to  review  all  questions  of  law  presented  by  the  rec- 
ord of  the  Industrial  Board,  or  a  suit  in  chancery  may  be 
commenced  by  any  party  in  interest  to  review  the  de- 
cision of  the  Board  only  for  errors  of  law  appearing  up- 
on the  record  of  said  Board.  The  court  may  confirm  or 
set  aside  the  decision  of  arbitrators  or  committee  of  arbi- 
tration of  Industrial  Board.  If  the  decision  is  set  aside 
and  the  facts  found  in  the  proceedings  before  the  Board 
are  sufficient,  the  court  may  enter  such  decision  as  in  jus- 
tified by  law  or  may  remand  the  cause  to  the  Industrial 
Board  for  further  proceedings,  and  may  state  the  ques- 
tions requiring  further  hearing  and  give  such  other  in- 
structions as  may  be  proper. 

"It  will  thus  be  seen  that  the  powers  of  the  court  in 
this  proceeding  are  different  from  the  powers  of  the  court 
when  the  common  law  writ  of  certiorari  has  been  issued, 
in  which  the  court  could  only  review  the  record  of  the  pro- 
ceedings and  either  dismiss  the  petition  and  quash  the 
certiorari  or  quash  the  proceedings,  as  pointed  out  in 
Sanner  v  Union  Drainage  District,  supra.  'In  case  a  suit 
in  chancery  is  brought  in  the  Circuit  Court,  as  provided 
in  clause  (f),  supra,  the  duties  and  powers  of  the  court 
therein  prescribed  are  different  from  the  powers  and  du- 
ties of  the  court  in  other  chancery  proceedings.  In  short, 
all  proceedings  under  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act 
are  purely  and  entirely  statutory,  and  if  a  writ  of  cer- 
tiorari is  awarded  by  the  Circuit  Court  or  a  suit  in  chan- 


126  OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT 

eery  is  commenced,  the  proceedings  thereunder  are  not 
the  same  as  in  other  similar  suits  but  are  governed, 
wholly  by  the  statute  in  question.  Where  in  a  special 
statutory  proceeding  one  form  of  review  is  specifically 
given,  all  other  forms  of  review  are  excluded.  (Allerton  v 
Hopkins,  supra;  McCollum  v  Title  &  Trust  Co.,  203  111. 
142;  Myers  v  Newcomb  Drainage  District,  245  111.  140.) 

"In  statutory  proceedings,  the  legislature  has  the 
power  to  provide  how  such  cases  shall  be  reviewed,  if  at 
all,  and  has  provided  that  certain  classes  of  cases  shall  be 
reviewed  by  the  Supreme  Court  only.  Among  such  cases 
are  those  arising  under  the  Eminent  Domain  Act  (Met- 
ropolitan West  Side  EL  R.  R.  Co.  v  Siegel,  161  111.  638, 
and  cases  cited),  also  cases  of  contested  elections.  Hart 
Bros,  v  West  Chicago  Park  Comrs.,  186  111.  464. 

' '  For  the  reasons  given  we  think  the  provisions  in  the 
Act  in  question  are  constitutional,  and  the  writ  for  man- 
damus will  be  denied." 

(Writ  Denied.) 

Strom  v  Postal  Telegraph  Co. 
271  IU.  Sup.  544. 

Februry   16,   1916 

MB.  CHIEF  JUSTICE  FARMER  delivered  the  opinion  of 
the  court. 

"This  is  an  appeal  from  a  judgment  of  the  Circuit 
Court  of  Will  County  against  appellant  and  in  favor  of 
appellee  for  a  personal  injury.  Appellee  was  employed 
by  appellant  as  a  lineman,  and  while  climbing  a  telegraph 
pole  in  the  course  of  his  employment  and  upon  the  order 
of  his  foreman,  fell  and  was  injured.  The  negligence 
charged  was  that  the  pole  was  in  a  decaying  condition 
and  while  appellee  was  climbing  it,  with  iron  spurs  on  his 
feet,  the  wood  gave  away  and  broke  out,  causing  appellee 
to  fall. 

* '  The  injury  occurred  in  March,  1914,  and  the  declara- 
tion alleged  appellant  was  not  operating  under  the  Work- 


OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT  127 

men's  Compensation  Act  of  1913.  The  general  issue  was 
pleaded  to  the  declaration.  The  reason  for  taking  the 
appeal  direct  to  this  court  is  the  claim  of  appellant  that 
the  constitutionality  of  the  provisions  of  the  Workmen's 
Compensation  Act  abolishing  the  defense  of  assumed  risk 
in  case  an  employer  engaged  in  any  of  the  occupations 
enumerated  in  the  statute  shall  elect  not  to  provide  com- 
pensation according  to1  its  provisions  is  involved.  It  is 
not  denied  that  appellant  was  engaged  in  an  occupation 
to  which  the  Act  applied,  and  it  was  admitted  on  the  trial 
that  it  was  not  operating  under  the  provisions  of  said 
Act. 

"The  only  way  in  which  it  is  claimed  by  appellant 
that  the  constitutionality  of  any  part  of  the  Workmen's 
Compensation  Act  was  raised  on  the  trial  is,  that  it  of- 
fered instructions,  which  the  court  refused,  that  an  em- 
ployee assumes  all  the  risks  which  are  the  usual  and  or- 
dinary incidents  of  the  line  of  the  employment  in  which 
he  is  engaged.  The  record  shows  these  instructions  were 
refused,  and  it  is  now  argued  that  they  should  have  been 
given  unless  the  provisions  of  the  Workmen's  Compen- 
sation Act  abolish  the  doctrine  of  assumed  risk  where 
the  employer  elects  not  to  come  under  the  provisions  of 
the  Act,  and  that  by  offering  said  instructions  appellant 
raised  the  constitutionality  of  the  Statute.  Appellant  con- 
cedes that  this  court  has  sustained  the  power  of  the  legis- 
lature to  abolish  the  defense  of  assumed  risk,  under  the 
Workmen's  Compensation  Act  of  1911,  in  three  cases— 
Deibeikis  v  Link-Belt  Co.,  261  111.  454 ;  Diets  v  Big  Muddy 
Coal  Co.,  263  id.  480;  and  Crooks  v  Taze^uell  Coal  Co., 
263  id.  343 — but  contends  that  they  were  either  not  well 
considered  cases  or  that  they  are  distinguishable  from 
this  case.  Those  cases  directly  held  that  the  rules  of 
law  relating  to  the  defenses  of  contributory  negligence, 
assumption  of  risk  and  the  effect  of  the  negligence  of  a 
fellow-servant  were  not  established  by  the  Constitution 
but  by  the  courts,  and  the  legislature  had  the  power  to 


128  OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT 

modify  them  or  abolish  them  entirely.  The  same  thing 
has  been  decided  by  the  Federal  courts  and  many  state 
courts.  It  is  therefore  no  longer  an  open  question  in  this 
state,  and  if  it  be  conceded  that  the  question  was  raised 
in  the  trial  court,  we  cannot  permit  it  to  be  made  a  pre- 
text for  a  direct  appeal  to  this  court  where  the  question 
has  been  repeatedly  decided  by  us  and  settled  contrary 
to  the  contention  of  appellant. 

1  i  The  cause  will  be  transferred  to  the  Appellate  Court 
for  the  Second  District." 

(Cause  Transferred.) 


OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT  129 

Lauruszka  v  Empire  Mfg.  Co.,  271  111.  Sup.  304. 
CBAIG,  J. 

This  was  a  proceeding  under  the  Workmen's  Compen- 
sation Act  of  1911  to  recover  for  the  death  of  one  George 
Lauruszka.  A  petition  was  filed  in  the  County  Court  for 
Winnebago  county  by  Anna  Lauruszka  and  Thomas  Lau- 
ruszka, as  sister  and  father,  respectively,  of  the  deceased, 
against  the  Empire  Manufacturing  Company  and  the  Cy- 
clone Blow  Pipe  Company  to  recover  for  injuries  sus- 
tained by  said  George  Lauruszka  in  the  course  of  his  em- 
ployment as  the  servant  of  the  above  named  corpora- 
tions, which  resulted  in  his  death.  To  this  petition  each 
of  the  companies  filed  a  separate  plea,  alleging  the  un- 
constitutionality  of  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  by 
reason  of  certain  irregularities  in  the  passage  of  the  Act. 
A  hearing  was  had  upon  the  issues  raised  by  these  pleas, 
which  resulted  in  a  finding  in  favor  of  the  petitioners. 
The  Cyclone  Blow  Pipe  Company  elected  to  stand  by  its 
plea,  and  therefore  objected  to  and  refused  to  participate 
further  in  the  proceedings.  The  Empire  Manufacturing 
Company  joined  in  the  arbitration  and  appointed  an  arbi- 
trator. A  hearing  was  had  before  the  arbitrators,  result- 
ing in  a  finding  that  Anna  Lauruszka  was  entitled  to  re- 
cover of  the  Cyclone  Blow  Pipe  Company  the  sum  of 
$1,200  as  the  personal  representative  of  the  deceased,  in 
weekly  payments  of  $6  each,  and  that  the  Empire  Manu- 
facturing Company  was  exonerated  from  all  liability. 

Thereafter  the  matter  came  on  to  be  heard  on  the  pe- 
tition of  Anna  Lauruszka  in  the  county  court  of  that 
county  for  a  lump  sum  settlement,  to  which  due  objection 
was  interposed  by  the  Cyclone  Blow  Pipe  Company 
(hereinafter  called  plaintiff  in  error)  both  to  the  consti- 
tutionality of  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  and  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  County  Court  to  entertain  the  cause 
where  the  amount  of  the  claim  is  in  excess  of  $1,000.  A 
hearing  was  had  on  the  petition  and  the  court  awarded 


130  OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT 

the  petitioner  $1,200  as  a  lump  sum  settlement  and  the 
costs  of  the  proceedings.  Plaintiff  in  error  preserved  its 
exception  to  the  judgment  as  entered,  and  has  prosecuted 
this  writ  of  error  direct  to  this  court  on  the  ground  that 
the  constitutionality  of  the  Statute  is  involved. 

The  two  reasons  urged  for  the  reversal  of  the  judg- 
ment are :  (1)  The  unconstitutionality  of  the  Workmen's 
Compensation  Act  of  1911;  and  (2)  want  of  jurisdiction 
in  the  County  Court  to  hear  a  case  of  this  character  when 
the  claim  for  damages  is  in  excess  of  $1,000. 

(1)  Defendant  in  error  has  made  her  motion  in  this 
court  to  dismiss  the  writ  of  error,  and  the  same  has  been 
taken  with  the  case.  The  ground  urged  is  that  this  court 
has  no  jurisdiction  to  entertain  an  appeal  or  writ  of  er- 
ror in  this  class  of  cases  by  reason  of  the  provisions  of 
sections  122  and  123  of  the  County  Court  Act,  Kurd's 
Stat.  1913,  p.  713.  Section  122  of  that  Act  provides: 

"Appeals  may  be  taken  from  the  final  orders,  judg- 
ments and  decrees  of  the  County  Courts  to  the  Circuit 
Courts  of  their  respective  counties  in  all  matters  except 
as  provided  in  the  following  section,  upon  the  appellant 
giving  bond  and  security  in  such  amount  and  upon  such 
conditions  as  the  court  shall  approve,  except  as  other- 
wise provided  by  law.  Upon  such  appeal  the  case  shall 
be  tried  de  novo. ' ' 

Section  123  provides  that  appeals  and  writs  of  error 
in  proceedings  for  confirmation  of  special  assessments, 
the  sale  of  lands  for  taxes  and  special  assessments,  and  in 
all  common  law  and  attachment  cases,  and  those  of 
forcible  entry  and  detainer,  may  be  taken  to  the  Supreme 
and  Appellate  courts. 

Sections  122  and  123  of  the  County  Court  Act  must 
be  read  in  connection  with  section  8  of  the  Appellate 
Court  Act  (Kurd's  Stat.  1913,  p.  681),  which  is  as  fol- 
lows: 

1 '  The  said  Appellate  Courts  created  by  this  Act  shall 
exercise  appellate  jurisdiction  of  all  matters  of  appeal, 


OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT  131 

or  writs  of  error  from  the  final  judgments,  orders  or  de- 
crees of  any  of  the  Circuit  Courts,  or  the  Superior  Court 
of  Cook  County,  or  County  Courts,  or  from  the  City 
Courts  in  any  suit  or  proceeding  at  law,  or  in  chancery 
other  than  criminal  cases,  not  misdemeanors,  and  cases 
involving  a  franchise  or  freehold  or  the  validity  of  a 
statute.  Appeals  and  writs  of  error  shall  lie  from  the 
final  orders,  judgments  or  decrees  of  the  Circuit  and  City 
Courts,  and  from  the  Superior  Court  of  Cook  county  di- 
rectly to  the  Supreme  Court  in  all  criminal  cases  and  in 
cases  involving  a  franchise  or  freehold,  or  the  validity  of 
a  Statute." 

It  is  also  necessary  to  consider  in  this  connection  sec- 
tions 91  and  118  of  the  Practice  Act  (Kurd's  Stat.  1913, 
pp.  1873, 1878),  which  are  as  follows : 

' '  Sec.  91.  Appeals  shall  lie  to  and  writs  of  error  from 
the  Appellate  or  Supreme  Courts,  as  may  be  allowed  by 
law,  to  review  the  final  judgments,  orders  or  decrees  of 
any  of  the  Circuit  Courts,  the  Superior  Court  of  Cook 
county,  the  County  Courts  or  the  City  Courts  and  other 
courts  from  which  appeals  and  to  which  writs  of  error 
may  be  allowed  by  law,  in  any  suit  or  proceeding  at  law 
or  in  chancery.  Appeals  or  writs  of  error  in  this  sec- 
tion allowed  shall  be  subject  to  the  limitations  by  this  Act 
provided  and  to  the  conditions  imposed  by  law." 

"Sec.  118.  Appeals  from  and  writs  of  error  to  Cir- 
cuit Courts,  the  Superior  Court  of  Cook  county, 
the  Criminal  Court  of  Cook  county,  County  Courts 
and  City  Courts,  in  all  criminal  cases  below  the 
grade  of  felony  shall  be  taken  directly  to  the  Appellate 
Court,  and  in  all  criminal  cases  above  the  grade  of  mis- 
demeanors and  cases  in  which  a  franchise  or  freehold  or 
the  validity  of  a  Statute  or  a  construction  of  the  Con- 
stitution is  involved ;  and  in  cases  in  which  the  validity  of 
a  municipal  ordinance  is  involved  and  in  which  the  trial 
judge  shall  certify  that  in  his  opinion  the  public  interest 
BO  requires,  and  in  all  cases  relating  to  revenue,  or  in 


132  OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT 

which  the  State  is  interested,  as  a  party  or  otherwise, 
shall  be  taken  directly  to  the  Supreme  Court." 

The  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  in  question  makes 
no  provision  for  any  appeal  from  a  judgment  rendered 
by  the  court  on  a  trial  de  novo  when  a  hearing  is  had  in 
either  the  Circuit  Court  or  the  County  Court  on  an  ap- 
peal to  either  of  said  courts  from  a  decision  of  the  arbi- 
trators, as  provided  in  section  10  of  that  Act. 

In  this  respect  the  Statute  is  similar  to  the  provisions 
of  the  Act  of  1874,  which  revised  the  law  in  relation  to 
the  commitment  and  detention  of  lunatics.  In  People  v 
Gilber,  115  111.  59,  in  construing  the  provisions  of  section 
122  of  the  County  Court  Act,  we  held  that  no  appeal 
would  lie  from  the  County  Court  to  the  Circuit  Court  on 
an  inquest  of  sanity.  This  court,  in  construing  the  sec- 
tions in  question  of  these  various  acts,  held  in  Union 
Trust  Co.  v  Trumbull,  137  HI.  146,  and  other  like  cases, 
that  a  proceeding  in  the  County  Court  under  the  Act  re- 
lating to  assignments  was  not  purely  a  statutory  proceed- 
ing, but  a  chancery  proceeding  modified  and  regulated 
by  statute,  and  therefore  not  appealable  to  the  Circuit 
Court. 

It  has  also  been  held  in  Lee  v  People,  140  111.  536,  that 
a  bastardy  proceeding,  while  not  a  suit  at  common  law, 
was  clearly  a  proceeding  at  law  and  therefore  not  appeal- 
able to  the  Circuit  Court. 

In  Grier  v  Cable,  159  HI.  29,  it  was  held  that  an  appeal 
from  a  judgment  of  the  County  Court  allowing  or  disal- 
lowing claims  against  the  estate  of  a  deceased  should  be 
taken  to  the  Circuit  Court,  as  such  hearings  were  in  no 
proper  sense  proceedings  at  law  or  in  chancery. 

In  Lynn  v  Lynn,  160  111.  307,  the  court  held  that  a  pro- 
ceeding in  the  County  Court  for  the  sale  of  lands  of  a  de- 
cedent for  the  payment  of  debts  was  practically  a  chan- 
cery proceeding,  and  therefore  not  appealable  to  the  Cir- 
cuit Court.  In  Groszglass  v  Von  Berzen,  220  HI.  340,  it 
was  held  that  an  application  to  the  County  Court  to  dis- 


OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT  133 

charge  a  debtor  under  the  Insolvent  Debtors  Act,  while 
not  a  suit  at  law,  was  a  proceeding  at  law  and  not  a  purely 
statutory  proceeding.  In  Myers  v  Newcomb  Drainage 
District,  245  111.  140,  this  court  had  these  sections  of  the 
Statute  under  consideration  and  held  that  the  proceed- 
ings to  organize  a  special  drainage  district  under  the 
Farm  Drainage  Act  of  this  State  was  a  statutory  pro- 
ceeding, and  not  a  proceeding  at  law  or  in  chancery,  and 
that  therefore  the  appeal  from  the  County  Court 's  order 
establishing  such  drainage  district  should  be  to  the  Cir- 
cuit Court. 

The  reasons  advanced  for  the  holdings  in  the  forego- 
ing cases  are  applicable  here.  The  working  of  the  whole 
law  under  consideration  shows  that  one  of  its  objects  was 
to  provide  a  speedy  remedy  for  the  injured  employee,  or 
those  dependent  upon  him  for  support,  to  recover  the 
compensation  due  him  under  the  provisions  of  the  Act. 
Proceedings  of  this  character  were  unknown  to  the  com- 
mon law  or  at  the  time  sections  122  and  123  of  the  County 
Courts  Act  were  enacted.  County  Courts  and  Circuit 
Courts  have  concurrent  jurisdiction  in  the  decision  of 
appeals  from  the  decision  of  the  arbitrators,  as  provided 
for  in  section  10  of  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act, 
and  a  hearing  de  novo  may  be  had  in  such  matters.  It 
does  not  seem  reasonable  that  it  was  the  intention  of  the 
legislature  to  give  a  party  two  hearings  de  novo  if  he 
took  his  appeal  from  the  decision  of  the  arbitrators  to 
the  County  Court,  but  only  one  hearing  de  novo  if  he  took 
his  appeal  from  such  decision  to  the  Circuit  Court.  Nor 
do  we  think  it  would  be  proper  so  to  construe  the  Act. 

In  support  of  the  first  contention,  plaintiff  in  error 
insists  that  it  does  not  appear  from  the  House  and  Sen- 
ate journals  that  certain  amendments,  Nos.  1  to  23,  inclu- 
sive, were  printed  before  the  final  vote  was  taken  on  the 
Act,  as  required  by  the  provisions  of  section  13,  article 
4,  of  the  Constitution  of  this  State.  Substantially  the 
same  questions  were  urged  to  the  constitutionality  of  the 


134  OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT 

passage  of  the  Act  and  the  same  evidence  offered  in  sup- 
port thereof,  in  Dragovich  v  Iroquois  Iron  Co.,  269  HI. 
478,  where  we  held  the  evidence  insufficient  to  show  that 
the  Act  was  not  constitutionally  passed.  The  reasons  for 
our  decision  sustaining  the  constitutionality  of  the  Act 
are  there  fully  set  forth  and  need  not  be  again  repeated 
here.  The  decision  in  that  case  is  conclusive  on  this 
question. 

v  It  is  next  urged  that  the  County  Court  had  no  juris- 
diction, under  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act,  in 
cases  where  the  amount  of  the  claim  or  judgment  entered 
would  be  in  excess  of  $1,000.  The  jurisdiction  of  the 
County  Court  in  such  matters  is  derived  from  section  10 
of  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  of  1911,  which  pro- 
vides : 

"Any  question  of  law  or  fact  arising  in  regard  to  the 
application  of  this  law  in  determining  the  compensation 
payable  hereunder  shall  be  determined  either  by  agree- 
ment of  the  parties  or  by  arbitration  as  herein  provided. 

"In  case  any  such  question  arises  which  cannot  be  set- 
tled by  agreement,  the  employer  and  employee  shall  each 
select  a  disinterested  party  and  the  judge  of  the  County 
Court,  or  other  court  of  competent  jurisdiction,  of  the 
county  where  the  injured  employee  resided  or  worked  at 
the  time  of  the  injury,  shall  appoint  a  third  disinterested 
party,  such  persons  to  constitute  a  board  of  arbitrators, 
for  the  purpose  of  hearing  and  determining  such  disputed 
questions  of  law  or  fact  arising  in  regard  to  the  applica- 
tion of  the  law  in  determining  the  compensation  payable 
hereunder.  *  *  *  Provided  that  either  party  to  such 
arbitration  shall  have  the  right  to  appeal  from  such  re- 
port or  award  of  the  arbitrators  to  the  Circuit  Court  or 
the  court  that  appointed  the  third  arbitrator  of  the 
county  where  the  injury  occurred  by  filing  a  petition  in 
such  court  within  twenty  days  after  the  filing  of  the  re- 
port of  the  arbitrators,  and  upon  filing  a  good  and  suffi- 
cient bond,  in  the  discretion  of  the  court,  and  upon  such 
appeal  the  questions  in  dispute  shall  be  heard  de  novo, 


OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT  135 

and  either  party  may  have  a  jury  upon  filing  a  written 
demand  therefor  with  his  petition."    Laws  1911,  p.  321. 

Section  18,  art.  6,  of  the  Constitution  provides  that 
County  Courts  shall  be  courts  of  record  and  have  origi- 
nal jurisdiction  of  all  matters  of  probate,  the  settlement 
of  estates,  etc.,  and  in  proceedings  for  the  collection  of 
taxes  and  assessments,  and  such  other  jurisdiction  as 
may  be  provided  for  by  general  law.  Pursuant  to  this 
constitutional  authority,  the  General  Assembly  passed  a 
general  law  conferring  upon  County  Courts  concurrent 
jurisdiction  with  Circuit  Courts  in  all  that  class  of  cases 
wherein  justices  of  the  peace  have  jurisdiction,  where 
the  amount  claimed  or  the  value  of  the  property  in  con- 
troversy does  not  exceed  $1,000,  and  in  all  cases  of  ap- 
peals from  justices  of  the  peace  and  police  magistrates. 
Kurd's  Stat.  1913,  c.  37,  par.  95.  But  proceedings  under 
Workmen's  Compensation  Acts  are  not  of  the  class  of 
cases  of  which  justices  of  the  peace  have  jurisdiction,  and 
the  provision  quoted  therefore  has  no  application  to  the 
question  whatever.  Section  10  of  the  Workmen's  Com- 
pensation Act  confers  upon  the  judge  of  the  County 
Court  of  the  county  where  the  injured  employee  resided 
or  worked  at  the  time  of  injury,  authority  to  appoint  ar- 
bitrators for  the  purpose  of  hearing  all  disputed  ques- 
tions of  law  or  fact  arising  under  that  Act,  and  then  gives 
either  party  a  right  of  appeal  from  the  decision  of  such 
arbitrators  to  the  Circuit  Court  or  the  court  of  the  county 
that  appointed  the  third  arbitrator,  where  the  cause  is 
tried  de  novo.  In  so  doing,  we  think  it  was  clearly  the  in- 
tention of  the  legislature  to  confer  upon  the  County  Court 
concurrent  jurisdiction  with  the  Circuit  Court  in  all  mat- 
ters arising  under  the  Act.  "All  questions  of  law  or  fact 
arising  in  regard  to  the  application  of  this  law  in  deter- 
mining the  compensation  payable  hereunder"  would  in- 
clude the  amount  of  compensation  to  be  awarded  in  cases 
properly  coming  within  the  provisions  of  this  Act. 

This  contention  of  plaintiff  in  error  is  not  well  taken. 

For  the  reasons  given,  the  judgment  of  the  County 
Court  of  Winnebago  county  will  be  affirmed. 

(Judgment  Affirmed.) 


136  OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT 

Richardson  v  Sears,  Roebuck  &  Co.,  No.  9790  Sup.  Ct. 
Ill  N.  E.  85. 

December,    1915. 

CRAIG,  J. 

Sears,  Roebuck  &  Co.,  a  corporation,  appellee  in  this 
court,  appealed  to  the  County  Court  of  Kankakee  county 
from  an  award  made  against  it  and  in  favor  of  the  appel- 
lant for  compensation  for  the  death  of  his  intestate,  Fred 
E.  Smith,  under  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  of 
1911.  The  County  Court  sustained  a  motion  made  by 
Sears,  Roebuck  &  Co.,  the  appellant  in  that  court,  to  dis- 
miss the  proceeding  on  the  ground  that  the  Workmen's 
Compensation  Act  was  unconstitutional.  The  appellee 
in  the  County  Court  thereupon  appealed  to  this  court. 

Counsel  for  appellee  in  this  court  have  made  a  motion 
to  dismiss  the  appeal  because  the  court  is  without  juris- 
diction to  entertain  it,  contending  that  under  the  Statute 
the  appeal  should  have  been  taken  from  the  County  Court 
to  the  Circuit  Court.  That  motion  was  taken  with  the 
case.  The  same  motion  was  made  in  Lauruszka  v  Empire 
Mfg.  Co.,  No.  9919,  111  N.  E.  82,  which  was  a  case  arising 
under  the  same  law,  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act 
of  1911,  and  substantially  the  same  reasons  were  assigned 
in  support  of  the  motion.  We  held  in  that  case  that  the 
APPEAL  was  properly  taken  to  this  court.  What  was  said 
in  that  case  is  decisive  of  the  same  questions  here,  and  it 
need  not  be  further  considered. 

The  CONSTITUTIONALITY  of  the  Act  in  question  was 
fully  considered  and  upheld  in  the  case  of  Dragovich  v 
Iroquois  Iron  Co.,  269  111.  478,  where  it  was  urged  that 
the  law  was  not  constitutionally  enacted  for  the  same 
reasons  that  are  urged  by  appellee  in  this  court,  and  for 
which  reasons  the  County  Court  dismissed  the  appeal  to 
it  from  the  arbitrators.  The  County  Court  was  in  error 
in  holding  the  law  unconstitutional  and  in  dismissing  the 
appeal  to  it,  and  the  order  of  the  County  Court  will  be 
reversed  and  the  cause  remanded  to  that  court  for  further 
proceedings  consistent  with  this  opinion. 

(Reversed  and  Remanded.) 


OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT  137 

Lavin  v  Wells  Bros.  Co.,  272  111.  Sup.  609. 
CABTWRIGHT,  J. 

Thomas  Lavin  was  employed  by  the  Wells  Bros.  Com- 
pany, a  corporation,  and  suffered  injuries  from  which  he 
died  on  January  16,  1913.  Martin  Lavin,  administrator 
of  his  estate,  applied  to  the  Superior  Court  of  Cook 
county  for  the  appointment  of  the  third  arbitrator  to  de- 
termine the  question  of  his  right  to  compensation,  and 
the  amount  of  the  same,  under  the  Workmen's  Compen- 
sation Act  of  1911.  The  court  appointed  an  arbitrator 
and  an  award  was  made,  from  which  the  corporation  ap- 
pealed to  the  court.  The  cause  was  tried  by  the  court 
without  a  jury,  and  there  was  a  finding  for  the  adminis- 
trator and  an  order  that  the  corporation  should  pay  to 
him  $3,500,  in  equal  weekly  installments  of  $8.61.  From 
that  judgment  the  corporation  was  allowed  and  perfected 
an  appeal  to  the  Appellate  Court  for  the  first  district. 
The  Appellate  Court  dismissed  the  appeal  on  the  ground 
that  the  law  did  not  allow  an  appeal  from  the  judgment 
and  therefore  the  court  had  no  jurisdiction.  The  record 
has  been  brought  to  this  court  by  certiorari. 

The  Appellate  Court  Act  and  the  Practice  Act  pro- 
vide for  appeals  from  final  judgments,  orders  or  decrees 
in  any  suit  or  proceeding  at  law  or  in  chancery,  and  the 
question  whether  an  appeal  will  lie  from  the  judgment  of 
a  court  under  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  depends 
upon  whether  the  proceeding  in  the  court  is  a  suit  or  pro- 
ceeding at  law  or  in  chancery.  The  term,  "suit  or  pro- 
ceeding at  law  or  in  chancery,"  includes  every  claim  or 
demand  in  a  court  of  justice  which  was  known  at  the 
adoption  of  our  Constitution  as  an  action  at  law  or  a  suit 
in  chancery,  and  also  all  actions  since  provided  for  in 
which  personal  or  property  rights  are  involved  of  the 
same  nature  as  those  previously  enforced  by  actions  at 
law  or  in  chancery,  but  does  not  include  special  statutory 
proceedings  involving  rights  and  providing  remedies 


138  OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT 

which  are  not  of  the  kind  previously  enforced  either  at 
law  or  in  chancery.  Douglas  v  Hutchinson,  183  111.  323. 
There  was  previous  to  the  enactment  of  the  Statute  in 
question  a  liability  of  the  employer  to  his  employee  for 
the  negligence  of  the  employer  resulting  in  injury  and 
damage  which  could  be  enforced  by  an  action  at  law.  The 
Statute  gives  the  employer  his  CHOICE  whether  to  accept 
its  provisions  extending  that  liability  to  all  cases,  or  to 
forfeit  substantial  DEFENSES  previously  accorded  to  him 
by  the  law,  leaving  the  legal  liability  as  it  was,  but  with- 
out those  defenses.  The  Statute  provides  that  upon  ac- 
ceptance its  provisions  shall  be  regarded  as  a  part  of  the 
CONTRACT  of  hiring,  and  that  the  measure  of  liability  of 
the  employer  for  an  injury  shall  be  determined  accord- 
ing to  the  provisions  of  the  Act.  The  liability  is  a  con- 
tract liability  not  different  in  its  nature  from  any  other 
liability  arising  out  of  contract.  It  is  true  that  the  right 
to  the  compensation  fixed  is  a  STATUTORY  right,  but  it  is 
not  of  any  different  character  from  the  right  to  compen- 
sation for  an  injury  within  the  limits  of  the  law  as  it  pre- 
viously existed.  It  is  a  right  to  receive  as  compensation 
a  sum  of  money  fixed  by  the  Statute,  in  such  amounts  and 
at  such  times  as  the  court  shall  determine.  A  method  is 
provided  for  the  determination  by  arbitrators  whether 
an  injured  employee  suffered  his  injury  while  engaged 
in  the  line  of  his  duty  in  his  employment  and  determining 
the  measure  of  liability  of  the  employer.  That  is  NOT  A 
JUDICIAL,  proceeding,  but  the  Statute  provides  for  an  ap- 
peal and  a  trial  de  novo  in  a  court,  and  that  provision  is 
for  a  JUDICIAL,  remedy,  which  begins  with  the  appeal  to 
the  court.  City  of  Aurora  v  Schoeberlein,  230  111.  496; 
Conover  v  Gatton,  251  111.  587.  The  proceeding  is  of  the 
same  nature  as  any  suit  or  proceeding  at  law  for  the  pur- 
pose of  fixing  a  liability  and  recovering  money,  and  the 
result  is  either  an  order  for  the  payment  or  money  or  the 
defeat  of  the  claiimant.  The  nature  of  the  right,  the 
method  of  proceeding,  and  the  judgment  are  of  the  same 


OPINIONS  BY  THE  SUPREME  COURT  139 

kind  as  in  any  other  claim  for  money  in  a  court  of  law. 

In  the  case  of  Lauruszka,  v  Empire  Mfg.  Co.,  271  HI. 
304,  a  writ  of  error  was  sued  out  of  this  court  to  the 
County  Court  and  there  was  a  motion  to  dimiss  the  writ, 
which  was  denied.  The  ground  of  the  motion  was  that 
an  appeal  should  have  been  taken  to  the  Circuit  Court, 
and  in  considering  that  question  the  right  to  an  appeal 
was  classed,  under  the  Appellate  Court  Act  and  Practice 
Act,  with  various  proceedings  in  which  an  appeal  was  al- 
lowed to  the  Appellate  Court  or  Supreme  Court,  accord- 
ing to  the  questions  involved.  The  opinion  of  the  court 
was  of  such  nature  as  to  give  the  right  of  appeal  to  the 
Appellate  Court,  and  by  the  same  Statute  a  writ  of  error 
could  be  sued  out  of  this  court  because  the  constitution- 
ality of  the  Statute  in  question  was  involved. 

The  judgment  of  the  Appellate  Court  is  reversed,  and 
the  cause  remanded  to  that  court,  with  DIRECTIONS  TO  CON- 
SIDER the  errors  assigned. 

(Reversed  and  Eemanded  with  Directions.) 


140 


WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACTS. 

DIGEST  OF  DECISIONS 

OPINIONS— EXTRACTS— NOTES 

STATE  OF  ILLINOIS 

SUPREME  COURT 
APPELLATE  COURT 
INDUSTRIAL  BOARD 

UNITED  STATES 

FEDERAL  COURTS 
HIGHEST  STATE  COURTS 

ENGLAND 

RULING  CASES 
For  cross-references  consult  index. 

ABBREVIATIONS. 

I.  B. — Industrial  Board,  Bulletin  No.  1.  (Decisions  1913- 
1915.) 

B.  W.  C.  C. — Butterworth 's  Compensation  Cases.  (Eng- 
land.) 

L.  T.  J. — Law  Times  Journal.    (England.) 

K.  B.— King's  Bench. 

N.  E. — North  Eastern  Reporter. 

N.  W. — North  Western  Reporter. 

A. — Atlantic  Reporter. 

P. — Pacific  Reporter. 

S.  E. — South  Eastern  Reporter. 

S.  W. — South  Western  Reporter. 


141 

CONSTITUTION 

Workmen's  Compensation  Act  of  Illinois — Valid.   149 
Deibeikis  v  Link-Belt  Company 
Declaration  of  Public  Policy. 
No  Vested  Right  in  Common  Law  Rules. 
Elective  Feature. 
Notes. 

Acts  of  other  states 151 

Valid. 

Federal  Courts. 
State  Courts. 

Iowa.  New  York. 

Ohio.  Ohio. 

Indiana.  Texas. 

Kansas.  Washington. 

Maine.  Wisconsin. 

Massachusetts.  Invalid. 

Michigan.  New  York. 

Minnesota.  Montana. 

Montana.  Texas. 

Nevada.  Kentucky. 

New  Jersey. 

Amendments  to  Constitutions 155 

Hawkins  v  Bleakley 156 

CONSTRUCTION 163 

To  be  Liberal. 

To  Effect  Dominant  Purpose. 

Extra-State  Precedents. 

§  1  ELECTION 169 

* '  Any  employer  may  elect  to  provide  and  pay  compen- 
sation according  to  provisions  of  Act." 
"Every  employee  shall  be  deemed  to  have  accepted 
provisions  of  Act  when  employer  so  elects." 

§  2  ELECTION 171 

"Every  employer  conclusively  presumed  to  have  filed 


142 

notice  of  election  to  provide  and  pay  compensation, 
who  is  engaged  in  any  of  enumerated  extra-hazard- 
ous occupations,  unless  filing  notice  to  the  contrary." 
Notices. 

t  3  OCCUPATION 174 

*  *  Occupations,  enterprises  or  businesses  declared  to  be 

extra-hazardous. ' ' 

1. — "Building,  maintaining,  removing,  repairing  or 
demolishing  of  any  structure. ' ' 

2. — "Construction,  excavating  or  electrical  work." 

3. — "Carriage  by  land  or  w^ater  and  loading  or  un- 
loading in  connection  therewith." 

4. — "The  operation  of  any  warehouse  or  general  or 
terminal  store  houses." 

5. — *  *  Mining,  surface  mining  or  quarrying. ' ' 

6. — "Any  enterprise  in  which  explosive  materials  are 
manufactured,  handled  or  used  in  dangerous  quan- 
ties." 

7. — "Any  enterprise  wherein  molten  metal,  or  ex- 
plosive or  injurious  gases  or  vapors,  or  inflam- 
mable vapors  or  fluids,  or  corrosive  acids,  are  man- 
ufactured, used,  generated,  stored  or  conveyed  in 
dangerous  quantities. ' ' 

8. — "Any  enterprise  in  which  statutory  or  municipal 
ordinance  regulations  are  now  or  shall  hereafter 
be  imposed  for  the  regulating,  guarding,  use  or 
the  placing  of  machinery  or  appliances,  for  the 
protection  and  safeguarding  of  the  employees  or 
the  public  therein." 

"Not  to  be  construed  to  apply  to  any  work,  employ- 
ment or  operations  done,  had  or  conducted  by  far- 
mers and  others  engaged  in  farming,  tillage  of  the 
soil,  or  stock  raising,  etc. ' ' 

§  3  DEFENSE 180 

"In  action  to  recover  damages  against  employer  en- 
gaged in  enumerated  extra-hazardous  occupations, 


143 

rejecting  Act,  it  shall  not  be  a  defense,  that : 

1. — "The  employee  assumed  the  risks  of  the  employ- 
ment; 

2. — "Tbe  injury  or  death  was  caused  in  whole  or  in 
part  by  the  negligence  of  a  fellow  servant ;  or 

3.i — "The  injury  or  death  was  proximately  caused  by 

the  contributory  negligence  of  the  employee." 
Safety    Acts — Violation    of — Common    law    defenses 

barred. 

4  "EMPLOYEE" 208 

1. — "Term  shall  be  construed  to  mean:  The  State  and 

each  county,  city,  town,  township,  incorporated  vil- 
lage, school  district,  body  politic,  or  municipal  cor- 
poration therein. ' ' 

2. — "Every  person,  firm,  public  or  private  corporation, 
including  hospitals,  public  service,  eleemosynary,  re- 
ligious or  charitable  corporations  or  associations, 
who  has  any  person  in  service  or  under  any  contract 
for  hire ' ' — accepting  by  filing  notice  or  by  presump- 
tion from  extra-hazardous  character  of  occupation. 

5  "EMPLOYEE" 209 

1. — "Term  to  be  construed  to  mean:  Every  person  in 

service  of  state  and  public  bodies  enumerated  in  §  4, 
1st  par. 

"Except  any  official  of  state  or  such  public  body." 
"Except  any  such  employee  to  whom  pension  is  pay- 
able from  pension  fund. ' ' 
* '  Except  contractor  with  such  public  body. ' ' 
2. — '  *  Every  person  in  the  service  of  another  under  any 
contract  of  hire,  express  or  implied,  oral  or  written." 
Alien. 

Included. 
Minor. 

Included.  "Legally  permitted  to  work  under  laws 
of  State" — Same  power  to  contract,  receive  pay- 
ments and  give  quittances  therefore  as  adult. 


144 

Excluded  by  laws  of  United  States — held  to  be  exclusive. 

elusive. 
Extra-territorial  effect. 

§  6  DAMAGES 221 

"No  common  law  or  statutory  right  to  recover  dam- 
ages for  injury  or  death  of  employee  covered,  while 
engaged  in  the  line  of  his  duty,  available  against  env 
ployer — other  than  compensation  provided  by  Act." 

§  7  ACCIDENTAL  INJURY 186 

"Accidental  injuries  sustained  by  employee,  arising 
out  of  and  in  the  course  of  the  employment. 

§  7  COMPENSATION 122 

"Amount  of  compensation  which  shall  be  paid  for  in- 
jury to  employee  resulting  in  death." 
(a) — "Leaving  widow,  child  or  children  whom  he 
was  under  legal  obligation  to  support  at  time  of 
injury. ' ' 

(b) — "Leaving  widow,  child,  parent,  grandparent  or 
other  lineal  heir,  to  whose  support  he  had  contrib- 
uted within  four  years  previous  to  time  of  injury." 
(c) — "Leaving  collateral  heirs  dependent  upon  his 

earnings  at  time  of  injury. ' ' 

(e) — "Installments — equal  to  one-half  average  earn- 
ings to  be  paid  at  same  intervals  as  wages  or  earn- 
ings were  paid. ' ' 

(f)' — "Payments  to  be  made  at  employer's  option  to 
personal  representative  or  beneficiaries — in  shares 
according  to  distributee 's  respective  dependency. ' ' 

§  8  COMPENSATION 226 

"Amount  of  compensation  for  injury  not  resulting  in 
death." 

(a) — "First  aid;  medical,  surgical  and  hospital 
services ;  not  longer  than  eight  weeks ;  not  exceed- 
ing $200." 


145 

(b) — "Temporary  total  incapacity  over  six  working 
days." 

(c) — "Serious  and  permanent  disfigurement  to  hand, 
head  or  face. ' ' 

(d) — "Partial  permanent  incapacity." 

*  '  Returning  to  the  employment  in  which  injured.  No- 
tice within  18  months. ' ' 
Injuries  in  schedule  of  losses : 

Thumb,  finger,  phalange. 

Toe,  phalange. 

Permanent  and  complete  losses : 
Hand. 
Arm. 
Foot. 
Sight  of  an  eye. 

Total  and  permanent  disability : 
Loss  of  both  hands,  both  arms,  both  legs,  both  eyes, 
any  two  thereof. 

Not  excluding  other  cases. 

(f) — "Complete  disability,  wholly  and  permanently 
incapable  of  work." 

(g) — "Death   from  injury  before  total  payments 

made — remainder  to  be  paid  to  beneficiaries. ' ' 
(h) — "Compensation  in  no  event  to  exceed  fifty  per 
centum  of  average  weekly  wage  or  $12  per  week- 
Payments  not  to  extend  over  eight  years,  except  in 
case  of  complete  disability. 

Conservator  or  guardian  for  incompetent  employee. 
Installments  payable  at  same  intervals  as  wages,  or 
weekly. 

9  LUMP  SUM 239 

"Any  employer,  employee  or  beneficiary  who  shall  de- 
sire to  have  compensation,  or  any  unpaid  part  there- 
of, paid  in  a  lump  sum,  may  so  petition  the  Industrial 
Board." 


146 

'  *  If  it  appears  to  the  interest  of  the  parties,  the  Board 
may  order  the  commutation  of  the  compensation  to 
an  equivalent  lump  sum,  equaling  the  total  sum  of  the 
probable  future  payments,  capitalized  at  their  pres- 
ent value  calculated  at  three  per  centum  per  annum 
with  annual  rests." 

"In  cases  indicating  complete  disability,  six  months  to 
empire  before  entertainment  of  petition." 

"Lump  sum  award  may  be  rejected  by  either  party  ex- 
cept under  §  7  or  par.  (e)  of  §  8,  total  and  permanent 
disability. ' ' 

§  10  COMPUTATION 240 

(a-g) — "Basis  for  computing  compensation  to  be  an- 
nual earnings  if  continuously  employed — Same  class 
of  employment — Working  days  of  year — Average 
daily  earnings — Operating  part  of  year — Day's 
work. ' ' 

(h) — "Subsequent  injury." 

§  11  RESPONSIBILITY. 

Compensation  to  be  "measure  of  responsibility." 

§  12  EXAMINATION 243 

"Employe  required,  if  requested,  to  submit  himself 
for  examination  to  a  duly  qualified  medical  practi- 
tioner or  surgeon  selected  by  employer. ' ' 
"If  employee  refuses  to  submit  himself  to  examination 
or  unnecessarily  obstructs  the  same,  his  right  to  com- 
pensation payments  shall  be  temporarily  sus- 
pended." 

§§  13-16  INDUSTRIAL  BOARD 243 

§  15  "Shall  have  jurisdiction  over  operation  and  ad- 
ministration of  Act." 

§  16  "May  make  rules  and  orders  which  shall  be 
deemed  prima  facie  reasonable  and  valid." 


147 

§  16  ' '  Process  and  procedure  shall  be  as  simple  and  sum- 
mary as  reasonably  may  be. ' ' 

"  Board  or   any  member  thereof   or   any  arbitrator 
designated  by  Board  shall  have  power  to  administer 
oaths,  subpoena  and  examine  witnesses,  issue  sub- 
poenas duces  tecum  and  examine  and  inspect  books, 
records,  documents,  places,  or  premises." 
Board  shall  have  power  to  determine  the  reasonable- 
ness and  fix  the  amount  of  any  fee  or  compensation 
charged  by  any  person  for  any  service  performed. 
§  18  "Board  to  determine  all  questions  arising  under 
Act." 

§  19  PROCEDURE 250 

(a)  "Disputed  questions  of  law  and  fact." 

"  Where  parties  fail  to  reach  an  agreement,  Board  shall 
appoint  an  arbitrator,  or,  in  claims  for  permanent  in- 
capacity or  death,  a  chairman  of  a  committee  of  arbi- 
tration, at  request  of  either  party,  depositing  twenty 
dollars. ' ' 

(b)  Hearing  in  vicinity  after  10  days'  notice. 

"Decision  of  arbitrator  or  committee  shall  become  de- 
cision of  Board,  unless  petition  for  review  is  filed 
within  fifteen  days  and  agreed  statement  of  facts  or 
stenographic  report  within  twenty  days. — Authenti- 
cation— extension. 

(c)  "Physical  examination  by  appointee  of  Board." 

(d)  "Compensation  of  employee  persisting  in  insani- 
tary or  injurious  practices  which  tend  to  imperil  or 
retard  recovery,  or  refusing  to  submit  to  reasonably 
essential  treatment  to  promote  recovery,  may  be  re- 
duced or  suspended. ' ' 

(e)  " Board  promptly  to  review  decision — questions  of 
law  and  fact — additional  evidence." 

(f)  "Decision  of  Board,  acting  within  its  powers,  and 


148 

arbitrators,  where  not  reviewed,  shall  in  the  absence 

of  fraud,  be  conclusive  unless  reviewed  by  court." 
(1)     "Circuit  Court  shall  by  writ  of  certiorari  have 

power  to  review  all  questions  of  law  presented  by 

record — Suit  in  chancery." 
"Judgments,  orders  and  decrees  of  Circuit  Court  shall 

be  reviewed  only  by  Supreme  Court. ' ' 
"Decision  of  any  two  members  of  Board  or  committee 

shall  be  considered  that  of  body. ' ' 
* '  Circuit  Court  may  enter  judgment  on  certified  copy  of 

decision  of  Board,  and  tax  costs  and  attorneys'  fees 

where  compensation  not  paid." 
' '  Review  by  Board  of  award  or  agreement  in  eighteen 

months. ' ' 

$  22  "Agreement  within  seven  days  after  injury  pre- 
sumed fraudulent. ' ' 

§  24  NOTICE  OF  ACCIDENT 266 

' '  No  proceedings  to  be  maintained  unless  notice  of  ac- 
cident given  to  employer  as  soon  as  practicable,  but 
not  later  than  thirty  days  after  accident — Inaccuracy 
not  bar  where  no  prejudice — Contents — Where  facts 
are  known. ' ' 

§§  25-27  INSURANCE,  ETC 266 

§  29  THIRD  PARTY 266 

Liable  for  damages — Subrogation. 

§  31  CONTRACTOR 267 

Contracting  to  do  or  have  work  done  of  extra-hazard- 
ous character,  failure  to  insure  payment  of  compen- 
sation, liability. 
Fraudulent  schemes  to  evade  responsibility. 


149 

CONSTITUTION. 

ILLINOIS. 

Workmen's  Compensation  Act  of  Illinois  is  in  har- 
mony with  and  not  repugnant  to  the  Constitution  of  the 
State  and  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States. 

Deibeikis  v  Link  Belt  Company,  261  111.  Sup. 

454;  104  N.  E.  Rep.  211. 
Diets  v  Big  Muddy  Coal  Company,  263  111.  Sup. 

480;  105  N.  E.  289. 
Crooks  v  Tazewell  Coal  Company,  263  111.  Sup. 

343;  105  N.  E.  132. 
Courier  v  Simpson  Construction  Company,  264 

111.  Sup.  488;  106  N.  E.  350. 
Dragovich  v  Iroquois  Iron  Company,  269  111. 

Sup.  479. 
Frey  v  Kerens-Donnewald  Coal  Company,  271 

111.  Sup.  121. 

Uphoff  v  Industrial  Board,  271  111.  Sup.  312. 
Strom  v  Postal  Telegraph  Company,  271  111. 

Sup.  544. 

People  v  McGoorty,  270  111.  Sup.  610. 
Przykopenski  v  Citizens  Coal  Co.,  270  111.  Sup. 

275. 
Richardson  v  Sears  Roebuck  &  Co.,  271  111.  Sup. 

325. 

Devine  v  Delano,  272  111.  Sup.  166. 
Lauruszka  v  Empire  Mfg.  Co.,  271  111.  Sup.  304. 
Bell  v  Toluca  Coal  Co.,  272  111.  Sup.  576. 
Lamn  v  Wells  Bros.  Co.,  272  111.  Sup.  609. 
Act  valid — Not  exercise  of  police  power — Declaration 
of  public  policy — Elective   feature — Not   compulsory — 
Nor  class  legislation — Nor  deprivation  of  property — Nor 
of  right  of  trial  by  jury — Defenses  at  common  law  abro- 
gated— Search  and  seizure. 

Deibeikis  v  Link-Belt  Company,  261  HI.  Sup. 
454;  Ann.  Cas.  1915  A.  241. 


150  CONSTITUTION 

"The  right  to  trial  by  jury  as  heretofore  enjoyed  shall 
remain  inviolate. ' ' 

Constitution  of  1870,  Art.  II,  Sec.  5. 
Standredge  v  Chicago  City  By.  Co.,  254  Sup. 

524. 

People  v  Rodenberg,  254  Sup.  386. 
' '  No  person  shall  be  deprived  of  life,  liberty  or  prop- 
erty without  due  process  of  law/' 

Constitution  of  1870,  Art.  II,  Sec.  2. 
Law  denying  right  of  employer  and  employee  to  con- 
tract in  regard  to  wages,  unconstitutional. 

Chicago,  W.  &  F.  Coal  Co.  v  People,  214  Sup. 

421. 

Matthews  v  People,  202  Sup.  389. 
Miller  v  People,  117  Sup.  294. 
Eamsay  v  People,  142  Sup.  380. 
Ritchie  v  People,  155  Sup.  98. 
Glover  v  People,  201  Sup.  545. 
Sweet  v  People,  200  Sup.  536. 
Contra,  Ritchie  v  People,  244  Sup.  507. 
No  vested  interest  or  right  of  property  is  conferred 
by  any  rule  of  the  common  law. 

Second  Employers'  Liability  Cases,  Mondou  v 
New  York,  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  Ry.  Co.,  223  U.  S. 
1;  56  L.  E.  327;  38  L.  R  A.  (N.  S.)  44;  32 
Sup.  Ct.  169. 

Consolidated  Coal  Co.  v  Illinois,  185  U.  S.  203. 
A  public  interest  arises  in  the  manner  in  which  prop- 
erty is  used. 

Munn  v  Illinois,  94  U.  S.  113. 

"The  power  of  the  legislature  to  pass  laws  for  the 
promotion  of  public  welfare  and  safety,  the  preservation 
of  good  order  and  the  prevention  of  fraud,  deceit  and  im- 
position, has  always  been  recognized  in  Illinois." 
People  v  Weiner,  271  111.  Sup.  74. 
People  v  Freeman,  242  id.  373. 
People  v  Schenck,  257  id.  384. 


CONSTITUTION  151 

The  police  power  is  that  inherent  and  plenary  power 
in  the  State  which  enables  it  to  prohibit  all  things  hurt- 
ful to  the  comfort,  safety  and  welfare  of  society. 

Town  of  Lake  View  v  Rose  Hill  Cemetery  Co. 

70  111.  Sup.  191. 

A  rightful  exercise  of  the  police  power  is  not  a  viola- 
tion of  the  fourteenth  amendment  even  though  property 
interests  are  affected. 

People  v  Weiner,  271  111.  Sup.  74. 
Powell  v  Pennsylvania,  127  IT.  S.  678. 
Booth  v  Illinois,  184  id.  425. 
Hammond  v  Montana,  233  id.  331. 
Certiorari  to  Supreme  Court:     Clause  (f)  of  §  19, 
Act  of  1913,  providing  for  review  as  to  questions  of  law 
by  certiorari  from  the  Supreme  Court,  conflicts  with  Art. 
6,  §  2,  of  the  State  Constitution,  and  is  invalid. 

Courier  v  Simpson  Construction  Co.,  264  III. 

Sup.  488;  106  N.E.  350. 
People  v  McGoorty,  270  111.  Sup.  610. 

OTHER  STATES. 

Constitutional  questions  involved  and  considered  in 
Workmen's  Compensation  Acts  of  various  states: — 

Police  power  of  state. 

Delegation  of  judicial  power. 

Right  of  trial  by  jury. 

Freedom  of  contract. 

Equal  protection  of  the  law. 

Class  legislation. 

Deprivation  of  property  without  due  process  of  law. 

Right  of  action  at  common  law. 

Vested  right  in  common  law  rules. 

Right  of  appeal. 

Unreasonable  search  and  seizure. 

Mode  of  passage. 

Special  constitutional  provisions. 

Workmen's  Compensation  Acts  in  the  following  states 
declared  valid  in  essential  features : 


152  CONSTITUTION 

FEDEEAL  COURTS. 
Ohio :  Jeffery  Manufacturing  Company  v  Blagg, 

235  U.  S.  Rep.  571. 
Iowa:  Hawkins  v  Bleakley,  220  Fed.  378  (op. 

post). 
Washington :  Stoll  v  Pacific  Coast  S.  S.  Co.,  135 

Fed.  169.  (Numerous  citations.) 

HIGHEST  STATE  COURTS. 
Indiana:  Emp.  Liab.  Act.  Indiana  Quarries  Co. 

v  Farmer,  110  N.  E.  549. 
Kansas:  Shade  v  Ash  Grove  Lime  &c  Co.,  93 

Kans.  257;  144  Pac.  Rep.  249. 
Maine :  Dirkin  v  Great  Northern  Paper  Co.,  110 

Me.  374;  86  Atl.  Rep.  320. 
Massachusetts:  Opinion  of  Justices,  209  Mass. 

607;  96  N.  E.  308;  Young  v  Duncan,  218 

Mass.  346,  107  N.  E.  443;  Turnquist  v  Han- 

non,  219  Mass.  560,  107  N.  E.  443. 
Michigan :  Jendrus  v  Detroit  Steel  Products  Co., 

144  N.  W.  563;  Wood  v  City  of  Detroit,  155 

N.  W.  592. 
Minnesota:  Matheson  v  Minneapolis  Street  Ry. 

Co.,  126  Minn.  286,  148  N.  W.  71-563;  State 

v  District  Court,  128  Minn.  150,  148  N.  W. 

71. 
Montana:  Cunningham  v  North  Western  Imp. 

Co.,  44  Mont.  180,  119  Pac.  554. 
Nevada :  Law  son  v  Halifax-Tonopah  Mining  Co., 

135  Pac.  611. 

New  Jersey:  Sexton  v  Newark  District  Tele- 
graph Co.,  84  N.  J.  L.  85,  86  Atl.  451,  affd. 

91  Atl.  1070;  Huyett  v  Penna.  Ry.  Co.,  92 

Atl.  8;  O'Connell  v  Magneto  Co.,  85  N.  J.  L. 

64,  89  Atl.  922;  Troth  v  Millville  Bottle 

Works,  91  Atl.  1031. 
New  York :  Jensen  v  Southern  Pac.  Co.,  109  N. 


CONSTITUTION  153 

E.  600,  167  App.  Div.  945 ;  Moore  v  Lehigh 
Valley  R.  Co.,  154  N.  Y.  S.  620.  (See  post.) 

Ohio :  State  ex  rel  Yaple  v  Creamer,  85  Oh.  St. 
349,  39  L.  E.  A.  (N.  S.)  694,  97  N.  E.  602; 
Porter  v  Hopkins,  109  N.  E.  629;  Jeffery 
Manufacturing  Co.  v  Blagg,  108  N.  E.  465. 

Texas:  Memphis  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v  Tolbert,  171 
S.  W.  309;  Missouri  &c  Ry.  Co.  v  Scott,  143 
S.  W.  710 ;  Consumers  Lignite  Co.  v  Grant, 
181  S.  W.  20;  Middleton  v  Texas  Power  & 
Light  Co.,  185  S.  W.  556. 

Washington:  State  ex  rel  Davis-Smith  Co.  v 
Clausen,  65  Wash.  156,  117  Pac.  1101,  37  L. 
B.  A.  (N.  S.)  466;  Stoll  v  Pacific  Coast  S.  S. 
Co.,  135  Fed.  169 ;  State  v  Mountam  Timber 
Co.,  75  Wash.  581,  135  Pac.  645;  State  v 
City  of  Seattle,  73  Wash.  396,  132  Pac.  45- 
685. 

Wisconsin:  Borgnis  v  Falk  Co.,  147  Wis.  327, 
133  N.  W.  209,  37  L.  R.  A.  (N.  S.)  489;  City 
of  Milwaukee  v  Miller,  144  N.  W.  188;  Mel- 
len  Lumber  Co.  v  Industrial  Com.  of  Wis., 
154  Wis.  114, 142  N.  W.  187,  Ann.  Cas.  1915, 
B.  1000. 


154  CONSTITUTION 

Workmen's  Compensation  Acts  in  the  following  states 
declared  invalid : 

New  York :  Not  proper  exercise  of  police  power,  im- 
posing liability  upon  employer  in  absence  of  negligence 
on  his  part. 

Ives  v  South  Buffalo  By.  Co.,  201  N.  Y.  271,  94 
N.  E.  431,  34  L.  R.  A.  162,  Ann.  Cas.  1912, 
B.  156,  174  rev.  140  App.  Div.  921. 
Montana :    Allowing  double  recovery. 

Cunningham  v  North  Western  Improvement  Co., 

44  Mont.  160, 119  Pac.  554. 
Texas :    Compulsory  on  employee. 

Middleton  v  Texas  Power  &  Light  Co.,  178  8. 

W.  956. 

Kentucky:  Contravening  constitutional  inhibition 
against  limiting  amount  of  recovery  for  injuries  to  per- 
son, resulting  in  death. 

Kentucky  State  Journal  v  Workmen's  Compen- 
sation Board,  161  Ky.  562,  170  S.  W.  1166- 
437. 

"The  New  York  court  held  the  law  invalid,  as  impos- 
ing the  ordinary  risks  of  a  business  (which  under  the 
common  law  the  employee  was  held  to  assume)  on  the 
employer.  The  court  states  one  of  the  premises  on  which 
it  proceeds  as  follows:  'When  our  constitutions  were 
adopted  it  was  the  law  of  the  land  that  no  man  who  was 
without  fault  or  negligence  could  be  held  liable  in  dam- 
ages for  injuries  sustained  by  another.'  But  that  rule 
was  not  of  universal  application.  At  common  law  one 
may  sustain  such  relation  to  the  inception  of  an  under- 
taking that  he  will  be  held  liable  for  negligence  in  the 
progress  of  the  enterprise,  even  though  he  has  no  part  or 
connection  with  the  negligent  act  itself  which  caused  the 
injury.  *  The  position  in  the  line  of  causation 

which  employers  sustain  in  modern  industrial  pursuits  is, 
of  course,  the  basic  fact  on  which  employers'  liability 
laws  rest." 

State  v  Creamer,  85  Oh.  St.  349. 


CONSTITUTION  155 

"It  is  not  meant  here  to  be  asserted  that  this  police 
power  is  above  the  Constitution,  or  that  everything  done 
in  the  name  of  the  police  power  is  lawfully  done.  It  is 
meant  only  to  be  asserted  that  a  law  which  interferes 
with  personal  and  property  rights  is  valid  only  when  it 
tends  reasonably  to  correct  some  existing  evil  or  promote 
some  interest  of  the  State,  and  is  not  in  violation  of  any 
direct  and  positive  mandate  of  the  Constitution.  The 
clause  of  the  Constitution  now  under  consideration  was 
intended  to  prevent  the  arbitrary  exercise  of  power  or 
undue,  unjust,  and  capricious  interference  with  personal 
rights;  not  to  prevent  those  reasonable  regulations  that 
all  must  submit  to  as,  a  condition  of  remaining  a  member 
of  society. ' ' 

State  v  Clausen,  65  Wash.  156 ;  See  Cooley  Con- 

stit.  Lim.  §  156;  Story  Const.  §  1935. 
Workmen's  Compensation  Acts  authorized  by  Consti- 
tutional amendments  in  Arizona,  California,  New  York, 
Ohio  and  Vermont. 

Such  New  York  Act  of  1914  valid. 
Const.  Amdt.  Nov.  4,  1913. 
Jensen  v  Southern  Pacific  Co.,  109  N.  E.  600. 
See  Miller  v  Pillsbury,  128  Pac.  327. 
"In  the  case  of  Jensen  v  Southern  Pacific  Co.,  167 
App.  Div.  945,  152  N.  Y.  S.  1120,  and  the  Burns  case,  167 
App.  Div.  945,  152  N.  Y.  S.  1101,  and  the  Walker  case, 
167  App.  Div.  945,  152  N.  Y.  S.  1147,  we  held  the  Work- 
men's Compensation  Act  to  be  constitutional." 

Moore  v  Lehigh  Valley  R.  Co.,  154  N.  Y.  S.  620. 
Act   constitutional,  though  depriving  employees   of 
common  law  rights. 

Jensen  v  Southern  Pac.  Co.,  215  N.  Y.  514,  109 

N.  E.  600. 
Moore  v  Lehigh  Valley  R.  Co.,  154  N.  Y.  S.  620. 


156  CONSTITUTION 

Hawkins  v  Bleakley,  U.  8.  Dist.  Ct.,  Iowa. 
220  Fed.  Rep.  378. 

Opinion  by  District  Judge  SMITH  MCPHEBSON. 

"This  is  an  action  by  a  bill  in  equity  exhibited  by 
complainant  against  State  Auditor  Bleakley  and  State 
Industrial  Commissioner  Garst  seeking  to  enjoin  the  en- 
forcement of  Chapter  147  of  the  Laws  of  the  Thirty-fifth 
General  Assembly  of  Iowa  (1913)  known  as  the  Employ- 
ers' Liability  or  Workmen's  Compensation  Law.  The 
complainant,  being  an  employer  of  labor  and  within  the 
terms  of  the  Statute,  contends  that  the  Statute  is  uncon- 
stitutional and  void.  The  defendant  moves  to  dismiss 
the  case,  equivalent  to  a  demurrer,  on  the  grounds  that 
the  bill  is  without  equity  and  that  the  Statute  is  valid. 
I  do  not  care  to  prepare  a  formal  opinion,  and  I  make 
known  my  views  as  orally  stated. 

"All  thoughtful  persons  agree  that  present  conditions 
call  for  legislative,  judicial  or  economic  relief,  one  or  all. 
Enterprises,  such  as  railroads,  street  car  lines,  interur- 
ban  lines,  manufacturing  plants  of  all  kinds,  with  rapidly 
moving  machinery,  usually  hazardous,  with  the  danger- 
ous invisible  electric  current  of  high  voltage,  the  agency 
of  steam,  geared  with  cogwheels,  belts,  pulleys,  and  other 
appliances,  are  killing  and  crippling  thousands  and 
thousands  of  persons  every  year.  This  is  so  even  when 
the  employees  are  sober,  attentive  and  watchful,  and  is 
materially  increased  when  such  persons,  or  some  of  them, 
are  negligent.  This  means  poverty  and  distress,  and  is 
followed  by  charities,  and  too  often  filling  the  poorhouses 
and  sanitariums.  The  man  with  an  eye  gone,  a  leg  or  arm 
off,  or  otherwise  physically  or  mentally  impaired,  has 
but  a  limited  or  no  chance  in  life.  This  burden  sometimes 
falls  upon  the  injured  person  alone,  sometimes  on  the 
wife,  children,  or  parents,  and  often  on  the  general  pub- 
lic by  increased  taxation.  Presidents,  congressmen,  leg- 
islatures and  men  of  eminence  for  years  have  been  urging 


CONSTITUTION  157 

actual  reforms  in  these  matters,  and  the  employees  have 
been  insisting  upon  relief.  All  persons  know  these  things 
to  be  so,  and  the  literature  and  debates  for  years  have 
been  devoted  to  the  query  as  to  the  solution  and  remedy. 
The  courts  have  not  been  lagging  so  much  as  retrograd- 
ing in  dealing  with  the  subject.  The  time  of  the  courts  is 
consumed  in  listening  to  the  harrowing  stories  sometimes 
of  truth  and  sometimes  of  perjury.  Claim  agents  are 
busy  from  the  hour  of  death  or  injury  in  locating  and  pre- 
serving the  testimony  that  the  corporation  may  be  pro- 
tected. The  friends  and  lawyers  and  agents  of  the  dead 
and  injured  are  equally  industrious.  We  often  see  ad- 
vertisements in  the  press  of  'witnesses  wanted  to  the  oc- 
currence.' We  have  new  words  in  the  dictionary,  but  the 
new  words  '  snitches '  and  '  ambulance  chasers '  are  of  the 
simple  and  well  known  language.  Verdicts  must  be  for 
twice  the  fair  amount  to  be  awarded  as  damages,  so  as  to 
allow  the  'contingent  fee,'  or  the  injured  man,  his  wid- 
ow or  children,  must  accept  half  the  sum  justly  due.  And 
these  results  are  only  obtained  after  years  of  litigation. 
Sickness,  unavoidably  out  of  town,  urgent  business  in 
other  courts,  prolong  the  litigation.  When  judgment  is 
at  last  obtained  in  favor  of  one  side  or  the  other,  appeals, 
certiorari,  mandamus,  and  writs  of  error,  one  or  all,  are 
sought,  and  then  sometimes  reversals,  and  then  other  de- 
lays. Sometimes  verdicts  are  returned,  and  later  on  it  is 
ascertained  that  the  testimony  was  to  meet  the  law  of  the 
case.  Sometimes  the  verdicts  are  returned  for  only  part 
of  the  sum  that  should  have  been  awarded,  and  some- 
times the  verdict  is  followed  by  getting  well  so  speedily 
as  to  be  termed  almost  miraculous.  So  that,  regardless 
upon  which  side  the  greater  wrongs  occur,  a  question  no 
one  can  decide,  all  ought  to  concede  that  which  is  the 
truth,  that  the  best  the  courts  can  do  in  many  cases  is 
frailty  itself.  Something  like  30  per  cent  of  the  time  of 
the  courts  is  taken  with  these  cases,  adding  enormously 
to  the  expense  of  the  tax  payers.  So  that  if  there  is  to  be 


158  CONSTITUTION 

a  remedy  for  these  evils,  and  that  remedy  is  limited  to 
the  courts,  reforms  more  than  paper  reforms  must  be 
brought  about,  and  such  real  reforms  are  well-nigh  hope- 
less, if  the  past  30  years  of  judicial  history  is  to  be  a  cri- 
terion. 

"To  meet  the  burdens  created  by  death  and  injury 
thus  brought  about  by  public  taxation,  is  to  argue  the 
question  by  idle  talk.  The  people  are  groaning  under 
taxation. 

' '  Damages  not  easily  avoided  must  go  into  the  cost  of 
production  and  be  borne  by  the  consumers,  and  those 
readily  avoided  in  some  instances  at  least  should  be  borne 
by  him  or  it  responsible  therefor.  But  that  aids  but  little 
because  the  question  as  to  who  is  responsible  is  often  a 
complicated  and  difficult  question  and  one  not  easily 
solved,  and  often  solved  by  well-nigh  a  guess. 

'  *  Nearly  every  foreign  country  has  attempted  to  solve 
it  by  legislation,  and  twenty  or  more  of  the  United  States 
within  a  few  years  have  enacted  statutes  for  the  purpose 
of  affording  a  remedy.  Some  of  these  statutes  have  been 
sustained  as  valid  legislation.  The  objections  usually 
urged  are  those  against  infringing  upon  the  liberty  of 
contract,  denying  due  process  of  law,  and  denying  the 
right  of  trial  by  jury.  The  clause  in  our  State  Constitu- 
tion providing  that  the  right  of  trial  by  jury  shall  remain 
inviolate  presents  a  serious  and  important  question.  It 
is  likewise  an  humorous  objection,  because  a  trial  by  jury 
is  seldom  asked  or  desired  by  the  employer  of  labor.  But 
waiving  the  humorous  phases,  it  is  both  important  and 
necessary  to  at  least  'briefly  consider  the  constitutional 
objections.  But  in  doing  this  I  shall  not  review  the  great 
decisions  on  constitutional  law,  but  will  be  content  by 
analyzing  this  Statute.  This  is  sufficient  because  all  agree 
that  the  constitutional  provisions  can  be  waived.  They 
are  forced  on  no  one,  if  both  agree  to  waive  them,  and 
this  waiver  can  be  by  writing,  or  verbally  done,  or  done 
by  common  consent  or  acquiescence. 


CONSTITUTION  159 

"The  statute  is  one  of  much  verbiage  and  prolixity 
of  51  lengthy  sections.  But  once  and  for  all  it  can  be 
stated,  and  correctly  stated,  that  under  this  Statute  every 
employer  and  every  employee  can  have  his  day  in  court, 
and  can  have  due  process  of  law,  and  can  have  a  jury 
trial,  if  one  or  all  are  desired.  No  one  of  these  constitu- 
tional rights  is  denied.  It  is  true  that  such  can  be  had 
with  some  limitation  on  what  has  heretofore  existed, 
which  limitations  will  presently  be  noted.  Whether  the 
parties  are  denied  the  full  scope  of  the  so-called  liberty 
of  contract  is  no  longer  argued  with  much  seriousness 
by  reason  of  the  decision  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States  in  the  case  from  this  state  of  Chicago,  Bur- 
lington &  Quincy  Railroad  v  McGuw,  219  U.  S.  549,  31 
Sup.  Ct.  259,  55  L.  Ed.  328. 

"The  first  22  sections  of  this  lengthy  Statute  fix  the 
liability  of  the  employer  and  the  rights  of  the  employee. 
A  scale  of  compensation  is  fixed  and  made  certain.  Each 
party  can  come  within  the  Statute  or  remain  outside  of 
the  Statute.  Each  party  has  his  election.  Many  of  the 
states  for  many  years  have  had  statutes  fixing  the  liabil- 
ity with  precision  in  cases  of  death,  and  in  no  instance 
has  any  court  held  such  statute  invalid.  And  why  a  stat- 
ute cannot  fix  with  certainty  the  damages  to  be  allowed 
in  case  of  the  loss  of  an  arm,  leg,  eye  or  other  injury,  is 
not  perceived,  and  counsel  fail  to  state  any  legal  or  con- 
stitutional objection  thereto. 

"But  it  is  argued  that  if  the  employer  fails  to  elect  to 
come  within  the  Statute  and  have  the  case  tried  and  de- 
termined as  heretofore,  the  employer  cannot  urge  the  de- 
fense of  assumption  of  risks  by  the  employee  or  contribu- 
tory negligence.  And  yet  each  of  these  defenses  first 
crept  into  the  law  by  slight  recognition  and  then  grew  and 
developed  by  judicial  decisions  without  the  aid  of  legis- 
lation and  it  cannot  be  so  that,  simply  because  such  be- 
came recognized  as  the  law  by  judicial  decisions,  they 
cannot  be  abridged  or  denied  by  legislation.  The  same 


160  CONSTITUTION 

is  true  of  the  doctrine  of  fellow  servants.  That  doctrine 
never  was  affirmed  by  legislation  except  impliedly,  and 
impliedly  only  because  of  legislative  action  denying  such 
defense  as  to  railroad  and  other  hazardous  employments. 
All  lawyers  know  that  the  court-made  rule  in  Iowa,  for  a 
long  time  maintained  but  against  the  decided  weight  of 
authority,  is  that  the  injured  person  must  show  that  he 
was  without  fault  or  negligence.  Most  of  the  appellate 
courts  hold  otherwise,  holding  that  it  is  a  defense  only. 
United  States  Courts  sitting  in  Iowa  as  well  as  in  all  the 
other  states,  hold  that  it  is  defensive  only  and  requires 
the  defendant  to  show  by  a  preponderance  of  testimony 
that  the  injured  man  or  deceased  contributed  to  the  in- 
jury. For  a  long  time  many  of  the  states  had  the  rule  of 
comparative  negligence,  and  now  in  some  instances  Iowa 
has  such  a  rule.  But  in  none  of  these  matters  is  there 
any  vested  right  for  or  against  any  of  these  defenses  or 
burdens  placed  upon  the  plaintiff.  They  closely  belong 
to  or  inhere  in  police  regulations  for  the  preservation  of 
life  and  limb  and  are  within  the  legislative  powers  of  the 
state,  and  in  inter-state  commerce  matters  within  the 
power  of  congress.  The  decisions  of  Appellate  Courts, 
the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  included,  are  re- 
cent and  well  known  by  the  profession.  It  is  true  that  if 
the  parties  elect  to  come  within  the  Statute  they  must  do 
so  by  notice  or  acquiescence.  This  is  attended  with  some 
formalities,  but  that  is  a  question  of  detail  and  policy 
alone  belonging  to  the  legislature  and  outside  the  prov- 
ince of  the  courts  to  either  regulate  or  condemn. 

' '  The  next  18  sections  of  the  Statute  relate  to  the  ap- 
pointment of  a  commissioner,  an  office  now  held  by  the 
defendant  Garst.  Under  his  direction  arbitrations  are 
brought  about.  Arbitrations  existed  at  common  law  and 
they  are  allowable  under  the  Iowa  statute.  The  conclu- 
sions and  award  of  the  arbitrator  can  be  enforced  by  ju- 
dicial proceedings.  There  is  nothing  new  about  all  this. 


CONSTITUTION  161 

And  these  arbitrations  are  agreed  to  under  this  Statute 
either  by  specific  agreement  or  by  acquiescence. 

4 '  The  remaining  nine  sections  of  the  Statute  relate  to 
insurance  to  cover  liability  for  damages.  The  Chicago, 
Burlington  &  Quincy  Kailroad  Company  for  years  had  a 
scheme  of  insurance  which  if  resorted  to  by  the  injured 
employee,  was  a  bar  to  recovery  by  an  action  in  court. 
Finally  that  scheme  was  condemned  by  Iowa  legislation, 
and  the  statute  prohibiting  it  was  sustained  by  the  Uni- 
ted States  Supreme  Court  in  the  McGuin  case  herein- 
before referred  to.  The  insurance  scheme  was  held  law- 
ful by  the  Iowa  Supreme  Court  in  a  number  of  cases  prior 
to  the  adoption  of  the  legislation  referred  to.  And  now 
we  have  additional  legislation  allowing  the  very  thing 
condemned  by  the  prior  legislation.  And  so  it  is  that  no 
constitutional  objection  can  be  made  to  the  latest  legisla- 
tion. 

"Nearly  all  of  the  objections  to  this  Statute  are  ar- 
gued from  the  standpoint  of  morals  and  propriety  and 
policy.  As  of  course  those  were  questions  for  the  legis- 
lature. 

"This  Statute  may  have,  and  no  doubt  does  have, 
many  objectionable  features ;  but  that  it  is  a  Statute  with 
the  right  tendencies  I  have  no  doubt,  and  all  such  legisla- 
tion is  a  matter  of  growth  and  development,  and  in  the 
end  when  mature,  as  it  ought  to  be  and  likely  will  be, 
beneficial  results  will  be  obtained.  At  all  events,  this  leg- 
islation cannot  bring  forth  worse  results  than  we  now 
have  as  to  these  matters  by  court  procedure.  And  still 
further,  and  in  no  event,  can  courts  condemn  the  mere 
policy  or  proprieties  of  the  law.  I  find  no  constitutional 
objections  to  this  measure.  Defendant's  motion  will  be 
sustained,  and  the  case  dismissed,  with  prejudice." 


162  CONSTITUTION 

Washington  Act  recites : 

"The  common  law  system  governing  the  remedy  of 
workmen  against  employers  for  injuries  received  in  haz- 
ardous work,  is  inconsistent  with  modern  industrial  con- 
ditions. In  practice  it  proves  to  be  economically  unwise 
and  unfair.  Its  administration  has  produced  the  result 
that  little  of  the  cost  of  the  employer  has  reached  the 
workman  and  that  little  only  at  large  expense  to  the  pub- 
lic. The  remedy  of  the  workman  has  been  uncertain, 
slow  and  inadequate.  The  welfare  of  the  state  depends 
upon  its  industries,  and  even  more  upon  the  welfare  of 
its  wage-earners.  The  state  of  Washington,  therefore, 
exercising  herein  its  police  and  sovereign  power,  declares 
that  all  phases  of  the  premises  are  withdrawn  from  pri- 
vate controversy  and  sure  and  certain  relief  for  work- 
men, injured  in  extra-hazardous  work,  and  their  families 
and  dependents,  is  hereby  provided  regardless  of  the 
question  of  point  and  to  the  exclusion  of  every  other  rem- 
edy, proceeding  or  compensation,  except  as  otherwise 
provided  in  this  Act ;  and  to  that  end  all  civic  actions  and 
civil  causes  of  action  for  such  personal  injuries  and  all 
jurisdiction  of  the  courts  of  the  state  over  such  causes 
are  hereby  abolished  except  as  in  this  Act  provided.'* 


CONSTRUCTION  163 

CONSTEUCTION. 

Act  is  to  be  construed  in  a  sufficiently  broad  and  lib- 
eral interpretation,  so  as  to  attain  its  beneficent  object 
in  providing  an  escape  from  the  rigor  of  the  common  law. 
Armour  &  Co.  v  Industrial  Board,  111.  App.  Ct. 

No.  21310,  Jan.  7,  1916. 
See  "Opinions  of  Illinois  Courts"  ante. 
Act  is  to  be  broadly  and  liberally  interpreted  so  as  to 
bring  about  its  dominant  object  of  providing  support  for 
dependents.    Mass. 

Coakley  v  Coakley,  216  Mass.  71,  102  N.  E.  930. 
Act  is  to  be  given  a  liberal  construction  in  favor  of 
life,  health  and  limb.   Wis. 

Tallman  v  Chippewa  Sugar  Co.,  Wis.,  143  N. 

W.  1054. 

Act  is  to  be  so  interpreted  as  effectively  to  remedy 
the  ills  intended  to  be  remedied. 

City  of  Milwaukee  v  Miller,  154  Wis.  652, 144  N. 

W.  188. 

North  Western  Iron  Co.  v  Industrial  Commis- 
sion, 154  Wis.  97,  142  N.  W.  271. 
Appeal  of  Hotel  Bond  Co.,  89  Conn.  143,  93  Atl. 

245. 

State  v  District  Court,  128  Minn.,  150  N.  W.  211. 
Sadowski  v  Thomas  Furnace  Co.,  Wis.,  146  N. 

W.770. 

"I  feel  that  in  construing  this  Act  of  Parliament,  as 
in  other  cases,  there  is  a  risk  of  frustrating  it  by  excess 
of  subtlety,  which  I  am  anxious  to  avoid. ' ' 

Ismay  v  Williamson,  1908,  42  Tr.  L.  T.  213,  42 

Ir.  L.  T.  213,  L  B.  W.  C.  C.  232. 
Liability  is  based,  not  on  tort,  but  on  contract,  with 
implied  condition  of  compensation  for  injury. 

Appeal  of  Hotel  Bond  Co.,  89  Conn.  143,  93  App. 
245. 


164  CONSTRUCTION 

Compensation  is  an  element  of  the  cost  of  production, 
the  consumer  defraying  the  expense,  and  the  public  bear- 
ing the  burden. 

City  of  Milwaukee  v  Miller,  154  Wis.  652, 144  N. 

W.  188. 

Fairness  of  award  by  Act  not  a  question  for  courts. 
O'Connell  v  Simms  Magneto  Co.,  N.  J.  Sup.  89 

A.  922. 
Compensation  and  liability  acts  distinguished. 

Qregutis  v  Clark  Wire  Works,  86  N.  J.  L.  610. 
Liability  is  not  different  from  any  other,  arising  out 
of  contract. 

Lavin  v  Wells  Bros.  Co.,  272  111.  Sup.  609. 


CONSTRUCTION  165 

"The  scheme  of  the  Statute  is,  in  brief,  to  charge  up- 
on the  business,  through  insurance,  the  losses  caused  by 
it,  making  the  business  and  the  ultimate  consumer  of  its 
product,  and  not  the  injured  employee,  bear  the  burden 
of  the  accidents  incident  to  the  business.  The  Statute 
contemplates  the  protection,  not  only  of  the  employee, 
but  of  the  employer,  at  the  expense  of  the  ultimate  con- 
sumer. The  Statute  must  have  a  broad  and  liberal  in- 
terpretation, to  protect  the  employee  for  all  injuries  re- 
ceived in  the  course  of  employment. ' ' 

Spratt  v  Sweeney  Co.,  153  N.  Y.  Sup.  505. 

"It  ought  to  be  remembered  that  the  Workmen's 
Compensation  Acts  are  expressed  not  in  technical  but  in 
popular  language,  and  ought  to  be  construed  not  in  a 
technical  but  in  a  popular  sense. ' ' 

Smith  v  Coles,  2  K.  B.  830,  8  W.  C.  C.  116. 

"The  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  was  intended  for 
the  benefit  of  the  workmen,  not  for  that  of  the  legal  pro- 
fession. No  doubt  there  has  been  unfortunately  a  good 
deal  of  litigation  under  the  Act,  but  I  do  not  think  we 
ought,  unless  absolutely  compelled  by  the  language  used, 
to  put  such  a  construction  upon  it  as  to  convert  it  into  a 
perennial  source  of  litigation  and  needless  expense." 
Field  v  Longden  &  Sons,  1  K.  B.  56. 


166  CONSTRUCTION 

"The  Workmen's  Compensation  Law  must  in  fairness 
be  deemed  to  have  been  enacted  in  furtherance  of  a  legis- 
lative determination,  enforced  by  explicit  mandate  of  the 
people  through  amendment  of  the  State  Constitution, 
that  a  new  and  different  scheme  and  basis  of  indemnity 
for  industrial  accidents  should  be  adopted  in  this  state, 
in  the  light  of  the  social  experience  of  other  common- 
wealths and  countries.  Injuries  sustained  by  those  who 
perform  the  manual  and  mechanical  tasks  of  an  industry 
must  be  decreed  to  have  been  intended  by  this  Statute  to 
be  made  a  social  risk,  a  liability  of  the  industry,  a  charge 
upon  the  productive  cost  of  the  article  manufactured  or 
the  service  rendered. 

"Hitherto  the  rule  of  our  Statute  and  fundamental 
law  had  been  that  any  right  of  recovery  for  industrial  ac- 
cidents must  arise  from  a  breach  of  the  master 's  duty  as 
to  care  and  safeguard  and  accordingly  was  limited  by 
whatever  contractual  relation  existed  between  the  person 
injured  and  the  person  whose  breach  of  duty  was  the  effi- 
cient cause  of  injury.  For  this  historic  concept  of  liabil- 
ity springing  from  omission  of  legal  duty  created  by  con- 
tractual relation  there  has  been  substituted  an  applica- 
tion of  the  social  principle  that  regardless  of  duty  and 
regardless  of  fault,  the  expenses  and  loss  of  earnings  re- 
sultant from  occupation  and  injury  to  a  workman  en- 
gaged in  carrying  on  an  inherently  hazardous  business  or 
avocation  of  an  employer,  should  be  paid  in  the  first  in- 
stance by  the  employer  and  by  him  made  a  charge  against 
the  operating  costs  of  the  business.  In  place  of  the  tra- 
ditional juristic  rule  that  the  master  must  respond  in 
damages  when  his  servant  is  injured  through  the  mas- 
ter's fault,  and  that  otherwise  the  servant  must  be  un- 
recompensed  and  the  loss  be  borne  by  him  alone,  the  peo- 
ple and  legislature  have  now  put  in  force  the  changed  con- 
cept that  the  trade  product  should  be  charged  with  all 
consequences  of  inherent  trade  hazards,  and  that  losses 
to  individual  workers,  through  disability,  while  engaged 


CONSTRUCTION  167 

in  the  service  of  the  proprietor  of  the  business,  should  be 
distributed  among  all  its  consumers  or  patrons,  rather 
than  left  to  operate  ruinously  against  the  disabled  em- 
ployee or  the  solitary  employer.  This  mandate  of  the 
fundamental  will  of  the  people  of  this  state  should  be  re- 
mediably  applied  and  beneficially  enforced  by  the  State 
Workmen's  Compensation  Commission  and  by  the  courts, 
in  fair  fulfillment  of  the  legislative  purpose,  and  ought 
not  now  to  be  hampered  or  crippled  by  continued  appli- 
cation of  definitions,  concepts,  and  rules  of  liability  which 
indubitably  produced  in  large  part  the  very  conditions  of 
hardship  for  which  the  present  Statute  was  designed  as 
comprehensive  relief.  *  '  *  The  law  was  intended  for 
the  protection  of  workmen  and  their  families ;  it  was  in- 
tended to  afford  machinery  by  which  the  burdens  of  in- 
juries sustained  by  those  who  do  the  actual  work  of  a 
business,  and  are  not  themselves  employers  with  a  duty 
of  insurance  under  the  Act,  may  be  socially  distributed 
and  borne  by  society  in  general. ' ' 

In  re  Rheinwald,  App.  Div.,  153  N.  Y.  S.  598. 

"The  provisions  of  the  acts  of  the  states  having 
adopted  such  legislation  upon  the  questions  here  under 
consideration  are  very  dissimilar  and  we  have  been  un- 
able to  find  much  help  from  adjudicated  cases  in  other 
jurisdictions." 

Courier  v  Simpson  Construction  Co.,  264  HI. 
Sup.  495,  opinion  ante. 

"Numerous  authorities  from  other  jurisdictions  con- 
struing Workmen's  Compensation  Acts  have  been  cited 
and  frequent  references  have  been  made  to  acts  in  other 
jurisdictions.  Both  counsel  have  cited  authorities  which 
it  is  argued  support  the  conclusions  contended  for.  The 
wording  of  our  Statute  is  so  different  on  the  question 
here  under  consideration  that  the  other  acts  or  decisions 
could  have  very  little  weight  as  to  the  proper  construc- 
tion to  be  here  given  and  further  reference  to  them  is  un- 
necessary. ' ' 


168  CONSTRUCTION 

Uphoff  v  Industrial  Board,  271  111.  Sup.  316. 
"It  does  not  help  us  to  be  referred  to  a  long  string  of 
authorities.    The  facts  in  no  two  cases  are  on  all  fours, 
and  to  decide  one  case  on  a  supposed  analogy  to  another 
is  highly  dangerous." 

Walters  v  Staveley  Coal  &  Iron  Co.,  4  B.  W.  C. 
C.  304. 

"The  Statute  gives  the  employer  his  choice  whether  to 
accept  its  provisions  or  to  forfeit  substantial  defenses 
previously  accorded  to  him  by  the  law,  leaving  the  legal 
liability  as  it  was  but  without  those  defenses.  The  Stat- 
ute provides  that  upon  its  acceptance  its  provisions  shall 
be  regarded  as  a  part  of  the  contract  of  hiring,  and  that 
the  measure  of  liability  of  the  employer  for  an  injury 
shall  be  determined  according  to  the  provisions  of  the 
Act.  The  liability  is  a  contract  liability  not  different  in 
its  nature  from  any  other  liability  arising  out  of  con- 
tract. " 

Lavin  v  Wells  Bros.  Co.,  272  111.  Sup.  609. 


y-          ELECTION  169 

§  1  ELECTION. 

"Any  employer  may  elect  to  provide  and  pay  compen- 
sation according  to  provisions  of  Act. " 

"In  Deibeikis  v  Link-Belt  Company,  we  held  that  the 
relation  between  employer  and  employee,  when  both  ac 
cept  the  provisions  of  the  Act,  is  one  of  contract,  of  which 
contract  the  said  law  is  a  part ;  but  if  either  elects  not  to 
come  under  the  law,  and  so  notifies  the  proper  authori- 
ties, then  there  is  no  such  contract." 

Crooks  v  Tazewell  Coal  Company,  263  111.  Sup. 
343. 

"Being  elective,  the  Act  does  not  become  effective  as 
to  any  employer  or  employee  unless  such  employer  or 
employee  chooses  to  come  within  its  provisions.  Having 
once  elected  to  come  within  the  provisions  of  the  Act,  so 
long  as  such  election  remains  in  force  the  Act  is  effective 
as  to  the  party  or  parties  making  the  election,  and  in 
case  an  employer  and  an  employee  both  elect  to  come 
within  the  provisions  of  the  Act,  the  Act  itself  then  be- 
comes a  part  of  the  contract  of  employment  and  can  be 
enforced  as  between  the  parties  as  such.  *  *  *  They 
thereby  agree  to  settle  by  arbitration  any  dispute  that 
may  arise  between  them  in  reference  to  compensation 
for  injury. ' ' 

Deibeikis  v  Link-Belt  Co.,  261  111.  Sup.  454,  opin- 
ion ante. 

"Every  employee  shall  be  deemed  to  have  accepted 
provisions  of  Act,  when  employer  so  elects." 

Act  applies  only  where  both  parties  have  accepted  its 
provisions. 

Price  v  Clover  Leaf  Coal  Mining  Co.,  188  111. 

App.  27. 

Employer  cannot  be  compelled  by  employee  to  ac- 
cept Act. 

Diets  v  Big  Muddy  Coal  &  Iron  Co.,  263  111.  Sup. 
480, 105  N.  E.  289. 


170  ELECTION 

Rejection  by  employer  precludes  acceptance  by  em- 
ployee. 

Favro  v  Superior  Coal  Co.,  188  111.  App.  203. 
Employee  may  positively  reject. 

Smith  v  Western  States  Portland  Cent.  Co.,  94 

Kans.  501, 146  Pac.  1026. 
See: 

Crooks  v  Tazewell,  263  111.  Sup.  243;  Note  Ann. 

Gas.  1915,  C.  308. 
Bateman  v  Carterville  &c  Co.,  188  111.  App.  357. 


ELECTION  171 

§  2  ELECTION. 

"Every  employer  conclusively  presumed  to  have  filed 
notice  of  election  to  provide  and  pay  compensation  ac- 
cording to  provisions  of  Act,  who  is  engaged  in  any  of 
enumerated  occupations,  declared  'extra-hazardous,*  un- 
less filing  notice  to  the  contrary." 

"It  thus  appears  to  be  a  presumption  of  law  that  both 
appellant  and  appellee  were  covered  by  the  provisions  of 
said  Act  unless  it  should  appear  that  one  or  both  of  them 
had  filed  an  election  to  the  contrary." 

Kinsman  v  Johnston  City  &  Big  Muddy  C.  &  M. 

Co.,  190  111.  App.  612. 
Staley  v  Illinois  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  268  111.  Sup. 

356. 

All  parties  in  the  enumerated  occupations  are  bound 
by  Act  until  excepted  by  notice. 

Dietz  v  Big  Muddy  Coal&Iron  Co.,  263  111.  Sup. 

480, 105  N.  E.  289. 

"There  are  just  two  ways  of  coming  under  the  Act, 
or  in  other  words,  of  giving  the  Industrial  Board  juris- 
diction : 

'  '  First — By  an  affirmative  election. 
"Second — By  not  specifically  rejecting  Act,  when  en- 
gaged in  any  of  the  businesses,  enterprises  or  occupations 
enumerated  as  extra-hazardous. ' ' 

Nelson  v  Fitzgerald,  Industrial  Board — Bulletin 

No.  1,  Case  No.  742,  page  95. 

Employer's  failure  to  withdraw  election  to  reject  Act 
sixty  days  previous  to  January  1st  of  following  year 
does  not  automatically  constitute  election  to  accept. 

Synkus  v  Big  Muddy  Coal  Co.,  190  HI.  App.  602. 
Burden  of  proof  of  rejection  is  on  claimant. 

Id. 

Notices — Of  acceptance  and  rejection. 
Copy  of  notice  of  election,  certified  by  person  charged 
with  custody  of  original,  is  admissible  as  best  evidence. 
Synkus  v  Big  Muddy  Coal  Co.,  190  111.  App.  602. 
Employer  who  comes  under  Act  by  operation  of  law, 
is  conclusively  presumed  to  have  filed  notice  of  his  elec- 
tion. 

Zorcic  v  Adams  Express  Co.,  I.  B.  578  p.  55. 


172  ELECTION 

Employer,  once  under  Act,  by  election  or  operation 
of  law,  remains  under  its  provisions,  until  excepted 
according  to  the  specific  methods  provided  by  Act. 

Flash  v  Pattridge  &c  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  160,  p.  46. 
Employer,  coming  under  Act,  either  by  election  or 
operation  of  law,  brings  with  him  all  his  employees  in 
any  wise  connected  with  his  business  and  not  part  only. 
Gilfe  v  Suburban  Ice  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  1305,  p.  167. 
Zorcic  v  Adams  Express  Co.,  I.  B.  578,  p.  55. 
Minneapolis  &c  Ry.  v  Industrial  Com.,  153  Wis. 

452,  141  N.  W.  1119. 

Operation  of  Act  is  not  ended  by  mere  suspension  of 
business. 

Flash  v  Pattridge  Metal  Equipment  Co.,  I.  B. 

No.  160,  p.  46. 

Provisions  of  Act,  whether  operative  by  election  or 

presumption  of  law,  are  part  of  contract  of  employment. 

Radigen  v  Sanitary  District,  I.  B.  No.  158,  p. 

138. 
Averment  of  being  covered  by  Act  necessary. 

Krisman  v  Johnston  City  &  Big  Muddy  Coal  & 

Mining  Co.,  190  HI.  App.  612. 

Where  employer  has  elected  not  to  come  under  Act, 
count  must  allege  negligence. 

Price  v  Clover  Leaf  Mining  Co.,  188  HI.  App.  27. 
Defense  of  employer  of  being  under  Act,  where  not 
mentioned  in  new  affidavit  of  merits — held  waived. 

Nosil  v  Ellis  Time  Stamp  Co.,  192  HI.  App.  538. 
Pleading  non-acceptance  by  employer,  not  necessary. 

Favro  v  Superior  Coal  Co.,  188  111.  App.  203. 
Beceiver  of  railroad  may  reject  Act. 
Devine  v  Delano,  272  HI.  Sup.  166 


ELECTION  173 

Burden  of  proof  of  negative  election  by  employer  is 
on  plaintiff. 

Synkus  v  Big  Muddy  Coal  &  Iron  Co.,  190  HI. 

App.  602. 
Certified  copy  of  notice  filed  is  best  evidence. 

Bateman  v  Carterville  &  Big  Muddy  Coal  Co., 

188  111.  App.  366. 
Instruction — part  of  section — error. 

Price  v  Clover  Leaf  Coal  Co.,  188  111.  App.  27. 
Employee  waives  his  common  law  right  by  not  giving 
notice  of  rejection. — Mass. 

Young  v  Duncan,  218  Mass.  246, 106  N.  E.  1. 
Non-acceptance  does  not  affect  previous  relation. 

SherchenJco  v  Detroit  United  Ry.,  155  N.  W.  423. 
All  employers  affected  by  Act  are  presumed  within 
its  provisions  until  the  contrary  appears,  and  employer's 
rejection  is  affirmative  defense. — Kans. 

Gorrell  v  Battelle,  93  Kan.  370, 144  P.  244. 
Notice  of  non-acceptance. 

See  Nosil  v  Ellis  Stamp  Co.,  192  111.  App.  538. 
Election — evidence  uncertain. 

Spottsville  v  Western  States  P.  C.  Co.,  94  Kan. 

258, 146  Pac.  356. 

Suit  by  employee  is  not  final  election,  barring  jurisdic- 
tion of  Board. — Cal. 

San  Francisco  Stevedoring  Co.  v  Pillsbury,  149 
Pac.  586. 


174  OCCUPATION 

§  3  OCCUPATION. 

"Occupations,  enterprises  or  businesses  declared  to 
be  extra-hazardous : ' ' 

1. — "Building,  maintaining,  removing,  repairing  or 
demolishing  any  structure." 

"Structure." 

See  Uphoff  v  Industrial  Board,  271  111.  Sup.  312. 
City,  maintaining  water  mains,  is  engaged  in  'build- 
ing, maintaining  or  demolishing  a  structure. ' ' 

Brown  v  City  of  Decatur,  188  111.  App.  147. 
Manhole — excluded. — Wash. 

Puget  Sound  &c  Co.  v  Schleif,  220  F.  48,  135  C. 
C.  A.  611. 

2. — "Constructing,  excavating  or  electrical  work." 
Maintenance  of  wires  of  telephone  company  is  extra- 
hazardous  business  and  within  paragraph  (b). 

Anderson  v  Ashmore  Mutual  Tel.  Co.,  I.  B.  No. 
601,  p.  132. 

3. — "Carriage  by  land  or  water  and  loading  or  un- 
loading in  connection  therewith." 

Street  railway  company  is  engaged  in  business  of  car- 
riage by  land  and  loading  and  unloading  in  connection 
therewith,  and  extra-hazardous  enterprise. 

Chicago  Savings  Bank  v  Chicago  Railways  Co., 

I.  B.  No.  235,  p.  104. 

Lumber  company,  keeping  teams  and  wagons  for 
hauling  lumber  in  community  is  included  in  term  "car- 
riage by  land. ' ' 

"We  do  not  believe  that  the  term,  standing  alone  and 
without  other  legal  phraseology  or  explanation,  was  in- 
tended to  mean  only  common  carrier  for  hire." 

/.  B.  Crawford  v  Darlington  Lumber  Co.,  I.  B. 
July  3, 1915. 


OCCUPATION  175 

4. — "Operation  of  any  warehouse  or  general  or  termi- 
nal store  house. ' ' 

" Operation  of  any  warehouse"  includes  not  only  pub- 
lic warehouses  but  also  such  as  are  used  for  storing  and 
vending  commodities. 

Armour  &  Co.  v  Industrial  Board,  111.  App.  Ct. 
No.  21310,  Jan.  7, 1916. 

5. — " Mining,  surface  mining  or  quarrying." 
Act  does  not  repeal  Mining  Act. 

Rogers  v  St.  Louis  Coal  Co.,  254  111.  Sup.  104. 
Eldorado  Coal  &  Mining  Co.  v  Marietta,  215 

Fed.  51. 

Under  constitutional  provision  for  safe-guarding 
miners,  statutes  regulating  mining  will  not  be  declared 
invalid. 

Rogers  v  St.  Louis  C.  Co.,  254  111.  Sup.  104. 

6. — "Any  enterprise  in  which  explosive  materials  are 
manufactured,  handled  or  used  in  dangerous  quantities." 

7. — "Any  enterprise  wherein  molten  metal  or  explo- 
sive or  injurious  gases  or  vapors  or  inflammable  vapors 
or  fluids,  or  corrosive  acids,  are  manufactured,  used,  gen- 
erated, stored  or  conveyed  in  dangerous  quantities." 

Board  of  Trustees  of  University  of  Illinois,  because 
operating  a  freight  elevator  and  in  the  conduct  of  its 
business  using  molten  metal  and  explosives,  is  engaged  in 
extra-hazardous  enterprise  and  presumed  within  Act  un- 
less notifying  Board  to  the  contrary. 

North  v  University,  I.  B.  Case  No.  462,  p.  63. 


176  OCCUPATION 

8. — "Any  enterprise  in  which  statutory  or  municipal 
ordinance  regulations  are  now  or  shall  hereafter  be  im- 
posed for  the  regulating,  use,  or  the  placing  of  machinery 
or  appliances,  or  the  protection  and  safe-guarding  of  the 
employees  or  the  public  therein." 

Note: — Statutory  regulations  which  bring  establish- 
ments within  Act  by  presumption  of  law,  within  the  legis- 
lative intent  in  enumerating  extra-hazardous  enterprises, 
naturally  include : 

The  Factory  Safety  Act. 
The  Structural  Act. 
The  Blower  Act. 
The  Mines  Safety  Act. 
The  Railway  Safety  Act. 

On  the  contrary,  the  Child  Labor  Act,  the  Female 
Hours  of  Service  Act,  etc.,  would  seem  not  included. 

See  Bishop,  Admr.  v  Bowman  Dairy  Co.,  HI. 
App.  No.  21016 ;  Bateman  v  Cartervitte  Coal 
Co.t  188  III  App.  357;  Nelson  v  Fitzgerald, 
I.  B.  570,  p.  71. 

Favro  v  Superior  Coal  Co.,  188  111.  App.  203. 
Price  v  Clover  Leaf  Mining  Co.,  188  111.  App.  27. 
Forrest  v  Roper  Furn.  Co.,  187  111.  App.  504. 
Burnes  v  Swift  &  Co.,  186  111.  App.  460. 
Also  Streeter  v  Western  Wheeled  Scraper  Co., 

254  111.  Sup.  244. 

Wilson  v  Railway  Spring  Co.,  165  111.  App.  344. 
De  La  Gardelle  v  Hampton  Co.,  153  N.  Y.  Sup. 

162. 

Packer's  branch  house  operating  elevator  which  is 
regulated  by  city  ordinance,  included. 

Estate  of  Richardson  v  Armour  &  Co.,  I.  B.  Case 

No.  437,  p.  57. 

.Defenses  of  prudence  and  foresight  are  foreclosed  by 
legislative  decision  in  Factory  Safety  Acts. — Kans. 

Caspar  v  Lewin,  82  Kan.  604. 
Failure  to  guard,  when  proximate  cause  of  injury. 
Hartman  v  Berlin  &c  Co.,  127  N.  Y.  Supp.  187. 
United  States  Cement  Co.  v  Cooper,  82  N.  E.  981. 
Labatt:  Master  &  Servant  §  1856. 


OCCUPATION  177 

"Intentional  omission"  of  employer,  to  comply  with 
statutory  safety  regulations — civil  liability  not  affected. 
Where  employer  failed  to  guard  saw  machinery  and  a 
splinter  injured  an  employee's  eye,  testimony  was  com- 
petent to  show  that  there  were  on  the  market  practical 
guards  which  would  have  prevented  danger. 

Forrest  v  Roper  Furn.  Co.,  187  111.  App.  504. 
Bight  of  action  under  safety  acts  barred  unless  em- 
ployee files  notice  of  election  not  to  be  subject  to  Act. 

Burnes  v  Swift  &  Co.,  186  111.  App.  466. 
Department  store — included  in  par.  (b)  §  3. 
Bostedo  v  Fair,  I.  E.  No.  506,  p.  15. 
Stevens  v  Hillman's  Department  Store,  I.  B.  No. 

502,  p.  17. 

Department  Store,  operating  electric  power  lathe  in- 
cluded. 

Wendt  v  Industrial  Commission,  80  Wash.  Ill; 

141  Pac.  311. 

Dry  goods  and  clothing  business  is  not  extra-hazard- 
ous. 

Christian  v  Barber,  I.  B.  No.  570  p.  71. 
Tailoring  business,  using  sewing  machine  operated  by 
motor,  is  not  within  Act. 

"This  business  is  purely  non-hazardous  and  one  in 
which  it  would  be  necessary  to  make  an  election  in  the 
regular  way  provided  by  the  Statute  in  order  that  it 
might  be  termed  as  operating  under  the  terms  and  pro- 
visions of  this  Act.  The  fact  that  no  notice  was  given 
of  its  refusal  to  come  under  the  Act  cuts  no  figure  be- 
cause its  business  was  not  such  as  Would  require  it  to  give 
such  notice  and  not  having  elected  to  come  under  the  Act, 
the  latter  can  not  be  invoked  by  the  employee. " 

Kennedy  v  Vehon,  I.  B.  July  2, 1915. 
Mercantile  establishments,  operating  ordinary  ele- 
vator not  extra-hazardous.    (Wash.) 

Guerrieri  v  Industrial  lins.  Com.,  146  p.  608. 
Apartment  house — excluded.    N.  Y. 

Sheridan  v  Groll  Const.  Co.,  112  N.  E.  568. 


178  OCCUPATION 

MOTOR  VEHICLE  ACT  AND  ORDINANCES. 

"There  are  just  two  ways  of  coining  under  the  Act,  or 
in  other  words  of  giving  this  Board  jurisdiction : 

First — By  an  affirmative  election. 

Second — By  not  specifically  rejecting  the  Act  when 
engaged  in  any  part  of  the  businesses,  enterprises  or 
occupations  enumerated  under  this  Act  as  extra-haz- 
ardous. 

Counsel  for  applicant  raises  the  point  that  paragraph 
(8)  of  section  3  brings  respondent  under  the  Act  and 
gives  the  Board  jurisdiction.  This  paragraph  deals  with 
the  questions  of  municipal  ordinances,  regulations,  etc. 

Counsel  for  applicant  claims  there  are  many  ordi- 
nances regulating  the  speed,  lights,  etc.,  of  automobiles, 
thereby  placing  the  respondent  under  the  Act. 

The  Board,  however,  cannot  agree  with  this  theory  of 
applicant,  but  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  provisions  of  this 
paragraph  apply  rather  to  the  business,  enterprise,  or  oc- 
cupation of  the  employer.  It  is  the  nature  of  the  em- 
ployers' business  that  decides  whether  or  not  an  employer 
comes  automatically  under  the  provisions  of  this  Act, 
and  not  the  particular  kind  of  labor  the  employee  may 
happen  to  perform  at  the  time  of  the  injury.  To  hold 
otherwise  would  be  to  hold  every  owner  of  an  automobile 
under  the  Act,  regardless  of  the  fact  whether  he  was 
engaged  in  business  or  not.  There  is  but  one  way  for  a 
private  automobile  owner  to  come  under  the  Act.  That 
is  by  notifying  the  Industrial  Board  of  his  election  to  ac- 
cept the  provisions  of  the  Act. 

Nelson  v  Fitzgerald,  I.  B.  570,  p.  71. 
Chauffeur:  Newcomb  v  Albertson,  N.  J.,  89  Atl. 
928. 

Ordinance  regulating  sidewalks  and  awnings  held 
bringing  business  within  Act. 

Christianson  v  Barber,  I.  B.  '570  p.  71. 
Elevator:    See  Walsh  v  Cidlen,  235  111.  Sup.  91. 


OCCUPATION  179 

"Not  to  be  construed  to  apply  to  any  work,  employ- 
ment or  operation  done,  had  or  conducted  by  farmers  and 
others  engaged  in  farming,  tillage  of  the  soil,  or  stock 
raising,  etc." 

Only  enterprises  of  some  importance  included. 

Uphoff  v  Industrial  Board,  271  111.  Sup.  312. 

One  working  for  a  farmer  in  the  occupation  of  running 
a  threshing  machine  that  is  operated  by  belt  and  pulleys, 
or  corn  shellers  operated  in  the  same  way,  and  injured 
while  in  such  employment,  is  entitled  to  damages  as  not 
coining  within  Act. 

The  business  of  running  threshing  machines  that  are 
operated  by  belts  and  pulleys  is  not  by  the  terms  of  the 
provisions  of  the  Act  hazardous  employment. 
Benton  v  Wilson,  I.  B.  No.  181,  p.  54. 

Farmer  moving  threshing  machine  not  included. 
Poling  v  Brown,  I  .B.  492  p.  21. 

English  Act  applies  to  "  employment  of  workmen  in 
agriculture  by  any  employer  who  habitually  employs  one 
or  more  workmen  in  such  employment;"  "agriculture" 
to  include  horticulture,  forestry,  and  the  use  of  land  for 
any  purpose  of  husbandry,  inclusive  of  the  keeping -or 
breeding  of  live  stock,  poultry  or  bees,  and  the  growth  of 
fruits  and  vegetables. 


180  DEFENSE 

§  3  DEFENSE. 

"In  action  for  damages  against  employer  engaged  in 
enumerated  extra-hazardous  occupations,  electing  not  to 
provide  and  pay  compensation  under  Act,  it  shall  not  be 
a  defense  that : 

1st — "The  employee  assumed  the  risks  of  the  employ- 
ment. 

2nd — ' '  The  injury  or  death  was  caused  in  whole  or  in 
part  by  the  negligence  of  fellow  servants,  or 

3rd — "The  injury  or  death  was  proximately  caused 
by  the  contributory  negligence  of  the  employee. '  * 

"It  will  be  observed  that  the  Act  is  elective,  and  that 
no  employer  or  employee  is  compelled  to  accept  or  come 
within  its  provisions  unless  he  chooses  to  do  so.  There- 
fore, unless  the  employer  or  the  employee  elects  to  come 
within  the  provisions  of  the  Act  he  is  not  affected  by  any 
of  the  provisions  thereof.  This  is  subject,  however,  to 
one  exception.  Under  the  conditions  specified  in  said 
section  1  an  employer  is  deprived  of  the  common  law  de- 
fense of  assumed  risk,  contributory  negligence,  and  that 
the  injury  or  death  was  caused,  in  whole  or  in  part,  by 
the  negligence  of  a  fellow  servant.  To  deprive  an  em- 
ployer, under  such  circumstances,  of  the  right  to  assert 
those  defenses  is  not  an  exercise  of  the  police  power,  but 
is  merely  a  declaration  by  the  legislature  of  the  public 
policy  of  the  state  in  that  regard.  The  right  of  the  legis- 
lature to  abolish  these  defenses  cannot  be  seriously  ques- 
tioned. The  rules  of  law  relating  to  the  defenses  of  con- 
tributory negligence,  assumed  risk  and  the  effect  of  neg- 
ligence of  a  fellow  servant  were  established  by  the  courts, 
and  the  legislature  may  modify  them  or  abolish  them  en- 
tirely, if  it  sees  fit  to  do  so." 

Deibeikis  v  Link-Belt  Co.,  261  HI.  Sup.  454,  opin- 
ions ante. 


DEFENSE  181 

"Plaintiff  alleged  that  defendant  had  elected  not  to 
provide  and  pay  compensation  under  Act  and  that  while  he 
was  engaged  as  a  miner  in  defendant's  coal  mine,  a  large 
piece  of  slate,  which  had  been  hanging  in  the  roof  for  a 
week,  the  condition  of  which  was  or  by  the  exercise  of  or- 
dinary care  would  have  been  known  to  defendant,  without 
warning,  fell  upon  and  injured  plaintiff ;  the  second  count 
alleging  defendant 's  failure  to  furnish  a  reasonably  safe 
place  to  work;  and  the  third,  violation  of  the  provisions 
of  §  21  of  the  Miners'  Act  of  1911.  Defendant  demurred 
on  the  ground  that  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  is 
unconstitutional  and  invalid  and  that  plaintiff  had  not 
averred  that  he  had  given  notice  of  his  election  to  accept 
its  provisions.  Demurrer  was  waived  by  pleading  over. 
Constitutional  question  was  waived  by  appeal  to  Appel- 
late Court.  All  counts  being  based  on  same  state  of  facts, 
no  election  was  necessary,  and  there,  was  no  misjoinder. 
Count  pleading  Workmen's  Compensation  Act,  but  not 
averring  negligence,  not  good.  Defendant,  by  non-accep- 
tance of  Act,  waived  defenses  of  assumed  risk  and  fellow 
servant's  and  contributory  negligence,  the  latter,  how- 
ever, to  be  considered  in  reducing  damages. ' ' 

Price  v  Clover  Leaf  Coal  Mining  Co.,  188  111. 

App.  27. 

'  *  The  appellant  elected  not  to  pay  compensation  under 
the  Act.  The  effect  of  that  election  by  appellant  is  to 
relegate  appellee  to  a  suit  at  law  for  his  damages,  meas- 
ured by  the  law  as  it  existed  prior  to  the  Act,  except  that 
contributory  negligence,  if  any,  of  appellee  should  be  con- 
sidered in  reduction  of  his  damages. ' ' 

French  v  Clover  Leaf  C.  M.  Co,,  190  111.  App. 
400. 


182  DEFENSE 

Employer,  in  enumerated  occupations,  rejecting  Act, 
is  liable  under  general  law,  and  precluded  from  enumer- 
ated defenses;  except  that  contributory  negligence  re- 
duces damages. 

Crooks  v  Tazewell  Coal  Co.,  263  HI.  Sup.  343, 

105  N.  E.  132. 

Price  v  Clover  Leaf  Mining  Co.,  188  HL  App.  27. 
Strom  v  Postal  Telegraph  Cable  Co.,  271  111. 

Sup.  544. 
Dietz  v  Big  Muddy  Coal  &  Iron  Co.,  263  IU.  Sup. 

480. 

"Appellant  concedes  that  this  court  has  sustained  the 
power  of  the  legislature  to  abolish  the  defenses." 

Strom  v  Postal  Telegraph  Cable  Co.,  271  EL 

Sup.  544. 
Although  employee  has  made  no  active  election. 

Synkus  v  Big  Muddy  Coal  &  Iron  Co.,  190  HI. 

App.  602. 

Deprivation  of  common  law  defenses  is  not  infringe- 
ment of  constitutional  rights. 

Armour  &  Co.  v  Industrial  Board,  111.  App.  Ct., 

No.  21310,  Jan.  7, 1916. 

"  Those  remaining  out  of  the  Act  and  who  might  come 
in  are  deprived  of  certain  defenses  which  the  law  might 
abolish  as  to  all  if  it  was  seen  fit  to  do  so. ' ' 

Jeffery  Mfg.  Co.  v  Blagg,  235  U.  S.  571. 
"Negligence  on  decedent's  part  would  not  bar  recov- 
ery in  cases  where,  as  here,  the  employer  had  not  elected 
to  take  the  benefit  of  the  Ohio  Workmen's  Compensation 
Act.  *  *  *  Both  the  defenses  of  contributory  negligence 
and  assumed  risk  were  denied  defendant  through  its  fail- 
ure to  come  under  the  Act. ' ' 

Crucible  Steel  Forge  Co.  v  Moir,  C.  C.  A.  219 

Fed.  151. 

Permission  to  introduce  defenses  under  one  count  and 
not  another,  proper. 

Devine  v  Delano,  272  I1L  Sup.  Ct.  166;  111  N.  E. 
742. 


DEFENSE  183 

Non-acceptance  of  Act  bars  defenses  of  assumption 
of  risk,  contributory  negligence  and  negligence  of  fellow 
servant. 

Crucible  Steel  Forge  Co.  v  Moir,  219  Fed.  151, 

135  C.  C.  A.  49. 

Dooley  v  Sullivan,  218  Mass.  597, 106  N.  E.  604. 
Lydman  v  De  Haas,  158  N.  W.  718. 
Memphis  Cotton  Oil  Co.  v  Tolbert,  Tex.,  171  S 

W.  309. 
Solus  v  Great  Northern  Ry.  Co.,  157  Wis.  546, 

147  N.  W.  1070. 

Matheson  v  Minneapolis  &c  Ry.,  126  Minn.  286, 

148  N.  W.  71. 

Consolidated  Arizona  Smelting  Co.  v  Ujack, 

Ariz.,  139  P.  465. 

Defense  of  contributory  negligence  held  not  abolished 
in  Wisconsin. 

,   In  re  Zohrlaut  Leather  Co.,  147  N.  W.  37. 
Defenses  lie  where  employee  rejects  Act. 

Karney  v  North  West.  Malleable  Iron  Co.,  160 

Wis.  316, 151  N.  W.  786. 

Where  employer  has  rejected  Act,  count  must  allege 
negligence. 

Price  v  Clover  Leaf  Mining  Co.,  188  111.  App.  27. 
Sections  3  and  10  apply  only  where  both  employer  and 
employee  have  accepted  Act. 

Price  v  Clover  Leaf  Mining  Co.,  188  111.  App.  27. 
Defenses  at  common  law  are  lost  by  rejection. 

Price  v  Clover  Leaf  Mining  Co.,  188  HI.  App.  27. 
Synkus  v  Big  Muddy  Coal  Co.,  190  111.  App.  602. 
Contributory  negligence  reduces  damages. 

Price  v  Clover  Leaf  Mining  Co.,  188  111.  App.  27. 
Instruction,  in  words  of  part  of  section  1,  misleading. 
Price  v  Clover  Leaf  Mining  Co. 


184  DEFENSE 

Safety  Acts, 

Employer,  guilty  of  intentional  omission  to  comply 
with  statutory  safety  regulations,  is  not  relieved  by  Com- 
pensation Act  from  his  general  civil  liability  for  injuries 
resulting  therefrom  to  employee. 

Forrest  v  Roper  Furniture  Co.,  187  111.  App.  504. 
Winter  v  Doelger  Brewing  Co.,  N.  Y.,  159  N.  Y. 

S.  113. 

Unguarded  circular  saw — Splinter  in  eye — instruc- 
tion. 

Ib. 
Open  hatchway — suit  for  injuries. 

Wajer  v  U.  S.  Brewing  Co.,  184  111.  App.  545. 
Failure    to    guard    a    circular    saw    is    intentional 
omission. 

Forrest  v  Roper  Furn.  Co.,  267  111.  331,  108  N. 

E.  328,  Aff.  187  App.  504. 

Act  bars  suit  for  damages  under  "Health,  Safety  and 
Comfort  Act,"  where  no  elective  corporation  officer's  in- 
tentional omission  caused  injury. 

Burnes  v  Swift  &  Co.,  186  111.  App.  460. 
Factory  Act — suit  under. 

Shade  v  Ash  Grove  &c  Co.,  92  Kan.  146,  139  P. 

1193. 
Willful  omission. 

McWeeney  v  Standard  Boiler  &  Plate  Co.,  210 

F.  507. 

Suit  may  be  brought  under  Factory  Act,  although  both 

employer  and  employee  have  accepted  Compensation  Act. 

Smith  v  Western  States  P.  Cement  Co.,  94  Kans. 

501, 146  P.  1026. 

"Intentional"  in  section  3  not  to  be  as  broadly  con- 
strued as  "willful."  (Act  1911.) 

Burnes  v  Swift  &  Co.,  186  111.  App.  460. 
Instruction,  omitting  defendant's  knowledge  of  defect 
in  failure  to  guard  saw,  sustained. 

Forrest  v  Roper  Furn.  Co.,  267  111.  331,  108  N. 
E.  328,  Aff.  187  App.  504. 


DEFENSE  185 

Due  care — contributory  negligence — assumption  of 
risk — duty  to  warn — safe  place. 

See  Schaffner  v  Massey  Co.,  270  HI.  Sup.  207. 
West  Stone  Co.  v  Muscial,  196  111.  Sup.  382. 
Hartrich  v  Hawes,  202  id.  334. 
Chicago  Edison  Co.  v  Moren,  185  id.  571. 
Illinois  Steel  Co.  v  Schymanousky,  162  id.  447. 
Anderson  Pressed  Brick  Co.  v  Sobkowiak,  148 

id.  573. 

National  Syrup  Co.  v  Carlson,  155  id.  210. 
Tollman  v  Chippewa  Sugar  Co.,  Wis.,  143  N.  W. 

1054. 

Employer  must  use  reasonable  care  in  warning  em- 
ployee of  dangers  not  known  to  him  and  instruct  him  how 
best  to  perform  the  particular  service. 

Casey  Hedges  Co.  v  Oliphant,  (1916)  228  Fed. 

636. 

Contract  to  assume  risk  against  public  policy  and 
void. 

Devine  v  Delano,  272  111.  Sup.  166. 
Bell  v  Toluca  Coal  Co.,  272  111.  Sup.  576. 


186  ACCIDENT 

§  7  ACCIDENT. 

§  1. — Accident.  "Accidental  injuries,  sustained  by 
employee,  arising  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  the  employ- 
ment." 

"Section  1  of  the  Act  requires  that  compensation  may 
be  had  for  accidental  injuries  sustained  by  any  employee 
'  arising  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  employment. '  This 
provision  of  the  statute  has  never  been  construed  by  this 
court  but  somewhat  similar  Acts  have  been  construed  by 
the  courts  in  other  jurisdictions.  Under  these  authorities 
it  is  clear  that  it  is  the  duty  of  an  employer  to  save  the 
lives  of  his  employees,  if  possible,  when  they  are  in  dan- 
ger while  in  his  employment,  and  therefore  it  is  the  duty 
of  a  workman  in  his  employ,  when  occasion  presents  it- 
self, to  do  what  he  can  to  save  the  lives  of  his  fellow-em- 
ployees when  all  are  at  the  time  working  in  the  line  of 
their  employment. ' ' 

Dragovich  v  Iroquois  Iron  Co.,  269  Sup.  478, 

opinion  ante. 

Employee  injured  while  removing  tin  can,  placed  on 
trip  hammer  for  fun  by  a  bystander,  sustained  accidental 
injury  arising  out  of  and  in  course  of  his  employment. 

Knopp  v  American  Car  &  Foundry  Co.,  186  HI. 
App.  605. 

See  also,  "Opinions"  ante. 

Brown  v  City  of  Decatur,  188  111.  Sup.  147. 


ACCIDENT  187 

Lord  Lindley,  in  leading  case  of  Fenton  v  Thorley, 
1903,  A.  C.443,K.B.  789: 

"The  word  'accident'  is  not  a  technical  legal  term 
with  a  clearly  denned  meaning.  Speaking  generally,  but 
with  reference  to  legal  liabilities,  an  accident  means  any 
unintended  and  unexpected  loss  or  hurt  apart  from  its 
cause  and  if  the  cause  is  not  known  the  loss  or  hurt  itself 
would  certainly  be  called  an  accident.  The  word  accident 
is  often  used  to  denote  both  the  cause  and  the  effect,  no 
attempt  being  made  to  discriminate  between  them.  The 
great  majority  of  accidents  are  occasioned  by  careless- 
ness, but  for  legal  purposes  it  is  often  important  to  dis- 
tinguish carelessness  from  other  unintended  and  unex- 
pected events. ' ' 

"An  accident  is  a  coming  or  falling;  an  event  that 
takes  place  without  one's  foresight  or  expectation;  an 
event  which  proceeds  from  an  unknown  cause  and  there- 
fore not  expected;  chance;  casualty;  contingency." — 
Webster's  Dictionary. 

Ripley  v  Railway  Pass.  Assur.  Co.,  20  Fed.  Gas. 

283. 
Aetna  Life  Ins.  Co.  v  Vandecar,  86  Fed.  282. 

"Accidents  are  unforeseen,  unexpected  and  unthought 
of  occurrences." 

Breed  v  Glasgow  Ins.  Co.,  82  Fed.  760. 
See  Words  &  Phrases,  Vol.  I,  p.  62. 

The  Supreme  Court  of  New  York,  appellate  division, 
unanimously  say: 


188  ACCIDENT 

"The  House  of  Lords  defined  the  meaning  of  *  per- 
sonal injury  by  accident'  as  an  'unlocked  for  mishap,  or 
an  untoward  event  which  is  not  expected  or  designed. ' 
Fenton  v  Thorley  &  Co.,  A.  C.  443,  5  W.  C.  C.  1.  The 
meaning  of  the  word  'accident/  as  contained  in  the  New 
Jersey  Compensation  Act,  is  an  unlooked  for  and  un- 
toward event  which  is  not  expected  or  designed.  Bryant 
v  Fissell,  84  N.  J.  L.  72,  86  Atl.  458.  The  United  States 
Supreme  Court  has  defined  the  term  'accidental,'  as 
used  in  an  accidental  insurance  policy,  as  used 
'in  its  ordinary,  popalar  sense'  as  meaning  'happen- 
ing by  chance ;  unexpectedly  taking  place ;  not  according 
to  the  usual  course  of  things ;  or  not  as  expected ;'  that,  if 
a  result  is  such  as  follows  from  ordinary  means,  volunta- 
rily employed,  in  a  not  unusual  or  unexpected  way,  it  can- 
not be  a  result  expected  by  accidental  means ;  but  that  if, 
in  the  act  which  precedes  the  injury,  something  unfore- 
seen, unexpected,  unusual  occurs,  which  produces  the  in- 
jury, then  the  injury  has  resulted  through  accidental 
means."  Mutual  \Acc.  Assn,  v  Barry,  131  U.  S.  100,  121; 
9  Sup.  Ct.  755 ;  33  L.  Ed.  60.  The  use  of  the  conjunction 
in  section  10  of  New  York  Workmen's  Compensation 
Law  (chapter  67,  Consol.  Laws;  chapter  816,  Laws  of 

1913,  as  re-enacted  and  amended  by  chapter  41,  Laws  of 

1914,  and  amended  by  chapter  316,  laws  of  1914,  and  chap- 
ters 167,  168,  Laws  of  1915 )• — "accidental  personal  in- 
jury sustained  by  the  employee  arising  out  of  and  in  the 
course  of  his  employment"  indicates  that  the  accidental 
jury  must  both  arise  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  the  em- 
ployment.    An  accidental  injury  sustained  during  the 
course  of  the  employment,  but  not  arising  out  of  the  em- 
ployment, as  well  as  such  an  injury  arising  out  of  the  em- 
ployment, but  not  sustained  during  the  course  of  the  em- 
ployment, does  not  fall  within  the  provisions  of  the  Com- 
pensation Law.    *  *  *    The  language  'arising  out  of  and 
in  the  course  of  the  employment'  is  also  used  in  the  Eng- 
lish Act,  and  we  may  therefore  properly  examine  the  de- 


ACCIDENT  189 

cisions  of  the  courts  of  that  country  for  their  views  as  to 
the  construction  of  this  language  as  applied  to  cases  more 
or  less  similar  to  the  case  before  us.  Where,  by  an  ar- 
rangement between  a  railway  company  and  certain  em- 
ployees, they  were  allowed  to  go  to  a  cabin  on  the  railway 
company's  premises  for  certain  meals,  and  one  of  such 
employees  was  returning  from  the  cabin  after  having  a 
meal  there,  and  was  knocked  down  by  a  car  which  was 
being  shunted  on  one  of  the  company's  tracks,  it  was  held 
that  the  injury  arose  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  the  em- 
ployment. 

Earnshaw  v  Lancashire  &  Y.  Ry.  Co.,  115  L.  T. 
Jour.  89, 5  B.  W.  C.  C.  28. 

"A  night  watchman,  who  left  his  box  and  went  into  a 
shanty,  where  tools  were  kept,  to  cook  and  eat  his  food, 
and  was  injured  by  the  falling  of  the  shanty,  was  held  to 
have  been  injured  by  accident  arising  out  of  and  in  the 
course  of  his  employment. 

Morris  v  Lambreth  Borough  Council,  22  T.  L. 
E.  22,  8  B.  W.  C.  C.  1.  " 

"A  bricklayer,  who  was  paid  according  to  the  number 
of  hours  he  worked,  remained  in  the  building  during  the 
noon  hour,  although  the  workmen  employed  on  the  build- 
ing usually  went  away,  and  sat  down  under  a  wall  to  eat 
his  dinner.  The  wall  fell  while  he  was  sitting  there  and 
injured  him.  *  *  *  The  Court  of  Appeals  held  that  the 
time  of  employment  covered  all  his  movements  within  the 
ambit  of  the  premises  where  he  was  employed  which  were 
ancillary  to  the  work  which  he  had  to  do,  and  that  the 
courts  should  take  a  broader  view  and  treat  him  as  still 
in  the  employment.  Collins,  M.  R.,  said : 

'It  was  to  the  interest  of  the  respondent  that  he 
should  eat  the  necessary  food  to  enable  him  to  do  his 
work,  and  he  was  allowed  as  part  of  the  terms  of  employ- 
ment to  stay  on  the  premises  during  dinner  hour  and  eat 
his  dinner  there.  We  cannot  say  that  it  is  an  inference  of 


190  ACCIDENT 

law  that,  because  he  was  eating  his  dinner  and  was  not 
paid  wages  in  respect  of  the  dinner  hour,  he  ceased  to  be 
in  the  respondent's  employ.    I  think  that  the  accident 
here  arose  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  the  employment. ' 
All  the  other  judges  concurred  in  that  conclusion. 
Blovelt  v  Sawyer,  1  K.  B.  271,  89  L.  T.  658,  6 
W.  O.  C.  16. 

"A  lighterman,  while  waiting  for  the  tide  to  ebb  suffi- 
ciently to  allow  him  to  go  to  work  to  pump  out  a  barge, 
went  to  a  small  boat  50  yards  from  the  barge  to  rest,  and 
in  trying  to  get  into  the  boat  was  injured.  It  was  held  by 
the  Court  of  Appeal  that  his  injury  arose  out  of  and  in 
the  course  of  his  employment. 

May  v  Ison,  1  B.  W.  C.  C.  148, 110  L.  T.  525. 

"A  risk  is  incidental  to  the  employment  when  it  be- 
longs to  or  is  connected  with  what  a  workman  has  to  do 
in  fulfilling  his  contract  of  service. 

Pope  v  Hill's  Plymouth  Co.,  102  L.  T.  632,  and 
on  appeal,  105  L.  T.  678. 

"In  the  case  of  North  Carolina  R.  Co.  v  Zachary,  232 
U.  S.  248,  34  Sup.  Ct.  305,  58  L.  Ed.  591,  Ann.  Cas.  1914, 
C.  159,  it  was  held  that  where  an  engineer  who  had  pre- 
pared his  engine  for  a  trip,  had  left  it  to  go  to  his  board- 
ing house  a  short  distance  away,  and  was  run  over  and 
killed  while  crossing  a  track  en  route  to  his  house,  he  was 
then  in  the  employ  of  the  company.  The  court  said : 

*  There  is  nothing  to  indicate  that  this  brief  vist  to 
the  boarding  house  was  at  all  out  of  the  ordinary,  or  was 
inconsistent  with  his  duty  to  his  employer.  It  seems  to 
us  clear  that  the  man  was  still  'on  duty/  and  employed 
in  commerce,  notwithstanding  his  temporary  absence 
from  the  locomotive  engine.  * 

''Where  a  railroad  employee,  in  crossing  the  tracks  at 
a  public  crossing  to  reach  a  toilet,  was  struck  by  an  auto- 
mobile and  thrown  upon  the  tracks,  where  he  was  subse- 
quently struck  by  one  of  the  defendant's  trains,  the  acci- 


ACCIDENT  191 

dent  was  one  '  arising  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  the  em- 
ployment,' within  the  meaning  of  the  Employers'  Liabil- 
ity Act,  for  the  resulting  fatal  injury. ' ' 

Zabriskie  v  Erie  R.  Co.,  (N.  J.  Sup.)  88  Atl.  824. 
1  "An  injury  sustained  by  a  workman  who  is  employed 
by  the  week  to  work  in  a  room  leased  to  his  employer,  in 
a  building  owned  by  the  lessor,  when  the  workman  on  his 
way  to  lunch,  at  the  noon  hour,  has  left  the  workroom, 
and  is  descending  the  stairway,  which  is  in  control  of  the 
owner  of  the  building,  but  which  the  employer  and  em- 
ployees have  the  right  to  use  as  the  only  means  available 
for  going  to  and  from  the  workman's  place  of  employ- 
ment, can  be  said  to  have  arisen  out  of  and  in  the  course 
of  his  employment  within  the  meaning  of  the  Workmen's 
Compensation  Act.  Sundine's  case,  218  Mass.  1,  105  N. 
E.  433.  *  *  * 

"In  the  case  of  Parker  v  Hambrook,  5  B.  W.  C.  C.  608, 
before  the  Court  of  Appeal,  the  headnote,  which  correctly 
states  the  substance  of  the  decision,  reads : 

*A  workman  was  employed  to  get  flints  on  the  sur- 
face, or  just  below  the  surface,  of  a  quarry.  He  was  ex- 
pressly forbidden  to  go  into  the  trench,  11  feet  deep.  The 
workman  was  paid  according  to  the  number  of  flints  dug 
out.  To  take  shelter  from  the  rain  and  to  get  more  flints 
he  went  into  the  trench  and  was  smothered  by  a  fall  of 
the  earth.  Held,  the  accident  did  not  arise  out  of  and 
in  the  course  of  the  employment. ' 

"In  WeigMl  v  South  Henton  Coal  Co.,  4  B.  W.  C.  C. 
141,  before  the  Court  of  Appeals,  a  collier  in  a  coal  mine 
was  ordered  to  cut  the  coal  in  the  colliery.  He  left  his 
work  and  went  to  cut  coal  in  a  part  of  the  mine  where  it 
was  forbidden  by  special  rule  to  cut  any.  He  thereby 
undermined  some  props  and  caused  a  fall,  which  killed 
him.  Held,  that  the  accident  did  not  arise  out  of  and  in 
the  course  of  employment. 

"However  in  the  case  of  Harding  v  Bryndda  Colliery 
Co.,  2  K.  B.  747,  4  B.  W.  C.  C.  269,  the  Court  of  Appeals, 


192  ACCIDENT 

distinguishing  the  Weighill  case,  held,  when  a  collier  who 
had  been  set  to  drill  a  hole  from  above  into  the  seam,  in 
order  to  draw  off  gases  and  render  safe  the  seam,  which 
was  marked  off  as  forbidden,  and  was  told  that  he  must 
not  go  into  the  seam  to  see  if  the  drill  was  running 
straight,  but  nevertheless  went  and  was  suffocated,  that 
there  was  evidence  to  support  the  finding  of  the  county 
judge  that  the  accident  arose  out  of  and  in  the  course  of 
employment,  and  that  the  appeal  by  the  employers  from 
the  award  should  be  dismissed. 

"In  the  case  at  bar  the  claimant  violated  no  rule  of  his 
employer,  did  no  forbidden  act,  and  accepted  with  the 
knowledge  of  defendant's  foreman  the  only  shelter  avail- 
able, unless  it  might  have  been  a  place  in  the  stone 
crusher  which  was  being  operated,  to  the  noise  of  which 
he  seems  to  attribute  his  failure  to  hear  the  moving  loco- 
motive. *  *  *  Obtaining  shelter  from  a  violent  storm, 
in  order  that  he  might  be  able  to  resume  work  when  the 
storm  was  over,  was  not  only  necessary  to  the  preserva- 
tion of  claimant's  health,  but  was  incident  to  the  claim- 
ant's work,  and  was  an  act  promoting  the  business  of  the 
master.  *  *  * 

"That  the  purpose  of  the  Workmen's  Compensation 
Law  was  to  make  the  risk  of  an  accidental  injury  one  of 
the  industry  itself,  even  when  happening  through  the 
fault  of  the  workman,  treating  it  as  an  element  in  the 
cost  of  production,  to  be  added  thereto,  and  hence  borne 
by  the  community  in  general,  and  that  the  Act  should  be 
construed  liberally,  and  not  strictly,  as  a  statute  in  dero- 
gation of  the  common  law,  and  should  receive  as  broad 
an  interpretation  as  can  fairly  be  given  it,  cannot  be 
questioned.  I  think  that  the  injury  to  the  claimant  arose 
out  of  and  in  the  course  of  his  employment  within  the  in- 
tent of  the  statute  and  hence  that  the  award  should  be 
affirmed." 

Moore  v  Lehigh  Val.  Ry.  Co.,  154  N.  Y.  S.  620. 


ACCIDENT  193 

' '  The  term  accident,  given  its  popular  and  wide  mean- 
ing for  the  purpose  of  this  Act,  is  denned  by  Lord  Mc- 
Naughton,  *  An  accident  is  an  untoward  event  which  is  not 
expected  or  designed.'  The  Board  believes  this  inter- 
pretation of  the  word  ' accident'  to  be  a  fair  and  reason- 
able one  for  the  purpose  of  our  Act  which  is  largely  pat- 
terned after  the  English  act. 

"In  the  opinion  of  this  Board  an  accident  arises  out 
of  the  employment  'when  there  is  apparent  to  the  ration- 
al mind  upon  consideration  of  all  the  circumstances  a 
casual  connection  between  the  conditions  under  which  the 
work  is  required  to  be  performed  and  the  resulting  in- 
jury. Under  this  test  if  the  injury  can  be  seen  to  have 
followed  as  a  natural  incident  of  the  work,  and  to  have 
been  contemplated  by  a  reasonable  person,  familiar  with 
the  whole  situation  as  a  result  of  the  exposure  occasioned 
by  the  nature  of  the  employment,  then  it  arises  out  of  tEe 
employment,  but  it  excludes  an  injury  which  cannot  be 
fairly  traced  to  the  employment  as  a  contributing  proxi- 
mate cause  and  which  comes  from  a  hazard  to  which  the 
workman  would  have  been  equally  exposed  apart  from 
the  employment.  The  causative  danger  must  be  peculiar 
to  the  work  and  not  common  to  the  neighborhood.  It  must 
be  incidental  to  the  character  of  the  business  and  not  in- 
dependent of  the  relation  of  master  and  servant.  It  need 
not  have  been  foreseen  nor  expected  but  after  the  event  it 
must  appear  to  have  had  its  origin  in  a  risk  connected 
with  the  employment,  and  to  have  flowed  from  that  source, 
as  a  natural  consequence. '  And  the  injury  occurs  in  the 
course  of  employment  when  the  workman  is  doing  the 
duty  which  he  is  employed  to  perform." 

Bishop  v  City  of  Chicago,  I.  B.  No.  262,  p.  96. 


194  ACCIDENT 

"A  prima  facie  case  is  made  when  it  is  shown  that  an 
employee  was  at  his  usual  place  of  employment,  at  the 
usual  time  of  day  when  he  is  expected  and  required  to  be 
there,  and  an  injury  of  any  character  is  shown.  ' ' 

Cerny  v  Wood  St.  Mill  Co.,  I.  E.  No.  454,  p.  53. 

"Where  a  miner  working  in  the  mines  inhales  poison- 
ous gases  which  caused  his  death,  the  injury  causing 
death  arose  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  the  employment." 
Giacobbia  v  Kerno  &c  Coal  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  409, 
May  12, 1915. 

"A  roadmaster  of  a  ^railroad  requested  an  interpreter 
to  get  ten  men,  such  as  he  had  secured  before,  and  bring 
them  to  a  certain  siding  for  the  purpose  of  going  to  work, 
at  the  same  time  giving  him  a  pass  for  himself  and  ten 
men,  from  Decatur  to  the  place  of  work;  after  arriving 
at  the  place,  one  of  the  men,  while  removing  his  baggage, 
was  struck  by  a  train  and  killed.  The  evidence  is  suffi- 
cient to  justify  the  conclusion  that  the  deceased  was  in 
the  employ  of  the  railroad  company,  and  that  the  injury 
arose  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  the  employment. 

Patterson  v  Bloomington  &c  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  727, 
p.  101. 

"Deceased  was  working  about  a  barn  of  respondent 
and  occasionally  drove  a  wagon.  On  the  occasion  on 
which  he  met  his  death,  he  took  a  different  route,  and 
drove  through  a  subway  under  a  right-of-way  of  a  rail- 
road, which  was  not  a  regularly  traveled  wagon  way  but 
had  all  the  appearances  of  a  wagon.  In  attempt- 
ing to  drive  under  the  subway,  deceased's  head  was 
caught  between  the  top  of  the  tank  and  the  lower  beams 
of  the  bridge,  from  which  he  received  injuries  causing  his 
death. 

"Deceased  was  working  in  the  line  of  his  employ- 
ment ;  he  drove  through  the  subway  in  an  apparent  hon- 
est effort  to  subserve  the  interest  of  the  employer;  the 
accident  arose  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  the  employ- 
ment. " 

Hamang  v  Paragon  Ref.  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  756,  p.  23. 


ACCIDENT  195 

"Where  a  driver  was  employed  to  solicit  sales  of  beer 
and  make  delivery  of  same,  and  in  performance  of  his 
duties  was  permitted  to  employ  helpers,  and  the  helper  in 
performance  of  his  duty  was  injured,  the  brewery  com- 
pany is  liable  for  the  injury  sustained  to  the  helper  just 
the  same  as  though  it  employed  the  helper,  paid  him,  di- 
rected him,  and  controlled  his  every  action  as  an  individ- 
ual employee  of  the  company. ' ' 

Schmidt  v  William  &c  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  673,  p.  118. 
"When  an  employee  was  working  on  a  punch  press  as 
a  machinist,  and  while  working  at  the  punch  press  felt  a 
numbness  in  hand  and  arm  and  subsequently  lost  the 
power  of  his  arm,  which  became  totally  disabled  as  a  re- 
sult of  the  jolting  and  jarring  of  the  machine,  such  in- 
jury comes  within  Act. ' ' 

Reid  v  Thomas  El.  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  975,  p.  144. 
"It  is  the  judgment  of  the  Board  that  during  the  time 
the  work  was  suspended  the  applicant  was  in  the  employ 
of  the  respondent,  and  that  the  mere  fact  that  he  stepped 
from  his  place  of  employment  on  the  car  on  which  he  was 
working  to  the  Illinois  Central  Railroad  Company 's 
track,  accompanied  by  other  employees,  and  sat  down 
there,  did  not  suspend  the  relation  of  master  and  serv- 
ant." 

Robinson  v  Kahl  Const.  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  664,  p.  7. 
"If  it  is  the  duty  and  the  custom  of  an  employee  to  do 
whatever  he  found  necessary  to  be  done  in  a  shop  and  he 
is  injured  in  the  performance  of  his  work,  he  is  entitled 
to  compensation  as  the  accident  arose  out  of  and  in  the 
course  of  the  employment. ' ' 

Whaley  v  Hudson,  I.  B.  No.  1052,  p.  186. 
'*  Where  an  employee  received  an  injury  to  his  hand 
by  striking  a  rusty  pipe  and  blood  poison  set  in,  and  he 
thereafter  was  taken  to  a  hospital  for  treatment;  and 
where  the  testimony  of  a  physician  showed  that  as  a  re- 
sult of  blood  poison  his  mind  became  unbalanced;  that 
during  the  night  he  ran  out  of  the  hospital  and  disap- 
peared ;  that  on  the  following  morning  his  dead  body  was 


196  ACCIDENT 

found  on  the  railroad  track,  there  is  sufficient  connection 
between  the  injury,  infection  of  the  hand,  and  subsequent 
death  on  the  railroad  track,  so  that  death  was  the  direct 
result  of  the  accident  sustained  by  him  during  the  em- 
ployment." 

Chiesa  v  United  States  Crushed  Stone  Co.,  I.  B. 

No.  629,  p.  82. 

Employee  of  a  drug  manufacturer,  injured  while 
building  a  shelf,  which  was  not  immediately  connected 
with  such  hazardous  employment,  included.  N.  Y. 

In  re  Larsen,  112  N.  E.  725. 
See: 

In  re  Heitz,  N.  Y.,  112  N.  E.  750. 

Waters  v  Taylor  Co.,  N.  Y.,  112  N.  E.  727. 


ACCIDENT  197 

"Where  one  engaged  as  teamster,  whose  special  duty 
was  to  take  care  of  his  team,  feed  the  same,  and  make  de- 
liveries to  customers  of  the  employer,  after  his  day's 
work,  took  his  team  to  the  stable  and  while  unharnessing 
and  feeding  the  team,  passed  behind  the  team  of  a  fellow 
employee  and  was  kicked  by  one  of  the  horses,  the  injury 
arose  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  his  employment." 
Gylfe  v  Suburban  Ice  Co.,  I.  B.  1305,  p.  167. 

"Where  a  number  of  employees  were  standing  in  line 
before  a  pay  window  for  the  purpose  of  receiving  their 
pay  checks,  and  some  of  them  began  pushing  and  shov- 
ing in  a  friendly  way,  and  applicant  was  pushed  out  of 
line  and  received  a  fall  from  which  he  was  injured,  the 
mere  scuffling  does  not  take  the  employee  temporarily  out 
of  the  employment  and  employee  is  entitled  to  compen- 
sation for  injuries  sustained  while  on  the  grounds  of  the 
employer  and  to  all  intents  and  purposes  in  the  employ 
of  employer;  the  injury  arose  out  of  and  in  the  course 
of  the  employment. ' ' 

Garls  v  Pekin  Cooperage  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  561,  p.  75. 

"An  employer  engaged  in  the  manufacture  of  leather 
goods  would  occasionally  have  one  of  his  employees  go 
to  his  home  to  do  work  about  the  house,  and  the  employee 
did  whatever  work  was  required  by  the  women  in  charge 
of  the  household,  which  had  been  the  practice  for  a  num- 
ber of  years.  The  city  of  Chicago  required  some  improve- 
ment to  be  made  upon  the  alley  and  the  employee  was  in- 
structed to  do  this  work,  and  while  so  engaged  stepped 
on  nail  from  which  he  got  lockjaw  and  died.  The  fact 
that  the  employee  was  working  at  the  private  residence 
of  the  employer  under  foregoing  statements  of  facts  does 
not  affect  the  relation  between  the  employer  and  employee 
and  employee  is  entitled  to  compensation  under  Act. ' ' 

Foreman  Bros.  Bank.  Co.  v  Lanz  &  Co.,  I.  B. 
No.  153,  p.  81. 


198  ACCIDENT 

"In  the  case  of  Hulda  Hanson,  administratrix  of  the 
estate  of  Joseph  B.  Hanson,  deceased,  v  Commercial  Sash 
&  Door  Company,  this  Board  held  that,  where  it  is  diffi- 
cult to  determine  where  the  weight  of  testimony  lies  con- 
cerning a  state  of  facts  or  a  condition  that  may  be 
material  concerning  the  'manner'  in  which  an  accident 
occurred  under  the  Act,  the  legal  presumption  applicable 
to  that  phase  of  the  record  is  that  it  was  accidental.  The 
Board  is  of  opinion  in  this  case  in  the  light  of  that  rule 
that,  where  it  is  difficult  from  the  testimony  to  determine 
the  extent  and  character  of  the  injury  received  in  cases 
where  the  parties  are  operating  under  the  Act,  the  pre- 
sumption of  law  should  favor  the  payment  of  compensa- 
tion." 

Isidora  v  Rockford  Gas  Light  &  Coke  Co.,  I.  B. 

No.  555,  p.  42. 
See: 

Talacsnski  v  (Armour  &  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  165,  p.  48. 

Kringle  v  Meyers,  I.  B.  No.  991,  p.  72. 

Elfstrom  v  Erickson,  I.  B.  No.  558,  p.  73. 

Burgnon  v  Edgewater  Coal  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  582,  p. 
86. 

Simple  v  Bishop,  I.  B.  No.  487,  p.  19. 
* '  Plaintiff  was  operating  a  crane  on  the  Mohawk  river, 
when  the  crane  broke  and  he  jumped  in  the  river  to  avoid 
injury.  As  the  result  of  exposure  in  wading  to  shore,  he 
contracted  a  heavy  cold  leading  on  to  tuberculosis  and 
disability. 

We  consider  the  claimant  in  the  same  position  as  if 
the  accident  had  thrown  him  into  the  river,  and,  clearly, 
his  being  accidentally  throVn  10  feet  into  the  water  was 
an  injury  within  the  meaning  of  the  Act,  and  the  disease 
following  has  been  found  to  naturally  and  unavoidably 
result  from  that  injury,  *  *  *  which,  it  has  developed 
was  very  serious. ' ' 

Rist  v  Larkm  &  Sangster,  156  N.  Y.  Supp.  875. 


ACCIDENT  199 

"It  is  not  easy  nor  necessary  to  the  determination  of 
the  case  at  bar  to  give  a  comprehensive  definition  of  these 
words  which  shall  accurately  include  all  cases  embraced 
within  the  Act  and  with  precision  exclude  those  outside 
its  terms.  It  is  sufficient  to  say  that  an  injury  is  received 
'in  the  course  of  the  employment  when  it  comes  while 
the  workman  is  doing  the  duty  which  he  is  employed  to 
perform.  It  arises  'out  of  the  employment,  when  there 
is  apparent  to  the  rational  mind  upon  consideration  of 
all  the  circumstances,  a  causal  connection  between  the 
conditions  under  which  the  work  is  required  to  be  per- 
formed and  the  resulting  injury.  Under  this  test,  if  the 
injury  can  be  seen  to  have  followed  as  a  natural  incident 
of  the  work  and  to  have  been  contemplated  by  a  reason- 
able person  familiar  with  the  whole  situation  as  a  result 
of  the  exposure  occasioned  by  the  nature  of  the  employ- 
ment, then  it  arises  'out  of  the  employment.  But  it  ex- 
cludes an  injury  which  can  not  fairly  be  traced  to  the  em- 
ployment as  a  contributing  proximate  cause  and  which 
comes  from  a  hazard  to  which  the  workmen  would  have 
been  equally  exposed  apart  from  the  employment.  The 
causative  danger  must  be  peculiar  to  the  work  and  not 
common  to  the  neighborhood.  It  must  be  incidental  to 
the  character  of  the  business  and  not  independent  of  the 
relation  of  master  and  servant.  It  need  not  have  been 
foreseen  or  expected,  but  after  the  event  it  must  appear 
to  have  had  its  origin  in  a  risk  connected  with  the  em- 
ployment and  to  have  flowed  from  that  source  as  a  ration- 
al consequence." 

In  re  Employers'  Liability  Association,  Mass., 
102  N.  E.  697. 

The  same  court  held  a  workman  to  have  been  in  the 

course  of  employment  in  a  case  in  which  a  horse  which 

he  was  driving  ran  away  and  killed  him  while  on  the  way 

to  a  watering  trough  where  he  was  to  water  the  horse  in 

accordance  with  instructions,  even  though  he  intended 

afterwards  to  ride  on  to  his  home  to  get  dinner,  which 

would  not  have  been  an  act  in  the  course  of  employment. 

Pigeon  v  Employers'  Liab.  Assurance  Corp.,  102 

N.  E.  932. 


200  ACCIDENT 

Different  tests  are  to  be  applied  to  "in  course  of* 
and  "out  of."  (Mich.) 

Hopkins  v  Michigan  Sugar  Co.,  150  N.  W.  325. 
Slipping  on  ice  in  city  street,  causing  death,  excluded. 

Id. 
Injury  from  falling  horse,  included. 

Costello  v  Taylor,  217  N.  Y.  175;  111  N.  E.  755. 
Casual  connection  between  conditions  of  the  work  and 
the  injury,  is  sufficient. 

In  re  Employers'  Liab.  Ass.  Corp.,  215  Mass. 

497, 102  N.  E.  930,  216  Mass.  71. 
Going  to  work  included. 

City  of  Milwaukee  v  Althoff,  156  Wis.  68. 
Riding  to  place  of  work  in  master's  wagon,  in  course 
of  employment. 

In  re  Donovan,  217  Mass.  76, 104  N.  E.  431. 
Going  to  lunch  included. 

Clem  v  Chalmers  Motor  Co.,  178  Mich.  340. 
Rayner  v  Sligh  Furn.  Co.,  180  Mich.  168. 
Factory  employee,  whose  hair,  while  being  combed, 
was  caught  in  machine,  included. — N.  J. 

Terlecky  v  Straus,  86  N.  J.  L.  708,  92  A.  1087. 
Employee,  injured  while  going  to  lunch,  on  stairs  not 
within  employer's  control — in  course  of  employment. 

In  re  Sundine,  218  Mass.  1, 105  N.  E.  433. 
Employee  going  home  for  lunch — excluded. 
Hills  v  Blair,  (Mich.)  148  N.  W.  243. 
Employee  going  home  from  plant  and  killed  by  train 
— excluded. 

Lever oni  v  Travelers'  Ins.  Co.,  219  Mass.  488, 

107  N.  E.  349. 

Direct  proof  of  how  accident  occurreQ,  not  necessary. 
Mass. 

In  re  Von  Ette,  111  N.  E.  696.      - 


ACCIDENT  201 

Employee  injured  while  removing  from  a  die  a  can 
placed  there  by  a  bystander  for  fun,  held  in  course  of  em- 
ployment. 

Knopp  v  American  Car  &  Foundry  Co.,  186  111. 

App.  605. 

Employee  fatally  injured  in  slipping,  while  dodging 
playful  attack  of  fellow  employee,  in  course  of  employ- 
ment. 

Halley  v  Moosbrugger,  N.  J.,  93  Atl.  79. 
Eailway  employee,  crossing  tracks  on  way  to  toilet, 
struck  by  automobile  and  later  by  train,  injured  in  course 
of  employment. 

Zabriskie  v  Erie  Ry.,  N.  J.,  88  Atl.  824. 
Employee,  when  presumed  to  have  been  in  perfor- 
mance of  his  duty. 

Crucible  Steel  Forge  Co.  v  Moir,  C.  C.  A.  219 

Fed.  151. 
Worthington  v  Elmer,  207  Fed.  309. 

"If  a  workman  in  the  reasonable  performance  of  his 
duties  sustains  a  physiological  injury  as  the  result  of  the 
work  he  is  engaged  in,  I  consider  that  this  is  accidental 
injury  in  the  sense  of  the  Statute. ' ' 

Stewart  v  Wilsons  &c  Coal  Co.,  5  Sc.  Sess.  Gas. 

5th  Series  120. 

Where  an  employee,  in  an  emergency,  does  what  he 
deems  necessary  for  his  master's  interest,  he  remains  in 
course  of  employmnt. 

Durham  v  Brown  Bros.,  1  Sc.  Sess.  Cas.  5th  Ser. 

279. 
For  other  citations  see 

Labatt :  Master  &  Servant,  Vol.  5,  §  1806. 
Burden  of  proof  that  accident  arose  out  of  and  in 
course  of  employment  is  on  plaintiff. 

McNicholas  v  Dawson,  68  L.  J.  Q.  B.  N.  S.  317. 
Sailor  returning  from  shore  leave  included. 

Leach  v  Oakley,  1  K.  B.  523,  4  B.  W.  C.  C.  9L 


202  ACCIDENT 

English  Act — Phraseology. 

"If  in  any  employment  (to  which  this  Act  applies) 
personal  injury  by  accident  arising  out  of  and  in  the 
course  of  the  employment  is  caused  to  a  workman  his  em- 
ployer shall,  subject  as  hereinafter  mentioned,  be  liable 
to  pay  compensation  in  accordance  with  the  first  schedule 
of  this  Act." 

"Course  of  Employment " — see 

Spooner  v  Detroit  Saturday  Night  Co.,  (Mich.) 

153  N.  W.  657. 

Larsen  v  Paine  Drug  Co.,  155  N.  Y.  S.  759. 
De  Voe  v  New  York  State  Rys.,  155  N.  Y.  S.  12. 
Mihm  v  Houssey,  155  N.  Y.  S.  860. 
Hendricks  v  Seeman  Bros.,  155  N.  Y.  S.  638. 
Newman  v  Newman,  155  N.  Y.  S.  663. 
Bryant  v  Fissell,  N.  J.,  86  Atl.  458. 
Zabriskie  v  Erie  R.  R.  Co.,  88  Atl.  824. 
Clem  v  Chalmers  Co.,  144  N.  W.  848,  Mich. 
In  re  Employers'  Liability  Assur.  Co.,  Mass., 

102  N.  E.  697. 
Pigeon  v  Employers'  Liab.  Ins.  Co.,  Mass.,  102 

N.  E.  932. 

Musik  v  Erie  R.  R.,  86  N.  J.  L.  695,  92  A.  1087. 
State  v  District  Court,  (Minn.)  151  N.  W.  912. 
Sabella  v  Brazileiro,  (N.  J.)  81  A.  1032. 
In  re  Howard,  218  Mass.  404, 105  N.  E.  636. 
Milwaukee  Coal  Co.  v  Industrial  Com.,  160  Wis. 

247,  151  N.  W.  245. 

Hulley  v  Moosbrugger,  (N.  J.)  95  A.  1007. 
Carroll  v  What  Cheer  Stables  Co.,  (R.  I.)  96  A. 

208. 


ACCIDENT  203 

Assault : 

'  *  On  principle,  the  better  rule  seems  to  be,  that  the  as- 
sault which  has  no  connection  with  the  work  in  which  the 
employee  is  engaged  does  not  entitle  the  workman  to  com- 
pensation. On  the  other  hand,  justice  appears  clearly  to 
have  been  accomplished  in  awarding  compensation  in 
those  cases  where  robbery  was  the  motive  of  the  assault, 
or  where  it  was  committed  to  prevent  an  employee  from 
performing  his  duty.  *  *  *  Thus,  a  cashier,  employed 
regularly  to  carry  wages  by  train  to  a  colliery,  was  shot 
by  a  stranger  in  the  course  of  the  journey,  and  the  wages 
were  stolen.  It  was  held  that  his  death  was  caused  by  an 
accident  and  that  the  accident  arose  out  of  and  in  the 
course  of  the  employment.  *  *  *  A  night  watchman 
on  the  premises  of  his  employer  who,  while  in  the  dis- 
charge of  his  duty,  was  shot  by  a  burglar,  from  the  effects 
of  which  he  died,  was  held  to  have  been  killed  while  in 
the  course  of  his  employment  and  his  dependents  were 
entitled  to  compensation. 

"It  is  argued,  however,  that  the  term  *  accidental  in- 
jury' in  the  Illinois  Act  precludes  the  idea  that  one  killed 
in  the  performance  of  his  duty,  as  the  deceased  was  here, 
by  a  robber,  or  some  other  wilful  act  is  barred  from  re- 
covering compensation. 

"Section  1,  subsection  1m  of  the  English  Act,  1906, 
uses  the  terms  'personal  injury  by  accident  arising,  etc.' 
Without  arguing  or  going  into  the  question  of  whether 
*  accidental  injury'  or  'personal  injury  by  accident'  are 
different  in  legal  meaning,  or  not,  we  find  that  in  the  case 
of  Challis  v  London  &  South  Western  Railway  Company, 
2  K.  B.  154,  the  courts  held  that  an  engine  driver  on  a 
railway  injured  by  a  stone  thrown  by  a  mischievous  boy 
was  entitled  to  compensation. 


204  ACCIDENT 

"In  Anderson  v  Balfour,  2  I.  B.  497,  the  court  held 
that  a  game  keeper  on  duty,  injured  by  a  poacher,  was  en- 
titled to  compensation,  and  that  the  injury  was  the  result 
of  an  accident. 

"The  old  theory  of  liability,  being  at  fault,  willful 
negligence,  etc.,  in  order  to  entitle  one  to  recover  being 
one  of  the  assumed  wrongs  that  the  Compensation  Act  cor- 
rects, the  idea  that  an  accident  must  be  an  occurrence 
resulting  from  the  lack  or  fault  or  intent  on  the  part  of 
anybody  has  but  little,  if  anything,  to  do  with  determin- 
ing what  constitutes  an  accident  under  the  Compensation 
Act  of  Illinois. 

"We  think  that  in  the  light  of  the  cases,  when  you  con- 
strue the  Act  from  its  context,  and  take  into  considera- 
tion the  spirit,  purpose  and  intent  of  the  Act  and  the 
wrong  intended  to  be  corrected,  etc.,  that  the  old  doctrine 
of  intent  precluding  the  idea  of  accident  is  not  applicable 
to  the  doctrine  of  compensation;  and  therefore,  one  in- 
jured in  the  course  of  his  employment  by  a  robber,  or 
from  assault  by  one  in  some  wrongful  act,  is  so  by  an 
accident. 

' '  From  this,  the  Board  finds  that  the  deceased  met  his 
death  on  account  of  an  accident  that  occurred  in  and 
arose  out  of  the  course  of  the  employment." 

Wurtz  v  Chicago  &  A.  Ry.,  I.  B.  No.  544,  p.  93. 
"A  private  watchman,  employed  by  a  railroad  com- 
pany, whose  duty  was  to  make  the  rounds  of  the  yards,  in- 
specting the  freight  house  and  various  portions  of  yards, 
keep  improper  persons  off  the  premises  and  prevent  steal- 
ing from  cars,  and  who  had  power  to  arrest  in  cases  of 
necessity,  if  injured  in  the  performance  of  his  duty,  is  en- 
titled to  compensation  under  the  Act. ' ' 

Bassett  v  Chicago  &c  Ry.f  I.  B.  No.  635,  p.  120. 

See  In  re  Harbroe  (Mass.),  Ill  N.  E.  709. 
Injury  in  fight. 

Mich.,  Clark  v  Clark,  155  N.  W.  507. 


ACCIDENT  205 

Violation  of  Kules : 

"It  seems  that  all  the  cases  cited,  holding  that  a  viola- 
tion of  a  specific  order  or  any  wilful  exposition  of  one's 
self  to  danger  in  connection  with  his  work  takes  him  out 
of  the  course  of  his  employment,  are  based  upon  statutes 
in  which  there  is  a  provision  in  substance  to  that  effect. 
In  the  Illinois  Act  there  is  no  provision  that  takes  one 
out  of  the  course  of  his  employment  who  is  injured  as  the 
result  of  a  violation  of  an  order ;  nor  is  there  any  provi- 
sion that  denies  him  compensation  for  an  injury  result- 
ing from  negligence  or  wilfulness.  To  hold  that  violation 
of  specific  orders,  concerning  the  manner  of  doing  one's 
work,  in  the  absence  of  any  such  statutory  provision,  takes 
an  employee  out  of  the  course  of  his  employment  would 
be,  if  not  an  invasion  of  the  province  of  the  legislature, 
an  exercise  of  judicial  power  and  no  such  power  is  con- 
ferred on  the  Board  by  the  Act. 

*  'If  the  Board  had  power  to  read  into  the  Act  in  this 
state  a  provision  concerning  wilful  violation  of  orders, 
we  yet  would  be  inclined  to  believe  that  we  would  not  be 
justified  in  adopting  the  theory  of  the  respondent  in  this 
case. 

' '  The  leading  case  on  facts  similar  to  this  case,  due  to 
the  violation  of  orders,  is  the  case  of  Whitehead  v  Reeder, 
2  K.  B.  48.  This  case  was  decided  in  1901.  It  was  a  part 
of  the  duty  of  the  workman  in  this  case  to  sharpen  his 
tools  on  a  grind  stone  rotated  by  a  band,  driven  by  steam 
power.  The  workman  was  told  not  to  touch  the  machinery. 
The  band,  however,  slipped  off  the  stone  and  the  work- 
man tried  to  replace  it,  and  was  injured  in  the  attempt. 
The  Court  of  Appeals  refused  to  disturb  the  finding  in 
favor  of  the  workman,  holding  that  it  was  not  every 
breach  of  a  master 's  order  that  would  terminate  the  ser- 
vant's  employment,  but  that  regard  must  be  had  to  the 
character  of  the  master's  orders.  The  court  further  said 
that  the  order  did  not  limit  the  sphere  of  the  employment 
so  as  to  forbid  contact  with  the  machinery.  'It  was  a 


206  ACCIDENT 

part  of  the  workman's  duty  to  work  at  the  machinery, 
and  the  act  of  the  workman  in  replacing  the  band  was 
not  so  remote  from  his  ordinary  duties  that  it  could  be 
fairly  said  that  it  did  not  arise  out  of  the  employment.' 
We  think  the  holding  in  that  case  is  applicable  to  the 
facts  in  this  case.  So  far  as  we  are  advised,  this  rule  has 
never  been  changed  by  any  of  the  courts.  Taking  into 
consideration  the  orders  and  the  work  to  be  performed, 
this  case  is  taken  out  of  the  general  rule  that  the  work- 
man cannot  increase  the  responsibilities  of  his  employer 
under  the  Act  by  voluntarily  taking  upon  himself  work 
which  is  quite  outside  of  the  character  of  the  particular 
class  of  work  which  his  employer  has  allotted  him." 

Reynolds  v  Mound  City  Water  &  Light  Co.,  I. 

B.  No.  952,  p.  123.  " 

"A  workman  injured  because  of  an  accident  that  is 
the  result  of  the  violation  of  some  specific  order  concern- 
ing his  work,  that  may  occur  just  before  his  regular  hours 
or  within  a  reasonable  time  thereafter,  which  is  in  some 
way  connected  with  his  usual  work  and  redounds  to  the 
protection  of  property  of  his  employer  or  his  interest, 
is  not  a  volunteer  in  the  ordinary  sense  of  the  word,  but 
an  employee." 

Casparson  v  Munn,  I.  B.  No.  1483,  p.  151. 
"Wilful  misconduct"  (phrase  in  other  acts)  means 
gross  and  reckless. 

In  re  Nickerson,  218  Mass.  158, 105  N.  E.  604. 
Although   employee   procured   employment   through 
false  representations,  which  were  a  misdemeanor  under 
Penal  Code,  compensation  was  allowed  for  his  death.  (N. 
Y.) 

Kenney  v  Union  Ry.,  166  App.  Div.  497,  154  N. 
Y.  Supp.  117. 


ACCIDENT  207 

Intoxication — Award  notwithstanding. 

Harvey  v  Gironda,  I.  B.  July  6, 1915. 

Hanson  v  Commercial  Sash  Door  Co.,  I.  B.  No. 

596,  p.  30. 

Intoxication  not  willful  misconduct;  does  not  bar 
claim. 

Neroosa-Edwards  Paper  Co.  v  Ind.  Com.  of 
Wis.,  154  Wis.  105,  141  N.  W.  1013,  Ann. 
Cas.  1915,  B.  997. 
Intoxication  not  bar  to  compensation. 

Williams  v  Llandudno  C.  &  C.  Co.,  1915,  2  K.  B. 

101. 
State  v  District  Court,  128  Minn.  221, 150  N.  W. 

623. 

Drayman,  returning  to  his  van,  after  a  two  minutes* 
drink  in  a  public  house  at  midday,  knocked  down  by  mo- 
tor car,  injured  "in  course  of  employment." 

Martin  v  Lovibond  &  Sons,  7  B.  W.  C.  C.  243. 


208  EMPLOYER 

§  4  "EMPLOYER." 

1st — "The  state  and  each  county,  city,  town,  town- 
ship, incorporated  village,  school  district,  body  politic  or 
municipal  corporation. " 

2nd. — "Every  person,  firm,  public  or  private  corpo- 
ration, including  hospitals,  public  service,  eleemosynary, 
religious  or  charitable  corporations  or  associations,  who 
has  any  person  in  service  or  under  contract  for  hire" — 
accepting  by  filing  notice  or  by  presumption  from  extra- 
hazardous  character  of  occupation. 

See  "Occupation"  (ante).  "Employee"  (post). 
Officer  of  corporation  cannot  be  held  personally. 
Peet  v  Mills,  Wash.,  136  Pac.  685. 


EMPLOYEE  209 

§  5  "EMPLOYEE." 

1. — "Every  person  in  service  of  public  bodies  enumer- 
ated as  *  Employers, '  except  officials. ' ' 
Employee  of  state,  held  included  in  Act. 

Miller  v  Pillsbury,  128  Pac.  327. 
Employee  of  State  Board  of  Agriculture  and  univer- 
sity regents  of  Michigan  excluded. 

Agler  v  Michigan  Agric.  College,  148  N.  W.  341. 
Employee  of  municipality  or  quasi-public  municipal- 
ity, such  as  the  Sanitary  District  of  Chicago,  included. 

Radigen  v  Sanitary  District,  I.  B.  No.  158,  p.  138. 
Officer :  Policeman  is  not  employee  but  officer. 
Blynn  v  City  of  Pontiac,  151  N.  W.  681. 
Workman :  Chemist  held  not  to  be. 

Bagnall  v  Levinstein,  $6  L.  T.  184,  9  W.  C.  C. 

100. 

2. — "Every  person  in  the  service  of  another  under 
any  contract  of  hire,  express  or  implied,  oral  or  written. ' ' 
Independent  Contractor : 

A  painter  engaged  to  do  some  sign  painting  on  the 
plant  of  a  supply  company  for  $50,  who  himself  furnished 
the  tools  and  materials  and  did  the  work  without  helpers, 
when  he  fell  from  scaffold  and  was  killed,  held  to  be  an 
"employee,"  whose  widow  was  entitled  to  recover  com- 
pensation under  New  York  Act. 

In  re  Rheinwald,  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  153  N.  Y.  S. 

598,  May  14, 1915. 
See  Mrs.  James  v  Western  Metal  Supply  Co., 

Cal.  Ind.  Ace.  Com.,  Claim  No.  58. 
"Not  including  any  person  whose  employment  is  but 
casual. ' ' 

Casual  employment. 

In  re  Cheevers,  219  Mass.  244,  106  N.  E.  861. 
In  re  King,  220  Mass.  290,  107  N.  E.  959. 
In  re  Gaynor,  217  Mass.  86, 104  N.  E.  339. 
*  *  Not  including  any  person  who  is  not  engaged  in  the 
usual  course  of  the  trade,  business,  profession  or  occupa- 
tion of  his  employer." 
See: 

Lyon  v  Windsor,  159  N.  Y.  S.  162. 
Chappelle  v  Four  Hundred  Twelve  Co.,  N.  Y., 
112  N.  E.  569. 


210  EMPLOYEE 

FEDERAL  EMPLOYEES'  LIABILITY  ACT 
"Employees  shall  not  be  included  when  excluded  by 
the  laws  of  the  United  States  *  *  *  where  such  laws  are 
held  to  be  exclusive." 

See  Staley  v  Illinois  Central  By.,  opinion  ante. 
"In  the  light  of  the  opinion  in  Staley  v  Illinois  Cen- 
tral Ey.  Co.,  268  111.  356,  it  seems  to  be  clearly  established 
that  where  a  workman  is  working  upon  an  instrumental- 
ity which  is  used  both  in  inter-state  and  intra-state  com- 
merce, such  employee  is  engaged  in  the  furtherance  of 
inter-state  commerce,  and  therefore,  if  he  is  injured,  his 
only  remedy  must  be  under  the  Federal  Employers7  Lia- 
bility Act." 

(Painter  working  on  inter-boundary  bridge.) 

Duffy  v  Illinois  Central  Ey.  Co.,  I.  B.  Aug.  14, 

1915. 

Where  a  switchman  was  assisting  in  moving  empty 
cars  from  an  ice  shed  to  a  place  near  loading  platform, 
where  the  nature  of  the  freight  to  be  loaded  therein  was 
determined,  award  was  granted  under  Compensation  Act, 
the  Board  holding  that  the  State  and  the  Federal  Act  did 
not  cover  the  same  field,  one  providing  for  compensation 
by  mutual  agreement,  and  the  other  covering  the  subject 
of  liability. 

Peterson  v  Chicago  Junction  Ey.  Co.,  I.  B.  July 

30,  1915. 

Inter-state  carriage  by  water  included  in  Act.  (Wash.) 
Stoll  v  Pacific  Coast  S.  S.  Co.,  205  Fed.  169. 


EMPLOYEE  211 

FEDERAL  EMPLOYERS'  LIABILITY  ACT 
"It  is  insisted  by  the  respondent  that  when  the  ser- 
vices of  one  in  the  employ  of  a  carrier,  who  does  both 
intra-state  and  inter-state  commerce,  can  fairly  be  said 
to  be  necessary  'for  inter-state  or  for  intra-state  pur- 
poses, that  the  Federal  Employers'  Liability  Act  is  the 
exclusive  remedy  in  case  of  injury.  In  the  case  now  be- 
ing considered  the  work  the  deceased  was  doing  can  fairly 
be  said  to  be  necessary  for  either  inter-state  or  intra- 
state  purposes,  and  this  without  the  necessity  of  goinjv 
into  details  concerning  the  particular  accident  or  charac- 
ter of  employment  the  deceased  was  actually  engaged  in 
at  the  time.  There  is  a  line  of  Federal  authorities  that 
tend  to  support  the  contention  of  the  respondent,  but 
when  carefully  considered,  may  be  differentiated  from  in 
this  case.  One  whose  employment  may  be  either  inter- 
state or  intra-state  and  whose  injury  may  or  may  not  be 
the  result  of  negligence,  as  we  read  the  cases  cited  by  the 
respondent,  has  the  right  to  proceed  either  under  the  Fed- 
eral Liability  Act  or  the  State  Compensation  Act.  It  is 
true  when  the  Federal  government  gets  jurisdiction  to 
legislate  concerning  a  subject  its  authority  is  exclusive. 
The  jurisdiction  the  Federal  government  takes  concern- 
ing liability  of  employers  to  their  employees  does  not  ex- 
tend into  the  field  of  compensation,  however.  Such  jur- 
isdiction not  extending  into  the  field  of  compensation,  the 
mere  fact  that  an  employee's  work  may  be  either  intra- 
state  or  inter-state,  does  not  exclude  the  right  of  the  state 
to  take  up  the  subject  at  the  place  where  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  Federal  government  terminates. 

"Federal  jurisdiction  is  given  in  express  terms  in  the 
Federal  Act  only  where  there  is  inter-state  traffic,  inter- 
state employment  and  negligence.  If,  in  the  absence  of 
negligence,  the  Federal  jurisdiction  does  not  extend  over 
employment  that  may  be  either  intra-state  or  inter-state, 
then  surely  such  jurisdiction  has  been  reserved  to  the 
states ;  and  if  reserved  to  the  states,  surely  an  employee, 
whose  work  may  be  either,  has  the  right  to  elect  in  what 


212  EMPLOYEE 

FEDERAL  EMPLOYEES'  LIABILITY  ACT 

forum  he  will  proceed  in  all  cases  where  there  is  doubt 
as  to  the  existence  of  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  em- 
ployer. To  hold  otherwise  would  amount  to  nothing  else, 
in  a  great  many  cases,  than  to  deprive  an  employee  of 
compensation  when  he  had  no  remedy  under  the  Federal 
Act. 

"The  spirit,  intent  and  entire  scope  of  the  Federal 
Act  seem  merely  to  provide  a  remedy  for  inter-state  em- 
ployees only  in  case  of  negligence.  The  spirit,  intent  and 
policy  of  the  Compensation  Act  are  entirely  different,  and 
do  not  contemplate  negligence  as  an  element  of  right  of 
recovery  at  all.  It  is  a  summary  remedy  for  the  payment 
of  compensation  to  employees  injured  in  the  course  of 
their  employment,  without  reference  to  how  the  injury 
occurred. ' ' 

Miller,  Adm'x  v  Illinois  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  I.  B. 
No.  650,  p.  27. 

"After  a  careful  consideration  of  the  record,  testi- 
mony, stipulation,  facts  in  the  case  and  the  argument  of 
counsel,  the  Board  reaches  the  following  conclusions : 

"First — That  all  the  inferences  to  be  drawn  from  the 
testimony  and  the  facts  fairly  establish  the  contention 
that  the  injury  arose  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  the  em- 
ployment. The  mere  fact  that  it  was  possible  for  the  de- 
ceased to  have  received  this  injury  at  a  time  other  than 
when  he  was  in  the  employ  of  the  respondent,  is  not  suffi- 
cient as  against  the  testimony  of  the  manner  in  which  the 
lever  was  thrown  and  the  statements  of  experts  that  such 
an  injury  would  occur  as  claimed.  This  conclusion  is  not 
reached  by  basing  a  presumption  upon  a  presumption.  If 
the  testimony  fairly  tends  to  show  the  strain,  injury  and 
death,  those  are  physical  facts,  and  the  only  inference 
that  can  be  said  to  be  indulged  in  this  conclusion  is  that 
the  injury  was  the  result  of  the  strain. 

"Second — The  mere  fact  that  the  engine  on  which  the 
deceased  was  working  at  the  time  it  is  alleged  that  the 


EMPLOYEE  213 

FEDERAL  EMPLOYERS'  LIABILITY  ACT 

injury  occurred  had  been  handling  both  intra-  and  inter- 
state commerce  and  continued  after  this  accident  to 
handle  both  kinds  of  merchandise,  is  not  controlling  on 
the  question.  So  far  as  we  are  able  to  learn,  no  court  of 
last  resort  has  yet  held  that  because  certain  instru- 
mentalities of  transportation  may  at  one  time  be  engaged 
in  one  character  of  commerce,  and  at  another  time  in  an- 
other, constitutes  the  same  (the  engine  in  this  case)  and 
its  operators  and  owners  as  being  engaged  in  inter-state 
commerce.  The  controlling  rule,  as  we  understand  it, 
takes  into  account  and  has  for  its  basis  the  character  of 
the  transportation  of  merchandise  being  transported  and 
the  kind  of  work  in  which  the  employee  was  engaged  at 
the  time  or  immediately  before  and  after  the  injury.  In 
this  case  the  record  does  not  disclose  that  at  the  time  or 
for  several  days  before  or  after  this  particular  engine 
was  actually  employed  in  hauling  inter-state  commerce, 
nor  that  the  deceased  at  any  time,  unless  in  the  way  it  is 
here  alleged,  was  an  inter-state  employee.  If  the  rule 
contended  for  by  the  respondent  is  correct,  no  railroad 
or  transportation  company  that  may  have  in  any  wise 
been  engaged  in  handling  any  character  of  merchandise 
destined  for  inter-state  points,  would  be  subject  to  the 
provisions  or  the  operation  of  the  Workmen's  Compen- 
sation Act.  We  believe  the  rule  announced  here  is  sound. " 
Turpin,  Adm'x  v  Chicago  &  Alton  R.  R.  Co.,  I. 
B.  No.  1191,  p.  205. 

"The  fact  that  along  the  line  of  a  particular  train  of 
a  railroad  there  was  merchandise  of  an  inter-state  char- 
acter to  be  handled;  that  just  prior  to  the  occurrence  of 
the  accident  the  crew  and  train  had  been  handling  inter- 
state packages  or  cars;  and  that  it  was  their  custom  to 
handle  whatever  merchandise  was  delivered  to  them, 
whether  inter-state  or  otherwise,  does  not  stamp  such 
train  and  its  employees  as  engaged  in  inter-state  com- 
merce. 


214  EMPLOYEE 

FEDERAL  EMPLOYEES'  LIABILITY  ACT 

"If  the  parties  are  not  in  any  wise  engaged  in  inter- 
state commerce,  then  the  Federal  Employers'  Liability 
Act  does  not  apply. 

"The  policy  of  the  state  of  Illinois  is  to  be  found  in 
the  Compensation  Act  and  requires  payment  to  em- 
ployees in  case  of  accident  growing  out  of  and  in  course 
of  the  employment  without  reference  to  the  doctrine  of 
negligence." 

Blauvelt  v  Chicago  &  Alton  R.  R.  Co.,  I.  B.  No. 

939,  p.  181. 

"Workmen's  Compensation  Act  of  Illinois  applies  to 
employees  injured  while  engaged  in  inter-state  com- 
merce; such  Act  is  not  in  conflict  with  the  Federal  Act 
and  was  not  designed  to  cover  the  same  field. 

"Act  of  Illinois  and  the  Federal  Act  are  not  in  con- 
flict, the  Federal  Act  being  designed  to  operate  upon  and 
regulate  commerce  between  the  several  states,  while  the 
Workmen's  Compensation  Act  merely  provides  for  com- 
pensation for  any  injury  suffered  to  an  employee. ' ' 

Neal  v  Illinois  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  757, 

p.  125. 
Norris  v  Illinois  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  458, 

p.  58. 

Acceptance  of  compensation  under  State  Act  bars  ac- 
tion under  Federal  Act. 

Mitchell  v  Louisville  &c.  R.  R.,  194  111.  App.  77. 


EMPLOYEE  215 

FEDERAL  EMPLOYERS'  LIABILITY  ACT 

Where  the  injured  man  was  concededly  engaged  in 
inter-state  commerce,  so  that  if  the  injury  had  been  due 
to  the  employer's  negligence  he  would  of  necessity  have 
had  recourse  to  the  Federal  liability  statute,  but  where 
there  was  no  negligence,  the  injury  being  due  to  pure  ac- 
cident, it  was  not  within  the  Federal  law,  and  the  court 
held  that  it  was  a  case  in  which  congress  had  not  yet 
acted,  so  that  the  state  law  would  control,  and  affirmed  an 
award  made  in  the  claimant's  favor  by  the  compensation 
commission. 

Winfield  v  New  York  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  Supreme 
Court  of  New  York,  168  Appellate  Division, 
351, 1915, 153  N.  Y.  Supp.  499. 

Act  is  not  superseded  by  Federal  Act.  Court  of  Ap- 
peals, N.  Y. 

Winfield  v  N.  Y.  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.,  216  N.  Y. 

284, 110  N.  E.  614,  Ann.  Cas.  1916,  A.  821. 
"In  the  case  of  Winfield  v  Neiv  York  Central  &  Hud- 
son R.  R.  Co.,  we  held  that  the  claimant,  although  engaged 
in  inter-state  commerce,  was  not  excluded  by  section  114 
of  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Law  from  claiming 
benefits  under  that  law,  where  the  injury  was  in  no  way 
attributable  to  the  negligence  of  the  employer,  but  was  as 
to  him  wholly  accidental. ' ' 

Moore  v  Lehigh  Valley  R.  Co.,  154  N.  Y.  S.  622. 

See  Pedersen  v  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  229  U.  S.  146, 

33  Sup.  Ct.  648,  57  L.  Ed.  1125,  Ann.  Cas. 

1914,  C.  153. 

Shanks  v  D.  L.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  214  N.  Y.  413,  108 

N.  E.  644. 

Fairchild  v  Pennsylvania  R.  R.,  155  N.  Y.  S.  751. 
Okrzezs  v  Lehigh  Valley  R.  R.,  155  N.  Y.  S.  919. 
Nelson  v  Illinois  Central  R.  Co.,  (Iowa)  155  N. 

W.  169. 

Rounsaville  v  Central  Ry.  Co.,  N.  Y.,  94  Atl.  392. 
Jensen  v  Southern  Pac.  Co.,  N.  Y.,  109  N.  E. 
"Federal    Employers'    Liability    Act — Practi- 
tioners' Manual,"  Walgren. 


216  EMPLOYEE 

FEDERAL  EMPLOYEES'  LIABILITY  ACT. 

"The  Ohio  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  does  not 
apply  to  employers  and  to  their  employees  engaged  ex- 
clusively in  inter-state  commerce,  but  it  applies  to  those 
engaged  in  both  inter-state  and  intra-state  commerce  to 
the  extent  that  their  mutual  connection  with  intra-state 
work  may  and  shall  be  clearly  separable  and  distinguish- 
able from  inter-state  or  foreign  commerce,  upon  the  elec- 
tion of  both  employer  and  employees  to  be  governed  by 
its  provisions. ' ' 

Connote  v  Norfolk  &  W.  By.,  U.  S.  Dist.  Ct,  216 

Fed.  823. 

Failure  of  inter-state  commerce  railroad  to  comply 
with  safety  appliance  acts,  renders  it  liable  under  Fed- 
eral Liability  Act,  even  though  employee  is  injured  while 
engaged  in  intra-state  traffic. 

Rigsby  v  Texas  Pac.  R.  R.,  U.  S.  Sup.  Ct.  1916. 
All  railroad  employees  covered  by  Act.  (Wis.) 

Minneapolis  R.  R.  Co.  v  Industrial  Com.,  153 
Wis.  552, 141  N.  W.  1119,  Ann,  Cas.  1914,  D. 
655. 


EMPLOYEE  217 

Alien :  Included  as  employee. 

"The  term  'persons'  used  in  the  Fifth  Amendment  is 
broad  enough  to  include  every  human  being  within  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  Republic.  A  resident,  alien  born,  is 
entitled  to  the  same  protection  under  the  law  that  a  citi- 
zen is  entitled  to.  He  owes  obedience  to  the  laws  of  the 
country  in  which  he  is  domiciled,  and  as  a  consequence  is 
entitled  to  the  equal  protection  of  the  law." 

"The  Constitution  of  the  State  of  Illinois  of  1870, 
article  II,  in  that  part  known  as  the  'Bill  of  Eights,'  is 
similar  to  the  Federal  Constitution,  in  that  it  uses  the 
word  'person'  instead  of  'citizen.'  We  agree  with  the 
contention  of  the  claimant  that  the  provisions  of  our 
Compensation  Act  allowing  to  heirs  and  widows  of  de- 
ceased persons  compensation  for  death  of  one  on  whom 
they  depend  in  no  way  affects  or  conflicts  with  the  spirit 
or  letter  of  either  the  Federal  or  State  Constitutions. 

"There  is  a  provision  in  the  Statutes  of  the  State  of 
Illinois  which  we  do  not  attempt  to  quote  but  which  allows 
aliens  to  acquire  and  hold  personal  property,  the  same  as 
natural  born  citizens,  and  that  casts  the  title  to  personal 
property  of  dying  aliens  upon  their  heirs,  the  same  as 
natural  born  citizens. 

"We  desire  to  quote  from  an  opinion  of  the  Judicial 
Committee  of  the  Privy  Council  of  the  Province  of  Brit- 
ish Columbia,  reported  in  Butterworth's  Compensation 
Cases,  Volume  5,  Canadian  Section,  page  728,  the  follow- 
ing: 

'Can  the  applicant,  who  is  the  legal  representative 
of  the  deceased  workman,  and  who  is  a  resident  in  the 
province  of  British  Columbia,  obtain  compensation  under 
the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act,  dependent  of  the  de- 
ceased being  an  alien  resident  in  a  foreign  country  at  the 
time  of  the  accident,  out  of  which  the  claim  for  compensa- 
tion arose,  and  ever  since  f 

'  This  question  was  answered  by  the  trial  court  in  the 
affirmative,  and  upon  an  appeal  to  the  Court  of  Appeals 


218  EMPLOYEE 

of  British  Columbia  was  reversed,  and  on  appeal  from 
the  decision  of  the  Court  of  Appeals  to  the  Privy  Council, 
the  opinion  of  the  Court  of  Appeals  was  reversed  and  the 
opinion  of  the  trial  court,  sustaining  the  contention  that 
compensation  could  be  paid  to  an  alien  beneficiary,  was 
sustained. ' 

"We,  therefore,  do  not  find  any  substantial  authority 
or  reason  for  the  position  of  the  respondent  in  this  case 
on  this  phase  of  the  case. 

"Therefore,  the  Board  finds  that  an  alien  non-resi- 
dent beneficiary  of  a  person  who  met  his  death  because  of 
an  injury  that  arose  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  his  em- 
ployment, under  the  terms  and  provisions  of  the  Work- 
men's Compensation  Act  of  Illinois,  is  entitled  to  com- 
pensation the  same  as  if  she  were  an  actual  citizen  and 
resided  in  the  state  of  Illinois." 

Bishop  v  Iroquois  Iron  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  762,  p.  108. 

Aliens< — Diversity  of  Citizenship: 

Congress  not  having  legislated  on  the  subject  covered 
by  Act,  the  latter  controls,  and  can  not  be  avoided  by  pe- 
tition for  removal  to  Federal  Courts  on  ground  of  diver- 
sity of  citizenship.  (Wash.) 

Stoll  v  Pac.  Coast  S.  S.  Co.,  205  Fed.  169. 

Alien  beneficiaries  held  within  Federal  Employers' 
Liability  Act. 

See:  "Fed.  Eanp.  Liab.  Act— Manual" 


EMPLOYEE  219 

Minor:  Included. 

"Who  are  legally  permitted  to  work  under  the  laws 
of  the  state,  and,  who  for  the  purpose  of  this  Act  shall 
be  considered  the  same  and  have  the  same  power  to  con- 
tract, receive  payments,  and  give  quittances  therefor,  as 
adult  employees." 

Violation  of  Child  Labor  Act  would  seem  to  exclude 
operation  of  this  Act. 

As  to  construction  of  Child  Labor  Act,  see : 

Stafford  v  Republic  Iron  &  Steel  Co.,  238  I1L 

Sup.  371. 
Jefferson  Theater  Program  Co.  v  Crejezuk,  125 

111.  App.  1. 

Struthers  v  People,  116  111.  App.  481. 
People  v  Ewer,  141  N.  Y.  129,  25  L.  E.  A.  794. 
The  common  law  disability  of  minor  to  contract  under 
Act  is  properly  cared  for  by  statute,  and  infancy  is  a  per- 
sonal privilege  which  can  be  taken  advantage  of  by  the 
minor  himself  only. 

Hoey  v  Superior  Laundry  Co.,  N.  J.,  88  Atl.  823. 
Award  to  minor's  guardian. 

Courier  v  Simpson  Construction  Co.,  I.  B.  No. 

21,  p.  5. 

Boyd  v  Pratt,  230  Pac.  371. 
Minor,  when  not  "workman." 

Hillestad  v  Industrial  Ins.  Com.,  80  Wash.  426, 

141  P.  913. 

Minor's  election  to  accept  Act  does  not  bar  right  of 
action  by  parents. 

King  v  Viscoloid  Co.,  219  Mass.  420,  106  N.  E. 

988. 

Notice  to  minor  must  be  given  to  parent  or  guardian. 
Posting  insufficient.  N.  J. 

Troth  v  Millville  Bottle  Works,  N.  J.  Sup.  1031. 


220  EMPLOYEE 

Extra-territorial  effect. 

Contract  of  employment  in  foreign  state. 

Pensabene  v  F.&J.  Auditore  Co.,  140  N.  Y.  Sup. 

266;  138  N.  Y.  S.  947;  78  Misc.  Eep.  538. 

In  re  American  Mut.  Liab.  Ins.  Co.,  215  Mass. 

480, 102  N.  E.  693. 

Stoll  v  Pacific  Coast  S.  S.  Co.,  205  Fed.  169. 
Johnson  v  Nelson,  128  Minn.  158, 150  N.  W.  620. 
American  Radiator  Co.  v  Rogge,  86  N.  J.  L.  436, 

92  Atl.  85. 
Gould's  Case,  215  Mass.  480,  Ann.  Cas.  1914, 

D.  377. 

Post  v  Burger  &  Oohlke,  216  N.  Y.  544. 
Removal  to  U.  S.  court. 

Benton  v  Tietgen  &  Lang  Dry  Dock  Co.,  219  Fed. 

763. 


DAMAGES  221 

§  6  DAMAGES. 

"No  common  law  or  statutory  right  to  recover  dam- 
ages for  injury  or  death  of  employee  covered  by  Act, 
while  engaged  in  the  line  of  his  duty,  available  against 
employer — other  than  compensation  provided  for  by 
Act." 

See:  "Defense" — Safety  Acts,  ante. 
Remedy  is  exclusive. 

Shade  v  Ash  Grove  Cement  Co.,  93  Kan.  257, 139 

Pac.  1193, 144  P.  249. 
Peet  v  Mills,  76  Wash.  437, 136  Pac.  685,  26  A.  & 

E.  Encyc.  L.  621. 
McRoberts  v  National  Zinc  Co.,  93  Kans.  364, 

144  P.  247. 
Meese  v  N.  P.  Ey.,  206  F.  222. 


222  COMPENSATION 

§  7  COMPENSATION. 

"Amount  of  compensation  which  shall  be  paid  for  an 
injury  to  an  employee  resulting  in  death." 

(a)  "If  the  employee  leaves  any  widow,  child  or  chil- 
dren whom  he  was  under  legal  obligation  to  support  at 
time  of  his  injury." 

(b)  "If  employee  leaves  any  widow,  child,  parent, 
grandparent  or  other  lineal  heir,  to  whose  support  he 
had  contributed  within  four  years  previous  to  the  time  of 
his  injury." 

(c)  Collateral  heirs  dependent  upon  earnings  of  de- 
ceased. 

DEPENDENCY. 

Compensation  is  payable  only  to  such  kin  as  prove  de- 
pendency by  legal  obligation  or  contributions. 

Matecny  v  Vierling  Steel  Works,  187  111.  App. 

448. 

Obligation  ceases  on  death  of  beneficiary,  and  this  fact 
is  to  be  considered  in  awarding  lump  sum. 

Id. 
Dependency  must  be  proved. 

Stevenson  v  Illinois  Watch  Case  Co.,  186  111. 

App.  418. 

Dragovich  v  Iroquois  Iron  Co.,  261  111.  Sup.  478. 
Staley  v  Illinois  Central  R.  Co.,  186  111.  Sup.  593. 
'Dependent'  means  for  the  ordinary  necessaries  of 
life  for  a  person  of  that  class  and  position. 

Turner  v  Miller,  3  B.  W.  Comp.  Cas.  305. 
Compensation  may  be  had   although  contributions 
went  into  common  fund  from  which  dependents  received 
support. 

Hodgson  v  West  Stanley  Colliery,  A.  C.  229,  79 

L.  J.,  K.  B.  N.  S.  356. 

Finding  of  dependency,  when  any  evidence  support- 
ing, final. 

Hendricks  v  Seeman  Bros.,  155  N.  Y.  S.  638. 
An  award  to  a  dependent  is  a  vested  right ;  in  case  of 
his  death,  personal  representative  is  entitled  thereto. 

State  ex  rel.  Mundig  v  Ind.  Com.  of  Ohio,  Sup. 

Ct.  1916. 

United  Collieries  Co.  v  Simpson,  Eng.  App.  Cas. 
1909,  383. 


COMPENSATION  223 

Dependency. 

Right  of  survivor  is  independent  of  decedent's  con- 
trol, release  of  latter  being  no  bar. 

Cripp's  case,  216  Mass.  586,  104  N.  E.  565,  Ann. 

Cas.  1915,  B.  828. 
Williams  v  Vauxhall  Colliery  Co.,  (1907)  2  K. 

B.  422. 

Payments  to  decedent  are  not  to  be  deducted  from 
award  to  beneficiary. 

Nichol's  Case,  217  Mass.  3,  104  N.  E.  566,  Ann. 

Cas.  1915,  C.  862. 
Dependency  is  an  issue  of  fact. 

In  re  Gallagher,  219  Mass.  140,  106  N.  E.  558. 
In  re  Nelson,  217  Mass.  467, 105  N.  E.  357. 
In  re  Bentley,  217  Mass.  79, 104  N.  E.  432. 
In  re  Herrick,  217  Mass.  Ill,  104  N.  E.  432. 
Miller  v  Public  Service  Co.,  N.  J.  85,  Atl.  1030. 
Finding  by  commission  that  claimant  is  a  dependent 
on  deceased  is  one  of  fact  and  final. 

Appeal  of  Hotel  Bond  Co.,  89  Conn.  143,  93  Atl. 

245. 
Petrozino  v  American  Mutual  Liability  Co.,  219 

Mass.  498, 107  N.  E.  370. 
In  re  Murphy,  218  Mass.  278,  105  N.  E.  278. 
Widow  living  apart. 

North  Western  Iron  Co.  v  Industrial  Com.,  154 

Wis.  97, 142  N.  W.  271. 
In  re  Fierro's  Case,  Mass.,  Ill  N.  E.  957. 
Mother. 

Krauss  v  Fritz,  N.  J.,  93  Atl.  578. 
Pinel  v  Rapid  Ry.  System,  150  N.  W.  897. 
Father — excluded. 

Dazy  v  Apponaugh  Co.,  R.  I.,  89  Atl.  160. 
Half -br  othe  r — Mass. 

Kelly's  Case,  111  N.  E.  395. 


224  COMPENSATION 

Dependency. 

Blanz  v  Erie  R.  E.  Co.,  85  Atl.  1030. 
Miller  v  Public  Service  Co.,  85  Atl.  1030. 
Dazy  v  Apponaug  Co.,  89  Atl.  160. 
Reardon  v  P.  &  R.  R.  Co.,  N.  J.,  88  Atl.  970. 
Batista  v  West  Jersey  &  R.  Co.,  N.  J.,  88  AtL 

954. 
Northwestern  Iron  Co.  v  Industrial  Com.  of 

Wisconsin,  142  N.  W.  271. 
Coakley  v  Coakley,  Mass.,  102  N.  E.  930. 
Smith  v  National  Sash  &  Door  Co.,  Kans.,  153 

P.  533. 
Miller  v  Riverside  Storage  Co.,  Mich.,  155  N.  W. 

462. 

Finn  v  Detroit  &c  Ry.,  Mich.,  155  N.  W.  721. 
Fairchild  v  Pennsylvania  R.  R.,  155  N.  Y.  S.  751. 
Walz  v  Holbrook,  155  N.  Y.  S.  703. 
Contributions — Receipts  of  express  company  of  re- 
mittances to  foreign  country,  held  establishing  fact  of 
contributions. 

Green  v  Marquette  Cement  Co.,  I.  B.  June  26, 

1915. 
See  Landolina  v  Victor  Chem.  Works,  I.  B.  No. 

908,  p.  92. 
Evidence  held  sufficient. 

Hull  v  Commonwealth  Edison  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  425, 

p.  8. 
At  odd  times  sufficient. 

Salin  v  Sherwin-Williams  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  497,  p. 

13. 
Stimber  v  Sangamon  Coal  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  500,  p. 

18. 
Son,  healthy  adult,  may  recover  as  beneficiary. 

Proulx  v  Hudson  &  Sons,  I.  B.  No.  255,  p.  45. 
The  fact  that  pecuniary  assistance  received  is  much 
less  than  minimum  amount  of  compensation  provided  for, 
does  not  bar  award. 

Appeal  of  Hotel  Bond  Co.,  89  Conn.  143,  93  A. 
245. 


COMPENSATION  225 

Dependency. 

Lord  Shaw : 

* '  My  Lords,  what  is  the  value  of  presumption  in  rela- 
tion to  the  ascertainment  and  settling  of  truth  in  matters 
of  fact  ?  The  legal  value  in  such  a  relation  is  that  it  forms 
a  guide  where  doubt  exists ;  it  assists  elucidation  where 
inferences  might  conflict;  and  it  settles  in  one  direction 
the  balance  of  the  judgment  in  favor  of  the  establishment 
of  truth  which  is  only  dimly  or  partially  ascertained.  But 
where  the  facts  are  ascertained,  where  there  is  no  differ- 
ence as  to  the  inference  which  flows  from  them,  and  where 
the  truth  is  plain  and  proved,  I  am  at  present  at  a  loss  to 
understand  what  is  the  value  or  cogency  or  appropriate- 
ness of  presumption.  And  I  view  with  much  disrelish  the 
idea  that  they  can  be  invoked  for  the  purpose  of  affirm- 
ing that  a  thing  is  true  in  law  which  is  not  true  in  fact. 
The  present  case  appears  to  me  plainly  to  illustrate  this 
position.  To  put  it  in  a  word,  this  wife  did  not  depend 
upon  her  husband 's  earnings. " 

Wife  who  had  for  22  years  clearly  asserted  and  defi- 
nitely maintained  her  complete  independence  of  her  hus- 
band, held  not  a  dependent. 

New  Monckton  Collieries  v  Keeling,  4  B.  W.  C. 
C.  332. 

Contra  Coulthard  v  Consett  Iron  Co.,  8  W. 
C  C  87 

INSTALLMENTS. 

Equal  to  one-half  of  average  earnings — to  be  paid  at 
same  intervals  as  wages. 

Payments  to  be  made  at  employer's  option  to  personal 
representative  or  beneficiaries  in  shares  according  to  dis- 
tributee's respective  dependency. 


226  COMPENSATION— TREATMENT 

§  8  COMPENSATION. 

''Amount  of  compensation  which  shall  be  paid  for  in- 
jury not  resulting  in  death. ' ' 

Employer  to  provide  first  aid,  medical,  surgical  and 
hospital  services.  Not  longer  than  eight  weeks.  Not  to 
exceed  $200. 

When  found  necessary  to  procure  services  of  physi- 
cian other  than  the  one  furnished  by  employer,  extra  al- 
lowance will  be  awarded. 

Cegrelski  v  Lehon  Company,  I.  B.  No.  591,  p.  35. 

Allowance  made  for  services  and  treatment  for  loss 
of  teeth. 

Kandaleto  v  Swift  &  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  495,  p.  24. 

Surgical  operation,  allowance  made  for. 
Quale  v  Hamilton,  I.  B.  No.  587,  p.  6. 

"The  word  'provide'  means  'to  furnish,'  and  in  the 
event  the  employer  fails  to  furnish  such  medical  aid  then 
such  employer  is  liable  to  the  extent  of  the  doctor's  bill, 
within  the  limitation  fixed  in  such  paragraph.  The  em- 
ployee is  responsible  for  medical  bills  only  in  the  event 
that  medical  services  have  been  offered  by  the  employer 
and  rejected  by  the  employee.  However,  the  Board  does 
not  agree  with  the  applicant  as  to  the  amount  of  the  phy- 
sician's bill  in  this  case.  All  bills  for  medical  and  hospi- 
tal services  authorized  under  this  Act  should  be  based  on 
reasonable  and  customary  rates,  and  the  fact  that  the 
bills  are  to  be  paid  by  the  employer  should  not  act  as  an 
incentive  for  physicians  to  make  unreasonable  charges. 
This  Board  will  scrutinize  with  the  same  degree  of  care 
all  medical  bills  in  connection  with  compensation  claims 
under  this  Act,  as  any  and  all  other  fees  and  charges 
thereunder. 

"From  the  testimony  before  the  Board  the  fair  and 
reasonable  charge  for  medical  and  surgical  services  in 
this  case  would  be  about  ninety-six  ($96.00)  dollars." 
Nowitz  v  Colw,  I.  B.  No.  834,  p.  90. 


COMPENSATION— DISFIGUREMENT  227 

(b)  Temporary  total  incapacity. 

(c)  "Any  serious  and  permanent  disfigurement  to  the 
hand,  head  or  face." 

"The  term  'serious  and  permanent  disfigurement ' 
means  disfigurement  that  is  an  actual  disability  and  any 
disfigurement  of  the  head,  hand  or  face  that  in  any  wise 
interferes  with  not  only  a  man's  ability  actually  to  work 
but  makes  his  less  liable  or  able  to  procure  employment 
or  tends  to  make  him  timid  and  less  agressive  with  ref- 
erence to  that  matter  of  certain  employments,  is  serious 
and  permanent  and  actually  disables.  It  is  universally 
known  that  a  man  whose  face,  head  or  hand  are  so  scarred 
as  to  be  repulsive,  will  find  it  difficult  to  procure  a  job, 
where  he  is  required  to  come  into  contact  with  the  public 
in  the  performance  of  his  duties.  It  is  also  a  well  known 
fact  that  one  who  is  conscious  of  the  fact  that  he  can  not 
make  a  reasonably  good  appearance  or  that  is  in  any  wise 
marked  or  disfigured,  becomes  less  aggressive  and  less 
liable  to  procure  work  in  many  of  the  well  known  lines  of 
employment.  The  fact  that  this  claimant  is  obtaining 
practically  the  same  wages  as  before  is  not  material,  as 
we  believe,  in  this  case. ' ' 

Sturma  v  Geneal  Chemical  Co.,  I.  B.  Oct.  29, 
1915. 

"The  test  is  not  whether  claimant's  earning  capacity 
in  the  employment  in  which  he  was  engaged  at  the  time 
of  the  accident  and  disfigurement  is  less,  but  whether  the 
latter  would  affect  his  earnings  or  ability  to  acquire  a 
job  in  some  other  line  of  employment." 

Hrusovsky  v  Horwein  &  Co.,  I.  B.  June  10, 1915. 
See  Meesis  v  United  Sanitary  Dairy  Co.,  I.  B. 

No.  209,  p.  78. 
Waiters  v  KroeUer  Co.,  187  111.  App.  548. 


228  COMPENSATION— DISFIGUREMENT 

Disfigurement  by  loss  of  tips  of  two  fingers  warrants 
award. 

Stevenson  v  Illinois  Watch  Case  Co.,  186  I1L 

App.  418. 

Disfigurement  of  hand,  although  not  affecting  earn- 
ings, warrants  recovery. 

Waiters  v  P.  E.  Kroehler  Mfg.  Co.,  187  HI.  App. 

548. 

Loss  of  two  teeth  which  have  been  replaced  by  em- 
ployer does  not  warrant  compensation. 

Kandaleto  v  Swift  &  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  495,  p.  24. 
"To  entitle  one  to  compensation  for  disfigurement, 
the  disfigurement  must  be  of  such  a  serious  and  perma- 
nent character  as  either  directly  or  indirectly  to  impair 
the  earning  capacity  or  ability  to  acquire  work  in  the  la- 
bor markets  of  the  world. 

"The  disfigurement  to  sound  in  compensation  must 
affect  the  earning  capacity  of  the  employee  in  the  labor 
markets  of  the  world  and  not  alone  in  the  employment  in 
which  he  was  engaged. " 

Billman  v  Two  Rivers  Coal  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  753,  p. 

69. 

"A  scar  on  side  of  head  about  three-quarters  of  an 
inch  wide,  is  such  disfigurement  as  to  affect  earning  ca- 
pacity as  it  makes  less  aggressive  and  more  timid. 

"Disfigurement,  to  entitle  applicant  to  compensation, 
must  in  reality  disfigure  to  the  extent  that  it  will  inter- 
fere with  his  obtaining  employment." 

Harpestad  v  Alexander,  I.  B.  No.  503,  p.  14. 
"The  loss  of  a  tooth  that  has  been  replaced  by  a  gold 
crown  does  not  constitute  a  disfigurement  of  the  face  un- 
der Act." 

Niemark  v  West  Coast  Roofing  Co.,  I.  B.  No. 
639,  p.  56. 


COMPENSATION  229 

( d)  *  *  Partially  incapacitated. ' ' 

Injury  includes  any  injury  or  disease  causing  inca- 
pacity for  work  or  impairing  ability  to  earn  wages. 

Johnson  v  London  Guar.  Co.,  217  Mass.  388, 104 

N.  E.  735. 
Disability — capacity  in  other  employment — rule. 

Mellen  Lumber  Co.  v  Industrial  Com.  of  Wis., 
154  Wis.  114,  142  N.  W.  187. 


230  COMPENSATION— FINGER 

( e )  * '  Injuries  in  schedule : ' ' 

Loss  of  thumb — fingers — or  the  permanent  and  com- 
plete loss  of  use — phalange. 

Waiters  v  KroeUer  Mfg.  Co.,  187  111.  App.  548. 
"In  order  that  there  might  be  uniform  ruling,  the 
Board  has  held  that  the  loss  of  a  part  of  the  bone  of  any 
given  phalange  constitutes  the  loss  of  that  phalange,  and 
that  the  loss  of  more  than  one  phalange  constitutes  the 
loss  of  the  finger. " 

Winters  v  Quedriga  Mfg.  Co.,  I.  B.  June  23, 

1915. 

Reading  v  Charvat,  I.  B.  June  28, 1915. 
"It  is  possibly  true  that  were  applicant  to  grip  noth- 
ing but  large  objects,  that  would  not  necessitate  the  flex- 
ion of  the  fingers  to  any  great  degree,  that  finger  would 
be  of  considerable  assistance  to  him.  However,  the  Board 
is  of  opinion  that  a  fair  test  of  what  use  a  given  function 
is  to  a  man  is  the  amount  of  use  he  is  able  to  get  from  that 
function  in  the  line  of  work  he  is  following  at  the  time  of 
the  accident.  This  man  is  a  structural  iron  worker,  and 
for  the  purposes  of  that  employment  the  man  has  suffered 
a  total  and  complete  loss  of  its  use. 

"His  wages  being  $29.92  per  week,  the  award  for  per- 
manent and  complete  loss  will  be  $12.00  for  35  weeks. ' ' 
Moffett  v  Thompson  Starr et  Co.,  I.  B.  July  14, 
1915. 


COMPENSATION— FINGER  231 

' '  The  loss  of  a  part  of  the  bone  of  any  phalange  con- 
stitutes the  loss  of  that  phalange  for  the  purpose  of  the 
Workmen's  Compensation  Act." 

Palmer  v  Scheidenheim,  I.  B.  No.  900,  p.  135. 
"The  loss  of  the  first,  second,  third  and  fourth  fingers 
of  a  right  hand  with  palm  and  thumb  remaining  intact 
constitutes  a  permanent  and  complete  loss  of  the  hand  un- 
der paragraph  (e),  section  8." 

Swickard  v  Arrow  Motor  Cartage  Co.,  I.  B.  No. 

1351,  p.  179. 

"Considering  the  matter  carefully  in  conference,  the 
Board  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  loss  of  any  part  of  the 
bone  of  the  phalange  of  any  finger,  thumb,  or  toe,  under 
the  terms  and  provisions  of  the  Act,  is  the  loss  of  such 
phalange,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  no  specific  pro- 
vision is  made  concerning  the  same.  This  contention,  the 
Board  thinks,  is  consistent  for  the  reason,  first,  that  the 
whole  spirit,  intent  and  nature  of  the  Act  make  provi- 
sions for  the  payment  of  compensation;  second,  because 
any  injury  that  results  in  the  loss  of  any  part  of  the  bone 
of  the  first  phalange  of  the  fingers,  toes,  or  thumbs,  must, 
of  necessity,  affect  one's  earning  capacity." 

Thompson  v  Van  Cleave,  I.  B.  No.  894,  p.  107. 
"The  Act  provides  that  the  loss  of  more  than  one 
phalange  shall  be  considered  as  the  loss  of  the  entire  fin- 
ger, and  logically,  the  loss  of  less  than  one  phalange  shall 
be  considered  as  the  loss  of  one-half  of  such  finger." 

Rosmieski  v  Victor  Mfg.  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  198,  p. 
33. 


232  COMPENSATION— FINGERS 

Fingers — injury  to — see : 

Rozmierski  v  Victor  Mfg.  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  198,  p. 

33. 
Klein  v  Johnson  &  Sons  Furn.  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  357, 

p.  85. 
McClennan  v  Allith  Prouty  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  436,  p. 

116. 
Di  Orazia  v  Novelty  Candy  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  590,  p. 

36. 

Brosi  v  Woelfel  Leather  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  699,  p.  50. 
Pulford  v  Packard  Motor  Car  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  901, 

p.  86. 
Finger : 

Fortino  v  Merchants'  Disp.  Transp.  Co.,  156  N. 

Y.  S.  262. 

The  loss  of  more  than  one  phalange  of  a  finger  or  toe 
is  equivalent  to  the  loss  of  the  entire  member. 

McClennan  v  Allith  Prouty  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  436,  p. 

116. 

See  Helme  v  Middlesex,  C.  P.,  84  N.  J.  L.  531. 
Banister  Co.  v  Kriger  (N.  J.)  85  A.  1027. 
Nitram  Co.  v  Creagh,  (N.  J.)  86  A.  435. 
In  re  Ethier,  217  Mass.  511,  105  N.  E.  76. 
Combined  award  for  total  and  partial  disability  from 
crushing  of  finger,  allowed. 

Nitram  Co.  v  Creagh,  N.  Y.,  86  Atl.  435. 

See  Helm  v  Middlesex,  Common  Pleas,  87  Atl. 

72. 
Mellen  Lumber  Co.  v  Industrial  Com.  of  Wis., 

142  N.  W.  187. 

Banister  Co.  v  Kriger,  N.  J.,  85  Atl.  1027. 
In  re  Meley,  219  Mass.  136, 106  N.  E.  559. 


COMPENSATION  233 

Loss  of  a  great  toe — one  toe — phalange. 

Walford  v  Pape  &  Loose,  I.  B.  No.  471,  p.  59. 
Loss  of  a  hand  or  the  permanent  and  complete  loss  of 
its  use. 

Holt  v  Wood  Brothers,  I.  B.  No.  512,  p.  10. 
Loss  of  an  arm  or  the  permanent  and  complete  loss  of 
its  use. 

Giachas  v  Cable  Co.,  190  111.  App.  285. 
Chatty  v  Wiener,  I.  B.  No.  700,  p.  49. 
Schuster  v  Schnackenberg,  I.  B.  No.  299,  p.  40. 
Injury  to  shoulder. 

Bostedo  v  The  Fair,  I.  B.  No.  506,  p.  15. 
Chatty  v  Wiener,  I.  B.  No.  700,  p.  49. 
Loss  of  a  foot  or  the  permanent  and  complete  loss  of 
its  use. 

Loss  of  a  leg  or  the  permanent  and  complete  loss  of 
its  use. 

"It  is  reasonably  certain  that  a  man  who  is  injured 
and  is  left  with  a  crooked  and  permanently  abnormal  leg 
has  been  seriously  injured  in  his  earning  capacity  even 
for  day  labor.  The  Board  is  of  opinion  that  claimant  has 
been  injured  to  the  extent  of  fifty  per  cent  of  his  earning 
capacity.  However,  so  long  as  the  claimant  remains  in 
the  employ  of  respondent,  he  is  entitled  to  only  one  half 
the  difference  of  his  former  and  present  wages,  or  37% 
cents  a  day.  For  the  balance  of  the  416  weeks  he  would 
be  entitled  to  $3.93  a  week,  which  would  equal  one-half 
the  difference  between  what  he  did  and  what  he  can  earn 
after  the  injury. 

Waters  v  Kewanee  Boiler  Co.,  I.  B.  April  10, 

1915. 
See  Burgnon  v  Edgewater  Coal  Co.,  I.  B.  No. 

582,  p.  86. 
Mustaccio  v  Simpson  Construction  Co.,  I.  B.  No. 

273,  p.  60. 

Judgment  allowing  more  for  a  stiffened  ankle  than 
schedule  allowance  for  amputation  between  knee  and 
ankle,  reversed. 

Rakiec  v  Del.  Lack.  &c  R.  R.,  N.  J.,  88  Atl.  953. 


234  COMPENSATION— SIGHT 

"Loss  of  the  sight  of  an  eye." 

Forrest  v  Roper  Furniture  Co.,  187  111.  App.  504. 
"Where,  as  a  result  of  an  injury,  an  employee  lost 
fifty  per  cent  vision  in  one  eye  and  his  earning  capacity 
is  thereby  impaired,  he  is  entitled  to  one-fourth  of  his 
average  weekly  wages,  the  same  being  based  upon  one- 
fourth  loss  of  vision,  the  injury  as  a  matter  of  law  hav- 
ing affected  his  earning  capacity  to  that  extent." 

CsuprinsJci  v  Mechanical  Mfg.  Co.,  I.  B.  No. 

557-A,  p.  105. 

See  Simple  v  Bishop,  I.  B.  No.  487,  p.  19. 
Beauregard  v  Tichener  &  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  69,  p.  8. 
Pavich  v  Illinois  Bridge  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  595,  p.  16. 
Kinstanski  v  Illinois  Steel  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  702,  p. 

127. 

Moeller  v  Bereda  Mfg.  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  175,  p.  66. 
Feldman  v  Braunstein,  93  Atl.  679. 
In  re  Brauconnier,  Mass.,  Ill  N.  E.  792. 
Infectious  disease  of  eye. 

McCoy  v  Michigan  Screw  Co.,  147  N.  W.  572. 
Cline  v  Studebaker  Corp.,  Mich.,  155  N.  W.  519. 
Evidence  held  sufficient  to  show  injury  as  charged  re- 
sulting in  loss  of  sight  because  of  weakened  condition  of 
eye  from  previous  accident,  reducing  damages. 

Forrest  v  Roper  Furn.  Co.,  187  HI.  App.  504. 


COMPENSATION  235 

Loss  of  both  hands — arms — feet — legs — eyes — or  any 
two  thereof — to  constitute  total  and  permanent  disability. 
"We  take  it  that  the  statute  must  be  for  those  pur- 
poses liberally  construed.  That  seems  to  be  the  purpose 
and  intent  and  policy  declared  in  the  Act.  In  determin- 
ing what  incapacity  means,  it  would  seem  the  policy  of 
the  Act  means  nothing  more  nor  less  than  incapacity  for 
following  some  ordinary  employment  in  the  ordinary  way. 
A  man  who  has  lost  one  eye  and  can  see  no  more  out  of 
the  other  than  the  evidence  discloses  this  man  can  see, 
for  all  practical  purposes  is  wholly  and  permanently  in- 
capacitated for  work." 

Mielke  v  Burge  Machine  Co.,  I.  B.  July  2, 1915. 
(f )  Complete  disability  which  renders  wholly  and  per- 
manently incapable  of  work. 
Injury  to  brain. 

Kerens  v  Donnewald  Coal  Co.,  271  111.  Sup.  124. 
'  *  The  question  as  to  whether  or  not  injured  employee 
had  a  predisposition  to  hernia,  or  a  weakness  toward  her- 
nia, is  not  material,  when  an  accident  occurs  which  brings 
forth  a  protrusion  of  the  intestines  and  causes  disability. 
It  is  an  accident  within  the  meaning  and  scope  of  Act." 

Fobes  v  Killeen,  I.  B.  No.  600,  p.  68. 
"Notwithstanding  an  employee  may  have  a  predis- 
position of  hernia,  and  even  a  slight,  or  latent  hernia,  a 
serious  hernia  brought  on  while  in  the  course  of  and  oc- 
curring during  his  employment  is  an  'accident'  within 
the  meaning  of  Act. ' ' 

Hasenstole  v  Chicago  House  Wrecking  Co.,  I.  B. 

No.  551,  p.  62. 
Hernia. 

DombJcowski  v  Squire  Dingee  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  608, 
p.  51. 

Mike  v  Sullivan-Daly  Construction  Co.,  I.  B.  No. 
654,  p.  31. 


236  COMPENSATION— DISABILITY 

Sciatica. 

Isidora  v  Rockford  Gas  Light  &  Coke  Co.,  L  B. 

No.  555,  p.  42. 
Hydrocele. 

Jasimski  v  Armour  &  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  594,  p.  34. 
Epilepsy. 

Talaczuski  v  \Armour  &  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  165,  p.  48. 
Septicemia — Blood  poisoning. 

Proulx  v  Hudson  &  Sons,  I.  B.  No.  255,  p.  45. 
Nervons  shock. 

Isidora  v  Rockford  Gas  Light  &  Coke  Co.,  I.  B. 

No.  555,  p.  42. 
Injury  to  head. 

Golbash  v  Burns  Lumber  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  692,  p.  77. 
Scott  v  Scully  Steel  &  Iron  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  711,  p. 

89. 
Impairment  of  health  is  personal  injury. 

Hurle's  case,  217  Mass.  223, 104  N.  E.  336,  Ann. 

Cas.  1915,  C.  919. 

Loss  of  vision — optic  neuritis  from  coal  tar  gas,  in- 
cluded. 

Hurle's  case,  217  Mass.  223, 104  N.  E.  336,  Ann. 

Cas.  1915,  C.  919. 

Over-exertion — aggravating  heart  disease  and  lead- 
ing to  death — injury  suffered  in  course  of  employment. 
In  re  Brightman,  220  Mass.  7, 107  N.  E.  527. 
In  re  Fisher,  220  Mass.  581, 108  N.  E.  361. 
Over-exertion — apoplexy — included.     ( England. ) 

Barnabas  v  Bersham  Colliery,  4  B.  W.  C.  C.  119. 
Lunacy — caused  by  injury  and  causing  suicide,  in- 
cluded. 

In  re  Sponatski,  220  Mass.  526, 108  N.  E.  466. 
Neurotic  state — which  employee  might  have  thrown 
offWincluded. 

In  re  Hunnewell,  220  Mass.  351, 107  N.  E.  934. 
Hemorrhage — from  pushing  post  against  furrowing 
machine — included. 

Voorhees  v  Smith  &  Co.,  86  N.  J.  L.  500,  92  Atl. 
280. 


COMPENSATION— DISABILITY  237 

Nervous  shock. 

Yates  v  South  Kirby  Colliers,  3  B.  W.  C.  C. 

418. 
Eaves  v  Blaenclydath  Colliery  Co.,  100  L.  T. 

747,  2  B.  W.  C.  C.  329. 
Poison. 

Higgins  v  Campbell,  1904, 1  K.  B.  328. 
Frost  bites. 

Morgan  v  Couchman,  1911, 1  K.  B.  351,  4  B.  W. 

C.  C.  32. 
Sunstroke. 

Morgan  v  Zenaida,  1909,  25  T.  L.  E.  446,  2  B.  W. 

C.  C.  19. 
Lightning  stroke. 

Andrews  v  Failsworth  Ind.  Soc.,  1904,  90  L.  T. 

7611. 
Gases  inhaled. 

Broderick  v  London  Council,  1908,  2  K.  B.  807. 
Strain  and  rupture. 

Timmins  v  Leeds  Forge  Co.,  16  T.  L.  E.  520. 
Paralysis. 

Frey  v  Kerens-Donnewald  Coal  Co.,  110  N.  E. 

824. 
Gonorrhea. 

Cline  v  Studebaker  Corp.,  Mich.,  155  N.  W.  519. 
Fracture — leading  to  bed  sore,  causing  blood  poison- 
ing and  death — injury  was  proximate  cause. 

In  re  Burns,  218  Mass.  8, 105  N.  E.  601. 
Failing  physical  powers,  independent  of  accident,  not 
bar  to  compensation. 

Duprey  v  Maryland  Casualty  Co.,  219  Mass.  189, 

106  N.  E.  686. 
Weak  heart. 

In  re  Madden,  Mass.,  Ill  N.  E.  379. 
Test  of  total  disability — work  of  same  character. 

Mellen  Lumber  Co.  v  Ind.  Com.  of  Wis.,  154 
Wis.  114. 


238  COMPENSATION 

(g)  In  case  death  occurs  before  total  payments  equal 
death  benefit — difference  to  be  paid  to  heirs  entitled  to 
compensation. 

"Another  contention  of  the  respondent  is  that  from 
the  title  of  the  Act,  and  f roan  the  wording  of  certain  sec- 
tions thereof  by  the  terms  'injury  to  employees  re- 
sulting in  death '  and  'injury  not  resulting  in  death,'  etc., 
the  legislature  intended  the  payment  of  compensation  in 
death  cases  only  where  the  death  was  the  immediate  re- 
sult of  the  injury  and  not  in  cases  where  death  resulted 
from  the  injury. 

"We  are  of  the  opinion  that  these  contentions  in  no 
wise  or  sense  limit  the  general  doctrine  of  compensation. 
If  the  use  of  these  words  do  so  limit  the  application  of  the 
doctrine  then  the  whole  theory  of  compensation  is  wrong. 
There  is  no  reason  why  dependents  of  one  who  meets 
death  at  the  time  of  the  injury  should  be  paid  compensa- 
tion and  the  dependents  of  one  who  dies  as  the  result  of 
injuries  should  not  be  paid  compensation.  If  our  com- 
pensation law  imeans  this,  it  is  unreasonable  and  the 
courts  will  not  permit  it  to  stand.  The  words  'injury  re- 
sulting in  death'  merely  mean  death  at  any  time  as  the 
result  of  such  injury.  In  other  words,  if  death  resulted 
at  all  from  the  injury,  the  limit  of  time  in  no  way  affects 
the  right  of  dependents  to  compensation;  and  we  do  not 
believe  that  the  legislature  so  intended  or  that  the  act  is 
susceptible  to  any  such  construction." 

Bishop  v  Iroquois  Iron  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  762.  p.  108. 

(h)  Compensation  in  no  event  to  exceed  50  per  centum 
of  average  weekly  wage  or  $12  per  week  in  amount. 


COMPENSATION— LUMP  SUM  239 

§  9  LUMP  SUM  PAYMENT. 

Provision  for  petition  for  lump  sum  is  complete  in  it- 
self, independent  of  Practice  Act. 

Staley  v  111.  Central  Ey.  Co.,  186  111.  App.  593. 
Lump  sum  awarded  to  mother,  58  years  of  age  and  an 
invalid,  who  might  not  live  during  the  period  of  install- 
ments, set  aside. 

Matecny  v  Vierling  Steel  Works,  187  111.  App. 

448. 

Petition  for  lump  sum — when  proceeding  under  sec- 
tion 10  not  necessary. 

Staley  v  Illinois  Central  Ey.,  186  111.  App.  593. 
See  New  York  Ship  Building  Co.  v  Buchanan, 

87  Atl.  86. 

Long  v  Bergen  County  Court,  86  Atl.  529. 
Finding  must  state  method  of  computing  and  reasons. 

N.  J. 

Mackett  v  Ashton,  84  N.  J.  L.  452,  90  A.  127. 
Bailey  v  U.  S.  Fidelity  &  G.  Co.,  155  N.  W.  237. 


240  COMPUTATION 

§  10  COMPUTATION. 

Basis  for  computing  compensation. 

(a)  Annual  earnings — if  in  employment  of  same  em- 
ployer continuously  during  year  next  preceding  injury. 

(b)  Employment  by  same  employer  to  mean  in  grade 
at  time  of  accident — uninterrupted  by  unavoidable  ab- 
sence. 

(c)  Annual  earnings  of  persons  of  same  class. 

(d)  300  times  average  daily  earnings. 

(e)  Number  of  actual  working  days. 

"The  fallacy  consists  in  regarding  these  statutory 
awards  for  permanent  injury  payments  for '  the  em- 
ployee 's  time  as  though  the  disability  were  temporary 
only,  whereas  they  are  in  reality  a  statutory  method  of 
ascertaining  the  damages  by  a  specified  multiple  of  the 
weekly  wage,  payable  normally  in  weekly  installments, 
and  reduced  to  present  value  if  commuted  to  a  lump 
sum." 

Helme  v  Middlesex,  87  Atl.  72. 

"Average  weekly  earnings"  do  not  restrict  right  of 
dependent  on  length  of  service,  and  employment  by  the 
day  is  within  English  Act. 

Leonard  v  Baird,  3  Sc.  Sess.  Gas.  5th  Ser.  890. 

Where  plaintiff,  a  single  man,  23  years  of  age,  whose 
annual  earnings  amounted  to  $509.95,  was  injured,  so  that 
his  right  arm  was  amputated  two-thirds  of  the  way  from 
the  elbow  to  the  wrist,  and  a  subsequent  amputation  be- 
came necessary  from  blood  poisoning,  he  being  totally  in- 
capacitated for  six  months— in  action  for  recovery  un- 
der clauses  (b)  and  (d),  the  time  on  which  to  compute  re- 
covery being  7y2  years,  and  half  of  the  amount  which 
would  have  been  earned  on  that  basis  being  $1,912.26,  a 
finding  of  the  court  for  $1,749.90 — amount  reached  by  de- 
ducting probable  earnings  in  some  suitable  employment 
in  that  period  and  adding  amount  due  under  clause  (b) 
and  probable  doctors '  fees  of  $225 — will  not  be  disturbed 
on  appeal. 

Giachas  v  Cable  Co.,  190  111.  App.  285. 


COMPUTATION  241 

"It  is  not  a  question  of  just  what  was  being  paid  at 
the  time  of  the  injury,  but  compensation  must  be  based 
upon  the  scale  paid  in  the  grade  of  work  he  was  actually 
doing.  The  minimum  wages  paid  for  erecting  engineers 
was  $21  per  week,  and  we  are  therefore  disposed  to  be- 
lieve that  compensation  should  be  paid  upon  the  basis  of 
the  earnings  of  $21  per  week." 

Metke  v  Surge  Machine  Works,  I.  B.  July  2, 

1915. 
Where  employment  is  irregular. 

GUlen  v  Ocean  Accident  Co.,  Mass.,  102  N.  E. 

346. 

Offer  of  employment  by  employer,  pending  litigation, 
has  little  weight  on  question  of  future  earnings. 
Qiachas  v  Cable  Co.,  190  111.  App.  285. 
Finding  of  trial  court  as  to  amount  of  probable  future 
earnings,  which  is  matter  of  conjecture,  will  ordinarily 
not  be  disturbed  on  appeal. 

Qiachas  v  Cable  Co.,  190  111.  App.  285. 
Tips  included. 

Penn  v  Spiers,  1  K,  B.  766. 

"The  mere  fact  that  an  employer  gives  an  employee 
employment  after  an  injury  is  not  binding  or  conclusive 
as  to  the  character  of  the  earning  capacity  of  the  em- 
ployee.'* 

Waters  v  Kewanee  Boiler  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  736,  p. 

169. 

Where  an  instructress, "employed  by  the  city,  draw- 
ing a  salary  of  $60.00  per  month,  has  not  worked  a 
full  year,  the  presumption  is  that  persons  doing  the  same 
work  who  worked  by  the  year  received  the  same  wages 
per  month  that  she  received. 

Shannessy  v  City  of  Chicago,  I.  B.  No.  884,  p. 
160. 


242  COMPUTATION 

"If  no  amount  is  payable  under  paragraph  (a)  or  (b) 
of  this  section  and  the  employee  leaves  collateral  heirs 
dependent  at  the  time  of  the  injury  to  the  employee  upon 
his  earnings,  such  a  percentage  of  the  sum  provided  in 
paragraph  (a)  of  this  section  as  the  average  annual  con- 
tributions which  the  deceased  made  to  the  support  of  such 
collateral  dependent  heirs  during  the  two  years  preceding 
the  injury  bear  to  his  earnings  during  such  two  years." 
In  this  case,  from  the  best  estimate  the  Board  can 
make  from  the  evidence,  the  deceased  earned  four  hun- 
dred ($400.00)  dollars  a  year.  His  annual  contributions 
to  the  sister  were  three  hundred  and  twelve  ($312.00) 
dollars.  Under  this  section,  the  average  annual  contri- 
butions being  three  hundred  twelve  ($312.00)  dollars,  and 
the  earnings  for  the  two  years  being  eight  hun- 
dred ($800.00)  dollars,  and  the  amount  earned  ac- 
cording to  the  terms  of  the  paragraph  referred 
to  in  the  above  section  being  sixteen  hundred 
($1,600.00)  dollars,  the  collateral  heir,  the  sister,  is 
entitled  to  312-800  of  $1,600,  or  six  hundred  twenty-four 
($624.00)  dollars.  This  computation  is  put  upon  the  ba- 
sis that  the  terms  "such  a  percentage  of  the  sum  pro- 
vided in  paragraph  (a)  of  this  section  as  the  average  an- 
nual contributions  which  the  deceased  made,"  etc.,  mean 
nothing  more  nor  less  than  the  contributions  for  one  year. 
("Average  annual  contributions"  means  the  contribu- 
tions for  one  year,  as  they  may  be  averaged. )  Hence,  the 
above  computation. 

Swing  v  Wittenberg  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  933,  p.  100. 
Double  compensation  not  allowed. 

Kcmdalets  v  Swift  &  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  496,  p.  24. 
That  applicant  returned  to  work  immediately  after 
the  accident  and  received  the  same  compensation  as  be- 
fore, is  not  a  test  of  disability.  The  test  is  not  what  an 
employer  gives  a  man  to  do  after  an  injury,  but  what  he 
is  able  to  do  in  the  same  or  some  other  suitable  employ- 
ment after  the  accident.  Disability  continued  although 
no  compensation  was  due  because  applicant  received  his 
regular  wages  during  that  period. 

Flackeriberg  v  Chicago  Nipple  Mfg.  Co.,  I.  B. 
Oct.  15, 1915. 


PROCEDURE  243 

§  12  EXAMINATION. 

Claimant  to  submit  to  examination  by  medical  prac- 
titioner or  surgeon,  selected  by  employer. 

See  p.  244. 

§§  13-14  INDUSTRIAL  BOARD. 

Creation — Appointment — Term  of  office — Salary. 

§  15  JURISDICTION. 

Operation  and  administration  of  Act. 
See  p.  250. 

§  16  PROCEDURE. 

Rules  and  orders — Prima  facie  valid — Administration 
of  oaths — Subpoena — Examination  of  witness* — Trans- 
cript of  testimony. 

Hearsay  evidence — award  may  be  made  on. 

Carroll  v  Knickerbocker  Ice  Co.,  155  N.  Y.  S.  1. 
Fixing  of  fees. 
Physicians'  and  nurses'  fees — Fixing  fair  value. 

City  of  Milwaukee  v  Miller,  154  Wis.  652, 144  N. 

W.  188. 
Attorney's  fee.    Board  will  not  allow. 

Cegreiski  v  Lehon  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  591,  p.  35. 

§  17  RECORD. 

Blank  forms — Record  of  notices  of  declinations  and 
withdrawals — Of  proceedings  and  awards. 


244  EXAMINATION 

§  18  DETERMINATION. 

Board  to  determine  all  questions  arising  under  Act. 

(c)  Examination  by  physician  of  Board. 

"In  this  case  there  was  a  great  deal  of  medical  testi- 
mony concerning  the  effects  of  an  injury  on  the  general 
physical  condition  of  the  claimant  and  upon  the  possibil- 
ity of  the  accident  which  he  received  producing  such  a 
shock  to  the  nerves  as  would  cause  a  permanent 
and  serious  condition,  or  even  the  condition  he  is  com- 
plaining of.  Some  physicians  testified  concerning  the 
results  of  the  examination  of  the  urine;  the  appear- 
ance and  physiological  conditions  indicating  other  dis- 
eases; the  effect  of  injury,  age,  general  health,  etc.,  as 
tending  to  depreciate  his  earning  capacity,  etc. 

"It  seems  that  the  claimant,  a  carpenter,  in  the  course 
of  his  employment,  fell  about  eight  or  ten  feet  upon  a 
hard  substance  injuring  his  neck  and  back  and,  as  he 
claims,  generally  affecting  his  nervous  system,  strength 
and  health. 

'  '  The  Board  has  given  careful  attention  to  all  the  tes- 
timony of  the  physicians,  both  from  their  personal  exam- 
inations and  as  experts.  Such  testimony  is  to  this  Board 
deceptive.  In  this  case  two  doctors,  who  testified  appar- 
ently perfectly  candidly,  stated,  from  their  personal  ex- 
aminations, they  were  certain  that  bones  of  the  vertebrae 
of  the  n'eck  were  broken  or  dislocated.  Other  doctors  say 
that  there  is  no  such  condition.  So  this  Board  did  not 
get  any  substantial  help  from  the  testimony  of  the  ex- 
perts, or  the  physicians  herein ;  therefore,  passes  by  with- 
out further  comment,  to  other  facts  which  apparently 
seem  to  control.  The  claimant  was  injured,  without  ref- 
erence to  the  medical  testimony;  he  insists  he  has  not 
been  able  to  work,  and  has  not  worked.  He  received 
twenty-four  ($24.00)  dollars  a  week  as  wages.  The  acci- 
dent occurred  in  the  course  of  the  employment. 


EXAMINATION  245 

"There  is  no  testimony  upon  which  this  Board  can 
base  any  findings,  intelligent  or  otherwise,  what  the 
difference  in  the  wages  of  the  injured  employee  was  be- 
fore the  injury  and  what  he  could  earn  since.  From  the 
above  facts,  the  Board  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  evidence 
preponderates  in  favor  of  the  claimant;  that  he  is  yet 
suffering  from  the  injury ;  and  inasmuch  as  there  are  no 
other  facts  to  determine  whether  or  not  this  is  a  tem- 
porary or  permanent,  partial,  or  total,  disability,  the 
Board  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  disability  in  some  form 
continues  to  exist. ' ' 

Daniels  on  v  Waful  &  Deuchler  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  930, 
p.  109. 


246  EXAMINATION 

"We  are  also  constrained  to  advise  you  that  it  is  an 
nncontroverted  fact  that  one  of  the  most  serious  diffi- 
culties to  be  confronted  in  the  disposition  of  compensa- 
tion questions  must  necessarily  be  determined  upon  the 
testimony  of  physicians.  So  long  as  the  respective  parties 
to  contests,  arising  out  of  an  industrial  accident,  are  per- 
mitted to  bring  before  the  Board  physicians  who  make 
examinations  for  the  specific  purpose  of  testifying  at 
the  instance  of  such  party,  will  there  be  difficulty  in  a 
satisfactory  adjustment  thereof.  Notwithstanding  the 
fact  that  physicians  and  surgeons  must  acquire  a  great 
amount  of  knowledge  and  a  high  degree  of  skill  in  their 
profession,  the  intricacies  of  the  human  system,  the  ills 
to  which  it  is  susceptible  and  the  effects  of  an  injury  that 
come  to  one  at  the  various  stages  in  life,  make  it  well 
nigh  impossible  for  them  to  testify  with  any  degree  of 
accuracy  in  the  majority  of  cases.  This  is  especially  true 
where  physicians  testify  solely  as  experts,  and  are  not 
personally  familiar  with  the  manner  of  injury  and  the 
process  of  recovery.  This  makes  it  especially  difficult 
to  reach  satisfactory  conclusions  oftentimes  in  the  most 
serious  kinds  of  injury.  However,  not  alone  are  we  con- 
cerned with  difficulties  that  come  from  an  honest  inability 
to  be  correctly  advised  concerning  these  serious  and 
apparently  unsolvable  questions,  but  much  might  be  said 
concerning  a  partisanship  in  the  appointment  of  arbitra- 
tors, such  as  referred  to  herein,  not  infrequently  being 
detected  in  this  class  of  testimony.  Because  of  these 
things,  in  the  judgment  of  this  Board,  if  only  expert  tes- 
timony concerning  the  nature,  character  and  extent  of  an 
injury,  etc.,  were  admissible,  and  such  experts  were  se- 
lected by  the  Board  from  sources  publicly  known  to  be 
disinterested  and  of  better  than  the  average  known  skill, 
conditions  would  be  much  better. ' ' 

(From  Annual  Report  of  Board  to  Governor,  1915.) 


TREATMENT  247 

(d)  Refusal  of  employee — Persistence  in  insanitary 
or  injurious  practices. 

Where  one  employed  as  a  journeyman  carpenter, 
while  in  the  course  of  his  employment,  ran  a  splinter  in 
the  thumb  of  his  hand  and  attempted  to  remove  the  splin- 
ter with  a  pin,  and  blood  poison  resulted,  from  which  the 
employee  died,  HELD :  that  the  employee  was  not  guilty 
of  injurious  practices  as  tending  to  impair  or  retard  his 
recovery  when  he  attempted  to  remove  the  splinter  from 
the  flesh  of  his  thumb. 

Proulx  v  Hudson  &  Sons,  I.  B.  No.  255,  p.  45. 
Where  employee  refuses  to  undergo  operation,  the 
burden  of  proof  is  on  employer  to  show  such  refusal  to 
have  been  unreasonable  and  that  the  operation  would 
have  accomplished  satisfactory  results. 

Marshall  v  Orient  Nav.  Co.,  1910, 1  K.  B.  79. 
Hay's  Wharf  v  Brown,  3  B.  84,  C.  A. 
Delay:  See 

In  re  McLeurn,  Mass.  Ill  N.  E.  783. 

Jendrus  v  Detroit  Steel  P.  Co.,  Mich.,  144  N.  W. 

563. 

Where  an  employee  refused  to  accept  treatment  from 
physician  of  employer  and  did  not  follow  directions  and 
advice  of  the  physician  to  whom  he  went  for  treatment, 
as  a  result  of  which  his  hand  became  somewhat  stiff; 
HELD,  the  condition  is  the  result  of  his  failure  to  accept 
treatment  and  not  of  the  injury. 

Janczewski  v  Central  LOG.  Works,  I.  B.  No.  593, 

p.  32. 
See  City  of  Milwaukee  v  Miller,  144  N.  W.  188. 


248  TREATMENT 

Medical  treatment  by  ignorant  and  unskilled  practi- 
tioner does  not  deprive  employee  of  right  to  compensa- 
tion. 

Charles  v  Walker,  25  T.  L.  R.  609,  2  B.  W.  C.  C. 

5. 
Recovery  may  be  had  for  defective  treatment. 

Ross  v  Erickson  (Wash.),  155  Pac.  153;  Pawiak 

v  Hayes  (Wis.),  156  N.  W.  464. 

Further  sum  for  medical  aid  will  be  allowed,  where  it 
is  shown  that  it  was  necessary  to  procure  the  service  of  a 
physician  other  than  that  furnished. 

Cegrelski  v  Lelion  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  591,  p.  35. 
Where  an  employee  was  injured  and  reported  to  the 
foreman  at  8:00  o'clock  the  following  morning  as  to  the 
injury,  and  was  advised  by  the  foreman  to  see  a  doctor, 
the  employer  is  liable  for  medical  bills  arising  out  of  the 
accident  not  to  exceed  $200.00. 

Eide  v  Horn,  I.  B.  No.  658,  p.  44. 
Doctor's  bill  held  excessive. 

Sleeth  v  Homer  &  Co.,  I.  B.  June  10,  1915. 
Recovery  may  be  had  for  defective  treatment  and 
malpractice  against  employer. 

Ross  v  Erickson  Construction  Co.,  Wash.,  155 

Pac.  153. 
And  physician  may  be  sued : 

Pawiak  v  Hayes,  Wis.,  156  N.  W.  464. 


OPERATION  249 

Refusing  surgical  operation,  when  not  unreasonable, 
does  not  affect  claim. 

Jendrus  v  Detroit  Steel  Prod.  Co.,  178  Mich. 
265, 144  N.  W.  563,  Ann.  Gas.  1915,  D.  476. 
Operation,  if  attended  with  risk  and  success  doubtful, 
may  be  refused. 

Fulton  v  Owners  of  Majestic,  100  L.  T.  N.  S. 

644.    1909,  2  K.  B.  54. 
In  re  McLean;  Mass. ;  111  N.  E.  783. 
Hawkes  v  Coles,  3  B.  W.  C.  C.  163. 
It  is  not  sufficient  to  preclude  a  physician,  who  has 
been  appointed  by  the  Board  to  make  an  examination  and 
report  his  findings,  from  testifying,  unless  it  is  clearly 
shown  he  is  biased  and  prejudiced. 

Krisan  v  American  Steel  Foundries  Co.,  I.  B. 

No.  581,  p.  156. 

"We  doubt  very  much  whether  the  Board  has  the 
right  in  any  case  to  force  an  operation  on  a  patient  where 
there  is  any  element  of  danger  to  life  or  which  would  be 
accompanied  by  any  great  amount  of  pain.  To  hold  that 
the  Board  had  power  to  force  an  operation  would  be,  in 
our  opinion,  sufficient  to  hold  the  Board  morally  respon- 
sible for  the  death  of  an  individual,  if,  unfortunately,  the 
death  would  come  as  result  of  this  operation." 

Burdcuski  v  Pedbody  Coal  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  1064,  p. 
183. 


250  ADMINISTRATION 

§  19  ADMINISTRATION. 

(a)  Arbitrator — Committee  of  arbitration — Election 
— Deposit. 

(b)  Hearing  by  arbitrator — Notice — Decision — Peti- 
tion for  review — Agreed  statement  of  fact. 

Under  section  19,  paragraph  (b)  of  Act,  the  statement 
of  fact,  verified  by  the  chairman  of  the  arbitration  com- 
mittee, is  sufficient  to  give  the  Board  jurisdiction  on  re- 
view. 

Section  16  of  Act,  and  rule  13,  adopted  by  the  Board, 
construed  in  connection  with  the  proper  method  of  taking 
the  record  up  for  review. 

Under  rule  15,  the  specific  provision  for  bringing  up 
the  record  does  not  preclude  other  methods. 

To  challenge  the  jurisdiction  of  Board,  it  is  necessary 
to  file  special  appearance. 

The  right  to  challenge  the  jurisdiction  of  Board  is 
waived  by  appearing  generally. 

Rossow  v  Denvir,  I.  B.  No.  861,  p.  141. 

Board  will  not  disturb  findings  of  arbitration  commit- 
tee on  a  close  question  of  fact  where  the  committee  heard 
all  of  the  evidence,  as  it  saw  the  witnesses,  heard  them 
testify  and  had  a  better  opportunity  to  judge  of  their 
character  and  credibility. 

Where  it  is  impossible  to  determine  where  the  weight 
of  the  testimony  is  or  reconcile  the  various  phases  of  a 
record  upon  a  question  of  facts,  the  Board  will  generally 
follow  the  conclusions  and  findings  of  the  committee  of 
arbitration. 

Lynch  v  Baers  Express  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  577,  p.  79. 

After  decision  is  once  rendered  and  filed,  Board  is  not 
vested  with  any  power  to  set  aside,  disturb  or  change  its 
own  findings  upon  the  record. 

Mustaccio  v  Simpson  Construction  Co.,  I.  B.  No. 
273,  p.  60. 


ADMINISTRATION  251 

*  *  The  mere  fact  that  one  makes  application  to  extend 
the  time  to  file  his  petition  for  review  does  not  automati- 
cally carry  with  it  an  extension  of  the  time  within  which 
to  file  an  agreed  statement  of  facts  or  stenographic  re- 
port. Inasmuch  as  the  record  shows  no  such  extension 
of  time,  the  Board  is  powerless  to  proceed  further  in  the 
case,  and  automatically  the  opinion  of  the  committee  of 
arbitration  becomes  the  opinion  of  this  Board." 
Bryer  v  Hayes,  I.  B.  July  9, 1915. 

Where  it  is  difficult  to  determine  where  the  weight  of 
testimony  lies  concerning  a  given  state  of  facts  or  condi- 
tion or  manner  in  which  an  accident  happened  under  the 
Workmen's  Compensation  Act,  the  legal  presumption  fa- 
vors the  payment  of  compensation. 

Isidora  v  Rockford  Gas  Light  &  Coke  Co.,  I.  B. 
No.  555,  p.  42. 

Ex  parte  affidavits,  depositions  not  in  conformity  with 
the  statute  or  rules  of  court,  and  transcripts  of  testimony 
taken  before  coroners,  are  not  best  evidence,  and  are  not 
admissible  to  establish  any  fact  or  question  at  issue. 

Testimony  of  a  deceased  witness  taken  in  some  other 
and  different  proceeding  than  the  one  in  which  the  same 
is  sought  to  be  introduced  is  not  admissible. 

In  death  cases,  where  employers  make  advances  that 
are  absolutely  needed  and  necessary  to  the  employee's 
dependents,  and  no  serious  question  is  raised  concerning 
the  correctness  of  same,  the  Board  will  allow  credit  for 
same. 

Rediger  v  Pekin  Wagon  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  889,  p.  146. 


252  ADMINISTRATION— EVIDENCE 

(e)  Review  by  Board — special  finding — notice — 
agreed  statement  of  facts — stenographic  report. 

Act  is  complete  in  itself  in  providing  means  for  sum- 
moning parties  interested,  independent  of  Practice  Act. 
Staley  v  Illinois  Central  Ry.,  186  HI.  App.  593. 
"As  we  understand  the  rule,  the  burden  is  upon  the 
claimant  in  the  first  instance  to  establish  the  material 
facts,  that  is  to  make  a  prima  facie  case.    Then  the  bur- 
den shifts  to  respondent. ' ' 

Rediger  Adm.  v  Pekin  Wagon  Co.,  I.  B.  March 

4, 1915. 

"The  coroner's  verdict  is  not  conclusive  evidence  of 
the  manner  in  which  deceased  met  his  death.  It  is  merely 
proper  evidence,  entitled  to  weight  along  with  the  other 
facts  and  circumstances  in  the  case. ' ' 

Rediger  Admr.  v  Pekin  Wagon  Co.,  March  4, 

4, 1915. 

"While  we  are  not,  we  believe,  bound  to  adhere  to  the 
technical  rules  of  evidence,  we  do  not  feel  disposed  to  go 
to  the  extent  of  admitting  this  class  of  testimony  unless 
the  truthfulness  of  same  is  admitted,  bears  the  highest 
possible  authentication  or  some  physical  or  other  sub- 
stantial facts  connected  therewith,  the  truthfulness  of 
which  may  be  fairly  presumed.  Applying  this  rule,  the 
Board  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  testimony  taken  before 
the  coroner's  jury  in  this  case  ought  not  to  be  admitted." 
Rediger  Admr.  v  Pekin  Wagon  Co.,  March  4, 
1915. 


ADMINISTRATION— EVIDENCE  253 

"The  Board,  after  a  thorough  consideration  of  the 
question  of  its  right  to  permit  to  be  read  in  evidence  tes- 
timony taken  under  a  dedimus  issued  by  it,  is  of  the  opin- 
ion that  the  position  of  the  respondent  is  not  sound.  In- 
asmuch as  all  of  these  objections  address  themselves  to 
the  one  question  of  the  Board's  right  to  issue  a  dedimus, 
we  dispose  of  the  same  by  a  finding  on  the  one  question. 
The  argument  of  counsel,  that  the  power  to  issue  a  dedi- 
mus is  inherent  in  courts,  does  not  agree  with  the  fact  that 
the  legislature  has  already  legislated  concerning  the  ques- 
tion. It  is  barely  possible,  if  there  were  no  provisions  of 
the  legislature  on  the  subject,  the  courts  could  invoke  the 
common  law  doctrine  of  'inherent  right,'  but  because  of 
the  fact  that  the  legislature  has  made  provisions  for  the 
same  precludes  the  idea  of  inherent  right.  In  any  event, 
this  would  cut  no  figure  concerning  the  right  of  the 
Board  to  issue  a  dedimus.  The  fact  that  the  legislature 
may  have  made  provision  for  the  same  as  applicable  to 
courts  does  not  preclude  its  power  to  legislate  concerning 
administrative  boards  exercising  such  power. 

4  *  This  was  evidently  the  intention  of  the  legislature,  as 
expressed  in  this  Act,  because  it  specifically  gave  the 
Board  the  power  to  make  rules  and  regulations  to  pro- 
ceed summarily. 

"Again,  the  rule  that  is  objected  to  by  respondent  here 
merely  permits  the  'reading  in  evidence  of  testimony 
taken  according  to  the  provisions  of  the  rule,'  leaving  the 
Board  to  judge  as  to  the  regularity  of  the  proceeding  in 
the  suing  out  of  the  dedimus,  etc.  Hence,  did  we  not 
have  specific  power  to  issue  a  dedimus,  yet  we  would  have 
the  right  to  make  a  rule  permitting  the  reading  of  testi- 
mony so  taken  because  of  the  specific  power  given  to  make 
rules. 

"It  is  therefore  ordered,  adjudged  and  decreed  by  the 
Board  that  the  motion  of  the  respondent  concerning  the 
issuing  of  the  dedimus  herein  be  overruled,  and  the  dedi- 
mus issue  herein  as  prayed  for  under  the  rule. 

"The  respondent  seriously  challenges  the  constitution- 
ality of  the  Act  and  makes  the  following  points : 

"That  the  Act  is  in  derogation  of  the  property  right 
provisions  in  the  Federal  Constitution. 


254  ADMINISTRATION 

"That  it  is  a  species  of  legislation  purely  beneficial  to 
certain  classes  of  people  interested  in  industrial  condi- 
tions only. 

"That  the  procedure  provisions  of  the  Act,  wherein  it 
is  provided  for  filing  claim  with  the  Industrial  Board,  ap- 
pointment of  arbitrators,  arbitrating  differences  between 
employers  and  employees,  and  reviewing  of  the  findings 
of  the  committee  of  arbitration,  violate  the  right  of  trial 
by  jury  provision  of  the  *  Bill  of  Bights. ' 

"That  one  of  the  essential  provisions  of  the  Act,  the 
one  dividing  employers  of  labor  into  hazardous  and  non- 
hazardous  classes,  etc.,  is  arbitrary  and  unreasonable  and 
in  violation  of  the  Constitution  concerning  the  powers  of 
the  legislature. 

"This  Board  has  carefully  considered  the  question  of 
its  right  to  sit  in  judgment  upon  the  acts  of  its  creators, 
so  far  as  the  same  may  apply  to,  or  in  any  wise  affect,  the 
power  that  the  legislature  may  have  to  enact  laws  con- 
cerning compensation  and  creating  this  Board.  The 
Board,  as  created  by  the  Act,  is  an  administrative  body, 
with  possible  quasi-judicial  power,  or  with  power  similar 
to  and  equivalent  to  the  power  exercised  in  a  measure  by 
courts  of  law.  Its  primary  purpose  is  purely  administra- 
tive. It  is  authorized  by  the  Act  to  maintain  offices,  se- 
lect employees,  and  to  proceed  to  administer  the  Act ;  that 
is,  require  the  reporting  of  accidents,  the  arbitration  of 
matters  upon  which  parties  do  not  agree,  the  keeping  of 
records  and  files,  the  making  of  rules,  the  supervision  and 
control  of  indemnity  insurance,  and  reviewing  of  matters 
submitted  on  arbitration.  It  is  not  a  court,  nor  are  its 
opinions  given  the  weight  of  authority  of  law.  The  only 
presumptions  indulged  in  favor  of  the  holdings  of  the 
opinions  of  this  Board  are  concerning  the  facts  given  on 
particular  cases,  and  in  this  its  findings  are  not  unlike  the 
findings  of  a  jury — merely  advisory — and  subject  to  re- 
view, should  it  be  in  violation  of  law." 

Cardinale  v  Valencano,  I.  B.  No.  665,  p.  114. 

Deposition — authority  to  issue — not  inherent  in  Su- 
perior Court  of  Massachusetts  for  use  before  Industrial 
Board. 

In  re  Martinelli,  219  Mass.  58, 106  N.  E.  557. 


ADMINISTRATION  255 

Procedure  should  be  with  as  little  formality  as  is  con- 
sistent with  preservation  of  the  real  rights  of  both  par- 
ties. 

In  re  Hwnnewell,  220  Mass.  351, 107  N.  E.  934. 
Where  cause  is  called  and  applicant  does  not  appear, 
motion  to  dismiss  by  respondent  will  be  allowed. 
Motely  v  McDonald,  I.  B.  No.  493,  p.  25. 
If  the  stenographic  report  is  filed  without  first  sub- 
mitting it  to  the  applicant  or  his  attorney  for  his  authen- 
tication, or  the  stenographic  report  was  not  authenticated 
by  any  one  representing  either  the  applicant  or  his  at- 
torney, nor  by  the  chairman  of  the  arbitration  committee, 
the  petition  for  review  will  be  dismissed. 

Petrock  v  Keystone  Steel  Works,  I.  B.  No.  964, 

p.  89. 

Motion  to  dismiss  for  want  of  a  stenographic  report 
will  be  denied  where  it  is  shown  that  a  letter  was  ad- 
dressed to  secretary  of  the  Board  requesting  that  it  be 
submitted  for  authentication. 

Other  methods  or  means  than  those  specifically  indi- 
cated in  the  terms  of  the  statute  are  permissible  to  bring 
the  record  properly  before  the  Board.  (Rossow  v  Den- 
vir  (861)  followed.) 

Hollas  v  Illinois  Steel  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  827,  p.  158. 
Failure  to  object  to  filing  stenographic  report  or 
agreed  statement  of  facts  after  the  time  provided  by 
statute  and  going  to  trial,  is  a  waiver  of  all  question  con- 
cerning the  regularity  of  proceedings  before  the  Board. 

Blake  v  Herskovitz,  I.  B.  No.  1193,  p.  161. 
Chairman  of  arbitration  committee  has  power  to  au- 
thenticate statement  of  facts  upon  failure  of  parties  to 
file  a  correct  stenographic  report  or  agreed  statement  of 
facts.    (Rossow  v  Denvir,  No.  861,  followed.) 

Where  parties  fail  to  file  a  stenographic  report  or 
agreed  statement  of  facts  within  the  time  prescribed  by 
law,  but  an  authenticated  statement  is  filed  in  apt  time 
by  the  chairman  of  arbitration  committee :  HELD :  that 
the  Board  is  not  estopped  from  hearing  the  case  on 
review. 

Bernstein  v  Bothman,  I.  B.  No.  1502,  p.  163. 
See  Renfroe  v  Whipple  Car  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  491, 
p.  14. 


256  ADMINISTRATION 

(f )  Decision  of  Board  final — of  arbitrator  when  no 
review. 

"Cause  set  for  trial  on  September  10th  in  East  St. 
Louis,  111.  Called  for  trial.  Applicant  filed  an  affidavit 
in  the  nature  of  a  motion  objecting  to  the  proceeding  be- 
cause he  was  not  financially  able  to  attend  the  sitting  and 
prepare  for  trial  at  the  city  of  East  St.  Louis,  the  same 
being  in  the  neighborhood  of  one  hundred  and  fifty  miles 
away  from  his  home. 

In  said  affidavit  it  was  also  alleged  that  additional  tes- 
timony could  not  be  taken  upon  any  points  not  disputed 
or  at  issue  before  the  committee  of  arbitration,  on  a  hear- 
ing before  the  Board.  It  was  also  alleged  that  so  far  as 
the  record  before  the  committee  of  arbitration  is  con- 
cerned the  proceeding  on  review  is  not  a  proceeding 
de  novo,  and  that  the  Board  was  bound  to  hear  it  solely 
upon  the  evidence  taken  before  the  committee,  and  addi- 
tional evidence  on  points  not  raised  before  the  committee. 

It  also  appeared  that  the  notice  required  under  the 
rules  of  the  Board  to  be  given  to  the  opposite  party  where 
a  party  desires  to  introduce  additional  testimony  had  not 
been  received  by  the  claimant,  or  his  attorney. 

Taking  up  these  questions  in  the  reverse  order  the 
Board  finds:  First,  that  the  rule  in  question  was  in- 
tended to  prevent  surprise  to  the  opposite  party ;  in  cases 
where  notice  under  the  rule  has  not  been  given  to  the 
party  entitled  to  the  same,  a  continuance  will  be  granted 
to  give  him  time  to  meet  such  additional  testimony. 

The  Board  does  not  agree  with  the  contention  of  the 
respondent  that  the  proceeding  before  the  Board  upon 
review  is  not  in  the  nature  of  a  trial  de  novo.  It  would 
seem  to  the  Board  that  the  provision  of  the  Act  provid- 
ing for  the  hearing  of  additional  testimony  excluded  any 
possibility  of  a  trial  upon  the  record.  The  contention 
that  additional  evidence  is  admissible  upon  review  upon 
issues  that  are  not  raised  before  the  committee  of  arbi- 


ADMINISTRATION  257 

tration  only,  we  think  it  not  tenable.  If  this  is  the  cor- 
rect view  of  the  law,  then  there  would  be  but  little  occa- 
sion for  the  use  of  additional  testimony.  Hearing  upon 
review  before  this  Board  is  not  only  summary  and 
simple,  but  to  be  conducted  as  though  the  matter  had 
never  been  tried.  Anything  that  will  in  any  way  throw 
any  light  upon  the  issues  must  be  admitted. 

Schweer  v  Owsley,  I.  B.  No.  532,  p.  74. 


258  ADMINISTRATION 

Dismissal  by  board  of  arbitration  without  prejudice 
saves  rights  of  parties. 

Junker  v  Larimer  &  T.  Con,  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  653, 

p.  28. 

Because  of  the  fact  that  the  chairman  of  the  commit- 
tee had  not  signed  such  statement  of  facts  it  is  insisted 
the  Board  has  no  jurisdiction.  The  Board  cannot  concur 
with  this  contention.  In  the  wide  powers  and  discretions 
given  to  the  Board  it  surely  was  intended  that  it  should 
be  the  judges  of  what  constituted  a  stenographic  report 
of  a  record  or  an  agreed  statement  of  facts ;  and  that  no 
advantage  should  be  taken  concerning  the  filing  of  the 
same.  The  Board  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  respondent 
has  substantially  complied  with  the  law  and  the  rules  of 
the  Board,  extending  the  time  in  which  to  file  the  same. 

Behling  v  Mets  Furn.  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  598,  p.  61. 
"The  decision  of  the  Industrial  Board  is  binding  only 
when  it  is  acting  within  its  powers.  It  has  no  jurisdic- 
tion to  apply  the  Act  to  persons  or  corporations  who  are 
not  subject  to  its  provisions  nor  to  an  accident  not  within 
the  provisions  of  the  Act. ' ' 

Upphoff  v  Industrial  Board,  271  111.  Sup.  312. 

Courier  v  Simpson  Construction  Co.,  264  HI. 
Sup.  488. 

Bragnis  v  Falk,  147  Wis.  327. 


ADMINISTRATION  259 

Finding  of  fact  of  Industrial  Board,  where  supported 
by  evidence,  must  stand,  unless  wrong  as  matter  of  law. 
In  re  Burns,  218  Mass.  8, 105  N.  E.  601. 
In  re  Buckley,  218  Mass.  354, 105  N.  E.  979. 
In  re  Meley,  219  Mass.  136,  106  N.  E.  559. 
Hills  v  Blair,  Mich.,  148  N.  W.  243. 
Nekoosa  Edwards  Paper  Co.  v  Indust.  Com., 

Wis.,  141  N.  W.  1013. 
In  re  Diaz,  217  Mass.  36, 104  N.  E.  384. 
In  re  Bentley,  217  Mass.  79, 104  N.  E.  432. 
Rayner  v  Sligh  Furn.  Co.,  Mich.,  146  N.  W.  665. 
In  re  Fierro's  Case,  Mass.,  Ill  N.  E.  957. 
The  decision  of  the  trial  court  as  to  the  best  method  of 
compensation  will  not  be  disturbed  except  where  its  dis- 
cretion has  been  abused. 

Gorrell  v  Battelle,  93  Kan.  370,  144  P.  244. 
In  re  Septinio,  219  Mass.  430,  107  N.  E.  63. 
See  In  re  Stickley,  219  Mass.  513, 107  N.  E.  350. 
A  finding  by  Industrial  Accident  Board  stands  on  the 
same  footing  as  the  finding  of  a  judge  or  jury. 

Pigeon  v  Emp.  Liab.  Ass.  Corp.,  Mass.,  102  N. 

E.  932. 
Cavanagh  v  Morton  Salt  Co.,  Wis.,  140  N.  W. 

53. 

Finding  of  Industrial  Board  is  res  adjudicata  except 
as  to  personal  injury. 

Spooner  v  Estate  of  Beckwith,  149  N.  W.  971. 


260  ADMINISTRATION 

Decision  of  any  two  members  that  of  committee  or 
Board. 

Two  members  of  the  board  have  a  right  to  hear  a  case 
on  review  as  Act  gives  any  member  of  the  Board  power 
to  swear  witnesses  and  take  testimony. 

Moeller  v  Beredo  Mfg.  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  175,  p.  66. 
The  mere  fact  that  evidence  is  heard  by  but  two  mem- 
bers of  the  Board  is  no  ground  for  striking  the  agreed 
statement  of  facts  from  the  files  and  dismissing  the  cause, 
even  though  a  limited  appearance  is  filed  for  that  pur- 
pose. 

Anderson  v  National  Fireproof  Co.,  I.  B.  No. 

625,  p.  41. 

Change  in  membership  of  arbitration  committee  does 
not  void  proceedings. 

Hill  v  Johnson,  I.  B.  Sept.  10, 1915. 
Determination  by  arbitrators  whether  employee  suf- 
fered injury  while  engaged  in  the  line  of  his  duty,  and 
the  measure  of  liability,  is  not  a  judicial  proceeding. 
Lavin  v  Wells  Bros.  Co.,  272  111.  Sup.  611 


ADMINISTRATION  261 

(1)  Review  by  Circuit  Court — Certiorari — Scire  fac- 
ias— Suit  in  chancery — Decision — Judgment — Review 
only  by  Supreme  Court. 

Review  of  decisions  of  Industrial  Board,  as  to 
whether  Board  has  acted  within  its  powers  or  illegally, 
is  within  inherent  power  of  Circuit  Courts. 

Courier  v  Simpson  Construction  Co.,  264  III. 

Sup.  468,  opinion  ante. 
Appeal  to  Circuit  Court. 

Dragovich  v  Iroquois  Iron  Co.,  269  Sup.  478, 

opinion  ante. 
Appeal  from  County  Court  lies  to  Appellate  Court. 

Lauruszka  v  Empire  Mfg.  Co.,  271  111.  Sup.  304. 
Proceedings  judicial  in  nature. 

Pigeon's  case,  216  Mass.  51, 102  N.  E.  932,  Ann. 

Cas.  1915,  A.  737. 

Certiorari  from  Circuit  Court  under  Act  is  broader 
than  at  common  law. 

People  v  McGoorty,  270  111.  Sup.  610. 
Joinder.    Where  all  counts  are  based  on  the  same 
state  of  facts,  there  is  no  mis-joinder. 

Price  v  Clover  Leaf  Mining  Co.,  18  111.  App.  27. 
Jury  trial — failure  to  pay  fee — not  ground  for  objec- 
tion. 

Davis  v  Denver  &  Rio  Grande  Ry.,  142  Pac.  705. 
Jury  trial  not  waived  entirely  by  election. 

Young  v  Duncan,  218  Mass.  346, 106  N.  E.  218. 


262  ADMINISTRATION 

(g)  Judgment  in  Circuit  Court  on  certified  copy — 
Taxation  of  costs  and  attorneys'  fees. 

(h)  Eeview  by  Board  of  agreement  or  award  when 
disability  changed. 

Under  paragraph  h,  section  19,  Board  may  re-estab- 
lish, increase,  diminish  or  end  compensation. 

Where  facts  show  that  applicant  has  not  been  guilty 
of  injurious  practices  or  has  done  nothing  to  retard  his 
recovery,  the  Board  on  review  will  not  interfere  with  its 
former  finding. 

"Where  it  is  not  known  how  long  a  disability  will  last 
or  continue  and  recovery  is  problematical,  the  Board  will 
not  disturb  its  finding. 

Smith  v  Israel  Bros.,  I.  B.  No.  1300,  p.  164. 

The  report  of  the  committee  of  arbitration  that  "Joe 
Beam  is  entitled  to  receive  and  recover  from  said  respon- 
dent, Thornton  Claney  Lumber  Co.,  the  sum  of  five  and 
63-100  ($5.63)  dollars  per  week  for  a  period  of  temporary 
total  disability"  is  sufficient  as  it  cannot  be  determined 
when  the  disability  will  terminate. 

Beam  v  Thornton  Claney  Lumber  Co.,  I.  B.  1048, 
p.  43. 

Where  an  award  is  made  to  an  employee  under  Act, 
and  death  occurs,  not  the  result  of  injury,  the  compensa- 
tion remaining  unpaid  at  the  time  of  the  death  abates 
under  section  21  of  Act. 

Ticzkus  v  Standard  Office  Co.,  I.  B.  1616,  p.  176. 

Even  had  the  Board  confirmed  the  decision  of  the 
committee  of  arbitration,  either  side  could  have  come  in 
within  18  months  and  have  had  the  award  increased, 
diminished  or  ended  upon  making  a  proper  showing  to 
this  Board,  so  that  the  mere  fact  that  applicant  failed  to 
petition  for  a  review  within  the  time  specified  by  law 
does  not  preclude  him  from  coming  in  under  the  18 
months  section. 

Krebs  v  Western  Wheeled  Scraper  Co.,  I.  B. 
July  10, 1915. 


ADMINISTRATION  263 

"It  is  not  within  the  power  or  province  of  the  em- 
ployer to  arbitrarily  suspend  payment  of  compensation 
for  an  injury  unless  in  fact  the  claimant  shall  have  recov- 
ered from  such  injury  and  such  disability  resulting  there- 
from shall  have  terminated.  In  the  case  at  bar  such  dis- 
ability had  not  terminated ;  hence  the  claimant  is  entitled 
to  invoke  the  powers  of  this  Board  to  review  such  ar- 
rangement." 

Murawski  v  Schriburger  &  Co.,  I.  B.  July  9, 1915. 
Board  has  no  power,  after  decision  once  rendered,  to 
set  aside,  disturb  or  change  its  own  findings  on  the  rec- 
ord. 

Mustaccio  v  Simpson  Construction  Co.,  I.  B.  No. 

273,  p.  60. 
APPEAL —     * 

Appeal  lies  under  Appellate  Court  and  Practice  Acts. 

Lavin  v  Wells  Bros  Co.,  272  IU.  Sup.  609. 
Appeal  lies  from  County  Court  to  Appellate  Court. 

Lauruszka  v  Empire  Mfg.  Co.,  271  HI.  Sup.  304. 
See: 

Richardson  v  Sears  Roebuck  &  Co.,  271  111.  Sup. 
325. 


264  WAIVER 

§  21  LIEN. 

No  award  to  be  subject  to  lien. 

§  22  AGREEMENT. 

Within  seven  days  after  injury,  presumed  fraudulent. 

$  23  WAIVER. 

Subject  to  approval  by  Board. 

No  settlement  wherein  any  amount  of  compensation 
is  waived  is  final  without  the  approval  of  the  Board. 

Section  18  of  Act,  which  provides:  "all  questions 
arising  under  the  Act,  if  not  settled  by  agreement  of  the 
parties  interested  therein,  shall,  except  as  otherwise  pro- 
vided, be  determined  by  the  Industrial  Board, ' '  is  quali- 
fied by  section  23  of  Act. 

McClennan  v  Allith  Prouty  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  436, 
p.  116. 

If  an  employe  who  sustained  an  injury,  while  work- 
ing under  Act,  has  not  been  paid  all  the  compensation  he 
is  entitled  to,  any  settlement  made  by  him  or  release  exe- 
cuted without  the  approval  of  the  Board  is  not  binding. 

Under  section  23  of  Act,  an  employee  cannot  waive 
any  compensation  he  may  be  entitled  to  without  the  ap- 
proval of  the  Board. 

Cass  v  Great  Lakes  D.  &  D.  Co.,  I.  B.  No.  779,  p. 
99. 


WAIVER 

If  an  employee  who  sustained  an  injury  and 
ing  under  Act  has  not  been  paid  all  the  compens 
is  entitled  to,  any  release  executed  by  him  without  the 
approval  of  Board  is  not  binding.  Such  release  acts  only 
as  a  receipt  and  the  amount  paid  should  be  deducted  from 
the  total  amount  payable. 

Act  is  a  contract  between  the  employer  and  all  his  em- 
ployees and  the  state,  represented  by  the  Industrial 
Board,  in  which  they  agree  to  accept  all  the  terms  and 
provisions  of  Act  where  the  employer  and  the  employees 
elect  to  be  bound  thereby. 

Fitt  v  Central  III.  Publ.  Service  Co.,  I.  B.  No. 

764,  p.  129. 

A  contract  signed  by  an  employee  before  going  to 
work,  absolving  the  employer  from  all  obligations  result- 
ing from  any  accident  he  might  subsequently  meet,  is  not 
binding,  as  the  contract  entered  into  between  the  em- 
ployer, employee  and  the  State  of  Illinois  when  they  ac- 
cepted the  provisions  of  Act  is  controlling,  and  all  pre- 
vious contracts  entered  into  are  merged. 

Chicago  Savings  Bank  v  Chicago  Rys.  Co.,  I.  B. 

No.  235,  p.  104. 

Agreement  to  settle  on  partial  disability  basis  no  bar 
to  claim  for  total  disability. 

Duprey  v  Maryland  Casualty  Co.,  219  Mass.  189, 

106  N.  E.  686. 

"The  purported  release  filed  herein,  showing  payment 
in  full  satisfaction,  etc.,  is  not  a  bar  as  against  this  claim- 
ant in  this  proceeding  as  the  same  amounts  to  a  waiver 
of  some  of  the  provisions  of  the  Compensation  Act  with 
reference  to  amounts." 

Auksutes  v  Newman,  I.  B.  Nov.  1,  1915. 


266  NOTICE 

§  24  NOTICE. 

Of  accident — in  30  days. 

Conversation  over  telephone  is  competent  to  prove 
notice. 

The  mere  fact  of  notice  over  telephone  is  sufficient  to 
charge  employer  with  knowledge  of  injury  to  employee. 

Cutavia  v  Swieberg,  I.  B.  No.  1855,  p.  153. 
Notice  over  the  telephone  to  the  superintendent  by 
the  employee,  followed  by  notice  over  the  telephone  by 
the  sister-in-law  of  the  employee  to  the  foreman,  is  notice 
to  the  employer. 

Upon  being  notified  of  an  accident  and  having  knowl- 
edge of  its  occurrence,  it  becomes  the  first  duty  of  the 
employer  to  furnish  the  necessary  medical  aid.  It  is  not 
the  duty  of  the  employee  to  demand  it. 

Olson  v  Hillman's,  I.  B.  No.  713,  p.  124. 
Onus  to  show  that  employer  has  not  been  prejudiced 
by  failure  to  give  notice  lies  on  workman. 

Shearer  v  Miller,  2  Sc.  Sess.  Cas.  5th.  Ser.  114. 
Failure  to  give  notice  held  not  bar  to  claim.  (Kans.) 

Ackerson  v  National  Zinc  Co.,  153  P.  530. 
Notice  to  foreman,  when  sufficient. 

In  re  Bloom,  Mass.,  Ill  N.  E.  783-45-783. 
§  29  THIRD  PARTY. 

Liability  of  other  persons; — surrogation. 
Bryant  v  Fissell,  N.  J.,  86  Atl.  458. 
Meese  v  Northern  Pac.  Ry.,  206  Fed.  222,  211 

Fed.  254. 
Peet  v  Mills,  71  Wash.  437,  136  Pac.  685,  Ann. 

Cas.  1915,  D.  154. 
Insurance. 

United  States  Fid.  &  G.  Co.  v  New  York  Rys. 

Co.,  156  N.  Y.  S.  615. 

Act  does  not  repeal  statute  giving  right  of  action  for 
wrongful  death  against  third  parties.  (Wash.) 

Meese  v  Northern  Pac.  Ry.,  211  Fed.  254. 


CONTRACTOR  267 

§  31  SUB-CONTRACT. 

Insurance — Fraud. 

Section  31  of  the  Act  of  1913  provided  that  "any  per- 
son, firm  or  corporation  who  undertakes  to  do,  or  con- 
tracts with  another  to  do,  or  have  done  for  him, 
them  or  it,  any  work  enumerated  as  extra-haz- 
ardous in  paragraph  (B),  section  3,  requiring 
employment  of  employees  in  or  about  the  premises  where 
he,  they  or  it,  as  principal  or  principals,  contract  to  do 
such  work,  or  any  part  thereof,  and  does  not  require  of 
the  person,  firm  or  corporation  undertaking  to  do  such 
work  for  said  principal  or  principals  that  such  person, 
firm  or  corporation  undertaking  to  do  such  work  shall  in- 
sure his,  their  or  its  liability  to  pay  compensation  pro- 
vided in  the  Act  to  his,  their  or  its  employees,  such  per- 
son, firm  or  corporation  shall  be  included  in  the  terms 
'employer'  and  with  the  immediate  employer  shall  be 
jointly  and  severally  liable  to  pay  the  compensation  here- 
in provided  for  and  be  subject  to  all  the  provisions  of 
this  Act. " 

It  is  the  opinion  of  this  Board  that  this  section  of  the 
Act  in  no  wise  applies  to  the  owner  of  property  who  en- 
ters into  a  contract  with  a  builder  to  erect  a  building  upon 
his  premises ;  and  that  the  owner  of  the  property  does  in 
no  sense  "contract  to  do  such  work"  as  the  terms  are 
used  in  said  section,  but  contracts  with  *  *  some  other  per- 
son" who  is  principal  or  principals  to  do  the  same  and 
therefore  is  in  no  sense  "any  person,  firm  or  corpora- 
tion" undertaking  to  do  any  work  enumerated  as  "extra 
hazardous;"  but  that  the  term  "principal"  or  "princi- 
pals" as  used  in  the  section  applies  to  the  building  con- 
tractor who  contracts  in  the  first  instance  to  do  the  work ; 
and  if  he  fails  to  require  "others  who  do  or  have  done 
for  him  work  as  extra  hazardous  to  insure  his  liability  to 
pay  compensation,"  then  he,  as  the  original  contractor  or 
principal  is  liable  to  the  employees  of  such  other  per- 
son, or  sub-contractor. 

The  Board  further  finds  the  claimant  herein  is  not  en- 
titled to  invoke  the  terms  and  provisions  of  the  Act  as 
against  the  respondent  here ;  and  that  therefore  no  com- 
pensation is  due  because  of  his  injury  so  sustained  and 
shown  by  the  evidence. 

Lullefair  v  Crawley,  I.  B.  No.  488,  p.  26. 


268  CONTRACTOR 

"We  undei  stand  the  rule  applicable  in  this  case  to  be 
as  follows : 

A  person,  by  contract  or  operation  of  law,  for  a  lim- 
ited time,  by  virtue  thereof  subject  to  the  control  of  an- 
other in  a  particular  trade,  business,  occupation  or  line 
of  employment,  is  in  law  the  employee  of  such  other  per- 
son, even  though  he  may  draw  his  wages  from  an  em- 
ployment made  primarily  with  some  other  person  and 
for  the  purpose  of  some  other  trade  or  business.  It  seems 
that  the  consensus  of  opinion  of  the  courts  is  that  the  rule 
determining  who  is  the  employer  of  a  given  individual 
turns  upon  who  has  the  power  to  direct,  supervise  and 
control  the  employment  and  the  power  to  discharge.  In 
this  case,  it  seems  that  the  deceased  Junker  was  employed 
by  the  farmer  Touchette  to  drive  his  team  while  doing 
work  for  the  Lorimer  &  Gallagher  Construction  Com- 
pany, and  was  subject  to  its  orders,  direction  and  com- 
mands, notwithstanding  that  in  the  driving  and  caring  of 
the  teams  he  was  probably  subject  to  the  orders  and  di- 
rections of  Touchette. 

The  facts  in  the  case,  reported  in  the  242d  Illinois, 
page  244,  are  not  similar  to  the  facts  in  the  case  now  at 
bar.  In  the  case  reported  in  the  242d  Illinois  the  driver 
was  in  the  employ  of  a  man  engaged  in  general  teaming. 
The  court  in  commenting  upon  the  facts  said:  "In  such 
cases  the  party  who  employs  such  contractors  indicates 
the  work  to  be  done,  and  in  that  sense  controls  the  ser- 
vant as  he  would  control  the  contractor  if  he  were  pres- 
ent. But  the  person  who  receives  such  orders  is  not  sub- 
ject to  the  general  orders  of  the  party  who  gives  them. 
He  does  his  own  business  in  his  own  way,  and  the  orders 
which  he  receives  simply  point  out  to  him  the  work  which 
he  or  his  master  has  undertaken  to  do.  There  is  not  that 
degree  of  intimacy  and  generality  in  the  subjection  of 
one  to  the  other  which  is  necessary  to  identify  it  to  and 
make  the  employer  under  the  fiction  that  the  act  of  the 
employer  is  the  act  of  the  employed  and  his  act,  etc." 


CONTRACTOR  269 

"All  the  orders  the  employee  of  the  general  teamster 
got  from  the  electric  company  were  merely  with  reference 
to  what  was  to  be  hauled  and  where  it  was  to  be  hauled. 
In  the  case  at  bar  they  admit  that  in  the  matter  of  his 
general  duty  the  deceased,  Junker,  was  subject  to  the 
orders  and  directions  of  the  Lorimer  &  Gallagher  Con- 
struction Company ;  they  could  take  him  from  one  job  to 
another;  they  would  order  him  to  go  to  town  for  provi- 
sions; they  could  suspend  his  work  entirely;  they  could 
require  him  to  haul  poles,  or  work  anywhere.  He  was 
subject  to  the  orders  of  Touchette  only  to  the  extent  that 
he  should  probably  feed,  drive  and  take  care  of  the  team. 
The  mere  fact  that  he  drove  Touchette 's  team,  fed  it  and 
cared  for  it,  and  got  his  wages  from  Touchette,  is  not 
sufficient,  in  the  light  of  the  authorities,  to  justify  a  hold- 
ing that,  at  the  time  he  was  doing  this  work  subject  to 
all  these  orders  and  directions  from  the  Lorimer  &  Galla- 
gher Construction  Company,  he  was  not  in  their  em- 
ploy." 

Junker  v  Lorimer  &  Gallagher  Construction  Co., 

I.  B.  No.  653,  p.  28. 
Independent  contractor. 

In  re  Sundine,  218  Mass.  1,  105  N.  E.  433. 

In  re  King,  220  Mass.  290,  107  N.  E.  959. 

See  "Employee"  (ante). 


270 


INDUSTRIAL  BOARD  OF  ILLINOIS 
RULES. 

1.  Accident  Reports;  Filing  

2.  Docketing  Cases   

3.  Application  for  Adjustment  of  Claims;  Arbitration 

4.  Application  for  Adjustment  of  Claims;  Requisites;  Blanks 

5.  Offices  of  Board  in  Aid  of  Settlement 

6.  Hearing;  Date  and  Place;  Notice 

7.  Hearings  Before  Arbitrator  or  Committee 

8.  Hearings  Before  Arbitrator  or  Committee ;  Practice 

9.  Arbitrators ;  Disqualification  

10.  Agreements  for  Compensation  and  Settlements 

11.  Lump  Sum  Settlements   

12.  Contested  Lump  Sum  Settlements;  Practice 

13.  Lump  Sum  Settlements ;  Paying ;  Receipt 

14.  Automatic  Dismissal  of  Lump  Sum  Petitions  

15.  Setting  Cases ;  Practice   

16.  Review ;  Disposition  Without  Hearing  

17.  Reviews ;  Hearings;  Continuances  

18.  Depositions ;   Applications    

19.  Summons  and  Subpoena 

20.  Assignment  of  Causes ;  Hearings ;  Findings 

21.  Reviews ;  Consideration  in  Conference 

22.  Rules  Governing  Hearings  on  Review 

23.  Records ;  Keeping 

24.  Assuring  Payment  of  Compensation;  Financial  statement; 

Indemnity  bond ;  Insurance  Affidavit 

25.  Financial  Statement ;  Approval ;  Notice 

26.  Evidence  of  Financial  Ability  Required 

27.  Non- Approval  of  Security ;  Option  

28.  Expiration  of  Insurance;  Notice 

29.  Receipts ;  Filing   

80.     Arbitrator's  Oath;  Form  

31.  Transcript  Record   

32.  Authentication  of  Records  on  Appeal 

RULE  1.  ACCIDENT  REPORTS;  FILING.)  All  accidents  which  re- 
sult in  disability  continuing  for  more  than  six  (6)  working  days,  and 
all  accidents  causing  disfigurement  or  death,  and  all  other  facts  as  the 
same  are  required  in  section  30  of  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act, 
shall  be  reported  to  the  Board  at  its  office,  303  City  Hall  Square  Build- 
ing, Chicago,  111.  Employers  shall  also  furnish  Board  with  monthly 
statement,  showing  amount  paid  for  hospital  and  medical  services 
rendered  in  cases  in  which  the  accidental  injuries  did  not  cause  dis- 
ability to  continue  for  more  than  six  working  days. 

RULE  2.  DOCKETING  CASES.)  All  petitions  for  adjustment  of 
claims  for  compensation,  in  which  the  parties  desire  to  introduce  ad- 
ditional testimony  or  to  be  heard  by  the  Board,  shall  be  docketed  by 
the  secretary  or  minute  clerk  in  the  order  in  which  the  same  are  filed, 
in  a  regular  docket  kept  for  such  purpose. 

RULE  3.  APPLICATION  FOR  ADJUSTMENT  OF  CLAIM;  ARBITRA- 
TION.) Any  employer,  employee  or  his  personal  representative,  work- 
ing under  the  Compensation  Act,  at  any  time  after  the  occurrence  of 
any  injury,  fatal  or  otherwise,  when  it  shall  be  determined  that  the 
parties  cannot  agree  concerning  any  disputed  question  of  law  or  fact, 
should  notify  the  Industrial  Board  of  such  failure  to  agree,  and  should 
file  therewith  his  application  for  adjustment  of  claim.  If  the  com- 


INDUSTRIAL  BOARD— RULES  271 

pensation  claimed  is  for  partial  permanent  or  total  permanent  inca- 
pacity, or  death,  then  arbitrators  may  be  appointed  and  the  cause  pro- 
ceed to  arbitration  in  the  manner  provided  in  section  19  of  the  Work- 
men's Compensation  Act. 

RULE  4.  APPLICATION  FOR  ADJUSTMENT  OF  CLAIM;  REQUISITES; 
BLANKS.)  At  the  time  the  party  or  parties  shall  notify  the  Board  of 
their  failure  to  agree,  and  of  their  claim  for  compensation,  the  appli- 
cation should  set  forth  with  reasonable  details  and  certainty,  the  gen- 
eral nature  of  the  controversy  out  of  which  such  claim  grows,  the 
character  of  the  injury  sustained,  and  any  and  all  other  facts  neces- 
sary and  proper  to  be  alleged  in  connection  with  such  dispute. 

RULE  6.  OFFICES  OF  BOARD  IN  AID  OF  SETTLEMENT.)  Imme- 
diately after  the  filing  of  a  petition  for  adjustment  of  claim,  the  In- 
dustrial Board  will  forward  or  deliver  to  the  applicant  and  respon- 
dent, a  notice  to  file  with  the  Board,  within  ten  (10)  days  of  the  re- 
ceipt thereof,  his,  its  or  their  detailed  account  of  the  occurrence  of  the 
accident,  when  and  where  the  same  occurred,  and  the  nature,  character 
and  extent  of  the  injury.  Upon  the  filing  of  such  detailed  accounts, 
or  the  failure  to  do  the  same,  within  said  time,  the  files,  together  with 
such  detailed  accounts,  shall  be  referred  to  the  chief  industrial  exam- 
iner of  this  Board,  who  shall  immediately,  or  as  soon  as  the  same  may 
conveniently  be  done,  call  the  parties  or  their  attorneys  together,  and 
tender  to  the  parties  the  offices  of  the  Industrial  Board  in  an  effort 
to  amicably  adjust  all  questions  arising  out  of  the  accident  and  al- 
leged in  the  petition  for  adjustment  of  claim.  After  the  calling  of 
such  parties  together,  in  the  event  of  an  amicable  adjustment,  and 
upon  waiver  of  arbitration  under  the  terms  of  the  Act,  a  formal 
order  of  approval  shall  be  entered,  approving  such  amicable  adjust- 
ment and  settlement,  in  the  event  the  Board  shall  deem  it  for  the  best 
interests  of  the  parties.  In  the  event  the  cause  cannot  be  amicably 
settled  and  adjusted,  the  detailed  reports  of  the  several  parties  filed  in 
conformity  with  the  notice  above  referred  to,  and  all  proceedings  con- 
cerning the  same,  may  be  cancelled  and  withdrawn  by  the  respective 
parties,  and  shall  in  no  wise  interfere  with  or  abridge  the  rights  of 
or  bind  either  or  any  of  the  parties  thereto;  and  the  cause  shall  be 
placed  upon  the  arbitration  docket  and  be  settled  by  arbitration  in 
the  regular  way  and  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  the  Workmen's 
Compensation  Act  of  Illinois,  without  prejudice  to  the  rights  of  such 
parties. 

RULE  6.  HEARING;  DATE  AND  PLACE;  NOTICE.)  After  the  ap- 
pointment of  an  arbitrator  or  committee  of  arbitration,  the  Industrial 
Board  will  fix  a  date  and  place  of  hearing  and  notify  the  parties  there- 
of, at  which  time  the  parties  should  appear  and  present  their  respec- 
tive cases  and  the  evidence  and  facts  in  connection  therewith. 

RULE  7.  HEARING;  BEFORE  ARBITRATOR  OR  COMMITTEE;  POST- 
PONEMENT.) Postponements  of  hearings  before  arbitrators  or  com- 
mittees of  arbitration,  as  the  case  may  be,  are  to  be  granted  only  when 
it  shall  appear  that  without  the  fault  of  the  party  asking  for  same, 
material  and  irreparable  injury  may  occur.  Parties  are  therefore  re- 
quired to  make  every  preparation  possible  and  to  appear  at  the  time 
and  place  and  proceed  with  the  cause.  In  the  event  that  either  of  the 
parties  fails  to  appear  at  the  time  and  place  set,  the  cause  will  pro- 
ceed to  final  determination,  except  as  provided  in  the  foregoing  part  of 
this  rule, 

RULE  8.  HEARING  BEFORE  ARBITRATOR  OR  COMMITTEE;  PRAC- 
TICE.) Hearings  before  an  arbitrator  or  committee  of  arbitration 
shall  be  summary,  simple  and  informal.  Proof  only  will  be  necessary 
upon  the  particular  disputed  questions  of  fact  or  law  set  forth  in  the 
application  for  adjustment  of  claims:  Provided,  however,  the  arbitra- 


272  INDUSTRIAL  BOARD— RULES 

tor  or  committee  may,  if  necessary,  in  order  to  properly  adjust  such 
claim,  hear  evidence  on  other  questions. 

RULE  9.  ARBITRATORS;  DISQUALIFICATION.)  No  person  finan- 
cially or  otherwise  interested  in  the  outcome  of  any  arbitration  or  any 
question  connected  therewith,  or  any  member  or  employee  of  the  In- 
dustrial Board,  will  be  permitted  to  act  as  an  arbitrator  on  such  case 
for  either  of  the  parties. 

RULE  10.  AGREEMENT  FOR  COMPENSATION  AND  SETTLEMENT.) 
All  agreements  made  between  employer  and  employee  or  between  per- 
sons furnishing  indemnity  or  insurance,  and  employees  concerning 
the  payment  and  the  fixing  of  compensation  to  be  allowed,  are  sub- 
ject to  the  approval  of  the  Industrial  Board:  Provided,  however,  that 
all  such  agreements  and  settlements  between  any  party  to  the  record 
that  provide  for  the  payment  in  full  in  regular  weekly  payments  of 
the  amounts  fixed  under  the  schedules  in  the  Compensation  Act,  will 
be  approved  as  a  matter  of  course.  All  contracts,  settlements  or  ad- 
justments made  that  are  procured  by  fraud,  improper  influence  or 
misrepresentation,  upon  petition  to  the  Board,  will  be  set  aside. 

RULE  11.  LUMP  SUM  SETTLEMENT.)  Petitions  for  lump  sum 
settlements  may  be  filed  at  any  time.  Such  petitions  must  be  signed 
by  both  parties,  except  those  arising  under  section  7,  or  paragraph  (e) 
of  section  8,  of  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act.  Petitions  for  lump 
sum  settlements  for  injuries  arising  under  section  7,  or  paragraph 
(e)  of  section  8,  may  be  filed  by  either  of  the  parties.  Such  petitions 
shall  set  forth  the  death  of  the  employee,  if  such  be  the  fact,  or,  if  the 
accident  did  not  produce  death,  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  injury; 
together  with  the  weekly,  monthly  or  annual  wages  of  the  employee; 
the  total  amount  of  compensation  due  and  the  present  value  of  the 
sum  remaining,  figured  with  annual  rests,  as  provided  by  law.  All 
petitions  for  lump  sum  settlements  will  be  approved  by  the  Board 
only  upon  investigation  and  showing  that  it  is  for  the  best  interests 
of  the  parties.  Such  petitions  for  lump  sum  settlements  shall  show 
the  names  and  addresses  of  both  employer  and  employee  and  guarantor 
and  surety. 

RULE  12.  CONTESTED  LUMP  SUM  SETTLEMENT;  PRACTICE.)  Con- 
tested questions  arising  on  petitions  for  lump  sum  settlements  may 
be  taken  up  before  the  Board  on  Thursdays  of  each  and  every  week, 
and  will  have  precedence  over  all  other  matters  at  such  times. 

RULE  13.  LUMP  SUM  SETTLEMENT;  PAYMENT;  RECEIPT.)  After 
the  approval  of  all  lump  sum  settlements,  the  employer  shall  procure 
a  receipt  showing  payment  in  full  of  such  lump  sum  so  fixed  as  pro- 
vided therein,  regularly  signed  by  the  injured  employee,  or  his  per- 
sonal representative,  in  case  of  death,  and  file  the  same  with  the  In- 
dustrial Board  at  its  office  in  the  City  Hall  Square  Building,  Chicago, 
Illinois. 

RULE  14.  AUTOMATIC  DISMISSAL  OF  LUMP  SUM  PETITION.)  All 
petitions  for  lump  sum  settlements  which  have  been  presented  to  the 
Board,  and  remain  on  file  in  the  department  for  a  period  of  ninety 
(90)  days,  without  leave  to  withdraw  or  further  action  taken  in  con- 
nection with  the  same,  will  be  automatically,  and  without  specific  or 
special  order  of  the  Board,  stricken  from  the  docket,  without  preju- 
dice to  the  parties,  and  ordered  regularly  indexed  and  filed. 

RULE  15.  SETTING  CASE;  PRACTICE.)  At  any  time  when  there 
shall  be  ten  (10)  or  more  cases  pending  on  review,  wherein  the  parties 
desire  to  introduce  additional  testimony  and  to  be  heard  by  the  Board, 
the  secretary  or  minute  clerk  of  the  Board,  after  consulting  with  the 
Board,  will  set  same  for  hearing  at  the  rate  of  from  six  to  twelve 
cases  per  day,  giving  preference  to  causes  in  the  order  in  which  the 
same  shall  be  filed. 


INDUSTRIAL  BOARD— RULES  273 

RULE  16.  REVIEW;  DISPOSITION  WITHOUT  HEARING.)  At  any 
time  after  the  filing  of  a  petition  for  review  in  a  given  case,  and  not 
before  the  records,  files  and  proceedings  before  the  arbitrator  or  com- 
mittee of  arbitration  shall  have  been  regularly  filed  in  accordance 
with  the  terms  and  provisions  of  the  Act  with  reference  to  reviews, 
agreed  statements  of  facts,  stenographic  reports,  etc.,  the  Industrial 
Board  will  take  and  assign  for  immediate  consideration  by  the  Board, 
not  to  exceed  twenty  (20)  cases  at  a  given  date.  Immediately  upon 
the  taking  of  such  cases  by  the  Board  for  disposition,  the  secretary 
will  notify  the  parties  to  the  record,  or  their  attorneys,  that  the  said 
causes  are  taken  for  consideration,  and  that  unless  within  twenty  (20) 
days  of  the  receipt  of  such  notice  the  parties,  or  either  of  them,  shall 
notify  the  Board  in  writing  that  he,  it  or  they  desire  to  introduce  ad- 
ditional testimony  and  to  be  heard  by  the  Board  upon  the  issues  in- 
volved in  the  petition  for  review,  the  case  will  be  closed,  and  such 
causes,  and  each  of  them,  will  be  disposed  of  in  conference  by  the 
Board  upon  such  records,  stenographic  report  or  agreed  statement  of 
facts,  as  the  case  may  be,  files  and  proceedings,  etc.,  as  were  had  be- 
fore the  arbitrator  or  committee  of  arbitration  in  the  said  cause,  and 
the  decision  handed  down  in  accordance  with  the  facts  then  appearing 
upon  the  record  there  made;  provided,  however,  that  the  parties  may 
file  with  the  Board  their  briefs,  and  together  with  the  same  a  type- 
written argument  of  not  to  exceed  five  pages,  presenting  their  theories 
of  the  facts  and  the  law. 

RULE  17.  REVIEW;  HEARING;  CONTINUANCE.)  Upon  the  call  of 
cases  set  for  hearing  on  review,  wherein  the  parties  desire  to  intro- 
duce additional  testimony  and  to  be  heard  by  the  Board,  the  parties 
should  appear  and  proceed  with  the  cause.  Continuances  will  not  be 
allowed  nor  delays  tolerated,  except  when  it  shall  appear  that  without 
fault  of  either  of  the  parties  material  and  permanent  injury  may 
result  from  a  failure  to  continue  the  cause.  Parties  making  such  ap- 
plications will  be  required  to  comply,  in  substance,  with  the  law  with 
reference  to  motions  and  affidavits  for  continuances  in  courts  of  rec- 
ord. After  the  same  shall  have  been  submitted,  the  Board  will  either 
grant  or  disallow  the  same,  according  to  the  justice  of  the  cause. 

RULE  18.  DEPOSITION;  APPLICATION.)  Parties  desiring  to  take 
the  testimony  of  witnesses  who  live  beyond  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
State,  or  who  for  any  lawful  reason  are  unable  to  attend  hearing  be- 
fore arbitrator  or  committee  of  arbitration  or  upon  review,  may  read 
in  evidence  at  the  hearing  before  such  arbitrator,  committee  or  the 
Board,  depositions  that  are  taken  by  agreement  of  the  parties;  or 
may  read  in  evidence  depositions  that  are  taken  before  some  person 
authorized  to  take  depositions;  provided,  that  they  apply  to  the  secre- 
tary of  the  Industrial  Board  of  Illinois  to  issue  a  deditnuv  potestatem 
or  commission  under  the  seal  of  the  Board,  directed  to  any  competent 
person  to  take  the  testimony  of  such  witness  or  witnesses,  and  pro- 
vided, that  in  all  particulars  the  persons  applying  for  such  dedimus 
or  commission  comply  substantially  with  the  terms,  provisions  and  re- 
quirements of  chapter  51  of  the  Revised  Statutes  of  the  State  of  Illi- 
nois for  the  year  1913. 

RULE  19.  SUMMONS;  SUBPOENA.)  At  any  time  when  any  cause 
concerning  compensation  is  pending  before  any  arbitrator,  committee 
of  arbitration  or  before  the  Industrial  Board,  the  parties  in  interest 
are  entitled  to  invoke  all  the  writs,  summons  or  subpoenas  provided 
for  under  the  Compensation  Act,  and  the  same  will  be  issued  upon  the 
application  of  such  parties  accordingly. 

RULE  20.  ASSIGNMENT  OF  CAUSE;  HEARING;  FINDING.)  At  the 
time  causes  upon  review  not  submitted  to  the  Board  upon  the  record 
made  at  the  hearing  before  an  arbitrator  or  committee  of  arbitration, 


274  INDUSTRIAL  BOARD— RULES 

wherein  the  parties,  or  either  of  them,  desire  to  submit  additional  tes- 
timony and  to  be  heard  before  the  Board,  are  set  for  hearing,  or  as 
soon  thereafter  as  may  be,  the  Board  will  determine  the  time  and 
place  of  hearing.  The  reviews  will  then  be  assigned  to  the  respective 
members  of  the  commission,  dividing  the  work  as  equally  as  may  be. 
Such  additional  testimony,  etc.,  upon  petition  for  review,  may  be 
heard  before  any  one  or  more  members  of  the  Board.  After  the  taking 
of  testimony,  the  Board  will  meet  in  conference  and  make  findings 
and  orders  therein  as  the  facts  justify  and  the  law  requires. 

RULE  21.  REVIEW;  CONSIDERATION  IN  CONFERENCE.)  All  orders, 
judgments  and  decrees  of  the  Board  are  to  be  filed  and  entered  only 
after  consideration  in  conference.  The  findings,  judgments  and  de- 
crees of  any  two  members  of  the  Board  will  constitute  the  opinion  of 
the  Board. 

RULE  22.  HEARING  ON  REVIEW.)  (a)  After  causes  wherein  the 
parties  have  given  notice  of  a  desire  to  introduce  additional  testimony 
and  to  be  heard  before  the  Board,  have  been  set,  the  secretary  or 
minute  clerk  will  make  a  daily  docket  showing  the  number,  title  and 
hour  of  setting  for  each  day's  sitting. 

(b)  Any  member  of  the  Board  may  swear  the  witnesses  and 
take  the  testimony  in  any  cause  pending  before  the  Board. 

(c)  In  all  cases,  where  the  parties  have  given  the  Board  notice 
of  a  desire  to  introduce  additional  testimony  and  to  be  heard  before 
the  Board  upon  review,  parties  petitioning  for  such  review  and  desir- 
ing to  submit  additional  testimony  are  required  to  give  to  the  opposite 
party  five  (5)  days'  notice  of  the  substance  thereof.    In  the  event  of 
failure  to  give  such  notice  concerning  the  substance  of  such  additional 
testimony,  the  other  party  shall  be  entitled  to  a  continuance  of  a 
reasonable  time  in  which  to  meet  the  same. 

(d)  The  claimant  in  the  original  proceedings  before  the  arbitra- 
tor or  committee  of  arbitration  shall  have  the  affirmative  and  the 
right  to  open  and  close  the  argument. 

(e)  At  the  conclusion  of  the  testimony  in  a  given  case,  the  mem- 
ber or  members  of  the  Board  hearing  such  cause  will  fix  the  time  in 
which  each  party  may  present  his,  her  or  its  argument.    At  the  con- 
clusion of  the  argument,  the  case  will  be  taken  for  conference. 

(f )  Proceedings  before  the  Board  shall  be  simple  and  summary, 
though  not  inconsistent  with  the  established  law  of  the  land. 

(g)  Any  attorney,  or  other  party  to  the  record,  violating  any 
of  the  rules  of  the  Board,  or  guilty  of  any  ungentlemanly  or  unpro- 
fessional conduct,  by  rule  regularly  passed  by  the  Board  in  session, 
may  be  subjected  to  discipline  or  disbarment  from  practicing  before 
the  Industrial  Board,  or  before  any  arbitrator  or  committee  of  arbi- 
tration appointed  thereby. 

RULE  23.  RECORDS.)  All  awards  of  arbitrators  or  committees 
of  arbitration,  and  all  orders,  findings  and  decrees  of  the  Industrial 
Board  concerning  the  fixing  of  compensation  or  the  allowance  of  lump 
sum  settlements,  shall  be  made  a  matter  of  record  in  a  book  of  records 
kept  for  such  purposes. 

RULE  24.  ASSURING  PAYMENT  OF  COMPENSATION.)  Each  and 
every  person,  partnership  or  corporation  employing  labor  in  the  State 
of  Illinois,  working  under  the  Compensation  Act,  is  required  to  com- 
ply with  one  of  the  following  provisions: 

(a)  Financial  statement. — File  with  the  Industrial  Board  a 
sworn  statement  of  some  officer  thereof,  if  a  corporation,  or  him,  if  it 
be  an  individual,  showing  its  or  his  financial  ability  to  pay  compensa- 
tion provided  for  in  the  Act  normally  required  to  be  paid;  or 


INDUSTRIAL  BOARD— RULES  275 

(b)  Indemnity    bond. — Furnish    security,    indemnity   or   bond, 
guaranteeing  payment  of  compensation  provided  for  in  said  Act,  nor- 
mally required  to  be  paid;  such  security,  indemnity  or  bond  shall  be 
taken  in  some  company  or  corporation  licensed  to  do  such  business 
under  the  laws  of  the  State  of  Illinois;  and  shall  furnish  therewith 
satisfactory  proof  of  the  solvency  of  such  surety,  indemnity  or  bond; 
or 

(c)  Insurance — -affidavit. — Take  out  insurance,  insuring  in  full 
his  or  its  normal  liability  to  pay  compensation  in  some  company,  cor- 
poration or  association  authorized,  licensed  or  permitted  to  do  such 
insurance  business  in  the  State  of  Illinois,  and  at  the  time  such  in- 
surance is  so  taken  the  insurance  company,  corporation  or  association 
so  furnishing  the  same   shall  furnish  to  the  Industrial   Board  an 
affidavit  of  some  officer  thereof,  if  it  be  a  corporation,  or  of  him,  if  an 
individual,  showing  what  such  normal  liability  of  such  person  so  in- 
sured has  been  for  two  years  prior  to  the  date  of  such  insurance. 

RULE  25.  FINANCIAL  STATEMENT;  APPROVAL;  NOTICE.)  The 
sworn  statement,  security,  indemnity  or  bond,  or  insurance  furnished 
as  provided  in  Rule  24,  will  be  subject  to  the  approval  of  the  Industrial 
Board,  and  when  the  same  shall  be  approved,  written  notice  of  ap- 
proval will  be  sent  to  the  employer  so  furnishing  the  same. 

RULE  26.  EVIDENCE  OP  FINANCIAL  ABILITY  REQUIRED.)  Em- 
ployers of  labor  electing  to  make  some  other  provision  than  the  above 
for  securing  of  compensation  shall,  within  twenty  (20)  days  of  re- 
ceipt of  written  demand  from  the  Industrial  Board,  furnish  to  the  In- 
dustrial Board  evidence  of  his  or  its  compliance  with  one  of  the  above 
alternatives. 

RULE  27.  NON-APPROVAL  OF  SECURITY;  OPTION.)  If  the  employer 
does  not  comply  with  one  of  the  provisions  of  paragraph  (a),  section 
26,  of  the  Compensation  Act,  as  provided  in  Rule  24  of  this  Board, 
within  ten  (10)  days'  written  demand  by  the  Board,  or  after  ten  (10) 
days'  written  notice  of  the  non-approval  of  the  security,  indemnity, 
bond  or  insurance  furnished,  he  or  it  will  be  liable  for  either  com- 
pensation or  damages  at  the  option  of  the  employee;  such  option  to  be 
exercised  within  thirty  (30)  days  after  the  accident  occurred. 

RULE  28.  EXPIRATION  OF  INSURANCE;  NOTICE.)  At  any  time 
any  policy  insuring  an  employer  of  labor  against  loss  by  reason  of  in- 
jury is  terminated,  the  insurance  company  shall  notify  the  Industrial 
Board  ten  (10)  days  before  such  termination.  On  receipt  of  such 
notice  of  termination  or  cancellation,  the  Board  will  notify  such  em- 
ployer so  taking  such  insurance  to  within  ten  (10)  days  take  out 
other  indemnities  or  insurance,  or  in  some  way  comply  with  section 
26  of  the  Compensation  Act,  and  upon  failure  to  comply  will  be  sub- 
ject to  either  compensation  or  damages  at  the  option  of  the  employee, 
provided  such  option  be  exercised  within  thirty  (30)  days  of  the  acci- 
dent. 

RULE  29.  RECEIPT;  FILING.)  Employers  paying  compensation 
under  provisions  of  the  Act,  whether  in  conformity  with  the  terms 
and  agreements  of  any  settlement  or  adjustment  between  the  parties, 
or  upon  the  findings  and  approval  of  the  Industrial  Board,  shall  file 
at  the  end  of  every  month  with  the  Industrial  Board,  receipts  showing 
the  sum  total  of  all  payments  made  during  the  month. 

RULE  30.  ARBITRATOR'S  OATH;  FORM.)  Each  arbitrator  ap- 
pointed by  either  of  the  respective  parties  or  by  this  Board,  to  sit  in 
any  given  case  for  the  purpose  of  arbitrating  any  question  of  law  or 
fact  between  the  parties,  shall  be  required  to  take  the  following  oath 
or  affirmation,  before  entering  upon  the  hearing  of  any  cause: 


276  INDUSTRIAL  BOARD— RULES 

"I, ,  do  solemnly  swear  (or  affirm)  that  I  will  honestly 

and  fairly  perform  the  duties  imposed  upon  me  as  arbitrator  in  the 

cause  wherein is  petitioner  and is  respondent,  to 

the  best  of  my  ability  and  in  accordance  with  the  terms  and  provisions 
of  the  State  Compensation  Act — so  help  me  God." 

RULE  31.  TRANSCRIPT  OP  RECORD;  AUTHENTICATION.)  Persons 
desiring  to  have  a  decision  of  the  Industrial  Board  reviewed  by  the 
Circuit  Court,  on  filing  with  the  secretary  of  the  Board  written  mo- 
tion therefor,  will  be  given  fifteen  (15)  days  in  addition  to  the  twenty 
(20)  days  fixed  in  and  by  law  in  which  to  file  with  the  Board  either  an 
agreed  statement  of  facts  or  a  correct  stenographic  report  of  the  ad- 
ditional proceedings  appearing  before  the  Board.  Such  agreed  state- 
ment of  facts  or  stenographic  report  to  be  authenticated  by  the  parties 
or  their  attorneys,  and  in  the  event  they  cannot  agree,  by  the  Chair- 
man of  the  Board. 

RULE  32.  AUTHENTICATION  OF  RECORD  ON  APPEAL.)  Upon  the 
service  of  a  writ  of  certiorari  from  any  of  the  Circuit  Courts  of  this 
State,  commanding  this  Board  to  certify  its  record  or  records  or  to 
the  proceedings  had  in  any  given  case,  to  such  court  for  further  pro- 
ceedings therein  as  may  be  required  by  law,  it  shall  be  the  duty  of 
the  secretary  of  this  Board,  in  compliance  with  such  writ,  to  certify 
to  the  records,  etc.,  ordered  therein,  in  the  name  of  the  Industrial 
Board  of  Illinois. 


277 


INDUSTRIAL  BOARD  OF  ILLINOIS 
FORMS. 

NO.  1.  Notice  of  election  by  employer  to  provide  and  pay 
compensation  according  to  provisions  of  Workmen's 
Compensation  Act  

NO.     7.     Notice  of  election  by  employer  not  to  provide,  etc.  . . 

NO.  2.  Notice  of  withdrawal  of  election  by  employer  to  pro- 
vide, etc.  

NO.  5.  Notice  of  withdrawal  of  election  by  employer  not  to 
provide,  etc 

NO.  4.  Notice  of  withdrawal  of  election  by  employee  to  be 
subject  to  Act 

NO.  6.  Notice  of  withdrawal  of  election  by  employee  not  to 
be  subject  to  Act 

NO.  46.  Report  of  accidental  injury  resulting  in  permanent 
disability  

NO.  40.  Notice  of  accidental  injury  and  claim  for  compensa- 
tion by  employee  

NO.  41.  Notice  of  accidental  injury  resulting  in  partial  per- 
manent disability  and  of  claim  by  employee  after  return 
to  work  

NO.  10.    Application  for  adjustment  of  claim 

NO.  77.    Notice  by  Board  of  filing  claim 

NO.  11.  Request  for  appointment  of  member  on  Committee 
of  Arbitration 

NO.  Notice  of  election  to  have  determination  by  Commit- 
tee of  Arbitration  and  appointment  of  member 

NO.  12.  Notice  of  appointment  of  member  of  Committee  of 
Arbitration  

NO.  13.  Notice  of  appointment  of  member  of  Committee  of 
Arbitration  by  Board  to  fill  vacancy 

NO.  15.     Subpoena  

NO.  16.    Notice  to  produce  books,  papers  and  records 

NO.     8.    Request  for  physical  examination  by  employer 

NO.  17.  Appointment  of  physician  by  Board  for  examination 
of  claimant  

NO.  71.  Tender  of  services  by  Board  for  amicable  adjustment 
of  disputed  claim 

NO.  26.  Stipulation,  waiver  of  arbitration  and  submission  of 
questions  in  dispute  for  decision  of  Board 

NO.  21.    Agreed  statement  of  facts 

NO.  Stipulation  waiving  stenographic  report  

NO.  74.  Report  of  accident  by  employer"  for  amicable  adjust- 
ment   

NO.  73.  Report  of  accident  by  employee  for  amicable  adjust- 
ment . 


278  INDUSTRIAL  BOARD— FORMS 

NO.  75.    Report  by  surgeon  for  amicable  adjustment 

NO.  72.    Notice  of  hearing  by  Board  for  amicable  adjustment 

NO.  9.  Notice  to  Board  by  employer  or  employee  of  failure  to 
reach  agreement  and  request  for  arbitration 

NO.  39.  Notice  by  employee  of  exercise  of  option  to  proceed 
for  recovery  of  damages  or  award  of  compensation  under 
Act  (§26)  

NO.  14.     Notice  by  Board  of  hearing 

NO.  ISA.    Decision  of  arbitrator 

NO.  O18.    Decision  and  award  by  Committee  of  Arbitration  . 

NO.  65.    Notice  of  decision  of  arbitrator  

NO.  24.     Petition  for  review  by  Board  of  agreement  or  award 

NO.  33.  Memorandum  of  name  and  address  for  service  of 
notices 

NO.  25.     Notice  by  Board  of  hearing  for  review 

NO.  66.  Notice  by  Board  to  introduce  any  additional  testi- 
mony   

NO.  22.     Decision  of  Board  on  review 

NO.  34.    Judgment  stay  bond  upon  petition  for  review 

NO.  28.     Petition  for  award  of  lump  sum 

NO.  Assent  by  employer  to  order  for  lump  sum 

NO.  27.    Notice  by  Board  of  petition  for  lump  sum 

NO.  29.    Answer  to  petition  for  award  of  lump  sum 

NO.  30.     Order  awarding  lump  sum 

NO.  31.     Notice  of  award  of  lump  sum 

NO.  32.     Notice  of  rejection  of  award  of  lump  sum 

NO.  43.    Receipt  on  account  for  compensation 

NO.  42.     Receipt  for  compensation  in  settlement 

NO.  20.     Request  by  Board  for  report  and  receipts 

NO.  36.  Demand  by  Board  for  security  for  payment  of  com- 
pensation   

NO.  37.    Notice  of  approval  by  Board  of  security 

NO.  38.    Notice  of  non-approval  by  Board  of  Security 

NO.  53.    Request  by  Board  for  financial  report  of  employer  . . . 


INDUSTRIAL  BOARD— FORMS  279 

Notice  of  Election  by  Employer  to  Provide  and  Pay  Com- 
pensation According  to  Provisions  of  Workmen's  Com- 
pensation Act. 

Form  1. 
To  THE  INDUSTRIAL  BOARD  OF  THE  STATE  OP  ILLINOIS: 

Notice  is  hereby  given  that  the  undersigned  employer  of  labor  in 
Illinois  ACCEPTS  THE  PROVISIONS  OF  THE  WORKMEN'S 
COMPENSATION  ACT  OF  ILLINOIS,  approved  June  28,  1913,  and 
amended  June  28,  1915,  and  elects  to  provide  and  pay  compensation 
for  accidental  injuries  to  employees,  in  accordance  therewith. 

Number  of  employees 

Location  of  place  of  employment  

(If  more  than  one  plant,  place  of  business  or  work  place,  state  each 

fully) 


Nature  of  employment 

(If  more  than  one  kind,  state  each  fully,  with  location) 


Method  of  providing  for  compensation  adopted  by  the  undersigned  . . 

(State  whether  mutual  insurance   [give  name],  insurance  company 
[give  name],  or  carrying  own  risk) 

Dated  at this day  of 19. .. 

Signed 


By 

Address : 


Notice  of  Election  by  Employer  not  to  Provide  and  Pay 
Compensation  According  to  Provisions  of  Workmen's 
Compensation  Act. 

Form  7. 
To  THE  INDUSTRIAL  BOARD  OF  THE  STATE  OF  ILLINOIS: 

Notice  is  hereby  given  that  the  undersigned  employer  of  labor  in 
Illinois  hereby  elects  NOT  to  provide  and  pay  compensation  accord- 
ing to  the  provisions  of  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  of  the  State 
of  Illinois,  approved  June  28,  1913,  and  amended  June  28.  1916. 

Dated  at this day  of 19. .. 

Signed    

By  

Engaged  in  the  business  of: 


(State  in  detail) 
Address: 


280  INDUSTRIAL  BOARD— FORMS 

Notice  of  Withdrawal  of  Election  by  Employer  to  Pro- 
vide and  Pay  Compensation  According  to  Provisions  of 
Workmen's  Compensation  Act. 

Form  2. 

To  THE  INDUSTRIAL  BOARD  OP  THE  STATE  OF  ILLINOIS: 

Notice  is  hereby  given  that  the  undersigned  employer  of  labor  in 

the  State  of  Illinois  hereby  WITHDRAWS   election  to  be 

subject  to  the  provisions  of  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  of  the 
State  of  Illinois,  approved  June  28,  1913,  and  amended  June  28,  1915. 

Dated  at this day  of 19. .. 

Signed    


Address : 


Notice  of  Withdrawal  of  Election  by  Employer  not  to 
Provide  and  Pay  Compensation  According  to  Provi- 
sions of  Workmen's  Compensation  Act. 

Form  5. 

To  THE  INDUSTRIAL  BOARD  OF  THE  STATE  OF  ILLINOIS: 

Notice  is  hereby  given  that  the  undersigned  employer  of  labor  in 
Illinois  hereby  WITHDRAWS election  to  reject  the  Work- 
men's Compensation  Acts  of  the  State  of  Illinois  of  1913  and  1915, 

Heretofore  filed  with  the  Industrial  Board,  on  or  about  the 

day  of 19 . . ,  and  hereby  accepts  the  provisions  of  said  Act. 

Number  of  Employees  

Location  of  place  of  employment 

(If  more  than  one  plant,  place  of  business  or  work  place,  state  each 

fully) 


Nature  of  employment 

(If  more  than  one  kind,  state  each  fully,  with  location) 

Method  of  providing  for  compensation 

(State  whether  mutual  insurance,  insurance  company,  or  carry  own 

risk) 

Dated  at this day  of 19. .. 


By 

Address: 


INDUSTRIAL  BOARD— FORMS  281 

Notice  of  Withdrawal  of  Election  by  Employee  to  be  Sub- 
ject to  Workmen's  Compensation  Act. 

Form  4. 
To  THE  INDUSTRIAL  BOARD  OF  THE  STATE  OF  ILLINOIS: 

Notice  is  hereby  given  that  the  undersigned  employee,  in  the  ser- 
vice of an  employer  of  labor  at in  the  State  of  Illi- 
nois, hereby  WITHDRAWS election  to  be  subject  to  the 

provisions  of  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  of  the  State  of  Illi- 
nois, approved  June  28,  1913,  and  amended  June  28,  1915. 

Dated  at this day  of 19. .. 

Signed    


Address : 


Notice  of  Withdrawal  of  Election  by  Employee  not  to  be 
Subject  to  Workmen's  Compensation  Act. 

Form  6. 
To  THE  INDUSTRIAL  BOARD  OF  THE  STATE  OF  ILLINOIS: 

Notice  is  hereby  given  that  the  undersigned  employee,  in  the  ser- 
vice of an  employer  of  labor  at  ,  Illinois,  hereby 

WITHDRAWS  election  to  reject  the  Workmen's  Compen- 
sation Act  of  the  State  of  Illinois  and  the  Act  of  Amendment  thereof 
of  1915,  heretofore  filed  with  the  Industrial  Board,  on  or  about  the 

day  of ,  19 . . ,  and  hereby  accepts  the  provisions  of 

said  Act. 

Dated  at this day  of 19. .. 

Address : 


282  INDUSTRIAL  BOARD— FORMS 

Report  of  Accidental  Injury  Resulting  in  Permanent  Dis- 
ability. 

Form  46. 
To  THE  INDUSTRIAL  BOARD  OF  THE  STATE  OF  ILLINOIS: 

The  undersigned  hereby  reports  accidental  injury,  in  which  per- 
manent disability  has  resulted  to  an  employee,  as  follows: 

Employer's  name   Business 

Main  Office:    City  or  Town  

City  or  town  in  which  accident  happened 

Employee's  name Address: 

City  or  Town 

Sex  . .  Age  . .  Married  or  Single  . .  American  or  foreign  born 

Occupation  when  injured Wages  

Date  of  accident  ........  o'clock M. 

Direct  cause  of  injury 


Nature  of  accident  (describe  fully) 


If  non-fatal,  the  length  of  disability 

Permanent  disability  of  employee  resulted  or  will  result  on  ....  19. .. 

Attending  physician  or  surgeon 

Hospital   

Amount  paid  By  whom  

Has  compensation  been  paid? To  whom 

Amount 

Date  of  report Prepared  by 


INDUSTRIAL  BOARD— FORMS  283 

Notice  of  Accidental  Injury  and  Claim  for  Compensation 
by  Employee. 

Form  40. 

To 

(Name  of  employer) 


(Address) 

You  will  take  notice  that  the  undersigned  on  the day  of 

,  A.  D.  19 . . ,  suffered  accidental  injuries  arising  out  of  and 

in  the  course  of  his  employment,  while  employed  by  you  at 

Illinois. 

Name  of  employee 

Post  Office  Address   

Claim  for  compensation  is  for 

Cause  of  the  accident  . 


Nature  of  the  injury  is  as  follows 


284  INDUSTRIAL  BOARD— FORMS 

Notice  of  Accidental  Injury  Resulting  in  Partial  Perma- 
nent Disability  and  of  Claim  by  Employee  After  Re- 
turn to  Work. 

Form  41. 
To  THE  INDUSTRIAL  BOARD  OP  THE  STATE  OP  ILLINOIS: 

Notice  is  hereby  given  that  the  undersigned,  an  employee,  in  the 

service  of an  employer  engaged  in  this  business  of 

at ,  Illinois,  suffered  accidental  injuries  arising  out  of  and  in 

the  course  of  such  employment,  on  the day  of 19 . . , 

at  the of  said  employer,  at ,  Illinois;  that  the  cause 

of  said  accident  was 

............*t. ........................... 

and  the  nature  of  the  injuries  is 

on  account  of  which  the  undersigned  employee  is  partially  and  per- 
manently incapacitated  from  pursuing  his  usual  and  customary  line 
of  employment;  that  on  the day  of 19. .,  the  un- 
dersigned employee  returned  to  the  employment  of  said  employer  .... 
,  in  whose  service  he  was  injured  as  aforesaid. 

Further  take  notice,  that  the  undersigned  employee  hereby  makes 

formal  claim  for  compensation  against  said  employer  for 

$ being   weeks   days,  at  $ per 

week  or day,  on  account  of  said  accidental  injuries  of  .... 

19 . . ,  and  request  is  hereby  made  that  a  copy  of  this  notice  be 

sent  by  registered  mail  to  said  employer   at   as 

provided  by  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  of  the  State  of  Illinois. 

Dated  .  .19.. 


(Employee) 
Address:  


INDUSTRIAL  BOARD— FORMS  285 

Application  for  Adjustment  of  Claim. 

(This  form  to  be  filed  in  duplicate) 
Form  10. 


Applicant. ., 
vs. 


Respondent. .. 

The  petition  of  the  above  named  applicant. .  respectfully  shows 
to  your  Honorable  Board  as  follows,  to  wit: 

I. 

That  on  the day  of 19 

(Name  of  person  injured.) 
suffered  accidental  injuries  arising  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  h. .. 

employment  by  the  above  named  

(Name  of  employer.) 

That  your  petitioner  is  the 

(If  applicant  is  a  dependent  state  relationship.) 
person  injured. 

II. 

That  a  question  has  arisen  with  respect  to  the  compensation  to 
be  paid  therefor,  and  the  general  nature  of  the  claim  in  controversy  is 
as  follows,  to-wit: 

(Give  the  date  that  employer  refused  to  pay  the  compensation  de- 
manded, and  state  briefly  the  exact  matter  in  dispute,  as  for  example: 

(A)  Employer  denies  liability  for  compensation,  or, 

(B)  A  dispute  has  arisen  concerning  the  amount  or  duration  of 
the  compensation  payable.) 


III. 

That  the  following  is  a  statement  of  particulars  relative  to  this 
application : 

1.  Name  of  injured  employee   

Address    

Occupation    

2.  Name  of  employer 

Address    

Place  of  establishment — 

Business  address   

3.  Names  and  addresses  of  all  other  parties  to  this  application,  and 
reason  such  parties  are  joined 


4.  Place  of  accident 

5.  Nature  of  work  on  which  injured  person  was  engaged  at  time  of 


286  INDUSTRIAL  BOARD— FORMS 

accident    

6.     Description  of  accident  and  cause  of  injury 


7.  State  whether  or  not  medical  and  surgical  treatment  required, 

and  whether  furnished  by  employer  or  not 

8.  Name  and  address  of  Attending  Physician 

9.  Nature  of  injury 

10.  Has  injured  person  fully  recovered?    If  so,  when 


11.  Particulars  of  disability,  whether  total  or  partial,  and  estimated 
duration  thereof.    If  death  resulted,  so  state,  giving  date  of  death. 


12.  Average  earnings  of  employee  prior  to  accident,  excluding  over- 

time: 

$ per  week. 

$ per  month. 

$ per  year. 

13.  Amount  injured  person  is  earning,  or  is  able  to  earn  in  some  suit- 
able employment  or  business  after  the  accident: 

$ per  week 

$ per  month. 

14.  Payment,  allowance  or  benefit  received  from  employer  during 
period  of  disability: 

$ for  medical  care  and  attendance. 

$ per  week  for weeks  of  total  disability. 

$ per  week  for weeks  of  partial  disability. 

15.  Additional  amount  claimed  as  compensation : 

$ for  medical  care  and  attendance. 

$ per  week  for weeks  of  total  disability. 

$ per  week  for weeks  of  partial  disability. 

16.  Date  of  service  on  the  employer  on  notice  of  accident 

17.  If  notice  not  served  within  thirty  days,  reason  for  omission  .... 


18.  If  application  is  to  adjust  claim  for  death,  state  name,  address  and 
relationship  of  all  dependents. 

Name    

Address    

If  to  adjust  claim  for  medical  attendance  or  funeral  expenses, 
state  names  and  addresses  of  all  other  such  creditors  and  amounts 
of  claims,  if  known. 
Name    


INDUSTRIAL  BOARD— FORMS  287 


Address    

Name    

Address    

IV. 
(Here  state  any  further  facts  that  may  be  desired.) 


Wherefore  your  petitioner  prays,  that  the  above  named  respon- 
dent be  required  to  answer  this  petition;  that  a  time  and  place  be 
fixed  for  hearing  hereof  and  due  notice  thereof  given;  and  that  upon 
such  hearing,  an  order  of  award  be  made  by  your  Honorable  Board 
granting  such  relief  as  the  said  applicant  may  be  entitled  to  in  the 
premises. 

Dated  at this day  of 19 ... 

(Signed)    

Address    

Paragraph  (a)  of  Section  19  of  the  Workmen's  Compensation 
Act  provides:  "If  the  compensation  claimed  is  for  a  partial  per- 
manent or  total  permanent  incapacity  or  for  death,  then  the  dispute 
may,  at  the  election  of  either  party,  be  determined  by  a  committee  of 
arbitration,  which  election  for  a  determination  by  a  committee  shall 
be  made  by  the  petitioner  filing  with  the  Board  his  election  in  writing 
with  his  petition  or  by  the  other  party  fling  with  the  Board  his  elec- 
tion in  writing  within  five  days  of  notice  to  him  of  the  filing  of  the 
petition,  *  *  *  The  party  filing  his  election  for  a  committee  of  arbi- 
tration shall  with  his  election  deposit  with  the  Board  the  sum  of 
twenty  dollars  to  be  paid  by  the  Board  to  the  arbitrators  selected  by 
the  parties  as  compensation  for  their  services  as  arbitrators;"  and 
that  in  case  neither  of  the  parties  make  such  election  or  fail  to  deposit 
the  sum  of  twenty  dollars  with  such  election,  or,  in  case  the  compen- 
sation claimed  is  not  "for  a  partial  permanent  or  total  permanent  in- 
capacity or  for  death,"  an  arbitrator  designated  by  the  Board  shall 
determine  said  matter. 

(In  case  petitioner  elects  to  have  said  matter  determined  by  a 
committee  of  arbitration,  the  following  election  must  be  filed  and  the 
sum  of  twenty  dollars  deposited  with  the  Board.) 

NOTICE  OF  ELECTION  FOR  A  DETERMINATION  BY  A  COM- 
MITTEE OF  ARBITRATION. 

The  petitioner  herein  elects  to  have  the  above  entitled  matter 
determined  by  a  Committee  of  Arbitration. 

Dated  this day  of ,  19. .. 


Petitioner. 

Address    . 


Petitioner's  Attorney  or  Agent. 

Address 

Telephone  Number 


288  INDUSTRIAL  BOARD— FORMS 

Notice  by  Board  of  Filing  of  Claim. 

Form  77. 

YOU  ARE  HEREBY  NOTIFIED  that  application  for  adjustment 
of  claim  in  the  above  entitled  matter  was  filed  with  said  Board  on  the 

day  of ,  19. . ;  that  under  paragraph  (a)  of  Section 

19  of  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act,  providing  for  cases  where 
claim  is  made  for  partial  permanent  or  total  permanent  incapacity  or 
for  death,  you  may  elect  to  have  said  matter  determined  by  a  Commit- 
tee of  Arbitration  by  filing  with  this  Board  your  "election  in  writing 
within  five  days"  of  the  receipt  of  this  notice  and  by  depositing  with 
this  Board  with  such  election  the  sum  of  twenty  dollars,  to  be  paid  to 
the  arbitrators  selected  by  the  parties  hereto  as  compensation  for 
their  services  as  such  arbitrators.  In  case  you  do  not  make  such 
election  and  deposit,  or,  in  case  the  compensation  claimed  is  not  for 
"partial  permanent  or  total  permanent  incapacity  or  for  death"  an 
arbitrator  designated  by  this  Board  will  determine  the  questions  in 
dispute  in  said  matter. 

Form (Notice  of  Election  for  a  Determination  by  a  Com- 
mittee of  Arbitration)  is  enclosed  herewith. 

Form  33  (Memorandum  of  Names  and  Addresses  for  Service  of 
Notices)  is  also  enclosed  herewith,  and  should  be  filled  in  and  filed 
with  this  Board  at  once. 

Dated  this day  of ,  19. .. 

INDUSTRIAL  BOARD  OF  ILLINOIS, 

(SEAL)  By 

Secretary. 


INDUSTRIAL  BOARD— FORMS  289 

Request  for  Appointment  of  Member  on  Committee  of 
Arbitration. 

Form  11. 

YOU  ARE  HEREBY  NOTIFIED  to  appoint  a  member  on  a 
Committee  of  Arbitration,  in  the  above  matter,  and  to  file  your  notice 
of  such  appointment  with  the  Industrial  Board  of  Illinois  within 
seven  (7)  days  after  the  receipt  of  this  notice,  in  default  of  which 
this  Board  will  appoint  a  suitable  person  to  act  for  you  as  a  member 
of  said  Committee  of  Arbitration,  for  the  purpose  of  hearing  and  de- 
termining all  questions  in  dispute  between  the  parties  in  the  above 
entitled  matter. 

Dated  this day  of ,  19. .. 

INDUSTRIAL  BOARD  OF  ILLINOIS, 

(SEAL)  By 

Secretary. 

Notice  of  Election  to  have  Determination  by  Committee 
of  Arbitration  and  Appointment  of  Member. 

To  THE  INDUSTRIAL  BOARD  OF  THE  STATE  OF  ILLINOIS: 

Notice  is  hereby  given  that  the  undersigned   ,  h 

elected  to  have  the  above  entitled  cause  determined  by  a  Committee  of 
Arbitration,  and  you  are  further  notified  that ,  whose  post- 
office  address  is ,  has  been  chosen  by as  a  member 

of  the  Committee. 

Noice  of  Appointment  of  Member  of  Committee  of  Arbi- 
tration. 

To  THE  INDUSTRIAL  BOARD  OF  THE  STATE  OF  ILLINOIS: 

Notice  is  hereby  given  that whose  Post  Office  address  is 

,  has  been  chosen  as  a  member  of  the  Committee  of  Arbitra- 
tion is  the  above  entitled  matter  by  the  undersigned. 

Notice  of  Appointment  of  Member  of  Committee  of  Arbi- 
tration by  Board  to  Fill  Vacancy. 

Form  13. 

You  are  hereby  notified  that  the  Industrial  Board  has  appointed 
of to  act  as  a  member  of  the  Committee  of  Arbi- 
tration, in  the  above  entitled  matter  representing  ,  who 

failed  to  appoint  a  representative  on  said  Committee  of  Arbitration 
within  seven  (7)  days  after  notification  by  this  Board,  as  required  by 
statute,  and  that  therefore  the  above  named  appointee  of  this  Board 
will  act  on  said  Committee  of  Arbitration. 

Dated  at  Chicago.  Illinois,  this day  of ,  19. .. 

INDUSTRIAL  BOARD  OF  ILLINOIS, 

(SEAL)  By 

Secretary. 


290  INDUSTRIAL  BOARD— FOKMS 

Subpoena. 

Form  15. 

To GREETING  : 

You  are  hereby  required  and  commanded  to  be  and  appear  before 

of  the  Industrial  Board  of  Illinois,  at in  the  City 

of County  of State  of  Illinois,  on  the day 

of A.  D.  19. . ,  at o'clock  in  the noon,  then 

and  there  to  give  evidence  in  a  certain  matter  pending  before  said 

wherein is  applicant  and  is  respondent. 

Hereof  fail  at  your  peril. 

GIVEN  under  the  hand  and  seal  of  this  Board  this day 

of A.  D.  19... 

INDUSTRIAL  BOARD  OF  ILLINOIS, 

(SEAL)  By 

Member  of  Board. 

Notice  to  Produce  Books,  Papers  and  Records. 

Form  16. 

To  GREETING: 

YOU  ARE  HEREBY  REQUIRED  AND  COMMANDED  to  ap- 
pear and  produce  before of  the  Industrial  Board  of  Illinois, 

at in  the  city  of County  of State  of  Illi- 
nois, on  the day  of 19 . . ,  at o'clock 

M.,  the  following  books,  papers  and  documents 

relating  to  the  matter  now  pending  before  this  Board,  wherein  .... 

....  is  applicant  and is  respondent. 

Hereof  fail  at  your  peril. 

GIVEN  under  the  hand  and  seal  of  this  Board  this day 

of A.  D.  19... 

INDUSTRIAL  BOARD  OF  ILLINOIS, 

(SEAL)  By 

Member  of  Board. 


INDUSTRIAL  BOARD— FORMS  291 

Request  for  Physical  Examination  by  Employer. 

Form  8. 

YOU  ARE  HEREBY  REQUESTED  to  submit  yourself,  at  the 
expense  of  the  undersigned,  for  examination  by  a  duly  qualified  medi- 
cal practitioner  or  surgeon  to  be  selected  by  the  undersigned,  and 

for  that  purpose  to  be  and  appear  at on  the day  of 

at o'clock M.,  and  if  such  time  and  place  is 

not  reasonably  convenient,  you  are  requested  immediately  to  notify  the 
undersigned  at  what  time  and  place  it  will  be  reasonably  convenient 
for  you  to  submit  to  such  examination,  which  examination  will  be  for 
the  purpose  of  determining  the  nature,  extent  and  probable  duration 
of  the  injury  claimed  to  have  been  received  by  you,  and  to  ascertain 
the  amount  of  compensation,  if  any,  which  may  be  due  on  account  of 
any  disability  resulting  therefrom. 

Dated  this day  of ,  19. .. 


Employer. 
Address    

Appointment  of  Physician  by  Board  for  Examination  of 
Claimant. 

Form  17. 

You  are  hereby  appointed  by  the  Industrial  Board  of  the  State  of 
Illinois  to  examine  ,  an  injured  employee,  who  claims  com- 
pensation from of on  account  of  an  accidental  in- 
jury, alleged  to  have  been  sustained  by  said  employee  on  the 

day  of ;  such  examination  to  be  made  by  you  on  the 

day  of  .........  at o'clock  ....  M.,  at 

Dated  this day  of ,  19 ... 

INDUSTRIAL  BOARD, 

(SEAL)  By 

Member  of  Board. 


292  INDUSTRIAL  BOARD— FORMS 

Tender  of  Services  of  Industrial  Board  for  Amicable  Ad- 
justment of  Disputed  Claim. 

Form  71. 
Application  for  Arbitration  of  the  above  entitled  matter  having 

been  filed  with  this  Board  on  the   day  of   ,  19 . . , 

you  are  hereby  notified  that  this  Board  tenders  its  services  to  the 
parties  hereto  in  order  that  they  may  arrive  at  an  amicable  adjust- 
ment thereof.  For  that  purpose  are  enclosed  herewith  blank  forms, 

which  should  be  filled  in  by  the  respective  parties  (Form  No by 

the  employee ;  Form  No.  ....  by  the  employer ;  and  Form  No 

by  the  attending  physician)  and  returned  promptly  to  this  Board. 

Form  26  (Stipulation  and  Waiver  of  Arbitration),  which  is  also 
enclosed  herewith,  should  also  be  signed  by  both  parties,  or  their  re- 
spective attorneys,  after  the  contentions  of  the  parties  have  been  set 
forth  therein,  and  returned  to  this  Board.  You  will  then  be  notified 
of  the  place,  date  and  hour  the  matter  will  be  taken  up  by  the  Board. 
This  tender  to  be  accepted  within  ten  days  from  date. 

Dated  this day  of 19. .. 

INDUSTRIAL  BOARD  OF  ILLINOIS, 
By  

Stipulation  and  Waiver  of  Arbitration. 

Form  26. 

The  facts  in  this  case  being  undisputed,  and  the  only  matter  in 
difference  between  the  parties  hereto  being  the  construction  and  ap- 
plication to  said  facts  of  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act,  and  the 
parties  hereto  desiring  to  obtain  a  decision  of  said  matter  by  the  In- 
dustrial Board  without  resorting  to  arbitration,  do  hereby  stipulate 
and  agree  as  follows : 

That  the  accident  to  the  employee,  upon  which  the  claim  for  com- 
pensation in  this  cause  is  based,  occurred  on  the day  of  .... 

.  . .  . ,  19 . . ,  in  the  city  or  town  of ,  County  of ,  State 

of  Illinois,  and  that  the  same  arose  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  his 
employment.  That  the  character  and  nature  of  the  injury  and  the 
result  thereof  is  substantially  as  set  forth  in  the  reports  of  the  em- 
ployee, employer  and  attending  surgeon,  which  are  filed  herewith  and 
made  a  part  hereof: 

That  the  questions  in  dispute  and  the  contentions  of  each  of  the 
parties  with  reference  thereto  are  as  follows: 

QUESTIONS  IN  DISPUTE 
EMPLOYEE'S  CONTENTION 
EMPLOYER'S  CONTENTION 
That  the  arbitration  of  the  matters  in  difference  between  the 


INDUSTRIAL  BOARD— FORMS  293 

parties  hereto,  provided  for  in  said  Workmen's  Compensation  Act,  be 
and  the  same  is  hereby  waived;  and  that  said  matters  are  hereby 
submitted  to  the  Industrial  Board  for  its  decision.  It  is  further  stip- 
ulated and  agreed  that  the  decision  of  said  Board  in  this  cause,  pur- 
suant to  this  stipulation,  and  based  upon  the  facts  set  forth  in  the 
reports,  etc.,  filed  herein,  shall  be  valid  and  binding,  and  shall  have 
the  same  validity,  force  and  effect  as  if  said  cause  had  proceeded  to 
arbitration  in  due  course,  and  been  brought  before  the  full  Board  for 
review  of  the  decision  of  an  arbitrator  or  arbitration  committee  herein. 
In  witness  whereof  the  parties  have  signed  this  stipulation  at  .... 

in  the  County  of ,  State  of  Illinois,  this day 

of 19... 


Applicant. 
Respondent. 
Agreed  Statement  of  Facts. 

Form  21. 

The  parties  to  the  above  entitled  matter  hereby  submit  the  fol- 
lowing as  an  agreed  statement  of  facts,  properly  authenticated  by  the 
signatures  of  the  parties  hereto,  as  required  by  the  Workmen's  Com- 
pensation Act. 

IT  IS  AGREED  that  the  facts  herein,  appearing  upon  the  hear- 
ing before  the  Committee  of  Arbitration,  were  as  follows: 


Stipulation  Waiving  Stenographic  Report. 

IT  IS  HEREBY  STIPULATED  by  the  parties  hereto  that  a 
stenographic  report  of  the  testimony  herein,  as  provided  in  Section  16 
of  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act,  be,  and  the  same  hereby  is 
waived. 


294  INDUSTRIAL  BOARD— FORMS 

Employer's  Report  of  Accident. 

Form  74. 

This  form  to  be  used  ONLY  in  caa.es  where  parties  accept  tender 
of  services  of  Board  for  amicable  adjustment, 

Name  of  injured  employee  (in  full)   

Occupation    

(At  time  of  accident.) 

Residence  

(Street  and  No.)  (City,  Town,  or  other  place.) 

Age Sex 

Employer's  name  Business 

Address 

Location  of  Plant  

(Street  and  No.)  (City,  Town,  or  other  place.) 

1.  Date,  hour  and  place  of  accident — Specify  exactly  where  and  if  on 
employer's  premises. 


2.  What  was  the  employee  doing  at  the  time?    Was  it  for  the  pur- 
poses of  your  business?    Was  it  part  of  his  regular  work? 


3.  Describe  occurrence  fully — part  of  plant — works — machine — tool 
— article— other  matters  and  things  connected  with  accident. 


4.  What  injuries  did  employee  sustain? 


5.  Was  any  person  not  in  your  employ  to  blame  for  accident?     (So 
far  as  you  now  know.)     Specify. 


6.  Name  and  address  of  attending  physician. 


7.  Where  is  injured  employee  now? 

8.  Has  employee  worked  any  since  date  of  accident?     Specify.    Is 
employee  now  able  to  resume  work?    If  not,  about  how  long  be- 
fore he  will  be  able? 

At  what  wages? If  so,  when  was  he  first  able  to 

do  so? ,  19 ...     (Give  your  own  opinion)  


INDUSTRIAL  BOARD— FORMS  295 

9.  What  were  employee's  weekly  earnings*  with  you  at  time  of  ac- 
cident? 
$ per  week. 

ID.  How  long  had  you  been  paying  him  at  this  rate? 

.- Did  he  work  on  Sundays? 

11.  How  long  had  he  been  working  for  you  at  the  work  in  which  he 
was  injured? 

12.  What  were  his  total  earnings*  with  you  at  that  work  during  the 
past  twelve  months,  or  during  the  shorter  time  he  was  at  that 
work  with  you? 

$ from  ,  19..,  to  ,  19... 

13.  During  how  much,  if  any,  of  that  time  did  he  not  work? 

14.  State  cause  and  duration  of  each  material  loss  of  time. 

Usually  close  down   weeks.     Sickness   weeks. 

Business  slack weeks.    Vacation weeks.     (Any 

other  cause.) 

15.  What   would   be   average   weekly   earnings    during   past   twelve 
months  of  employees  of  same  class  in  same  employment  and  same 
location? 

$ per  week. 

16.  Have  you  paid  or  allowed  injured  employee  anything  for  period 
of  his  disability?    If  so,  state  particulars. 


Total  amount,  $ . 


Dated  this day  of ,  19. .,  at 

Employer's  Name 

Signed  by 

Official  Title 

*  Include  in  earnings  the  fair  value  of  anything  such  as  board, 
gratuities,  etc.,  forming  part  of  remuneration,  but  not  payments 
covering  special  expenses  entailed  by  nature  of  employment. 


296  INDUSTRIAL  BOARD— FORMS 

Employee's  Report  of  Accident. 

Form  77. 

This  form  to  be  used  ONLY  in  cases  where  parties  accept  tender 
of  services  of  Board  for  amicable  adjustment. 

Claimant's  Name  (in  full)    

Residence   

(Street  and  No.)  (City,  Town,  or  other  place.) 

State  your  age,  occupation  and  sex — married  or  single — speak  Eng- 
lish? 

State  name  and  business  of  employer  with  whom  you  were  employed 
when  accident  occurred. 

1.  State  date  and  hour  and  place  of  accident.    Specify  exactly  where 
and  if  on  employer's  premises. 

B.  What  were  you  doing  at  the  time?    Was  it  for  the  purpose  of  your 
employer's  business?    Was  it  part  of  your  regular  work? 


3.  Describe  occurrence  fully — part  of  plant — works — machine — tool 
— article— other  matters  or  things  connected  with  accident. 


4.  What  injuries  did  you  sustain? 


5.  Was  any  person  other  than  your  employer  or  fellow- workmen  to 
blame  for  accident?    Specify. 


6.  Name  and  address  of  attending  physician. 


7.  Have  you  worked  any  since  date  of  accident?    Specify.    Are  you 
now  able  to  resume  work?     If  not,  about  how  long  before  you 
will  be  able  in  your  opinion? 

At  what  wages?  If  so,  when  were  you  first 

able  to  do  so? ,191 

8.  What  were  your  weekly  earnings*  with  your  employer  at  time  of 
accident? 

$ per  week. 

9.  How  long  had  said  employer  been  paying  you  at  this  rate? 

Do  you  work  on  Sundays? 

10.  How  long  had  you  been  working  for  your  employer  at  work  in 
which  you  were  injured? 


INDUSTRIAL  BOARD— FORMS  297 

11.  What  were  your  total  earnings*  with  said  employer  at  that  work 
during  the  past  twelve  months,  or  during  any  shorter  time  you 
were  at  that  work  with  him? 

$ from ,  191. .,  to ,  191. .. 

12.  During  how  much,  if  any,  of  that  time  did  you  not  work? 


13.  What  was  the  cause  and  duration  of  each  material  loss  of  time? 

Usually  close  down weeks.    Sickness weeks. 

Business  slack weeks.    Vacation weeks.     (Any 

other  cause.) 

14.  Has  your  employer  paid  or  allowed  you  anything  for  period  of 
your  disability?    State  particulars. 

Total  amount  $ 

I  declare  that  all  the  foregoing  is  true  and  correct,  and  I  claim 
compensation  for  the  above  mentioned  accident. 

Signed  this day  of ,  19. ..  at  . 


Address    

•Include  in  earnings  fair  value  of  anything  such  as  board,  gratu- 
ities, etc.,  forming  part  of  remuneration,  but  not  anything  paid  to 
cover  any  special  expenses  entailed  by  nature  of  employment. 


298  INDUSTRIAL  BOARD— FORMS 

Surgeon's  Report. 

Form  76. 

This  form  to  be  used  ONLY  in  cases  where  parties  accept  tender 
of  services  of  Board  for  amicable  adjustment. 

Name  of  injured  workman  

Address    

1.  In  whose  employ  was  injured  when  accident  happened? 

2.  State  employee's  age,  sex  and  occupation. 


3.  Had  employee  any  previous  physical  defect?    (e.  g.,  Hernia,  of 
Sight,  Hearing,  Limbs,  Fingers,  Spine.)     If  so,  specify. 


4.  Date  and  hour  of  accident. 

5.  State  nature,  extent,  degree  and  region  of  injury — MUST  be  defi- 
nitely stated,  and  MARKED  as  clearly  as  possible  on  CHART 
ON  BACK  OF  THIS  REPORT.) 


6.  Did  you  render  first  treatment?    If  not,  who  did?    When? 

7.  State  your  treatment.     (It  is  not  sufficient  to  say  "Usual,"  "An- 
tiseptic," "Surgical,"  or  "Dressing  applied."  etc.     State  sufficient 
to  indicate  clearly  means  taken  to  remedy  injury.) 


8.  Give  your  estimate  of  minimum  length  of  total  disability  (reck- 
oning from  its  commencement)  resulting  from  the  injury. 


9.  Is  employee  now  able  to  resume  work?    If  so,  on  what  date  was 
he  first  able  to  do  so? 


10.  In  your  opinion,  will  any  permanent  disability  result  from  injury? 
If  so,  nature  and  extent  tereof. 


State  anything  additional  of  interest  in  this  case. 

Signed  this day  of ,  19. .,  at 

Attending  Surgeon. 


INDUSTRIAL  BOARD— FORMS  299 

Notice  of  Hearing  by  Board  for  Amicable  Adjustment. 

Form  72. 

You  are  hereby  notified  that  the  above  entitled  matter  has  been 
referred  to  the  Chief  Industrial  Examiner  for  the  purpose  of  a  pos- 
sible amicable  adjustment  of  the  disputed  questions  involved  therein. 
And  you  are  further  notified  to  appear  before  said  Examiner  at 

in  the  City  of ,  County  of in  said  State, 

at o'clock  in  the noon,  on  the day  of 

.....19... 

Dated  this day  of ,  19. .. 

INDUSTRIAL  BOARD  OF  ILLINOIS, 
By  

Notice  to  Board  of  Failure  to  Reach  Agreement  and  Re- 
quest for  Arbitration. 

Form  9. 
To  THE  INDUSTRIAL  BOARD  OP  THE  STATE  OF  ILLINOIS: 

Notice  is  hereby  given  that and have  failed  to 

reach  an  agreement  between  themselves  with  reference  to  a  claim  for 
compensation  under  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  of  the  State 

of  Illinois,  arising  out  of  an  alleged  accidental  injury  on  the 

day  of  19 . . ,  and  the  undersigned  therefore  requests  that 

said  claim  may  be  arbitrated  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of 
said  Act,  and  that  your  Honorable  Board  may  take  the  requisite 
steps  for  the  appointment  of  a  Committee  of  Arbitration  to  hear  and 
determine  said  claim. 

Notice  by  Employee  of  Exercise  of  Option  to  Proceed  for 
Recovery  of  Damages  or  Award  of  Compensation 
Under  Act. 

Form  39. 

You  are  hereby  notified  that  by  reason  of  your  failure  to  com- 
ply with  the  demand  of  the  Industrial  Board  of  the  State  of  Illinois, 
under  Section  26  of  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act,  that  you  fur- 
nish sworn  statement  of  financial  ability,  or  security,  indemnity  or 
bond,  or  sufficient  amount  of  insurance,  or  other  satisfactory  provision 
for  securing  the  payment  of  compensation  provided  by  said  Act,  I, 
the  undersigned,  hereby  exercise  the  option  given  to  me  by  the  pro- 
visions of  said  Act  to  proceed  against  you  for ,  and  that  I 

have  accordingly  filed  proceedings  therefor  on  this  date  in  

at on  account  of  accidental  injuries  sustained  by  me  while 

in  your  employment  on  the day  of A.  D.  19 ... 

Notice  by  Board  of  Hearing. 

Form  14%. 
YOU  ARE  HEREBY  NOTIFIED  that  a  hearing  in  the  above 

entitled  matter  will  be  held  on  the day  of 191. ., 

at  ,  in  the  City  of  ,  Illinois,  before  the  arbitrator 

designated  by  the  Industrial  Board  of  Illinois. 

Dated  this day  of ,  191 ... 

INDUSTRIAL  BOARD  OF  ILLINOIS, 

By   

Arbitrator. 


300  INDUSTRIAL  BOARD— FORMS 

Decision  of  Arbitrator. 

Form  ISA. 

Notice  and  application  for  adjustment  of  claim  having  been  filed 
in  the  above  entitled  matter,  and  the  undersigned  having  been  desig- 
nated by  said  Board  as  Arbitrator  thereof,  and  said  matter  having 

come  on  to  be  heard  before  said  Arbitrator  at in  the  City 

of said  County  and  State,  at o'clock  in  the 

noon  on  the day  of 19 . . . . ,  and,  after  hearing  the 

proofs  and  allegations  of  the  parties  hereto,  and  having  made  care- 
ful inquiry  and  investigation  of  said  matter  and  being  fully  advised 
in  the  premises,  said  Arbitrator  finds: 

That  the  petitioner  and  the  respondent  were  on  the 

day  of . ,  19 . . . . ,  operating  under  the  provisions  of 

the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act;  that  on  the  date  last  above 

mentioned  said  '. . .  suffered  accidental  injuries  which  did 

arise  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  his  employment;  that 

notice  of  said  accident  was  given  to  said  respondent  and 

demand  for  compensation  on  account  thereof made  on  said 

respondent  within  the  time  required  under  the  provisions  of  said  Act. 


Decision  and  Award  by  Committee  of  Arbitration. 

Form  018. 

Notice  and  application  for  adjustment  of  claim  having  been  filed 
the  Industrial  Board  in  the  above  entitled  matter,  and  the  Board 
^%ang  requested  the  parties  to  appoint  their  respective  representa- 
tives on  a  Committee  of  Arbitration  and  said  Committee  having  been 

duly  formed,  consisting  of ,  representing  said  applicant,  and 

,  representing  said  respondent,  and ,  agent 

of  the  Industrial  Board  as  Chairman  thereof;  and  the  said  cause 

having  come  on  to  be  heard  at ,  in  the  city  of , 

county  of ,  and  State  of  Illinois,  on  the day  of 

,19 at o'clock  in  the noon,  the  commit- 
tee, after  hearing  the  proofs  and  allegations  of  the  said  applicant  and 
said  respondent,  having  made  careful  inquiry  and  investigation  of 
said  matter,  and  being  duly  advised  in  the  premises,  doth  find  that 
it  has  jurisdiction  of  the  subject  matter  and  the  parties  herein,  and 
further  find: 

1.  That  the  said  parties  were on  the day  of 

,  19 . . . . ,  operating  under  the  provisions  of  the  Illinois  Work- 
men's Compensation  Act. 

2.  That  the  applicant on  the day  of 

suffered  accidental  injuries  while  in  the  employ  of  respondent,  and 

that  such  injuries  did arise  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  his 

employment. 


INDUSTRIAL  BOARD— FORMS  301 

3.  That    is   entitled   to  receive  compensation  on 

the  basis  of per 

4.  That   applicant    been   furnished   medical    and 

hospital  aid,  to  the  amount  of Dollars. 

5.  That  the  applicant  was  temporarily  totally  incapacitated  for 

work  for  a  period  of weeks,  and  is  entitled  to  the  sum  of 

dollars  per  week  for  such  period  beginning  on  the  eighth  day 

after  the  date  of  injury, dollars  of  which  is  now  due. 

6.  That  the  applicant  is  entitled  to  compensation  herein  because 
the  injury  sustained  caused   ( serious  and  permanent  dis- 
figurement of  the  hands,  head  or  face;  partially  incapacitated  from 

pursuing  his  usual  occupation,  specific  loss  of or  permanent 

and  complete  incapacity  for  work.) 

7.  That  applicant  is  entitled  to  have  and  receive  from  respond- 
ent the  further  sum  of   dollars  per  week  for  the  further 

period   of    weeks,    or   until    otherwise   relieved   therefrom 

under  the  terms  and  provisions  of  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act, 

8.  That  of  the  last  named  amount  there  is  now  due  the  appli- 
cant the  sum  of dollars. 


Notice  of  Decision  of  Arbitrator. 

Form  65. 

TAKE  NOTICE,  that  on  the  day  of  there 

was  filed  with  the  Industrial  Board,  Chicago,  Illinois,  the  decision 
of  the  Arbitrator  in  the  above  entitled  matter,  a  copy  of  which  de- 
cision is  enclosed  to  you  herewith;  and 

YOU  ARE  FURTHER  NOTIFIED  that  unless  a  petition  for 
review  is  filed  by  you  with  the  Industrial  Board  within  fifteen  (16) 
days  after  receipt  by  you  of  this  notice  and  copy  of  such  decision,  and 
an  agreed  statement  of  the  facts  appearing  upon  the  hearing  before 
the  Arbitrator  or  a  correct  stenographic  report  of  the  proceedings 
at  such  hearing  within  twenty  (20)  days,  then  and  in  that  event  the 
decision  of  the  said  Arbitrator  shall  be  entered  of  record  by  this 
Board  as  the  decision  of  the  Industrial  Board. 

YOU  ARE  FURTHER  NOTIFIED  that,  for  sufficient  cause 
shown,  this  Board  is  authorized  to  grant  further  time  in  which  to 
petition  for  such  review  or  to  file  such  agreed  statement  or  steno- 
graphic report. 

Dated  at  Chicago,  Illinois,  this day  of 19 

INDUSTRIAL  BOARD  OF  ILLINOIS, 
(SEAL)  By 

Secretary. 


302  INDUSTRIAL  BOARD— FORMS 

Petition  for  Review  of  Agreement  or  Award. 

Form  24. 

Petitioner of respectfully  represents  that  on 

the day  of 19 . . . . ,  at Illinois,  an  agree- 
ment (or  award,  as  the  case  be)  was  duly  made  in  the  above  entitled 

matter,  of  compensation  due from growing  out  of 

an  accidental  injury  arising  out  of  and  in  the  course  of  the  em- 
ployment of as  an  employee  of 

Petitioner  further  represents  that  said  agreement  (or  award,  as 
the  case  may  be)  should  be  reviewed  by  your  Honorable  Industrial 
Board  upon  the  ground  that  the  disability  of  has,  subse- 
quent to  the  date  of  said  agreement  (or  award,  as  the  case  may  be), 
recurred  (increased,  diminished,  or  ended,  as  the  case  may  be). 

(Allege  what  compensation  has  been  paid,  if  any,  and  any  other 
facts  and  circumstances  proper  for  the  Board  to  consider  under  the 
statute  upon  petition  for  review.) 


Petitioner  therefore  prays  that  proper  notices  may  be  given  to 
all  parties  interested  under  this  petition  for  review,  and  that  this 
petition  may  be  set  down  for  hearing  at  some  date  to  be  fixed  by  your 
Honorable  Industrial  Board,  and  that  upon  such  hearing  upon  review, 
said  compensation  payments  as  fixed  in  said  agreement  (or  award, 
as  the  case  may  be)  may  be  re-established  (increased,  diminished  or 
ended,  as  the  case  may  be). 

Memorandum  of  Name  and  Address   for  Service   of 
Notices. 

Form  33. 
To  the  Industrial  Board  of  the  State  of  Illinois: 

The  undersigned  requests  that  all  notices  of  proceedings  in  the 
above  entitled  matter  be  served  personally  or  by  registered  mail  upon 
the  party  or  attorney  whose  names  and  addresses  follow  on  this 
memorandum. 


INDUSTRIAL  BOARD— FORMS  303 

Notice  by  Board  of  Hearing  for  Review. 

Form  25. 

Take  notice  that  on  the  day  of  19 . . . . ,  the 

above  named filed  a  petition  for  review  with  the  Industrial 

Board  of  an  agreement  (or  award,  as  the  case  may  be)  made  between 

and  in  the  above  entitled  matter  on  the  ground 

that  the  disability  of  said has,  subsequent  to  the  making  of 

said  agreement  (or  award,  as  the  case  may  be),  recurred  (increased, 
diminished  or  ended,  as  the  case  may  be). 

You  are  further  notified  that  in  accordance  with  the  rules  of 
said  Board,  your  appearance  and  answer  to  said  petition  must  be 

filed  with  said  Board  on  or  before  the  day  of A. 

D.  19 

Further  take  notice  that  the  Industrial  Board  has  set  said  peti- 
tion for  review  for  hearing  at  the  office  of  said  Board  of  Chicago, 

Illinois,  on  the day  of A.  D.  19 ,  at 

o'clock  M.,  at  which  time  and  place  you  may  appear  and 

present  such  evidence  as  may  be  relevant  to  such  inquiry  upon  review. 

Dated,  Chicago,  Illinois,  this day  of A.  D.  19 . . 

INDUSTRIAL  BOARD, 
(SEAL)  By 

Secretary, 


304  INDUSTRIAL  BOARD— FORMS 

Notice  by  Board  to  Introduce  any  Additional  Testimony. 

Form  66. 

You  are  hereby  notified  that  on  the  day  of  

191 . . ,  the  Industrial  Board  did  take  and  assign  for  consideration  the 
above  entitled  cause,  pending  before  the  Board  upon  petition  for  re- 
view. Unless  you  shall  notify  this  within  twenty  days  of  the  receipt 
of  this  notice,  that  you  desire  to  introduce  additional  testimony  and 
to  be  heard  upon  the  issues  involved  in  said  cause,  the  same  will  be 
closed,  and  the  Board  will  dispose  of  said  cause  upon  the  records, 
stenographic  reports,  etc.,  made  and  filed  in  the  proceedings  had  on 
arbitration  of  said  cause.  Upon  receipt  of  notice  from  either  of  the 
parties  to  the  said  cause,  that  you  desire  to  introduce  additional  testi- 
mony and  to  be  heard,  the  said  cause  will  be  placed  upon  the  calendar 
for  setting. 

If  the  party  or  parties  hereto  do  not  desire  to  introduce  addi- 
tional testimony  or  to  be  heard  before  the  Board  on  Review,  briefs 
may  be  filed,  together  with  written  arguments  of  not  to  exceed  five 
typewritten  pages,  within  twenty  days  of  the  receipt  of  this  notice, 
and  the  same  will  become  a  part  of  the  files  and  have  the  consideration 
of  the  Board  herein. 

INDUSTRIAL  BOARD  OF  ILLINOIS, 


Secretary. 

Decision  of  Board  on  Review. 

Form  22. 

This  matter  coming  on  to  be  heard  before  the  Industrial  Board 
of  the  State  of  Illinois  upon  the  petition  for  review  of  the  decision 

of  the  Committee  of  Arbitration,  filed  herein  on  the day  of 

19 .  . .  . ,  and  said  Board  having  considered  said  petition  and 

being  fully  advised  in  the  premises: 

IT  IS  THEREFORE  ORDERED  AND  DETERMINED  by  said 
Board  as  follows: 


Dated  at  Chicago,  Illinois,  this day  of A.  D.  19. . 


(SEAL) 

Industrial  Board. 


INDUSTRIAL  BOARD— FORMS  305 

Judgment  Stay  Bond  Upon  Petition  for  Review. 

Form  34. 

KNOW  ALL  MEN  BY  THESE  PRESENTS,  That  we 

and (here  insert  name  of  surety) ,  of  County,  in 

the  State  of  Illinois,  are  held  and  firmly  bound  unto  of 

,  in  the  penal  sum  of  (here  state  an  amount  double  the 

amount  of  the  award)  lawful  money  of  the  United  States, 

for  the  payment  of  which  well  and  truly  to  be  made  we  bind  ourselves, 
our  heirs,  executors  and  administrators,  jointly,  severally  and  firmly 
by  these  presents. 

Witness  our  hands  and  seals  this day  of 19 . . 

The  condition  of  the  above  obligation  is  such  that  whereas  the 

said did  on  the day  of ,  19 . . ,  before  the 

Industrial  Board  of  the  State  of  Illinois,  secure  an  award  against  the 

above  bounden for  payment  of  compensation  (if  the  award 

is  upon  the  decision  of  the  Committee  of  Arbitration,  so  state),  such 
compensation  and  the  payment  thereof  to  be  as  follows,  to-wit: 


And  whereas  the  said has  filed  notice  with  the  Indus- 
trial Board  of  the  State  of  Illinois  of  application  for  the  entry  of 

judgment  in  the  Circuit  Court  of County,  upon  said  award, 

in  acordance  with  the  statute; 

And  whereas  it  is  the  desire  of  the  above  bounden to  file 

and  prosecute  proceedings  for  review  by  the  Industrial  Board  of  said 
award,  in  accordance  with  the  Statute; 

NOW  THEREFORE,  If  the  said  above  bounden  shall 

duly  prosecute  with  effect  said  proceedings  for  review  before  said  In- 
dustrial Board,  and,  moreover,  pay  the  amount  of  said  award  with 
costs  and  interest  entered  and  to  be  entered  against  him  in  case  said 
award  is  upheld  and  affirmed  upon  review  by  said  Industrial  Board, 
then  the  above  obligation  is  to  be  void,  otherwise  to  remain  full  force 
and  virtue. 

[SEAL] 

[SEAL] 

Approved  this   day  of   19 .. 

INDUSTRIAL  BOARD  OF  ILLINOIS, 

By  

Member  of  Board. 


306  INDUSTRIAL  BOARD— FORMS 

Petition  for  Award  of  Lump  Sum. 

Form  28. 

Now  comes  petitioner  herein,  and  respectfully  repre- 
sents that he  is  (or,  petitioner's  decedent  was)  and  was  on 

the day  of  191 . . ,  an  employee  in  the  service  of 

an  employer,  at ,  in  the  City  of , .,  Illinois; 

that  both  said  employer  and  said  employee  were  working  under  and 
subject  to  the  provisions  of  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act;  and 
that  on,  to-wit,  the day  of 191 . . ,  said  employee  suf- 
fered accidental  injuries,  arising  out  of  in  the  course  of  his  said 
employment,  as  a  result  of  which (state  nature  of  injury). 

Petitioner  further  shows  that  said  employer  has  paid  compen- 
sation on  account  of  said  injury  (or  death)  as  follows. 


Petitioner  further  shows  that  said  employee  earned  as  wages  the 
sum  of  $ per  week  (month  or  annum) ;  that  under  the  pro- 
visions of  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act,  petitioner  is  entitled 

to  compensation  at  the  rate  of  $ per  week  for  a  period  of 

weeks.  (In  case  of  death,  state  average  annual  wages  and 

that  four  times  such  average  annual  wages  amounts  to  the  sum  of 

$ ;  also  that  petitioner  is  a  dependent  of  said  employee,  in  this, 

that  petitioner  is  the  surviving  widow,  or  child,  with  whom  said  em- 
ployee lived  at  the  time  of  his  death,  and  whom  he  was  under  legal 
obligations  to  support;  or  in  case  of  parents,  grandparents  or  other 
lineal  heirs,  that  said  employee  contributed  to  petitioner's  support 
within  four  years  previous  to  the  time  of  said  injury,  if  the  petition 
is  presented  by  an  administrator  or  executor,  allege  that  petitioner  is 
the  duly  qualified  and  acting  administrator  or  executor,  as  the  case 
may  be,  of  said  deceased  employee). 

Petitioner  further  shows  that  ...  .he  believes  it  to  the  best  inter- 
est of  the  parties  that  compensation  now  due  and  to  become  due  be 
paid  in  a  lump  sum,  for  the  following  reasons:  (Show  necessity  for 
such  payment,  and  proper  anticipated  use  of  the  money,  etc). 


Petitioner  therefore  respectfully  prays  that  proper  notices  may 
be  given  to  the  interested  parties,  and  particularly  to  said  employer 

at ,  Illinois,  and  that  a  hearing  may  be  had  at  some 

day  to  be  fixed  by  your  Honorable  Board,  and  that  upon  such  hear- 
ing said  Board  may  order  the  commutation  of  the  compensation  to 
an  equivalent  lump  sum  equal  to  the  total  sum  of  the  probable  future 
payments  capitalized  at  their  present  value  upon  a  three  per  cent 
basis  with  annual  rests  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the 
Workmen's  Compensation  Act. 


INDUSTRIAL  BOARD— FORMS  307 

Assent  by  Employer  to  Order  for  Lump  Sum. 

The  undersigned  employer,  hereby  indicate  our  willingness  to 
pay  compensation  payable  herein  commuted  in  accordance  with  Sec- 
tion 9  of  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act,  if  so  ordered  by  the 
Industrial  Board  of  Illinois. 

Notice  by  Board  of  Petition  for  Lump  Sum. 

Form  27. 

YOU  ARE  HEREBY  NOTIFIED  that  a  petition  has  been  filed 

with  the  Industrial  Board  by  of  ,  praying  for  a 

commutation  of  the  compensation  now  due  and  to  become  due 

of by  reason  of  an  accidental  injury  alleged  to  have  been  sus- 
tained on  the day  of 19 . . ,  such  commutation  to  be  an 

amount  which  will  equal  the  total  sum  of  the  probable  future  pay- 
ments, capitalized  at  their  present  value  upon  the  basis  of  interest 
calculated  at  3  per  cent  per  annum  with  annual  rest. 

YOU  ARE  FURTHER  NOTIFIED  that  if  you  desire  to  appear 
to  or  answer  said  petition,  you  are  required  by  the  rules  of  In- 
dustrial Board  to  do  so  by  the  day  of  19 . . ,  and 

that  unless  you  are  further  notified,  a  hearing  will  be  held  in  the 

offices  of  the  Industrial  Board,  on  said  petition,  on  the day 

of 19 ....  at M.,  at  which  time  and  place  you  may 

appear  and  present  any  evidence  or  argument  relevant  to  the  inquiry 
to  be  made  by  said  Board  on  said  petition. 

Dated,  Chicago,  Illinois,  this day  of 19.  ... 

INDUSTRIAL  BOARD  OF  ILLINOIS, 
(SEAL)  By 

Secretary. 

Answer  to  Petition  for  Award  of  Lump  Sum. 

Form  29. 

Now  comes  respondent  herein,  and  for  answer  to  the 

petition  of  herein,  praying  for  a  lump  sum  settlement  of 

claim  for  compensation  arising  out  of  the  alleged  accidental  injury 
sustained  by on  the day  of states : 

(Admit  facts  controverted  and  deny  other  allegations.) 


Respondent  further  answering,  says  that believes  that  it 

is  not  for  the  best  interests  of  the  parties  that  the  compensation,  if 
any,  which  is  now  due  or  which  is  to  become  due  on  account  of  said 
alleged  accidental  injury  to  be  paid  in  a  lump  sum,  for  the  following 
reasons,  to-wit: 

(Show  no  necessity  for  such  payment,  liability  to  waste,  etc.) 


Respondent  therefore  prays  that  said  alleged  compensation  now  due 
and  to  become  due  be  not  ordered  paid  in  a  lump  sum,  and  that  said 
petition  may  be  dismissed. 


308  INDUSTRIAL  BOARD— FORMS 

Order  Awarding  Lump  Sum. 

Form  30. 
A  petition  for  the  payment  of  a  lump  sum  having  been  filed  with 

the  Industrial  Board  in  the  above  entitled  matter  on  the day 

of 19. .,  and  the  Board  having  given  proper  notice  to  the 

interested  parties,  and  said  matter  now  coming  on  to  be  heard,  pursu- 
ant to  such  notice,  before  this  Board,  after  hearing  the  proofs  and 
allegations  of  the  said  petitioner  and  said  respondent,  and  having 
made  careful  inquiry  and  investigation  of  said  matter,  and  being  fully 
advised  in  the  premises ; 

IT  IS  ORDERED,  ADJUDGED  AND  DECREED  by  the  Indus- 
trial Board  as  follows: 

(Insert  findings  as  to  whether  petition  be  allowed  or  disallowed 
and  dismissed,  with  recital  that  it  is  or  is  not,  as  the  case  may  be,  to 
the  best  interest  of  the  party  that  compensation  be  paid  in  lump  sum.) 


IT  IS  FURTHER  ORDERED,  ADJUDGED  AND  DECREED, 
that  this  order  for  a  commutation  of  compensation  herein  to  the  lump 

sum  of dollars  ($ )  shall  be  binding  and  conclusive 

upon  the  parties  hereto,  except  such  parties,  or  either  of  them,  reject 
the  same  within  ten  (10)  days  after  notice  of  this  award,  by  filing  a 
written  rejection  thereof  with  this  Board,  in  which  event  the  compen- 
sation herein  shall  be  payable  in  installments  as  provided  by  Section 
IX  of  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act. 


INDUSTRIAL  BOARD  OF  THE  STATE  OF  ILLINOIS. 

Notice  of  Award  of  Lump  Sum. 

Form.  31. 

TAKE   NOTICE,  That  on  the day  of 19. .,  the 

Industrial  Board  of  the  State  of  Illinois  entered  an  order  in  the  above 
entitled  matter,  providing  for  a  commutation  of  the  compensation  due 
and  to  become  due  herein  to  an  equivalent  lump  sum,  equal  to  the  total 
sum  of  the  probable  future  payments  of  such  compensation  capitalized 
at  their  present  value  upon  the  basis  of  interest  at  three  per  cent  (3 

per  cent)  per  annum  with  annual  rests,  amounting  to dollars 

($ ),  it  appearing  to  this  Board  to  be  to  the  best  interest  of 

the  parties  hereto  that  such  compensation  be  so  paid  in  a  lump  sum. 

FURTHER  TAKE  NOTICE,  That  said  order  for  a  lump  sum 
settlement  will  become  binding  and  conclusive  upon  all  parties  inter- 
ested therein  unless  written  rejection  thereof  is  filed  with  the  Indus- 
trial Board,  within  ten  (10)  days  from  this  date. 

Dated  Chicago,  Illinois 19. . 

INDUSTRIAL  BOARD  OF  ILLINOIS, 

(SEAL)  By 

Secretary- 


INDUSTRIAL  BOARD— FORMS  309 

Notice  of  Rejection  of  Award  of  Lump  Sum. 

Form  32. 
To  the  Industrial  Board  of  the  State  of  Illinois: 

The  undersigned  hereby  rejects  the  award  of  lump  sum  compen- 
sation made  and  entered  on  the    day  of    19.., 

by  the  Industrial  Board  in  the  above  entitled  matter. 

Receipt  on  Account  for  Compensation. 

Form  43. 
,     PAID  FOR  Death,  Specific  Loss,  Disfigurement,  Disability. 

Amount  paid  to  date,  including  this  payment,  $ 

Amount  remaining  due,  $ 

I, have  received  of the  sum  of dollars 

and cents,  being  the  compensation  due  from  the day 

of ,  19 . . ,  to  the day  of ,  19 . . ,  under  the 

provisions  of  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act,  subject  to  review  by 

the  Industrial  Board  for  accidental  injuries  sustained  by on 

the day  of ,  19. .,  while  in  the  employ  of 

(address) 
I*. 


(Name  of  Employee  or  Beneficiary) 
Date ,19..  

(Street  and  Number) 

Receipt  for  Compensation  in  Settlement. 

Form  42. 

Received  of the  sum  of dollars  and  

cents,  making  in  all,  with  weekly  payments  already  received  by  me,  the 

total  sum  of  dollars  and   cents  in  settlement  of 

compensation  under  the  Illinois  Compensation  Law,  for  all  injuries 

received  by  me  on  or  about  the day  of 19. .,  while 

in  the  employ  of (address)  subject  to  review  by 

the  Industrial  Board. 

Witness  my  hand  this 19 .. 

Witness  . 


(address) 


310  INDUSTRIAL  BOARD— FORMS 

Request  by  Board  for  Reports  and  Receipts. 

Form  20. 

You  are  hereby  requested  immediately  to  notify  this  Board  as 
to  the  disposition  made  in  the  following  named  cases. 

IF  FINAL  COMPENSATION  has  been  paid  under  the  pro- 
visions of  the  WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACT,  forward  SET- 
TLEMENT RECEIPT  or  RELEASE.  Also  show  total  length  of  dis- 
ability in  each  case. 

If  compensation  is  being  paid  under  the  provisions  of  the  ACT,  in 
weekly  or  semi-monthly  installments,  show  the  amount  that  has  been 
paid  to  date,  and  also  the  amount  to  be  paid  in  each  case. 

If  no  payments  of  any  kind  have  been  made,  so  state  and  give 
reasons  for  non-payment. 

EMPLOYER  INJURED  EMPLOYEE  DATE  OF  ACCIDENT 


INDUSTRIAL  BOARD  OF  ILLINOIS, 
By 


INDUSTRIAL  BOARD— FORMS  311 

Demand  by  Board  for  Security  for  Payment  of  Compen- 
sation. 

Form  36. 

Demand  is  hereby  made  upon  you  under  the  authority  given  the 
Industrial  Board  by  Section  XXVI  of  the  Workmen's  Compensation 
Act:  ' 

That  within  ten  days  of  the  receipt  by  you  of  this  written  notice, 
you  either: 

1.  File  with  the  Industrial  Board  a  sworn  statement,  showing 
your  financial  ability  to  pay  compensation  provided  for  in  said  Act, 
normally  required  to  be  paid,  or, 

2.  Furnish  security,  indemnity  or  a  bond  guaranteeing  the  pay- 
ment by  you  of  the  compensation  provided  for  in  said  Act,  normally  re- 
quired to  be  paid ;  or, 

3.  Furnish  the  Board  with  satisfactory  evidence  that  you  have 
insured  to  a  reasonable  amount  your  normal  ability  to  pay  such  com- 
pensation in  some  corporation,  association  or  organization  authorized, 
licensed  or  permitted  to  do  such  insurance  business  in  this  state;  or 

4.  Make  some  other  provision  for  the  securing  of  the  payment 
of  compensation  provided  for  in  said  Act,  normally  required  to  be 
paid. 

You  are  further  notified  that  you  are  required  by  the  provisions 
of  said  Act  to  furnish  the  Industrial  Board  at  Chicago,  Illinois,  within 
twenty  days  of  the  receipt  of  this  written  demand  and  notice,  evidence 
of  your  compliance  with  one  of  the  above  four  alternatives,  and  that 
the  steps  taken  by  you  pursuant  to  this  notice  and  demand  for  com- 
pliance with  the  requirements  of  said  Act  as  above  stated,  shall  be 
subject  to  the  approval  of  the  Industrial  Board. 

You  are  further  notified  that  if  one  or  more  of  the  above  named 
four  alternatives  are  not  complied  with  by  you  within  t»n  days  of  the 
receipt  of  this  demand  and  notice,  or  if  such  compliance  on  your  part 
shall  not  be  approved  by  the  Industrial  Board,  and  you  fail  to  properly 
comply  with  this  written  demand  within  ten  days  after  the  receipt 
by  you  of  written  notice  of  non-approval,  then  and  in  such  case  you 
shall  be  liable  for  compensation  to  any  injured  employee,  or  his  per- 
sonal representative,  according  to  the  terms  of  said  Act,  or  for  dam- 
ages in  the  same  manner  as  if  you  had  elected  not  to  accept  this  Act, 
at  the  option  of  such  employee  or  his  personal  representative. 

Prompt  compliance  with  the  above  demand  is  respectfully  urged. 

Dated  at  Chicago,  Illinois,  this day  of A.  D.  19 . . 

INDUSTRIAL  BOARD, 

(SEAL)  By 

Member  of  Board. 


312  INDUSTRIAL  BOARD— FORMS 

Notice  of  Approval  by  Board  of  Security. 

Form  37. 

You  are  hereby  notified  that  the  Industrial  Board  has  approved 
your  compliance  with  Section  26  of  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act 
upon  proof  thereof  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  said  Act,  on 

the day  of A.  D.  19 

INDUSTRIAL  BOARD  OF  ILLINOIS, 
(SEAL)  By 

Notice  of  Non- Approval  by  Board  of  Security. 

Form  38. 

You  are  hereby  notified  that  the  Industrial  Board  has  refused  to 
approve  your  attempted  compliance  with  Section  XXVI  of  the  Work- 
men's Compensation  Act,  upon  written  demand  of  this  Board  made 
upon  you,  for  the  following  reasons,  to-wit: 


You  are  further  notified  that  it  becomes  your  duty  to  properly 
comply  with  the  provisions  of  said  Act,  as  outlined  in  said  demand 
heretofore  made  upon  you  by  this  Board,  within  ten  days  after  the 
receipt  by  you  of  this  notice  of  non-approval. 

In  default  thereof  you  will  be  liable  in  accordance  with  the  pro- 
visions of  said  Act  for  compensation  to  any  injured  employee,  or  his 
personal  representative,  according  to  the  terms  of  said  Act,  or  for 
damages  in  the  same  manner  as  if  you  had  elected  not  to  accept  said 
Act,  at  the  option  of  said  employee,  or  his  personal  representative. 

Prompt  compliance  with  this  notice  is  respectfully  urged. 

Dated,  Chicago,  Illinois, 19 .... 

INDUSTRIAL  BOARD, 

(SEAL)  By 

Secretary. 

Request  by  Board  for  Financial  Report  of  Employer. 

Form  53. 

We  have  notice  from  the that  your are  not 

covered  by  their  policy. 

Under  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  it  is  necessary  ,for  you 
to  secure  the  payment  of  compensation  to  all  your  employees.  If 
you  do  not  desire  to  carry  insurance  for  these  employees,  please  notify 
this  office  immediately  and  furnish  affidavit  embodying  the  following 
facts: 

State  your  assets  over  liabilities; 

State  the  number  of  persons  employed  as  above  mentioned: 
State  the  amount  paid  as  damages  to  these  employees  during  each 
of  the  past  two  years. 

Respectfully, 

Security  Supervisor. 


313 


STATE  OF  ILLINOIS 

INDUSTRIAL  BOARD 

DISTRICTS 


District  No.  1 — Chicago — Comprised  of  the  following 
counties : 


Cook, 
Lake, 
McHenry, 

District 

Boone, 
Winnebago, 

District 

Whiteside, 
Bureau, 

District 

Knox, 
Stark, 
Marshall, 

District 

Iroquois, 

Vermillion, 

District 

Menard, 
Logan, 
Sangamon, 
District 

Hancock, 

McDonough, 

District 

Moultrie, 
Shelby, 
District 

Marion, 
Clay, 
Rich!  and, 
District 

Calhoun, 

Jersey, 

Madison, 

District 

Tackson, 

Williamson, 

Saline, 


Dupage,  Will, 

Kane,  Kankakee, 

Kendall,  Dekalb, 

No.  2 — Freeport: 

Stephenson,  Carroll, 

Jo  Daviess,  Ogle, 

No.  3 — Bock  Island: 

Henry,  Mercer, 

Rock  Island,          Henderson, 
No.  4 — Peoria: 

Livingston,  Peoria, 

McLean,  Mason, 

Woodford,  Putnam, 

No.  5 — Danville: 

Ford,  Piatt, 

Champaign,  Douglas, 

No.  6 — Springfield: 

Cass,  Macoupin, 

Scott,  Montgomery, 

Greene,  Christian, 
No.  7 — Quincy: 

Adams,  Brown, 

Schuyler, 

No.  8 — Mattoon: 

Cole,  Clark, 

Effingham,  Cumberland, 

No.  9 — Centralia: 

Lawrence,  Wayne, 

Wabash,  White, 

Edwards,  Hamilton, 

No.  10— East  St.  Louis: 


Clinton, 
Bond, 
St.  Clair, 

No.  11 — Cairo: 

Gallatin, 

Hardin, 

Pope, 


Washington, 

Perry, 

Randolph, 

Massac, 
Johnson, 

Pulaski, 


Grundy, 
La  Salle. 


Lee. 


Warren. 


Fulton, 
Tazewell. 


Edgar. 


Macon, 
Dewitt, 
Morgan. 

Pike. 


Jasper, 
Crawford. 


Franklin, 
Jefferson, 
Fayette. 

Monroe. 


Alexander, 
Union. 


DEGREES  OP  DISABILITY  FOR  SPECIFIED  INJURIES,  ACCORDING  TO 
VARIOUS  FOREIGN  STANDARDS  AND  AUTHORITIES,  EXPRESSED  IN 
PERCENTAGES  OF  TOTAL  DISABILITY. 


e  - 
-52* 


Natur.  of  injury. 


Loss  of  right  or  major- 

Per  cent. 
75 
70 
85 
65 
30 
35 
15 
15 
10 
6 
10 
8 
5 
10 
8 
5 
8 
6 
3 
45 
25 
20 
20 
55 
35 
30 
65 
50 

65 
60 
75 
55 
25 
30 
10 
10 
8 
5 
8 
6 

I 

t 

e 

4 

i 

35 
20 
15 
12 
45 
25 
20 
50 
40 

85-90 
70-80 
60-65 
45-55 
20-30 
12-16 
15-20 
4-  5 
3-  5 
20-25 
20-^50 

8-10 
10-15 

10-151 

50! 

Per  cent. 
60-75 
66-75 

Per  cent. 
60-85 
70-80 

Per  cent. 
66-83 

Per  cent. 
80 
70-80 

Hand              .  .  -  •  

50-75 
30 

55-80 
14-60 

50-83 
25-33 

70 
30 

Including  metacarpal  bone  

10-20 
10-15 
10 
0-10 
20 
0-10 
0-10 
15 
0-10 
0-10 
10 
0-10 
0 
4C 
25-50 
33-40 
20-33 
50-60 
45-60 
33 
50-60 

6-30 
8-15 
7-20 
2-12 
6-16 
5-10 
3-10 
8-11 
5-10 
0-  8 
6-  8 
3-  8 
0-  6 

16 

15 
20 

10 

8 

1-10 

5 

8 

5 
12 

8-10 

5 

34-70 
33-40 
10-20 
30-50 
40-50 
50-60 
60-65 
60 

60-80 
60 

Thumb,  index,  and  middle  fingers 
Index,   middle,  and   ring  fingers.. 
Middle,  ring,  and  little  fingers  

Loss  of  left  or  minor  — 

60 

60-75 

66-83 
66-75 

75 
65-75 

Disartlculation    at    shoulder  

Hand                

|      50-60 
25 

50-55 
10-20 

50-83 
25-30 

65 
25 

Thumb        >  

Including  metacarpal  bone  

10 
10 
10 
0-10 
15 
0-10 
0-10 
0-10 
0-10 
0-10 
0-10 
0-10 
0 

5-13 
11-13 
6-20 
0-10 
5-16 
8-15 
3-10 
8-10 
5-  8 
2-  6 
3-10 
2-10 
1-  6 

12 
15 

Middle  finger                              

8 

Two  phalanges   

One  phalange  only   

1-10 

Ring  finger              

Two  phalanges   

Little  finger           

Two  phalanges   

One  phalange  only 

8-10 

Thumb  and  index  finger  

Index  and  middle  fingers  

20-35 

Middle  and  ring  fingers  

Ring  and  little  fingers  

13 
30-40 

Thumb,  index,  and  middle  fingers 
Index,  middle,  and  ring  fingers... 
Middle,  ring,  and  little  fingers  
Thumb  and  three  fingers  

33 
45 

20-35 

Four  fingers   

Loss  of  thigh  : 
Disarticulation    

85| 
66| 
50-70 
50-60 
35-50 
10-15 

50-83 
66 
45-«5 

70 
60 
50 
50 

Amputation    

65-90 
43-65 
60-65 

Loss  of  leg  

Loss  of  foot  

Fore  part  of  foot  only  

Loss  of  great  toe  

5-  8 

10 

7 
15 

Including  metatarsal  bone   

One  phalange  onlv   

2-  8 

Loss  of  other  toe  

5 
20-25 
25 

10-40 
15-30 

20-30 
15-50 

7-20 

5 

Loss  of  all  toes  

30 

Loss  of  sight,  one  eye  

33 

36 

Loss  of  hearing,  one  ear: 
Partial    

Complete    

4-22 

10 

Loss  of  hearing,  both  ears: 
Partial    

Complete    

45| 

40 

NUMBER  OF  WAGE  EARNERS  IN  THE 
PERSONS  COVERED  BY  ACCIDENT 


POPULATION  AND  NUMBER  OF 
COMPENSATION  INSURANCE. 


Country. 

°5oo 

••S9 

4t 

0 

I 

K 

B 

I 

11 

1" 

£ 

Austria    

1909 

27,800,000 

10,000,000 

3,710,000 

Belgium    

1910 

7,400,000 

2,100,000 

Denmark     .  .  , 

1911 

2,800,000 

500,000 

Finland    

1909 

3,000,000 

500,000 

France      

1911 

40,000,000 

10,000|000 

4,250,000 

Germany    

1911 

65,000,000 

16,700,000 

24,600,000 

Great  Britain   

1911 

45,200,000 

14,000,000 

13,000,000 

Greece        .   . 

1910 

2  700000 

Hungary    

1909 

21,000,000 

3,200,000 

1,160,000 

Italy    .». 

1911 

34,700,000 

10,500,000 

1,800,000 

Luxemburg    

1910 

260,000 

55,000 

40,000 

Netherlands    

1909 

5,900,000 

1,500,000 

500,000 

Norway    

1910 

2,400,000 

400,000 

380,000 

Roumania    

1911 

7,070,000 

250,000 

180,000 

Russia    

1910 

145,600,000 

6,500,000 

2,400.000 

Servia   

1910 

2,900,000 

56000 

Spain    

1910 

20,000,000 

7,000,000 

Sweden    

1910 

5,500,000 

1  000000 

650000 

Switzerland    

1910 

3  800000 

800000 

700  000 

LIFE  EXPECTANCY  TABLE. 


Age  Males 

10 49.99 

11 49.32 

12 48.64 

13 47.95 

14 47.26 

15 46.57 

16, 45.88 

17 45.18 

18 44.48 

19 43.78 

20 43.07 

21 42.30 

22 41.65 

23 40.93 

24 40.21 

25..       39.49 

26..      38.77 

27..      38.04 

28 37.31 

29 36.58 

30 35.85 

31 35.12 

32 34.38 

33 33.65 

34 32.91 

35 32.17 

36 31.43 

37 30.70 

38 29.96 

39 29.22 

40 28.48 

41 27.75 

42 27.01 

43 26.28 

44 25.55 

45 24.82 

46 24.09 

47 23.38 

48 22.66 

49 21.95 

50 21.24 

51 20.54 

52 19.84 

53 19.15 

54 18.47 

55 ..17.80 


Age  Males 

56 17.13 

57 16.47 

58 15.83 

59 15.19 

60 14.56 

61 13.94 

,62 13.34 

63 12.74 

64 12.16 

65 11.60 

66 11.04 

67 10.50 


69 

9.46 

70 

8.97 

71 

8.49 

72 

8.02 

73 

7.57 

74 

7.14 

75 

6.72 

76 

6.32 

77 

5.93 

78 

5.57 

79 

5.21 

80 

4.87 

81 

4.55 

82 

4.24 

83 

3.95 

84 

3.67 

85 

3.40 

86 

3.14 

87 

2.89 

88 

2.64 

89 

2.39 

90 

2.17 

91 

1.98 

92 

1.81 

93 

1.64 

94 

1.49 

95 

1.34 

96 

1.18 

97 

1.03 

98 

83 

99 

50 

100 

00.00 

(30 

American  ,  Companies) 

INDUSTRIAL  ACCIDENT  LEGISLATION. 

HISTORIC  REVIEW. 

"The  principle  of  systematic  compensation  for  losses 
due  to  industrial  accidents  has  been  known  in  Europe  for 
over  a  century,  the  earliest  examples  being  found  in  the 
mining  industries,  especially  in  Germany  and  Austria. 
As  these  industries  were  the  first  to  be  operated  on  a 
large  scale  with  large  numbers  of  employees  whose  life 
and  safety  depended  on  the  care  and  skill  of  the  manager 
and  of  the  fellow  workmen,  and,  in  addition,  had  a  higher 
danger  rate,  it  was  but  natural  that  attempts  should  be 
made  to  provide  in  a  definite  manner  for  the  relief  of  the 
distress  caused  by  accidental  injuries  or  other  physical 
disability  of  employees.  The  industry  of  navigation  pos- 
sessed similar  characteristics  and  also  developed  at  an 
early  date  comparative  well-defined  systems  of  relief  for 
disability  arising  from  the  operations  of  vessels.  The 
next  industry  to  be  operated  on  a  large  scale,  an  industry 
which  had  at  the  same  time  a  high  trade  risk,  was  that  of 
railway  transportation,  and  in  the  states  of  the  present 
German  Empire  we  find  early  efforts  to  make  provision 
for  railway  employees  on  a  more  liberal  scale  than  that 
prevailing  in  the  manufacturing  industries. 

"With  the  introduction  of  the  factory  system,  the  de- 
velopment of  large-scale  industries,  and  the  more  exten- 
sive use  of  power  machinery,  there  was  an  increase  in  the 
trade  risk  of  the  industries  so  affected.  Previous  to  the 
development  of  large-scale  production,  a  system  of  com- 
pensation for  industrial  accidents  prevailed  in  practically 
all  countries  of  the  world,  based  on  the  idea  that  a  work- 
man suffering  an  injury  from  industrial  accident  should 
be  compensated  by  the  person  or  persons  at  fault  in 
causing  the  accident.  The  relief  provided  under  the  civil 
code  in  continental  Europe  was  more  readily  obtainable 
than  that  permitted  under  the  English  common  law,  but 


HISTORIC  REVIEW  317 

iii  each  case  the  person  liable  was  supposed  to  have  com- 
mitted some  fault,  and  it  was  necessary  for  the  plaintiff 
to  begin  suit  and  to  prove  such  fault  or  negligence  ac- 
cording to  the  rules  of  evidence  prevailing  in  the  courts 
of  each  country. "  Bulletin  No.  126,  of  U.  S.  Department 
of  Labor. 

The  enactment  in  Germany  as  early  as  in  1884  of  a 
statute  providing  for  compensation  for  injured  workmen 
has  been  ascribed  to  the  teachings  of  Hegel  and  Fichte, 
one  of  whose  followers,  Sismondi,  after  a  journey 
through  industrial  centers,  wrote: 

"We  regard  the  Government  as  having  the  duty  of 
protecting  the  weak  against  the  strong.  I  became  per- 
suaded that  governments  were  upon  the  wrong  road.  A 
state  may  be  very  miserable  indeed,  even  though  a  few 
individuals  gather  colossal  fortunes." 

Frederick  the  Great,  "King  of  the  Poor,"  had  already 
declared  in  his  historic  message : 

"It  is  the  duty  of  the  State  to  provide  sustenance  and 
support  to  those  of  its  citizens  who  cannot  provide  suste- 
nance for  themselves.  Work  adapted  to  their  strength 
and  capability  shall  be  supplied  to  those  who  lack  means 
and  opportunities  of  earning  a  livelihood  for  themselves 
and  those  dependent  upon  them." 

Bismarck — originator  of  the  "Mailed  Fist"  doctrine, 
now  in  evidence — had  likewise  announced : 

"  It  is  the  duty  of  Humanity  for  the  State  to  interest 
itself  to  a  great  degree  in  those  of  its  members  who  need 
help.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  State  to  cultivate  beneficent 
institutions.  The  State  should  not  merely  discharge  the 
duties  of  self-defense  but  those  also  of  a  positive  charac- 
ter in  promoting  the  welfare  of  all  its  members  and  es- 
pecially of  the  weak  and  needy." 

In  accord  therewith,  Emperor  William  I,  in  his  mes- 
sage of  1881,  promulgated  a  new  social  era  by  recommend- 
ing the  first  compensation  measure. 


318  INDUSTRIAL  ACCIDENT  LEGISLATION 

In  England,  where  twenty-five  years  of  legislative  ef- 
fort were  required  to  restrict  the  employment  of  children 
not  over  nine  years  of  age  to  sixty-nine  hours  of  labor  a 
week,  there  had  been  enacted  in  the  time  of  George  III  the 
first  Factory  Safety  Act:  "An  Act  for  the  preservation 
of  the  Health  and  Morals  of  Apprentices  and  others  em- 
ployed in  Cotton  and  other  Mills  and  Factories ;"  (42 
Geo.  Ill,  Ch.  73)  requiring  yearly  washings  of  plants 
with  quicklime,  admission  of  sufficient  fresh  air,  suitable 
clothing ;  also  prohibiting  night  work  and  excessive  work. 

The  first  English  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  was 
passed  in  1897  (Stats.  60-61,  Viet.  Ch.  37),  and  the  second 
Act  in  1906  (Stats.  6  Edw.  VII,  Ch.  57). 

The  English  Parliament  not  being  at  the  mercy  of  the 
veto  power  of  administrative  and  judicial  functionaries 
— often  arbitrary  as  a  Turkish  Caleph — nor  in  the  grip 
of  obsolete  formulas  and  absurd  dogmas  of  the  tomb,  the 
measure  was  promptly  put  into  operation  in  the  actual 
life  of  men. 

"The  justification  put  forward  for  these  new  laws," 
declared  Sir  J.  G.  Hill,  "is  that  it  is  expedient  in  the  pub- 
lic interest  to  throw  the  risk  of  accidents  on  the  trade  in 
which  they  occur,  and  the  employer  can  recoup  himself 
for  the  cost  incurred  by  him  by  raising  the  price  of  his 
productions  and  by  reducing  wages." 

The  Statute,  which  had  been  intended  as  a  means  of 
lessening  litigation,  however,  was,  according  to  Lord 
Brampton,  "so  framed  as  to  provoke,  rather  than  mini- 
mize, litigation,"  and  "bristles  with  obscurities." 
Cooper  v  Wright,  86  L.  T.  N.  S.  776. 

Following  the  English  Statute  in  varying  adaptations, 
the  majority  of  the  States  of  the  North  American  Union 
established  Workmen's  Compensation  Acts — Montana  in 
1909;  New  York  in  1910;  Illinois,  California,  Kansas, 
Massachusetts,  Nevada,  New  Hampshire,  New  Jersey 
and  Wisconsin  in  1911;  Arizona,  Iowa,  Michigan,  Ohio 
and  Khode  Island  in  1912 ;  and  Minnesota  in  1913. 


HISTORIC  REVIEW  31* 

The  New  York  enactment  having  been  nullified,  consti- 
tutional enabling  amendments  were  made  in  that  State, 
Arizona,  California,  Ohio  and  Vermont. 

The  ancient  law  of  employers'  liability  is  a  decadent 
system,  and  already  the  great  mass  of  the  industrial 
workers  of  this  continent  and  entire  civilized  society,  ex- 
cept farm  laborers,  are  covered  by  Workmen's  Compen- 
sation Acts;  thirty-one  American  States  and  two  terri- 
tories, also  Canada,  Columbia  and  the  Argentine  Repub- 
lic, now  operating  such  laws.  New  Statutes  were  passed 
during  the  past  year  in  Alaska,  Colorado,  Hawaii, 
Indiana,  Maine,  Montana,  Oklahoma,  Pennsylvania  and 
Wyoming.  Amending  Acts  were  passed  in  1915  in 
California,  Connecticut,  Illinois,  Massachusetts,  Michi- 
gan, Minnesota,  Nevada,  New  Jersey,  New  York,  Oregon, 
Rhode  Island,  Washington,  West  Virginia  and  Wisconsin. 

In  the  Southern  States,  including  Alabama,  Georgia, 
Florida,  Kentucky  and  Virginia,  similar  systems  of  re- 
imbursement are  sought,  one  consideration  retarding 
progress  being  in  reference  to  negro  population. 

The  Federal  Statute,  entitled  "An  Act  granting  to 
certain  employees  of  the  United  States  the  right  to  re- 
ceive from  it  compensation  for  injuries  sustained  in  the 
course  of  their  employment,"  was  passed  May  30,  1908. 
35  U.  S.  Stat.,  p.  556. 

The  second  Federal  Employers'  Liability  Act,  entitled 
"An  Act  relating  to  the  liability  of  Common  Carriers  by 
Railroad  to  their  Employees  in  certain  cases,"  was  en- 
acted April  22,  1908,  and  amended  April  5,  1910.  (35 
Stat.  65).  It  was  upheld  in  "Second  Liability  Cases," 
223  U.  S.  1,  (wherein  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States  once  and  for  all  abrogated  the  doctrine  of  vested 

rights  in  common  law  rules). 

***** 

In  the  State  of  Illinois,  under  enactment  of  March  4, 
1910,  an  Employers '  Liability  Commission  was  appointed, 
consisting  of  six  representatives  each  of  the  employing 


320  INDUSTRIAL  ACCIDENT  LEGISLATION 

and  employee  classes,  to  investigate  the  problem  of  in- 
dustrial accidents  and  the  law  of  liability  for  injuries 
and  death  suffered  in  the  course  of  industrial  employ- 
ment within  and  outside  the  State  and  to  inquire  into  the 
most  equitable  and  effectual  method  of  providing  for 
compensation  for  losses  suffered  and  to  draft  a  bill  ac- 
cordingly. 

The  report  of  the  Illinois  commission  is  an  octavo  vol- 
ume of  249  pages,  presenting  a  brief  record  of  the  work 
of  the  commission ;  a  draft  of  a  bill ;  a  discussion  of  the 
constitutionality  of  a  compensation  law ;  records  of  cases 
heard  before  certain  courts  of  the  State;  the  record  of 
the  coroner  of  Cook  County,  in  which  the  city  of  Chicago 
is  situated;  special  studies  of  the  coal-mining  industry, 
railroads,  manufactories,  etc.,  from  the  standpoint  of 
hazard,  and  showing  accident  records  and  compensation 
for  injuries ;  and  other  statistical  and  economic  data.  The 
discussion  as  to  constitutionality  was  made  by  the  com- 
mission's attorney,  who  expressed  the  conviction  that 
within  a  decade  provision  for  compulsory  compensation 
will  be  generally  accepted  as  being  within  the  police 
power  of  the  State.  He  recommended,  however,  as  a  con- 
cession to  the  present  state  of  information  and  public 
opinion,  that  an  alternative  proposition  be  enacted,  em- 
bodying compensation  as  optional  but  not  required, 
though  so  limiting  rights  and  defenses  as  to  lead  both 
parties  to  an  acceptance  of  the  compensation  provisions. 
"That  the  law  should  read  into  every  contract  of  hiring  a 
limited  guaranty  by  the  master  to  his  servant  against  in- 
jury to  life  or  limb  while  the  servant  is  going  about  his 
master's  business,  when  it  appears  that  the  larger  pro- 
portion of  such  injuries  in  almost  all  employments  are  en- 
tirely incidental  to  the  business,  does  not  seem  any  more 
unreasonable  than  that  the  law  should  conclusively  pre- 
sume that  the  servant,  upon  entering  the  employment, 
voluntarily  assumes  in  advance  all  the  necessary  and  in- 
herent hazards  of  the  trade." 


HISTORIC  REVIEW  321 

In  the  other  industries  investigated  and  in  the  report 
from  the  Illinois  Manufacturers'  Association,  details  of 
accidents,  showing  the  nature  of  the  injury  and  the  form 
and  amount  of  damages  or  compensation  on  account  of 
it,  are  shown;  also  a  comparison  of  the  present  actual 
cost  and  the  estimated  cost  under  the  commission's  plan. 

The  formulated  measure,  with  numerous  amendments, 
was  placed  upon  the  statute  book  in  1911.  As  it  was  con- 
fined to  especially  dangerous  occupations,  the  second  Act 
of  1913  was  passed,  extending  the  field  of  operation,  and 
the  unconstitutional  provision  for  certiorari  to  the  Su- 
preme Court  was  remedied.  The  amendments  of  1915 
followed. 

Under  the  operation  of  the  law,  there  were  reported 
during  the  first  six  months  in  1913  to  the  Industrial 
Board  166  fatal  and  9,415  non-fatal  accidents,  the  major- 
ity of  which  were  settled  under  the  statutory  provisions. 
For  the  year  ending  June  30,  1915,  the  Industrial  Board 
reports  approximately  5,000  claims  filed,  the  number  of 
amicable  settlements  being  of  course  not  known.  In  this 
connection  there  is  a  noted  decrease  of  personal  injury 
litigation  and  the  high  cost  of  courts  and  juries  incident, 
thereto,  of  about  twenty  per  cent.  For  the  same  period, 
the  State  Factory  Inspector  reports  56,068  establish- 
ments inspected,  the  larger  portion  of  the  employees  in 
such  industries  being  affected  by  the  Act  by  reason  of 
its  provisions  concerning  employments  under  statutory 
safety  regulations. 

The  Industrial  Board  of  Illinois,  in  its  Bulletin  No. 
1,  thus  voices  the  spirit  in  which  it  has  given  expression 
to  the  Statute  in  its  administration  thereof: 

"For  many  years  there  has  been  a  growing  demand 
in  the  states  for  a  change  in  all  laws  affecting  the  regu- 
lation of  employment  and  the  adjustment  of  industrial 
accidents.  Notwithstanding  this,  the  old  doctrine  of  tort 
was  so  firmly  fixe4  in  the  minds  of  the  people  as  to  make 
it  well  nigh  impossible  to  draft  laws  that  would  obviate 


322  INDUSTRIAL  ACCIDENT  LEGISLATION 

the  objection  to  the  same.  The  most  experienced  legisla- 
tors, many  of  whom  recognize  the  evils  that  come  from 
the  'law  court  idea'  of  enforcing  rights,  were  not  able  to 
devise  or  formulate  corrective  legislation  on  the  subject. 
Many  opposed  any  move  made  to  correct  the  evils  of  the 
old  doctrine.  Lawyer  and  business  man  earnestly  and 
honestly  believed  he  was  responsible  only  for  his  own 
wrongful  acts ;  but  great  innovations  in  industrial  activi- 
ties and  a  constant  increase  in  the  number  of  injuries  to 
workmen,  have  required  better  protection  in  working 
conditions,  and  more  ample  provision  for  injured  work- 
men and  their  dependents.  In  the  earlier  history  of  in- 
dustrial enterprises,  most  workmen  did  their  work  under 
the  immediate  direction  of  the  employer.  Little,  if  any, 
machinery  was  required  to  produce  any  of  the  articles 
which  were  the  special  subject  of  commerce  or  exchange. 
Few,  if  any,  injuries  occurred  that  were  not  chargeable 
directly  to  the  employer ;  but,  by  virtue  of  the  great  in- 
crease in  the  population  of  the  world,  and  the  installment 
of  machinery  in  the  production  of  almost  every  product 
manufactured,  injuries  to  employees  have  greatly  in- 
creased. The  fact  that  more  than  twenty-three  states, 
(thirty-one  at  present),  have  adopted  compensation  laws 
fixing  the  burden  upon  consumption  for  industrial  acci- 
dents argues  strongly  that  this  is  the  best  remedy  for  the 
evils  of  the  old  system.  Industry  now  bears  the  burdens 
of  worn-out  industrial  machinery,  and  society  now  de- 
mands that  industry  also  bear  the  burden  of  destruction 
and  inefficiency  in  human  machinery,  without  which  there 
can  be  no  stable  social  and  industrial  conditions.  When 
a  man  loses  his  life  or  is  injured  in  his  employment,  every 
rule  of  Humanity  requires  that  those  depending  upon  him 
in  the  event  of  his  death,  and  he  himself  in  the  case  of  in- 
jury, should  be  properly  provided  for.  Hence,  the  enact- 
ment of  laws  requiring  payment  of  compensation  and 
making  the  same  a  direct  burden  upon  consumption. 


HISTOKIC  REVIEW  323 

"Those  of  us  whose  education  is  of  the  old  school  and 
who  are  fixed  in  our  opinions,  must  get  our  eyes  opened, 
get  in  line  with  the  spirit  of  progress,  remove  the  cob- 
webs from  the  shelf,  buckle  on  our  armor  and  begin  the 
fight  again.  Every  man's  right  to  live  and  enjoy  the 
blessings  and  comforts  of  life  no  longer  is  a  mere  legal 
fiction,  but  a  well  grounded,  formal  and  established  right. 
Equal  opportunity  before  the  law  really  means  some- 
thing today.  The  day  of  high  sounding  phrases  and  gen- 
eralities in  legalism  and  legislation,  is  gone  forever.  Idle 
sophisms  have  given  place  to  plain  and  comprehensive 
reasoning. ' ' 


The  legal  relationship  of  master  and  servant  was  rec- 
ognized in  the  oldest  body  of  laws  extant — the  Code  of 
King  Hammurabi  of  Babylon,  promulgated  nearly  fifty 
centuries  ago,  wherein  provisions  were  made  for  the 
rates  of  wages  to  be  paid  to  employees  of  various  classes. 

A  thousand  years  ago,  employers  were  required  to 
support  their  servants  during  sickness  by  the  "Grey 
Goose,"  the  Code  of  the  Northland  King  Magnus. 

The  first  attempt  in  England  on  the  part  of  a  servant 
to  hold  a  master  liable  for  neglect  of  duty  was  made 
eighty  years  ago  by  a  servant  whose  leg  had  been  broken 
by  the  giving  away  of  an  overloaded  butcher's  van,  in 
which  he  was  riding  while  in  his  master's  service,  and 
who  rashly  ventured  to  sue  his  master  for  damages  in  an 
action  on  the  case.  A  verdict  for  £500  being  rendered,  the 
court  (Lord  Abinger;  Court  of  Exchequer)  ridiculed  the 
suggestion  and  arrested  judgment  for  reasons  on  which 
the  doctrine  of  fellow-servant  has  rested  ever  since. 
Priestley  v  Fowler,  3  Meeson  &  Welsby's  Rep.  1-1827. 
It  was  adopted  by  the  House  of  Lords  in  Barston  &>c  Co. 
v  Reid,  3  Macq.  House  of  Lords  Cases,  266. 

Thereupon  followed  the  first  real  decision  whereby  a 
bad  exception  to  a  bad  rule  was  established — to  the  effect 
that  while  the  master  did  not  guarantee  against  injury 


324  INDUSTRIAL  ACCIDENT  LEGISLATION 

from  the  negligence  of  a  fellow  servant,  there  was  never- 
theless an  implied  agreement  between  them.  Murray  v 
South  Car.  R.  R.  Co.,  1  McMullen  Rep.  S.  Car.  385.  The 
rule  in  its  present  form  was  laid  down  in  Massachusetts 
by  Chief  Justice  Shaw  in  1842  in  Farwell  v  Boston  & 
Worcester  R.  R.  Co.,  4  Mete.  Rep.  49.  The  doctrine  cul- 
minated in  1868  in  the  much  condemned  case  of  Wilson  v 
Merry,  L.  E.  1  Scotch  &  Div.  App.  326,  which  abolished 
liability  for  the  fault  of  a  vice-principal. 

The  reaction  in  the  drift  of  popular  feeling  resulted 
in  the  enactment  by  Parliament  of  the  Employers'  Liabil- 
ity Act  of  1880  and  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act  of 
1897,  which  was  in  effect  a  statute  providing  for  compul- 
sory insurance. 

The  chief  obstacle  in  the  inauguration  of  this  modern 
system  of  social  equity  has  been  the  juristic  doctrine  of 
tort,  culminating  in  the  Iv es  decision. 

"  Negligence, "  as  denned  by  Baron  Alderson  in 
Blyth  v  Waterworks  Co.,  11  Exch.  784,  "is  the  omission 
to  do  something  which  a  reasonable  man,  guided  by  those 
considerations  which  ordinarily  regulate  the  conduct  of 
human  affairs,  would  do,  or  doing  something  which  a 
reasonable  or  prudent  man  would  not  do. ' ' 

At  common  law  it  is  the  duty  of  an  employer  to  use 
ordinary  and  reasonable  care  for  the  safety  of  the  em- 
ployee while  performing  his  work : 

1.  By  providing  a  reasonably  safe  place  to  work ; . 

2.  By  providing  reasonably  safe  tools  and  appli- 
ances ; 

3.  By  using  reasonable  care  in  hiring  agents  and  ser- 
vants, fit  for  the  work  they  are  to  do ;   , 

4.  By  formulating  suitable  and  reasonable  rules  for 
carr/ying  on  the  work ; 

5.  By  warning  and  instructing  youthful  and  inexpe- 
rienced servants  as  to  hazards  of  employment 

6.  By  cautioning  against  hidden  dangers. 


HISTORIC  REVIEW  325 

WMle  employment  was  still  conducted  on  a  limited 
scale,  considerations  for  the  protection  of  small  and  soli- 
tary employers  led  to  the  grafting  into  the  law  of  the 
other  two  shoots  of  these  triplet  favorites  of  courts,  con- 
tributory negligence  and  assumption  of  risks.  With  the 
revolution  in  modern  industrial  operations,  these  excep- 
tions, originally  intended  to  subserve  justice,  were  per- 
verted into  gross  and  farcical  injustice,  in  the  judgment 
of  compensation  advocates. 


In  Ives  v  South  Buffalo  Ry.  Co.,  201  N.  Y.  271,  where- 
in the  New  York  Act  was  nullified,  because  it  set  the  ax  to 
the  root  of  this  ancient  judicial  tree,  the  court  say : 

"  The  new  statute  is  totally  at  variance  with  the  com- 
mon law  theory  of  the  employer 's  liability.  Fault  on  his 
part  is  no  longer  an  element  of  the  employee's  right  of 
action.  This  change  necessarily  and  logically  carries 
with  it  the  abrogation  of  the  'fellow  servant'  doctrine, 
the  'contributory  negligence'  rule,  and  the  law  relating 
to  the  employee's  assumption  of  risks.  There  can  be  no 
doubt  that  the  first  two  of  these  are  subjects  clearly  and 
fully  within  the  scope  of  legislative  power,  and  that,  as 
to  the  third,  this  power  is  limited  to  some  extent  by  con- 
stitutional provisions. 

"The  'fellow  servant'  rule  is  one  of  judicial  origin,  in- 
grafted upon  the  common  law  for  the  protection  of  the 
master  against  the  consequences  of  negligence  in  which 
he  has  no  part.  In  its  early  application  to  simple  indus- 
trial conditions,  it  had  the  support  of  both  reason  and 
justice.  By  degrees  it  was  extended  until  it  became  evi- 
dent that,  under  the  enormous  expansion  and  indefinite 
complexity  of  our  modern  industrial  conditions,  the  rule 
gave  opportunity,  in  many  instances,  for  harsh  and  tech- 
nical defenses.  In  recent  years  it  has  been  much  re- 
stricted in  its  application  to  large  corporate  and  indus- 
trial enterprises,  and  still  more  recently  it  has  been 


326  INDUSTRIAL  ACCIDENT  LEGISLATION 

modified,  and  to  some  extent  abolished,  by  the  labor  law 

and  the  Employers'  Liability  Act. 

***** 

"We  have  said  enough  to  show  that  the  statutory 
modifications  of  the  *  fellow  servant'  rule,  and  the  law 
of  contributory  negligence  are  clearly  within  the  legisla- 
tive power.  These  doctrines,  for  they  are  nothing  more, 
may  be  regulated  or  even  abolished.  *  *  * 

"There  can  be  no  doubt  as  to  the  theory  of  this  law. 
It  is  based  upon  the  proposition  that  the  inherent  risks 
of  an  employment  should  in  justice  be  placed  upon  the 
shoulders  of  the  employer,  who  can  protect  himself 
against  loss  by  insurance  and  by  such  an  addition  to  the 
price  of  his  wares  as  to  cast  the  burden  ultimately  upon 
the  consumer;  that  indemnity  to  an  injured  employee 
should  be  as  much  a  charge  upon  the  business  as  the  cost 
of  replacing  or  repairing  disabled  or  defective  machinery, 
appliances  or  tools;  that  under  our  present  system,  the 
loss  falls  immediately  upon  the  employee,  who  is  almost 
invariably  unable  to  bear  it,  and  ultimately  upon  the  com- 
munity, which  is  taxed  for  the  support  of  the  indigent; 
and  that  our  present  system  is  uncertain,  unscientific,  and 
wasteful,  and  fosters  a  spirit  of  antagonism  between  em- 
ployer and  employee,  which  it  is  to  the  interests  of  the 
State  to  remove.  *  *  * 

"The  argument,  that  the  risk  to  an  employee  should 
be  borne  by  the  employer,  because  it  is  inherent  in  the  em- 
ployment, may  be  economically  sound;  but  it  is  at  war 
with  the  legal  principle  that  no  employer  can  be  com- 
pelled to  assume  a  risk  which  is  inseparable  from  the 
work  of  the  employee,  and  which  may  exist  in  spite  of  a 
degree  of  care  by  the  employer  far  greater  than  may  be 
exacted  by  the  most  drastic  law.  *  *  * 

"There  is,  of  course,  in  this  country  no  direct  legal 
authority  upon  the  subject  of  the  liability  sought  to  be 
imposed  by  this  statute ;  for  the  theory  is  not  merely  new 
in  our  system  of  jurisprudence,  but  plainly  antagonistic 


HISTORIC  REVIEW  327 

to  its  basic  idea.  The  English  authorities  are  of  no  as- 
sistance to  us,  because  in  the  King's  Court  the  decrees  of 
the  Parliament  are  the  supreme  law  of  the  land,  although 
they  are  interesting  in  their  disclosures  of  the  paternal- 
ism which  logically  results  from  a  universal  employers' 
liability,  based  solely  upon  the  relation  of  employer  and 
employee,  and  not  upon  faults  in  the  employer.  *  *  * 

"It  is  true,  as  stated  by  Mr.  Justice  Brown,  in  Holden 
v  Hardy,  169  U.  S.  366,  42  L.  Ed.  780,  18  Sup.  Ct.  383, 
that '  the  law  is,  to  a  certain  extent,  a  progressive  science ; ' 
that,  in  some  of  the  states,  methods  of  procedure  which, 
at  the  time  the  Constitution  was  adopted,  were  deemed 
essential  to  the  protection  and  safety  of  the  people,  or 
to  the  liberty  of  the  citizen,  have  been  found  to  be  no 
longer  necessary;  that  restrictions  which  had  formerly 
laid  upon  the  conduct  of  individuals,  or  of  classes  of  in- 
dividuals, had  proved  detrimental  to  their  interests; 
while,  upon  the  other  hand,  certain  other  classes  of  per- 
sons, particularly  those  engaged  in  dangerous  or  un- 
healthful  employments,  have  been  found  to  be  in  need  of 
additional  protection.  *  *  *  The  ancient  tenures  of  real 
estate  have  been  largely  swept  away,  and  land  is  now 
transferred  almost  as  easily  and  cheaply  as  personal 
property.  *  *  *  The  power  of  the  State  to  make  such 
changes  in  methods  of  procedure  and  in  substantive  law 
is  clearly  recognized.  *  •  •  All  that  is  necessary  to  af- 
firm in  the  case  before  us  is,  that  in  our  view  of  the  Con- 
stitution of  our  State,  the  liability  sought  to  be  imposed 
upon  the  employers  enumerated  in  the  Statute  before  us 
is  a  taking  of  property  without  due  process  of  law,  and 
the  STATUTE  is  THEREFORE  VOID.  ' ' 


"The  criticisms  of  the  policy  of  the  decision  are  that 
it  carries  a  constitutional  principle  to  the  *  drily  logical 
extreme,'  condemned  by  Mr.  Justice  Holmes  in  Noble 
State  Bank  v  Haslcell,  219  U.  S.  104,  55  L.  Ed.  112,  32  L. 


328  INDUSTRIAL  ACCIDENT  LEGISLATION 

B.  A.  N.  S.  1062,  31  Sup.  Ct.  186,  and  thereby  converts 
our  fundamental  law  into  an  obstacle  to  social  justice ;  in 
other  words,  that  it  assumes  that  present  day  economic 
conditions  and  social  philosophy  have  nothing  to  do  with 
the  constitutional  guaranties  of  property,  and  that  such 
guaranties  must  be  interpreted  absolutely  as  abstract 
principles  until  reformulated  by  amendment ;  that  it  gives 
a  different  interpretation  to  the  'due  process  of  law' 
clause  than  is  given  by  the  Supreme  Court  to  the  similar 
clause  in  the  Federal  Constitution,  thereby  making  such 
clause  the  embodiment  of  a  variable  rather  than  of  a  fixed 
principle ;  and  that  the  court,  in  declaring  the  Statute  not 
to  be  a  proper  exercise  of  the  police  power,  has  invaded 
the  province  of  the  legislature  by  constituting  itself  the 
judge  of  the  existence  of  the  economic  and  industrial 
facts  which  gave  rise  to  the  enactment.  *  *  * 

"The  law  of  negligence  is  of  comparatively  recent 
origin  and  it  does  not  embrace  all  torts.  (See  historical 
articles  by  Prof.  Wigmore  in  7  Harvard  L.  Rev.  315,  383, 
441;  8  Harvard  L.  Rev.  200,  377.) 

1 '  Torts  may  be  divided  into  three  classes :  Those  for 
which  the  defendant  can  be  held  only  if  he  committed  the 
damaging  act  intentionally;  (2)  those  for  which  the  de- 
fendant can  be  held  if  negligent  in  committing  the  act; 
(3)  those  for  which  the  defendant  can  be  held  where  the 
act  was  not  intended  by  him,  and  where  he  was  not  negli- 
gent, but  which  was  due  to  an  instrumentality  (not  nec- 
essarily human)  which  he  employed.  *  *  * 

"Consequently,  the  legislature  in  passing  the  Work- 
men's Compensation  Act,  merely  declared,  in  effect,  that 
for  physical  damage  done  to  these  workmen  the  requisites 
for  the  recovery  of  damages  should  be  those  of  class  8 
above,  instead  of  those  of  class  2.  Legislation  changing 
the  requisites  for  recovery  for  a  tort  has  often  been  up- 
held." Lawyers'  Reports  Annotated.  Note;  Vol.  34  (N. 
S.)  162. 


HISTORIC  REVIEW  329 

Moreover,  the  spirit  of  the  times  demands  a  govern- 
ment— of  living  men,  reason  and  justice — not  of  an  end- 
less mass  of  accumulated,  contradictory  and  antiquated 
precedents,  a  great  portion  of  which  has  by  this  modern 
legislation,  been  turned  into  debris. 

However,  the  question  is  now  foreclosed  in  the  Em- 
pire State  by  the  filing  of  an  opinion  by  the  Sovereign 
People  in  the  ballot  box.  In  Illinois  it  remains  unsettled, 
as  this  universally  adopted  measure  is  here  still  limited 
by  its  elective  feature. 

***** 

One  of  the  greatest  difficulties  in  the  operations  of 
the  Act  has  been  encountered  in  ascertaining  the  nature 
and  extent  of  injuries  by  reason  of  the  proverbial  unre- 
liability of  expert  testimony  of  the  medical  profession 
and  in  limiting  the  fees  of  its  practitioners  within  reason- 
able bounds.  The  experience  of  employers  in  New  Jersey, 
where  the  amount  of  such  fees  was  limited  to  $100  for 
two  weeks,  in  that  the  doctor 's  bill  in  most  instances  went 
up  to  the  limit,  led  to  the  further  limitation  to  $50. 

The  fear  of  employers  of  exposure  to  extortion  has 
forced  the  limitation  in  other  states  to  $25.  According 
to  the  requirements  of  the  highly  specialized  nature  of 
this  profession,  an  ordinary  employer  should  always  be 
prepared  to  provide  a  bonesetter,  a  pediatrician,  an 
orthopedic  surgeon,  a  throat  surgeon,  a  neurologist,  a 
gynecologist,  an  oculist,  an  aurist,  an  X-ray  specialist,  a 
Wasserman  test  specialist,  a  laboratory  worker,  a  skin 
specialist,  a  nail  specialist,  a  corn  doctor,  a  dentist,  a  gen- 
eral physician  and — an  undertaker.  By  reason  of  the 
uncertainty  in  theories  and  failure  in  results  of  medicine 
and  surgery,  Congress,  in  enacting  the  Federal  Compen- 
sation Statute,  excluded  all  mention  of  the  subject. 


330  INDUSTRIAL  ACCIDENT  LEGISLATION 

Considering  the  beneficent  purpose  of  this  Statute  of 
Illinois,  which  can  only  be  attained  by  simple  and  unen- 
cumbered procedure,  any  attempt  to  force  upon  em- 
ployers or  employees,  practitioners  or  courts,  in  any 
little  case  that  may  arise,  the  necessity  of  consulting  and 
wading  through  the  vast  and  rapid  accumulations  of 
precedents  in  half  a  hundred  foreign  jurisdictions,  with 
as  many  different  kinds  of  Compensation  Acts — each  and 
all  of  the  provisions  of  all  of  which  are  apt  to  vary  in 
phraseology  and  meaning — would  result  in  nothing  else 
than  rendering  this  enactment  the  very  opposite  of  what 
it  was  intended  to  be — a  grotesque  opera  bouffe — in  fact 
the  most  burdensome  and  hopelessly  encumbered  piece  of 
legislation  ever  placed  upon  a  statute  book. 

That  the  courts  of  this  State  will  not  sanction  this 
"reductio  ad  absurdum"  is  clearly  evident  from  the  fol- 
lowing : 

The  Supreme  Court,  in  Uphoff  v  Industrial  Board, 
271  111.  Sup.  316,  stated: 

"Numerous  authorities  from  other  jurisdictions,  con- 
struing Workmen's  Compensation  Acts,  have  been  cited 
and  frequent  references  have  been  made  to  acts  in  other 
jurisdictions.  Both  counsel  have  cited  authorities  which, 
it  is  argued,  support  the  conclusions  contended  for.  The 
wording  of  our  Statute  is  so  different  on  the  question 
here  under  consideration  that  the  other  acts  or  decisions 
could  have  very  little  weight  as  to  the  proper  construc- 
tion to  be  here  given,  and  further  reference  to  them  is  un- 
necessary." 

The  Supreme  Court  further  said,  in  Staley  v  III.  Cent. 
R.R.: 

"The  provisions  of  the  acts  of  the  states  having 
adopted  legislation  of  this  character  on  the  questions 
here  under  consideration  are  very  dissimilar  and  we 
have  been  unable  to  find  much  help  from  adjudicated 
cases  in  other  jurisdictions." 


HISTORIC  REVIEW  331 

In  approaching  the  "Dixi"  of  this  little  labor,  atten- 
tion is  invited  to  the  curious  fact  that  near  the  very  cradle 
of  the  Anglo-Saxon  race,  among  the  Viking  sons  of  the 
Northland,  there  was  a  thousand  years  ago  in  general  op- 
eration— as  a  substitute  for  blood  vengeance  of  kin  or 
outlawry — a  system  of  jurisprudence  formulated  on  the 
principle  of  definite  compensation  for  every  loss,  includ- 
ing that  of  life  by  wilful  slaying. 

Here  is  a  graphic  picture  of  those  days  of  real  popu- 
lar government,  when  the  yeomen  from  near  and  far 
gathered  at  the  "Folcmote"  or  "Thing"  and,  after  lis- 
tening to  the  recital  of  the  Law-saga,  sat  in  legislative, 
judicial  and  administrative  session  regarding  their  own 
daily  affairs. 

It  is  a  brief  extract  from  Njals  Saga,  chronicled  in  the 
1100 's.  ("Sources  of  Ancient  and  Primitive  Law,"  Con- 
tinental Legal  History  Series,  Professor  John  H.  Wig- 
more.) 

"The  sons  of  Sigfus  gave  notice  of  their  suit  at  the 
Hill  of  Laws,  and  asked  in  what  Quarter  Courts  they  lay, 
and  in  what  house  in  the  district  the  defendant  dwelt.  * 
*  *  Many  sought  to  bring  an  atonement  between  them, 
but  Flosi  was  steadfast;  yet  others  were  still  more  wordy, 
and  things  looked  ill. 

"Then  the  whole  body  of  men  at  the  Thing  went  to 
the  courts.  Flosi  stood  south  at  the  court  of  the  men  of 
Rangriver,  and  his  band  with  him.  There  with  him  was 
Hall  of  the  Side,  and  Runolf  of  the  Dale,  Wolf,  Aur- 
priest's  son,  and  those  other  men  who  had  promised  Flosi 
help.  , 

"Njal  had  already  prayed  the  judges  to  go  into  the 
court,  and  now  the  sons  of  Sigfus  plead  their  suit.  They 
took  witness  and  bade  Njal's  son  listen  to  their  oath; 
after  that  they  took  their  oath;  and  then  they  declared 
their  suit;  then  they  brought  forward  witness  of  the  no- 
tice; then  they  bade  the  neighbors  on  the  inquest  to  take 


332  INDUSTRIAL  ACCIDENT  LEGISLATION 

their  seats;  then  they  called  on  Njal's  son  to  challenge 
the  inquest.  Then  up  stood  Thorhall,  Asgrim's  son,  and 
took  witness  and  forbade  the  inquest  by  a  protest  to  ut- 
ter their  finding. 

"  'Mord,  Valgard's  son/  said  Thorhall,  'fared  to 
Hauskuld' s  slaying  with  Njal's  sons,  and  wounded  him 
with  that  wound  for  which  no  man  was  named  when  wit- 
ness was  taken  to  the  death  wounds;  and  ye  can  say  noth- 
ing gainst  this,  and  so  the  suit  comes  to  naught.' 

"Then  Njal  stood  up  and  said:  'It  seems  to  me  as 
though  this  suit  were  come  to  naught,  and  it  is  likely  it 
should,  for  it  hath  sprung  from  an  ill  root.  I  will  let  you 
all  know  that  I  loved  Hauskuld  more  than  my  own  sons, 
and  when  I  heard  that  he  was  slain,  methought  the  sweet- 
est light  of  my  eyes  was  quenched,  and  I  would  rather 
have  lost  all  my  sons,  and  that  he  were  alive.  Now  I  ask 
thee,  Hall  of  thei  Side,  and  thee,  Runolf  of  the  Dale,  and 
thee,  Hjallti,  Skeggi's  son,  and  thee,  Einar  of  Thvera,  and 
thee,  Hafr  the  Wise,  that  I  may  be  allowed  to  make  an 
atonement  for  the  slaying  of  Hauskuld  on  my  son's  be- 
half; and  I  wish  that  those  men  who  are  best  fitted  to  do 
so  shall  utter  the  award.'  *  *  * 

"So  the  bell  was  rung,  and  all  men  went  to  the  Hill 
of  Laws,  and^  Hall  of  the  Side  stood  up  and  spoke,  'In 
this  suit,  in  which  we  have  come  to  an  award,  we  have  all 
been  well  agreed;  and  we  have  awarded  six  hundred  in 
silver,  and  half  this  sum  we,  the  daysmen,  will  pay,  but  it 
must  all  be  paid  up  here  at  the  Thing.  Now  each  must 
give  the  other  pledges  of  peace.' 


WORKMEN'S  COMPENSATION  ACTS. 
Publications. 

United  States  Department  of  Labor — Bureau  of  Statistics — 
"Workmen's  Compensation  Laws  of  the  United  States  and  Foreign 
Countries,"  1913;  No.  126. 

"Compensation  Legislation  of  1914  and  1915,"  1915;  No.  185. 

"Compensation  for  Accidents  to  Employees  of  the  United  States," 
under  Act  of  May  30,  1914;  No.  155. 

"Decisions  of  Courts  Affecting  Labor  Bills;"  Nos.  169,  152. 

"Report  of  the  Employers'  Liability  Commission  of  the  State  of 
Illinois;"  1910-1913. 

"Report  of  Employers'  Liability  and  Workmen's  Compensation 
Commission;"  U.  S.  Senate  Doc.  No.  338;  62nd  Congress;  2nd  Sess. 

Chief  State  Factory  Inspector,  "Annual  Report,"  1915. 

Workmen's  Insurance  and  Benefit  Funds  in  U.  S.  Dept.  Com. 
and  Lab.,  Rep.  1909. 

Workmen's  Insurance  and  Compensation  Systems  in  Europe.  U. 
S.  Com.  of  Labor,  1911. 

Legal  Liability  for  Injuries  to  Employees.  U.  S.  Bur.  Lab.,  Bui. 
74. 

Illinois  Employers'  Liability  Commission;  Report  Initial  Meeting, 
March  27,  1910,  Final  Meeting  Sept.  15,  1910. 

Workmen's  Compensaton  for  Industrial  Accidents,  Proceedings 
of  National  Conference. 

Industrial  Board  of  Illinois;  "Bulletin  No.  1."  (Containing  deci- 
sions to  July,  1915.)  Annual  report;  1915. 

"Proceedings  of  Commission  on  Compensation  for  Industrial  Acci- 
dents," Chicago;  Amos  T.  Saunders,  Sec'y,  Clinton,  Mass. 

"The  Law  of  Compensation  for  Injuries  to  Workmen."  James 
Harrington  Boyd;  Bobbs-Merrill  Co.,  Indianapolis. 

"Workmen's  Insurance  in  Europe;"  Frankel  &  Dawson. 

"Industrial  Insurance  in  the  United  States;"  Prof.  Charles  R. 
Henderson. 

"Economic  Value  of  Man;"  Chauncey  Rea  Burr,  U.  S.  Senate 
Doc.  No.  965;  Gov't  Printing  Office. 

"Workmen's  Compensation  Acts,"  Treaties  by  Mr.  Beren,  Mr. 
Minton  Senhouse  and  Messrs  Parsons  &  Bertram.  (London.) 

Butterworth's  "Workmen's  Compensation  Cases."  Vols.  I-IX; 
New  Series:  1 — London. 

"Workmen's  Compensation  Appeals;"  C.  Y.  C.  Dawbarn,  London. 

"Workmen's  Compensation;  Judicial  Interpretations."  John 
Charters,  London. 

"Workmen's  Compensation  Acts  and  Cases."  Canada.  Edgar  T. 
Dale. 

"Master  and  Servant;"  C.  B.  Labatt;  Vol.  6  (contains  Acts  of 
States). 

"Negligence  and  Compensation  Cases,  Ann."  Callaghan  &  Co., 
Chicago. 

"Workmen's  Compensation  Act,"  1914.    Samuel  A.  Harper. 


STATE  OF  ILLINOIS 

STATUTES 

Regulating 

EMPLOYMENTS 

Related  to  Workmen's  Compensation  Act;  Enforced  by 
State  Factory  Inspector. 

Safety  Act S35 

Structural  Act  354 

Occupational  Disease  Act 361 

Blower  Act   368 

Noxious  Fumes  Act 371 

Garment  Manufacture  Act 373 

Butterine  and  Ice  Cream  Manufacture  Act 375 

Hours  of  Service  of  Women  Act 377 

Child  Labor  Act 379 

Wash  Room  Act 389 

Miscellaneous  Acts .  391 


SAFETY  ACT 

SAFETY  ACT. 
See  Workmen's  Compensation  Act,  §  3,  par.  8. 


335 


§  1.  Hazardous  machinery  to 
be  located  so  as  not  to  be 
dangerous  —  dangerous 
places  to  be  properly  en- 
closed— no  machine  to  be 
used  when  defective — no 
repairs  while  machine  in 
motion. 

§  2.  Safeguards  not  to  be  re- 
moved, except  for  repairs. 

§  3.  Means  to  be  provided  for 
disconnecting  power. 

§  4.  Hoistways,  etc.,  to  be  en- 
closed—  safety  devices  — 
device  to  hold  elevator  cab 
or  cars  in  event  of  acci- 
dent. 

§  5.  Notice  of  unsafe  condition 
— to  remedy — by  chief 
factory  inspector. 

§  6.  Employe  not  to  operate  or 
tamper  with  machine  with 
which  he  is  unfamiliar. 

§  7.  Traversing  carriage  of 
self-acting  machine  must 
be  located  at  what  dis- 
tance. 


5     8. 


§ 


Food  not  to  be  taken 
where  poisonous  sub- 
stances, etc.,  are  present 
as  result  of  process  of 
manufacture. 


9.     Requirements  as  to  seats 

for  female  employees. 
§  10.     Equitable  temperature  to 
be  maintained. 


§  16.  Hand-rails.  Stair-ways — 
how  constructed. 

§  17.  Proper  light  in  all  main 
stairways,  etc.  Where 
and  when  necessary. 

§  18.  Floor  space  not  to  be 
overloaded,  etc. 

§  19.  Passageways  must  be  of 
ample  width,  etc. 

§  20.  Requirements  as  to  water 
closets  —  number  —  loca- 
tion— ventilation. 

§  21.  Washing  facilities— dress- 
ing rooms. 

§  22.  Employer  to  make  chang- 
es and  additions—owner 
to  permit  alterations. 

§  23.  Alterations  and  additions 
— time  after  notice  by 
chief  factory  inspector. 

§  24.  Report  as  to  accidents  re- 
sulting in  death — as  to 
accidents  entailing  loss  of 
15  days'  time — what  re- 
port to  state. 

§  25.  Chief  factory  inspector 
and  assistants  to  enforce 
act — notice  of  violations — 
when  changes  made  com- 
plying with  act  not  to  be 
disturbed  for  a  year. 

§  2«.     Penalty. 


336 


SAFETY  ACT 


§  11.  Air  space  required — when 
artificial  means  of  venti- 
lation required — terms  de- 
fined. 

§  12.  Factories  to  be  kept  free 
from  gas  from  sewer,  etc. 
— poisonous  fumes,  dust, 
etc.,  arising  from  any 
process  to  be  removed  by 
ventilating  and  exhaust 
device. 

§  18.  Kefuse,  waste,  and  sweep- 
ings removed  once  each 
day  —  cleaning  —  where 
floors  are  wet. 

§  14.  Means  of  egress — fire  es- 
capes. 

{  15.  Outside  doors  to  open  out- 
ward— doors — how  con- 
structed. 


§  27.  Where  inspection  of  a 
standard  equal  to  that  of 
this  act  is  required  by 
ordinances  of  city,  etc. 

§  28.  Act  not  to  apply  where 
federal  government  exer- 
cises jurisdiction. 

§  29.     Terms  defined. 

§  30.  Act  to  be  printed  in  Eng- 
lish and  other  languages. 

§  31.  Notice  covering  salient 
features  of  Act — to  be 
posted  in  office  and  work- 
rooms. 

§  32.     In  force — repeal. 


SAFETY  ACT. 

AN  ACT  to  provide  for  the  health,  safety  and  comfort  of 
employees  in  factories,  mercantile  establishments, 
mills  and  workshops  of  this  State,  and  to  provide  for 
the  enforcement  thereof,  and  to  repeal  an  Act  en- 
titled, "An  Act  to  provide  for  the  health,  safety  and 
comfort  of  employees  in  factories,  mercantile  estab- 
lishments, mills  and  workshops  in  this  State,  and  to 
provide  for  the  enforcement  thereof."  Approved, 
June  29,  1915 ;  in  force,  July  1,  1915.  Laws  1915,  p. 
18,  House  Bill  No.  713. 

Section  1.  Be  it  enacted  by  the  People  of  the  State  of 
Illinois,  represented  in  the  General  Assembly:  That  all 
power  driven  machinery,  including  all  saws,  planers, 
wood  shapers,  jointers,  sand  paper  machines,  iron  man- 
gles, emery  wheels,  ovens,  furnaces,  forges  and  rollers  of 
metal;  all  projecting  set  screws  on  moving  parts;  all 
drums,  cogs,  gearing,  belting,  shafting,  tables,  fly  wheels, 


SAFETY  ACT    ,  337 

flying  shuttles,  and  hydro-extractors ;  all  laundry  machin- 
ery, mill  gearing  and  machinery  of  every  description ;  all 
systems  of  electrical  wiring  or  transmission;  all  dyna- 
mos and  other  electrical  apparatus  and  appliances;  all 
vats  or  pans,  and  all  receptacles  containing  molten  metal 
or  hot  or  corrosive  fluids  in  any  factory,  mercantile  es- 
tablishment, mill  or  workshop,  shall  be  so  located  wher- 
ever possible,  as  not  to  be  dangerous  to  employees  or 
shall  be  properly  enclosed,  fenced  or  otherwise  protected. 
All  dangerous  places  in  or  about  mercantile  establish- 
ments, factories,  mills  or  workshops,  near  to  which  any 
employee  is  obliged  to  pass,  or  to  be  employed  shall, 
where  practicable,  be  properly  enclosed,  fenced  or  other- 
wise guarded.  No  machine  in  any  factory,  mercantile  es- 
tablishment, mill  or  workshop,  shall  be  used  when  the 
same  is  known  to  be  dangerously  defective,  and  no  re- 
pairs shall  be  tmade  to  the  active  mechanism  or  operative 
part  of  any  machine  when  the  machine  is  in  motion. 

§  2.  Removing  and  replacing  Safeguards. — No  per- 
son shall  remove  or  make  ineffective  any  safeguard  re- 
quired by  this  act,  during  the  active  use  or  operation  of 
the  guarded  machine  or  device,  except  for  the  purpose  of 
immediately  making  repairs  thereto,  and  all  such  safe- 
guards so  removed  shall  be  promptly  replaced. 

§  3.  Disconnecting  Power. — In  every  factory,  mer- 
cantile establishment,  mill  or  workshop,  effective  means 
shall  be  provided  for  immediately  disconnecting  the 
power,  so  that  in  case  of  need  or  accident  any  particular 
machine,  group  of  machines,  room  or  department,  can  be 
promptly  and  effectively  shut  down. 

a.  Where  machines  require  to  be  started  and  stopped 
frequently,  they  shall,  wherever  practicable,  be  provided 
with  tight  and  loose  pulleys,  clutch  or  other  effective  dis- 
engaging device.  When  provided  with  tight  and  loose  pul- 
leys, the  shifting  of  the  belt  shall  be  accomplished  by  the 
use  of  a  belt  shifter,  placed  within  easy  reach  of  the  oper- 
ator. When  a  clutch  or  other  disengaging  device  is  used, 


338  SAFETY  ACT 

an  effective  means  for  throwing  such  device  into  or  out 
of  engagement  shall  be  provided,  and  shall  be  placed 
within  easy  reach  of  the  operator. 

b.  Where  machines  are  direct  connected  with  the 
prime  mover  (electric  motor,  steam,  gas  or  gasoline  en- 
gine, or  other  source  of  power),  a  switch,  throttle,  or 
other  power  controlling  device  shall  be  furnished  and 
shall  be  placed  within  easy  reach  of  the  operator,  or  his 
co-worker. 

c.  Where  machines  are  arranged  in  groups,  rooms  or 
departments,  and  power  is  supplied  by  a  prime  mover, 
located  within  the  confines  of  such  group,  room  or  depart- 
ment, a  switch,  throttle,  or  other  power-controlling  device 
shall  be  furnished,  and  shall  be  placed  within  easy  reach 
of  the  operators  affected,  so  that  all  shafting,  transmit- 
ting machinery  and  machines  of  such  group,  room  or  de- 
partment, can  be  simultaneously  shut  down. 

d.  Where  machines  are  arranged  in  groups,  rooms  or 
departments,  and  are  supplied  by  power  through  the  use 
of  main  or  line  shafts,  receiving  power  from  some  prime 
mover,  located  without  the  group,  room  or  department, 
the  power-receiving  wheel  of  such  main  or  line  shaft, 
shall,  wherever  possible,  be  provided  with  a  friction 
clutch,  or  other  effective  power-disengaging  device,  with 
suitable  means  for  operating  the  clutch,  or  power-disen- 
gaging device,  and  these  means  shall  be  placed  within  the 
confines  of  such  group,  room  or  department,  and  within 
easy  reach  of  the  employees  or  operatives  affected,  so 
that  all  machines,  shafting  and  other  transmission  ma- 
chinery within  such  group,  room  or  department,  can  be 
simultaneously  shut  down.  In  addition  to  such  safeguard, 
communication   consisting   of   speaking   tubes,   electric 
bells,  electric  colored  lights,  or  other  approved  and  effec- 
tive means,  shall  be  provided  in  all  cases  covered  by  this 
paragraph  between  each  such  group,  room  or  depart- 
ment, and  the  room  in  which  the  engineer,  or  prime 
mover,  is  located,  so  that  in  case  of  need  or  accident,  the 


SAFETY  ACT  339 

motive  power  of  such  group,  room  or  department  can  be 
promptly  stopped  or  controlled. 

§  4.  Hoistways,  Elevator  Wells,  Wheel  Holes — 
Safety  Devices. — All  hoistways,  hatchways,  elevator 
wells  and  wheel  holes  in  factories,  mercantile  establish- 
ments, mill  or  workshops,  shall  be  securely  fenced,  en- 
closed or  otherwise  safely  protected,  and  due  diligence 
shall  be  used  to  keep  all  such  means  of  protection  closed, 
except  when  it  is  necessary  to  have  the  same  open,  in 
order  that  said  hatchways,  elevators  or  hoisting  appara- 
tus may  be  used.  All  elevator  cabs  or  cars,  whether  used 
for  freight  or  passengers,  shall  be  provided  with  some  de- 
vice, whereby  the  car  or  cab  may  be  held  in  the  event  of 
accident  to  the  shipper  rope  or  hoisting  [machinery  or  con- 
trolling apparatus. 

§  5.  Unsafe  Conditions — Notice — to  Remedy. — If 
any  elevator,  machine,  electrical  apparatus  or  system  of 
wiring,  or  any  part  or  parts  thereof,  in  any  factory,  mer- 
cantile establishment,  mill  or  workshop,  are  in  an  unsafe 
condition,  or  are  not  properly  guarded,  where  reasonable 
to  guard  the  same,  the  owner  or  lessee,  or  his  agent,  su- 
perintendent or  other  person  in  charge  thereof,  shall, 
upon  notice  from  the  Chief  State  Factory  Inspector,  or 
the  Assistant  Chief  State  Factory  Inspector,  remedy 
such  unsafe  condition  within  a  reasonable  time  after  re- 
ceiving such  notice. 

§  6.  Tampering  with  Machine  or  Appliance. — No 
employee  of  any  factory,  mercantile  establishment,  mill 
or  workshop,  shall  operate  or  tamper  with  any  machine 
or  appliance  with  which  such  employee  is  not  familiar 
and  which  is  in  no  way  connected  with  the  regular  and 
reasonably  necessary  duties  of  his  employment,  unless  it 
be  by  and  with  the  direct  or  reasonably  implied  command, 
request,  or  direction  of  the  master  or  representative  or 
agent. 

§  7.  Traversing  Carriage — Space  Limited. — The 
traversing  carriage  of  any  self-acting  machine  must  not 


340  SAFETY  ACT 

be  allowed  to  run  out  within  a  distance  of  eighteen  (18) 
inches  from  any  fixed  structure,  not  being  part  of  the  ma- 
chine, if  the  space  over  which  it  runs  out  is  a  space 
through  which  any  employee  is  liable  to  pass,  whether  in 
the  course  of  his  employment  or  otherwise. 

§  8.  Food  Prohibited  in  Certain  Rooms,  etc. — No 
employee  shall  take  or  be  allowed  to  take  food  into  any 
room  or  apartment  in  any  factory,  mercantile  establish- 
ment, mill  or  workshop,  where  white  lead,  arsenic  or 
other  poisonous  substances  or  injurious  or  noxious  fumes, 
dusts  or  gases  under  harmful  conditions  are  present,  as 
the  result  of  the  business  conducted  by  such  factories, 
mercantile  establishments,  mills  or  workshops,  and  no- 
tice to  this  effect  shall  be  posted  in  each  room  or  apart- 
ment. Employees  shall  not  remain  in  any  such  room  or 
apartment  during  the  time  allowed  for  meals,  and  suit- 
able provision  shall  be  made  and  maintained  by  the  em- 
ployer, when  practicable,  for  enabling  the  employees  to 
take  their  meals  elsewhere  in  such  establishment:  Pro- 
vided, however,  that  this  section  shall  not  apply  to  such 
employees  whose  presence  during  the  meal  hours  may  be 
necessary  for  the  proper  conduct  of  such  business. 

§  9.  Seats  for  Female  Employees. — That  every  per- 
son, firm  or  corporation  employing  females  in  any  fac- 
tory, mercantile  establishment,  mill  or  workshop  in  this 
State,  shall  provide  a  reasonable  number  of  suitable  seats 
for  the  use  of  such  female  employees,  and  shall  permit  the 
use  of  such  seats  by  them  when  they  are  not  necessarily 
engaged  in  the  active  duties  for  which  they  are  employed, 
and  shall  permit  the  use  of  such  seats  at  all  times  when 
such  use  would  not  actually  and  necessarily  interfere 
with  the  proper  discharge  of  the  duties  of  such  employees 
and,  where  practicable,  such  seats  shall  be  made  a  per- 
manent fixture  and  may  be  so  constructed  or  adjusted 
that  when  said  seats  are  not  in  use  they  will  not  obstruct 
such  female  employee,  when  engaged  in  the  performance 
of  her  duties. 


SAFETY  ACT  341 

§  10.  Equable  Temperature. — In  every  factory,  mer- 
cantile establishment,  mill  or  workshop,  where  one  or 
more  persons  are  employed,  adequate  measures  shall  be 
taken  for  securing  and  maintaining  a  reasonable,  and  as 
far  as  possible,  equable  temperature,  consistent  with  the 
reasonable  requirements  of  the  manufacturing  process. 
No  unnecessary  humidity  which  would  jeopardize  the 
health  of  employees  shall  be  permitted. 

§  11.  Air  Space — Temperature — Ventilation  Terms 
Interpreted. — In  every  room  or  apartment  of  any  factory, 
mercantile  establishment,  mill  or  workshop,  where  one  or 
more  persons  are  employed,  at  least  500  cubic  feet  of  air 
space  shall  be  provided  for  each  and  every  person  em- 
ployed therein,  and  fresh  air,  to  the  amount  specified  in 
this  act,  shall  be  supplied  in  such  a  manner  as  not  to 
create  injurious  drafts,  nor  cause  the  temperature  of  any 
such  room  or  apartment  to  fall  materially  below  the 
average  temperature  maintained:  Provided,  where  lights 
are  used  which  do  not  consume  oxygen,  250  cubic  feet  of 
air  space  shall  be  deemed  sufficient.  All  rooms  or  apart- 
ments of  any  factory,  mercantile  establishment,  mill  or 
workshop,  having  at  least  2,000  cubic  feet  of  air  space  for 
each  and  every  person  employed  in  each  room  or  apart- 
ment, and  having  outside  windows  and  doors  whose  area 
is  at  least  one-eighth  of  the  total  floor  area,  shall  not  be 
required  to  have  artificial  means  of  ventilation;  but  all 
such  rooms  or  apartments  shall  be  properly  aired  before 
beginning  work  for  the  day  and  during  the  meal  hours, 
All  such  rooms,  or  apartments,  having  less  than  2,000 
cubic  feet  of  air  space,  but  more  than  500  cubic  feet  of 
air  space,  for  each  and  every  person  employed  therein, 
and  which  have  outside  windows,  and  doors  whose  area 
is  at  least  one-eighth  of  the  floor  area,  shall  be  provided 
with  artificial  means  of  ventilation,  which  shall  be  in 
operation  when  the  outside  temperature  requires  the 
windows  to  be  kept  closed,  and  which  shall  supply  during 
each  working  hour  at  least  1,500  cubic  feet  of  fresh  air 


342  SAFETY  ACT 

» 

for  each  and  every  person  employed  therein.  All  such 
rooms  or  apartments,  having  less  than  500  cubic  feet  of 
air  space  for  each  and  every  person  employed  therein,  all 
rooms  or  apartment  having  no  outside  windows  or  doors, 
and  all  rooms  or  apartments  having  less  than  2,000  cubic 
feet  of  air  space  for  each  and  every  person  employed 
therein,  and  in  which  the  outside  window  and  door  area 
is  less  than  one-eighth  of  the  floor  area,  shall  be  provided 
with  artificial  means  of  ventilation,  which  will  supply 
during  each  working  hour  throughout  the  year,  at  least 
1,800  cubic  feet  of  fresh  air  for  each  and  every  person 
employed  therein;  Provided,  that  the  provisions  of  the 
preceding  portions  of  this  section  shall  not  apply  to  stor- 
age rooms  or  vaults:  And,  provided,  further,  that  the 
preceding  portions  of  this  section  shall  not  apply  to  those 
rooms  or  apartments  in  which  manufacturing  processes 
are  carried  on  which  from  their  peculiar  nature  would  be 
materially  interfered  with  by  the  provisions  of  this  sec- 
tion. No  part  of  the  fresh  air  supply  required  by  this 
section  shall  be  taken  from  any  cellar  or  basement. 

The  following  terms  of  this  section  shall  be  interpre- 
ted to  mean:  The  air  space  available  for  each  person  is 
the  total  interior  volume  of  a  room,  expressed  in  cubic 
feet,  without  any  deduction  for  machinery  contained 
therein,  divided  by  the  average  number  of  persons  em- 
ployed therein. 

Outside  windows  and  doors  are  those  connecting  di- 
rectly with  the  outside  air;  the  window  and  door  area  is 
the  total  area  of  the  windows  and  doors  of  all  outside 
openings ;  and  the  floor  area  is  the  total  floor  area  of  each 
room. 

§  12.  Ventilating  and  Exhaust  Devices. — All  fac- 
tories, mercantile  establishments,  mills  or  workshops 
shall  be  kept  free  from  gas  or  effluvia  arising  from  any 
sewer,  drain,  privy  or  other  nuisance  on  the  premises.  All 
poisonous  or  noxious  fumes  or  gases  arising  from  any 
process,  and  all  dust  of  a  character  injurious  to  the  health 


SAFETY  ACT  343 

of  the  persons  employed,  which  is  created  in  the  course  of 
a  manufacturing  process,  within  such  factory,  mill  or 
workshop,  shall  be  removed,  as  far  as  practicable,  by 
either  ventilating  or  exhaust  devices. 

§  13.  Disposition  of  Refuse — Drainage. — All  decom- 
posed, fetid  or  putrescent  matter,  and  all  refuse,  waste 
and  sweepings  of  any  factory,  mercantile  establishment, 
mill  or  workshop,  shall  be  removed  and  disposed  of,  at 
least  once  each  day,  and  in  such  a  manner  as  not  to  cause 
a  nuisance;  and  all  cleaning  shall  be  done,  as  far  as  pos- 
sible, outside  of  working  hours ;  but  if  done  during  work- 
ing hours,  shall  be  done  in  such  a  manner  as  to  avoid  the 
unnecessary  raising  of  dust  or  noxious  odors.  In  every 
employees,  and  gratings  or  dry  standing  rooms  shall  be 
factory,  mill  or  workshop,  in  which  any  process  is  car- 
ried on  which  makes  the  floors  wet,  the  floor  shall  be  con- 
structed and  maintained  with  due  regard  to  the  health  of 
provided,  if  practicable,  at  points  where  employees  are 
regularly  stationed,  and  adequate  means  shall  be  pro- 
vided for  drainage,  and  for  preventing  seepage  or  leak- 
age to  the  floors  below. 

§  14.  Means  of  Egress. — In  all  factories,  mercantile 
establishments,  mills  or  workshops,  sufficient  and  reason- 
able means  of  escape  in  case  of  fire  shall  be  provided,  by 
more  than  one  means  of  egress,  and  such  means  of  escape 
shall  at  all  times  be  kept  free  from  any  obstruction  and 
shall  be  kept  in  good  repair  and  ready  for  use,  and  shall 
be  plainly  marked  as  such. 

§  15.  Doors — Construction. — All  doors  used  by  em- 
ployees as  entrances  to  or  exits  from  any  factory,  mer- 
cantile establishment,  mill  or  workship,  of  a  height  of  two 
stories  or  over,  shall  open  outward,  slide  or  roll,  and  shall 
be  so  constructed  as  to  be  easily  and  immediately  opened 
from  within  in  case  of  fire  or  other  emergency. 

§  16.  Stair-ways — Construction. — Proper  and  sub- 
stantial hand  rails  shall  be  provided  on  all  stair-ways  in 
factories,  mercantile  establishments,  mills  or  workshops, 


344  SAFETY  ACT 

and  the  treads  on  all  stair-ways  shall  be  so  constructed 
as  to  furnish  a  firm  and  safe  foothold. 

§  17.  Lights — Where  and  When  Necessary. — In  all 
factories,  mercantile  establishments,  mills  or  workshops, 
a  proper  light  shall  be  kept  burning  by  the  owner"  or 
lessee  in  all  main  passageways,  main  hallways,  at  all 
main  stairs,  main  stair  landings  and  shafts,  and  in  front 
of  all  passenger  or  freight  elevators,  upon  the  entrance 
floors  and  upon  the  other  floors,  on  every  work  day  of  the 
year,  from  the  time  that  the  building  is  opened  for  use 
until  the  time  when  it  is  closed,  except  at  times  when  the 
influx  of  natural  light  shall  make  artificial  light  unneces- 
sary: Provided,  that  when  two  or  more  tenants  occupy 
different  floors  in  one  building,  such  elevator  shafts  need 
be  lighted  only  on  the  floors  occupied  and  used  by  em- 
ployees. 

§  18.  Overloaded  Floor  Space. — No  floor  space  or 
any  work  room  in  any  factory,  mercantile  establishment, 
mill  or  workshop,  shall  be  so  overloaded  with  machinery 
or  other  material  as  thereby  to  cause  serious  risk  to  or 
endanger  the  life  or  limb  of  any  employee,  nor  shall  there 
be  permitted  in  any  such  establishment  a  load  in  excess 
of  the  safe  sustaining  power  of  the  floors  and  walls  there- 
of. 

§  19.  Passageways. — In  all  factories,  mercantile  es- 
tablishments, mills  or  workshops,  machines  must  not  be 
placed  so  closely  together  as  to  be  a  serious  menace  to 
those  that  have  to  pass  between  them.  Passageways 
must  be  of  ample  width  and  head  room  and  must  be  kept 
well  lighted  and  free  from  obstructions. 

§  20.  Water  Closets — Number — Location — Ventila- 
tion.— Every  factory,  mercantile  establishment,  mill  or 
workshop,  shall  be  provided  with  a  sufficient  number  of 
water  closets,  earth  closets  or  privies,  within  reasonable 
access  of  the  persons  employed  therein,  and  such  water 
closets,  earth  closets  or  privies  shall  be  supplied'  in  the 
proportion  of  at  least  one  (1)  to  every  thirty  (30)  male 


SAFETY  ACT  345 

persons  and  one  (1)  to  every  twenty-five  (25)  female 
persons ;  and  whenever  both  male  and  female  persons  are 
employed,  said  water  closets  and  privies  shall  be  provided 
separate  and  apart  for  the  use  of  each  sex,  and  plainly 
marked  by  which  sex  they  are  to  be  used;  and  no  person 
or  persons  shall  be  allowed  to  use  the  closets  or  privies 
assigned  to  the  opposite  sex;  and  such  water  closets  or 
privies  shall  be  constructed  in  an  approved  manner  and 
properly  enclosed,  and  at  all  times  kept  in  a  clean  and 
sanitary  condition.  The  closets  or  privies,  where  practi- 
cable, shall  be  located  so  that  they  shall  have  direct  ven- 
tilation with  the  outside  air;  where  it  is  impracticable  to 
locate  the  closets  or  privies  so  as  to  have  direct  ventila- 
tion with  the  outside  air,  they  shall  be  placed  in  an  en- 
closure, and  every  such  closet  or  privy  shall  be  properly 
and  effectively  disinfected  and  separately  ventilated,  and 
shall  be  properly  lighted  by  artificial  light,  except  when 
the  influx  of  natural  light  makes  artificial  light  unneces- 
sary: 

Provided,  that  nothing  in  this  section  shall  be  con- 
strued to  prevent  any  city,  town  or  village,  by  appropri- 
ate ordinance  or  regulation,  from  prohibiting  the  con- 
struction, use  or  maintenance  in  such  city,  town  or  vil- 
lage, of  any  kind  of  earth  closets,  or  privies,  which  may 
be  considered  a  nuisance  or  detrimental  to  the  public 
health. 

§  21.  Washing  Facilities — Dress  Rooms. — In  all  fac- 
tories, mercantile  establishments,  mills  or  workshops, 
adequate  washing  facilities  shall  be  provided  for  the  em- 
ployees, where  necessary,  and  in  such  case  in  all  factories, 
mills  and  workshops  not  less  than  one  spigot,  basin  or  re- 
ceptacle shall  be  provided  for  each  thirty  (30)  employees; 
and  in  mercantile  establishments,  not  less  than  one  spigot, 
basin  or  receptacle  shall  be  provided  for  each  fifty  (50) 
employees.  Where  the  labor  performed  by  the  employees 
is  of  such  a  character  as  to  make  customary  or  necessary 
a  change  of  clothing  by  the  employees,  there  shall  be  pro- 


346  SAFETY  ACT 

vided  sanitary  and  suitable  dressing  room  or  rooms,  and 
both  such  dressing  rooms  and  washing  facilities  shall  be 
separately  maintained  for  each  sex: 

Provided,  that  nothing  in  this  act  shall  be  construed 
as  abrogating  or  repealing  any  provision  of  section  5  of 
an  act  entitled,  "An  act  to  provide  for  the  licensing  of 
plumbers,  and  to  supervise  and  inspect  plumbing,"  ap- 
proved June  10,  1897,  and  in  force  July  1,  1897;  or  the 
provisions  of  any  local  ordinance  or  regulation  of  any 
city,  town  or  village,  requiring  approved  and  sufficient 
methods  of  sanitation,  light,  heat,  drainage  or  ventilation 
of  an  equal  or  superior  standard  to  that  required  in  this 
act. 

§  22.  Duties  of  Proprietor. — It  shall  be  the  duty  of 
every  person,  firm  or  corporation  to  which  the  provisions 
of  this  act  may  apply,  to  carry  out  the  same,  and  make  all 
the  changes  and  additions  necessary  therefor,  and  in 
every  way  to  comply  with  all  the  provisions  of  this  act, 
and  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  owner  of  the  building  in 
which  is  located  any  such  factory,  mercantile  establish- 
ment, mill  or  workshop,  to  permit  any  alterations  or  ad- 
ditions to  such  building  as  may  be  necessary  to  comply 
with  the  provisions  of  this  act. 

§  23.  Alterations  and  Additions — Notice  by  State 
Factory  Inspector. — Whenever,  by  the  provisions  of  this 
act,  it  is  made  the  duty  of  any  person,  firm  or  corporation 
within  this  State,  to  make  or  install  any  alterations,  ad- 
ditions or  changes,  the  same  shall  be  made  and  installed 
in  conformity  with  the  provisions  of  this  act,  and  com- 
pleted within  a  reasonable  time  after  notification  by  the 
Chief  State  Factory  Inspector  or  his  deputy. 

§  24.  Report  of  Accidents  and  Injuries. — It  shall  be 
the  duty  of  the  owner  or  lessee,  or  superintendent  or  per- 
son in  charge  of  any  factory,  mercantile  establishment, 
mill  or  workshop  in  this  State,  to  send  to  the  Chief  State 
Factory  Inspector,  in  writing,  an  immediate  report  of  all 
accidents  or  injuries  resulting  in  death.  It  shall  also  be 


SAFETY  ACT  347 

the  duty  of  the  person  in  charge  of  such  factory,  mercan- 
tile establishment,  mill  or  workshop,  to  report  between 
the  15th  and  25th  of  each  month,  all  accidents  or  injuries 
occurring  during  the  previous  calendar  month,  which  en- 
tailed a  loss  to  the  person  injured  of  fifteen  (15)  consecu- 
tive days '  time  or  more.  All  reports  shall  state  the  cause 
and  character  of  the  injury,  character  of  employment  and 
the  age  and  sex  of  the  person  injured.  No  statement  con- 
tained in  any  such  report  shall  be  admissible  in  evidence 
in  any  action  arising  out  of  the  death  or  accident  therein 
reported: 

Provided,  that  any  such  employer  who  shall  make  the 
reports  of  accidents,  required  by  this  act,  shall  not  be  re- 
quired to  make  such  reports  to  any  other  State  officer, 
board  or  commission. 

§  25.  Duties  of  Factory  Inspector. — It  shall  be  the 
duty  of  the  Chief  State  Factory  Inspector,  and  of  the  As- 
sistant Chief  State  Factory  Inspector,  and  deputy  factory 
inspectors,  under  the  direction  and  supervision  of  the 
Chief  State  Factory  Inspector,  to  enforce  the  provisions 
of  this  act,  and  to  prosecute  all  violations  of  the  same 
before  any  magistrate  or  any  court  of  competent  jurisdic- 
tion in  this  State,  and  for  that  purpose  they  and  each  of 
them  are  hereby  empowered  to  visit  and  inspect,  at  all 
reasonable  times,  all  such  factories,  mercantile  establish- 
ments, mills  and  workshops  in  this  State :  Provided,  that 
whenever  any  secret  process  is  used  in  any  factory,  mer- 
cantile establishment,  mill  or  workshop  the  owner  shall, 
whenever  asked  by  the  Chief  State  Factory  Inspector  or 
the  Assistant  Chief  State  Factory  Inspector,  file  with  him 
an  affidavit  that  the  owner  has  in  all  respects  complied 
with  the  provisions  of  this  act,  and  such  affidavit  shall  be 
accepted  in  lieu  of  inspection  of  any  room  or  apartment  in 
which  any  such  secret  process  is  carried  on. 

In  the  enforcement  of  the  provisions  of  this  act  the 
Chief  State  Factory  Inspector,  and  the  Assistant  Chief 
State  Factory  Inspector,  and  the  deputy  factory  inspec- 


348  SAFETY  ACT 

tor,  under  the  direction  and  supervision  of  the  Chief 
State  Factory  Inspector,  shall  give  proper  notice  in  re- 
gard to  any  violation  of  this  act  to  the  persons  owning, 
operating  or  managing  any  such  factory,  mercantile  es- 
tablishment, mill  or  workshop.  Such  notice  shall  be  writ- 
ten or  printed  and  signed  officially  by  the  Chief  State 
Factory  Inspector,  or  the  Assistant  Chief  State  Factory 
Inspector,  and  said  notice  may  be  served  by  delivering 
the  same  to  the  person  upon  whom  service  is  to  be  had,  or 
by  leaving  at  his  usual  place  of  abode,  or  business,  an 
exact  copy  thereof,  or  by  sending  a  copy  thereof  to  such 
person  by  mail. 

When  general  changes  relative  to  the  location  and 
spacing  of  machinery  or  to  ventilation  have  been  made 
and  such  changes  comply  with  the  provisions  of  this  act, 
such  arrangements,  conditions  remaining  the  same,  shall 
not  be  disturbed  by  any  requirement  of  the  Chief  State 
Factory  Inspector  or  his  deputies  within  the  period  of 
twelve  (12)  months. 

§  26.  Penalties. — Any  person,  firm  or  corporation, 
who  shall,  or  any  agent,  manager  or  superintendent  of 
any  person,  firm  or  corporation,  who,  for  himself,  or  for 
such  person,  firm  or  corporation,  shall  violate  any  of  the 
provisions  of  this  act,  or  who  omits  or  fails  to  comply 
with  any  of  the  foregoing  requirements  of  this  act,  or  who 
disregards  any  notice  of  the  Chief  State  Factory  Inspec- 
tor, or  of  the  Assistant  Chief  State  Factory  Inspector, 
when  said  notice  is  given  in  accordance  with  the  pro- 
visions of  this  act;  or  who  obstructs  or  interferes  with 
any  examination  or  investigation  being  made  by  a  State 
Factory  Inspector,  under  this  act,  or  any  employee  in  any 
such  factory,  mercantile  establishment,  mill  or  workshop, 
who  shall  remove  or  interfere  with  any  guard  or  protec- 
tive or  sanitary  device,  required  by  the  provisions  of  this 
act,  except  as  hereinbefore  provided,  or  who  shall  violate 
any  of  the  other  provisions  of  this  act,  shall  be  deemed 
guilty  of  a  misdemeanor,  and  on  conviction  thereof,  shall 


SAFETY  ACT  349 

be  punished  for  the  first  offense  by  a  fine  of  not  less  than 
ten  dollars  ($10.00)  nor  more  than  fifty  [dollars] 
($50.00) ;  and  upon  conviction  of  the  second  or  subsequent 
offense,  shall  be  fined  not  less  than  twenty-five  dollars 
($25.00)  nor  more  than  two  hundred  dollars  ($200.00), 
and  in  each  case  shall  stand  committed  until  such  fine  and 
costs  are  paid  unless  otherwise  discharged  by  due  process 
of  law. 

§  27.  Municipal  Inspection. — Whenever  any  inspec- 
tion of  machinery,  ways,  means,  instruments  or  appli- 
ances in,  on,  about  or  connected  with  any  factory,  mill, 
mercantile  establishment  or  workshop  is  required  to  be 
made  by  the  ordinances  of  any  city,  town  or  village  of  a 
standard  equal  to  that  of  this  act  and  the  inspection  re- 
quired by  such  ordinances  has  been  made,  then  and  in 
every  such  case  such  inspection  shall  be  accepted  by  the 
Chief  State  Factory  Inspector,  Assistant  Chief  State  Fac- 
tory Inspector  and  the  deputy  factory  inspectors  as  a 
compliance  in  that  respect  with  the  provisions  of  this  act; 
and  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  person  for  whom  such  in- 
spection has  been  made  to  furnish  the  Chief  State  Fac- 
tory Inspector,  or  his  assistant  or  deputies,  with  a  copy 
of  the  report  of  inspection  made  under  such  ordinances. 

§  28.  Establishments  Operated  by  Federal  Govern- 
ment Exempted. — The  provisions  of  this  act  relating  to 
sanitation  and  ventilation  shall  not  be  held  to  apply  to 
such  rooms  or  apartments  of  any  factory,  mercantile  es- 
tablishment, mill  or  workshop,  which  are  being  operated 
under  the  supervision  of  the  federal  government,  by 
virtue  of  an  act  of  Congress  entitled  "An  Act  making  ap- 
propriations for  the  Department  of  Agriculture  for  the 
fiscal  year  ending  June  thirtieth,  nineteen  hundred  and 
seven,"  approved  June  30, 1906,  or  any  amendment  there- 
of; nor  shall  any  other  of  the  provisions  of  this  act  so  ap- 
ply respecting  matters  and  conditions  over  which  the  fed- 
eral government  now  exercises  or  shall  hereafter  exercise 
jurisdiction. 


350  SAFETY  ACT 

§  29.  Terms  Defined. — The  following  terms  used  in 
this  act  shall  have  the  following  meaning:  The  term  "fac- 
tory" means  any  premises  wherein  electricity,  steam, 
water  or  other  mechanical  power  is  used  to  move  or  work 
any  machinery  employed  in  preparing,  manufacturing  or 
finishing,  or  any  process  incident  to  the  manufacturing  of 
any  article  or  part  of  any  article;  or  the  altering,  repair- 
ing, ornamenting  or  the  adapting  for  sale  of  any  article. 
The  term  "mill  or  workshop"  shall  include  any  premises, 
room  or  apartment  not  being  a  factory  as  above  defined, 
wherein  any  labor  is  exercised  by  way  of  trade  or  for  the 
purpose  of  gain  in  or  incidental  to  any  process  of  making, 
altering,  preparing,  cleaning,  repairing,  ornamenting,  fin- 
ishing or  adapting  for  sale  any  article  or  part  of  any 
article,  and  to  which  or  over  which  building,  premises, 
room  or  apartment,  the  employer  of  the  person  employed 
or  working  therein  has  the  right  of  access  or  control:  Pro- 
vided, however,  that  a  private  house  or  private  room  in 
which  manual  or  other  labor  is  performed  by  a  family 
dwelling  therein,  or  by  any  of  them  for  the  exclusive  use 
of  the  members  of  such  family  is  not  a  factory,  mill  or 
workshop,  within  this  definition.  The  term  "mercantile 
establishment ' '  shall  include  all  concerns  or  places  where 
goods,  wares  or  merchandise  are  purchased  or  sold,  either 
at  wholesale  or  retail. 

§  30.  Printed  Copies  of  Act. — Copies  of  this  act  shall 
be  printed  in  English  and  such  other  languages  as  may 
be  necessary  to  disseminate  a  general  knowledge  of  the 
provisions  herein  set  forth  and  shall  be  supplied  by  the 
Chief  State  Factory  Inspector  on  application. 

§  31.  Notice  Covering  Salient  Features  of  Act. — For 
the  purpose  of  disseminating  a  general  knowledge  of  the 
provisions  of  this  act  among  employees,  the  Chief  State 
Factory  Inspector  shall  have  prepared  a  notice  covering 
the  salient  features  of  this  act,  which  may  be  in  the  fol- 
lowing form : 


SAFETY  ACT  351 

Notice  to  Owners  and  Employees  of  Mercantile  Establish- 
ments, Factories,  Mills  and  Workshops. 
This  notice  must  be  posted  in  a  conspicuous  place  in 
every  office  and  workroom  of  this  establishment.    The  ob- 
ject of  this  notice  is  to  promote  the  health,  comfort  and 
safety  of  employees,  and  requires  their  attention  and  co- 
operation. 

1.  All  machinery  when  in  operation  is  dangerous, 
and  should  be  considered  so  by  the  operator.    It  should 
be  so  protected  as  to  offer  the  least  possible  chance  for  in- 
jury to  those  who  operate  it. 

2.  All  machinery  must  be  daily  inspected  by  the  op- 
erator, and  upon  discovery  of  any  defects,  notice  of  the 
same  shall  be  given  at  once  to  anyone  in  authority,  and 
the  machine  not  used  until  repaired. 

3.  All  set  screws  or  other  dangerous  projections  on 
revolving  machinery  shall  be  countersunk  or  otherwise 
guarded  when  possible. 

4.  Means  shall  be  provided  and  placed  within  con- 
venient reach  for  promptly  stopping  any  machine,  group 
of  machines,  shafting  or  other  power-transmitting  ma- 
chinery. 

5.  Machines  must  not  be  placed  so  closely  together  as 
to  be  a  serious  menace  to  those  who  have  to  pass  between 
them.    Passageways  must  be  of  ample  width  and  head 
room,  and  must  be  kept  well  lighted  and  free  from  ob- 
structions. 

6.  All  hatchways,  elevator  wells  or  other  openings  in 
floors  shall  be  properly  enclosed  or  guarded. 

7.  The  premises  must  be  kept  in  a  clean  and  sanitary 
condition. 

8.  Ample  and  separate  toilet  facilities  for  each  sex 
shall  be  provided,  and  toilet  rooms  must  be  kept  clean, 
well  ventilated  and  well  lighted. 

9.  Food  must  not  be  taken  into  any  work  room  where 
white  lead,  arsenic  or  other  poisonous  substances  or  gases 
are  present  under  harmful  conditions. 


352  SAFETY  ACT 

10.  Proper  and  sufficient  means  of  escape,  in  case  of 
fire,  shall  be  provided,  and  shall  be  kept  free  from  ob- 
structions. 

11.  Poisonous  and  noxious  fumes  or  gases,  and  dust 
injurious  to  health,  arising  from  any  process,  shall  be  re- 
moved as  far  as  practicable. 

12.  All  employees  are  strictly  prohibited  from  at- 
tempting to  operate,  experiment  or  tamper  with  machines 
or  appliances  with  which  they  are  not  familiar  and  which 
are  in  no  way  connected  with  their  regular  duties.    All 
employees  are  prohibited  from  jumping  on  or  off  moving 
cars,  elevators,  machines  or  appliances  not  under  their 
immediate  charge  or  control.    All  employees  are  prohibi- 
ted from  carrying  to  their  place  of  work  acids,  chemicals 
or  explosives  of  any  kind  which  are  liable  to  endanger  life 
or  property. 

*  13.  Reports  must  be  sent  to  the  office  of  the  State 
Factory  Inspector,  as  provided  by  law,  and  immediate 
notice  of  the  death  of  any  employee  resulting  from  acci- 
dent or  injuries  must  be  sent  to  the  same  office. 

The  notice  shall  be  printed  on  card  board  of  suitable 
character,  and  the  type  used  shall  be  such  as  to  make  it 
easily  legible.  In  addition  to  English,  this  notice  shall  be 
printed  in  such  other  languages  as  may  be  necessary  to 
make  it  intelligible  to  employees.  Copies  shall  be  sup- 
plied by  the  Chief  State  Factory  Inspector  on  application, 
and  must  be  posted  in  a  conspicuous  place  in  every  of- 
fice and  work  room  of  every  establishment  covered  by  the 
provisions  of  this  act. 

§  32.  "An  Act  to  provide  for  the  health,  safety  and 
comfort  of  employees  in  factories,  mercantile  establish- 
ments, mills  and  workshops  in  this  State,  and  to  provide 
for  the  enforcement  thereof, ' '  approved  June  4,  1909,  en- 
forced January  I,  1910,  be  and  the  same  is  hereby  re- 
pealed. 


SAFETY  ACT  353 

As  to  effect  of  this  Act  in  conjunction  with  provisions 
in  §  3,  par.  8  of  Workmen's  Compensation  Act,  see  "Opin- 
ions in  Illinois  Cases"  and  " Digest,"  ante,  and  consult 
Index,  post.  See,  also — 

Streeter  v  Western  Wheeled  Scraper  Co.,  254 

111.  Sup.  244. 

Nosil  v  Ellis  Stamp  Co.,  192  IU.  App.  538. 
Wilson  v  Railway  Spring  Co.,  165  HI.  App.  344. 
Circular  saw — evidence  of  practical  guards  being  on 
market,  competent. 

Forrest  v  Roper  Furn.  Co.,  187  HI.  App.  504. 


STRUCTURAL  ACT. 

AN  ACT  providing  for  the  protection  and  safety  of 
persons  in  and  about  the  construction,  repairing,  altera- 
tion, or  removal  of  buildings,  bridges,  viaducts,  and  other 
structures,  and  to  provide  for  the  enforcement  thereof. 

Approved  June  3,  1907,  in  force  July  1,  1907.  Rev. 
Stat.  1912,  Ch.  48-79. 

SECTION  1.  Be  it  enacted  by  the  People  of  the  State 
of  Illinois,  represented  in  the  General  \Assembly:  That 
all  scaffolds,  hoists,  cranes,  stays,  ladders,  supports,  or 
other  mechanical  contrivances,  erected  or  constructed  by 
any  person,  firm  or  corporation,  in  this  State,  for  the  use 
in  the  erection,  repairing,  alteration,  removal  or  painting 
of  any  house,  building,  bridge,  viaduct,  or  other  structure, 
shall  be  erected  and  constructed  in  a  safe,  suitable  and 
proper  manner,  and  shall  be  so  erected  and  constructed, 
placed  and  operated,  as  to  give  proper  and  adequate  pro- 
tection to  the  life  and  limb  of  any  person  or  persons  em- 
ployed or  engaged  thereon,  or  passing  under  or  by  the 
same,  and  in  such  manner  as  to  prevent  the  falling  of  any 
material  that  may  be  used  or  deposited  thereon. 

Scaffolding,  or  staging,  swung  or  suspended  from  an 
overhead  support,  more  than  twenty  (20)  feet  from  the 
ground  or  floor,  shall  have,  where  practicable,  a  safety 
rail  properly  bolted,  secured  and  braced,  rising  at  least 
thirty-four  (34)  inches  above  the  floor,  or  main  portion  of 
such  scaffolding  or  staging,  and  extending  along  the  en- 
tire length  of  the  outside  and  ends  thereof,  and  properly 
attached  thereto,  and  such  scaffolding  or  staging  shall  be 
so  fastened  as  to  prevent  the  same  from  swaying  from 
the  building  or  structure. 

§  2.  If  in  any  house,  building  or  structure  in  pro- 
cess of  erection  or  construction  in  this  State  (except  a 
private  house,  used  exclusively  as  a  private  residence), 
the  distance  between  the  enclosing  walls  is  more  than 
twenty-four  (24)  feet,  in  the  clear,  there  shall  be  built, 


STRUCTURAL  ACT  355 

kept  and  maintained,  proper  intermediate  supports  for 
the  joists,  which  supports  shall  be  either  brick  walls,  or 
iron  or  steel  columns,  beams,  trussels  [trusses]  or  gir- 
ders, and  the  floors  in  all  such  houses,  buildings  or  struc- 
tures, in  process  of  erection  and  construction,  shall  be  de- 
signed and  constructed  in  such  manner  as  to  be  capable  of 
bearing  in  all  their  parts,  in  addition  to  the  weight  of  the 
floor  constructon,  partitions  and  permanent  fixtures  and 
mechanisms  that  may  be  set  upon  the  same,  a  live  load  of 
fifty  (50)  pounds  for  every  square  foot  of  surface  in  such 
floors,  and  it  is  hereby  made  the  duty  of  the  owner,  lessee, 
builder  or  contractor  or  subcontractor  of  such  house, 
building  or  structure,  or  the  superintendent  or  agent  of 
either,  to  see  that  all  provisions  of  this  section  are  com- 
plied with. 

§  3.  It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  owner  of  every 
house,  building  or  structure  (except  a  private  house,  used 
exclusively  as  a  private  residence)  now  under  construc- 
tion, or  hereafter  to  be  constructed,  to  affix  and  display 
conspicuously,  on  each  floor,  of  such  building,  during  con- 
struction, a  placard,  stating  the  load  per  square  floor 
[foot]  of  floor  surface,  which  may  with  safety  be  applied 
to  that  particular  floor,  during  such  construction;  or  if 
the  strength  of  different  parts  of  any  floor  varies,  then 
there  shall  be  such  placards  for  each  varying  part  of  such 
floor.  It  shall  be  unlawful  to  load  any  such  floors  or  any 
part  thereof,  to  a  greater  extent,  than  the  load  indicated 
on  such  placards,  and  all  such  placards  shall  be  verified 
and  approved  by  the  State  Factory  Inspector,  a  deputy 
factory  inspector,  or  by  the  local  commissioner  or  inspec- 
tor of  buildings  or  other  proper  authority,  in  the  city, 
town  or  village  charged  with  the  enforcement  of  building 
laws. 

§  4.  Whenever  it  shall  come  to  the  notice  of  the 
State  Factory  Inspector,  or  the  local  authority  in  any 
city,  town  or  village  in  this  State,  charged  with  the  duty 
of  enforcing  the  building  laws,  that  the  scaffolding  or  the 


356  STRUCTURAL  ACT 

( slings,  hangers,  blocks,  pulleys,  stays,  braces,  ladders, 
irons  or  ropes  of  any  swinging  or  stationary  scaffolding, 
platform  or  other  similar  device  used  in  the  construction, 
alteration,  repairing,  removing,  cleaning  or  painting  of 
buildings,  bridges  or  viaducts  within  this  State  are  un- 
safe, or  liable  to  prove  dangerous  to  the  life  or  limb  of 
any  person,  the  State  Factory  Inspector,  or  such  local 
authority  or  authorities  shall  immediately  cause  an  in- 
spection to  be  made  of  such  scaffolding,  platform  or  de- 
vice, or  the  slings,  hangers,  blocks,  pulleys,  stays,  braces, 
ladders,  irons  or  other  parts  connected  therewith,  if 
after  examination,  such  scaffolding,  platform  or  device  or 
any  of  such  parts,  is  found  to  be  dangerous  to  the  life  or 
limb  of  any  person,  the  State  Factory  Inspector,  or  such 
local  authority  shall  at  once  notify  the  person  respon- 
sible for  its  erection  or  maintenance,  of  such  fact,  and 
warn  him  against  the  use,  maintenance  or  operation 
thereof,  and  prohibit  the  use  thereof,  and  require  the 
same  to  be  altered,  and  reconstructed  so  as  to  avoid  such 
danger.  Such  notice  may  be  served  personally  upon  the 
person  responsible  for  its  erection  or  maintenance,  or  by 
conspicuously  affixing  it  to  the  scaffolding,  platform  or 
other  such  device,  or  the  part  thereof  declared  to  be  un- 
safe. After  such  notice  has  been  so  served  or  affixed,  the 
person  responsible  therefor  shall  cease  using  and  imme- 
diately remove  such  scaffolding,  platform  or  other  de- 
vice, or  part  thereof,  and  alter  or  strengthen  it  in  such 
manner  as  to  render  it  safe. 

The  State  Factory  Inspector,  or  any  of  his  deputies, 
or  such  local  authority,  whose  duty  it  is,  under  the  terms 
of  this  act,  to  examine  or  test  any  scaffolding,  platform  or 
other  similar  device,  or  part  thereof,  required  to  be  erec- 
ted and  maintained  by  this  section,  shall  have  free  access 
at  all  reasonable  hours,  to  any  building,  or  structure,  or 
premises  containing  such  scaffolding,  platform  or  other 
similar  device,  or  parts  thereof,  or  where  they  may  be  in 
use.  All  swinging  and  stationary  scaffolding,  platforms 


STRUCTURAL  ACT  357 

and  other  devices  shall  be  so  constructed  as  to  bear  four 
times  the  maximum  weight  required  to  be  depended 
therein,  or  placed  thereon,  when  in  use,  and  such  swing- 
ing scaffolding,  platform  or  other  device,  shall  not  be  so 
overloaded  or  overcrowded  as  to  render  the  same  unsafe 
or  dangerous. 

§  5.  That  any  person,  firm  or  corporation  in  this 
State,  hiring,  employing  or  directing  another  to  perform 
labor  of  any  kind,  in  the  erecting,  repairing,  altering  or 
painting  of  any  water  pipe,  stand  pipe,  tank,  smoke 
stack,  chimney,  tower,  steeple,  pole,  staff,  dome  or 
cupola,  when  the  use  of  any  scaffold,  staging,  swing, 
hammock,  support,  temporary  platform  or  other  similar 
contrivance  are  required  or  used,  in  the  performance  of 
such  labor,  shall  keep  and  maintain  at  all  times,  while 
such  labor  is  being  performed,  and  such  mechanical  de- 
vice is  in  use  or  operation,  a  safe  and  proper  scaffold, 
stay,  support  or  other  suitable  device,  not  less  than  six- 
teen (16)  feet  or  more  below  such  working  scaffold,  stag- 
ing, swing,  hammock,  support  or  temporary  platform, 
when  such  work  is  being  performed,  at  a  height  of  thirty- 
two  (32)  feet,  [or  more]  for  the  purpose  of  preventing 
the  person  or  persons  performing  such  labor,  from  fall- 
ing in  case  of  any  accident  to  such  working  scaffold,  stag- 
ing, swing,  hammock,  support  or  temporary  platform. 

$  6.  All  contractors  and  owners,  when  constructing 
buildings  in  cities,  where  the  plans  and  specifications  re- 
quire the  floors  to  be  arched  between  the  beams  thereof  or 
where  the  floors  or  filling  in  between  the  floors  are 
fireproof  material  or  brick  work,  shall  complete  the  floor- 
ing or  filling  in  as  the  building  progresses,  to  not  less 
than  within  three  tiers  or  beams  below  that  on  which  the 
iron  work  is  being  erected.  If  the  plans  and  specifications 
of  such  buildings  do  not  require  filling  in  between  the 
beams  or  floors  with  brick  or  fire-proof  material,  all  con- 
tractors for  carpenter  work  in  the  course  of  construction 
shall  lay  the  under  flooring  thereof  or  a  safe  temporary 


358  STRUCTURAL  ACT 

floor  on  each  story  as  the  building  progresses  to  not  less 
than  within  two  stories  or  floors  below  the  one  to  which 
such  building  has  been  erected.  Where  double  floors  are 
not  to  be  used,  such  owner  or  contractor  shall  keep  plank 
over  the  floor  two  stories  or  floors  -below  the  story  where 
the  work  is  being  performed.  If  the  floor  beams  are  of 
iron  or  steel  the  contractors  for  the  iron  or  steel  work 
of  buildings  in  the  course  of  construction  or  the  owners 
of  such  buildings,  shall  thoroughly  plank  over  the  entire 
tier  of  iron  or  steel  beams  on  which  the  structural  iron  or 
steel  work  is  being  erected,  except  such  spaces  as  may 
be  reasonably  required  for  the  proper  construction  of 
such  iron  or  steel  work  and  for  the  raising  and  lowering 
of  such  buildings,  or  such  spaces  as  may  be  designated  by 
the  plans  and  specifications  for  stairways  and  elevator 
shafts. 

§  7.  If  elevating  machines  or  hoisting  apparatus 
are  used  within  a  building  in  the  course  of  construction, 
for  the  purpose  of  lifting  materials  to  be  used  in  such 
construction,  the  contractors  or  owners  shall  cause  the 
shafts  or  openings  in  each  floor  to  be  enclosed  or  fenced 
in  on  all  sides  by  a  substantial  barrier  or  railing  at  least 
eight  feet  in  height.  Any  hoisting  machine  or  engine 
used  in  such  building  construction,  shall  where  practica- 
ble, be  set  up  or  placed  on  the  ground,  and  where  it  is  nec- 
essary in  the  construction  of  such  building  to  place  such 
hoisting  machine  or  engine  on  some  floor  above  the 
ground  floor,  such  machine  or  engine  must  be  properly 
and  securely  supported  with  a  foundation  capable  of 
safely  sustaining  twice  the  weight  of  such  machine  or  en- 
gine. If  a  building  in  course  of  construction  is  five  stories 
or  more  in  height,  no  material  needed  for  such  construc- 
tion shall  be  hoisted  or  lifted  over  public  streets  or  alleys 
unless  such  street  or  alley  shall  be  barricaded  from  use 
by  the  public.  The  chief  officer  in  any  city,  town  or  vil- 
lage charged  with  the  enforcement  of  local  building  laws, 
and  the  State  Factory  Inspector  are  hereby  charged  with 


STRUCTURAL  ACT  359 

enforcing  the  provisions  of  this  act.  Provided,  that  in 
all  cities  in  this  State,  where  a  local  building  commis- 
sioner is  provided  for  by  law,  such  officer  shall  be 
charged  with  the  duty  of  enforcing  the  provisions  of  this 
act,  and  in  case  of  his  failure,  neglect  or  refusal  so  to  do, 
the  State  Factory  Inspector  shall,  pursuant  to  the  terms 
of  this  act,  enforce  the  provisions  thereof. 

§  7a.  If  elevating  machines  or  hoisting  apparatus, 
operated  or  controlled  by  other  than  hand  power,  are 
used  in  the  construction,  alteration  or  removal  of  any 
building  or  other  structure,  a  complete  and  adequate  sys- 
tem of  communication  by  means  of  signals  shall  be  pro- 
vided and  maintained  by  the  owner,  contractor  or  subcon- 
tractor, during  the  use  and  operation  of  such  elevating 
machines  or  hoisting  apparatus,  in  order  that  prompt 
and  effective  communication  may  be  had  at  all  times  be- 
tween the  operator  of  engine  or  motive  power  of  such 
elevating  machine  and  hoisting  apparatus,  and  the  em- 
ployees or  persons  engaged  thereon,  or  in  using  or  oper- 
ating the  same. 

§  8.  It  shall  be  the  duty  of  all  architects  or  drafts- 
men engaged  in  preparing  plans,  specifications  or  draw- 
ings to  be  used  in  the  erection,  repairing,  altering  or  re- 
moving of  any  building  or  structure  within  the  terms  and 
provisions  of  this  act  to  provide  in  all  such  plans,  specifi- 
cations and  drawings  for  all  the  permanent  structural 
features  or  requirements  specified  in  this  act;- and  any 
failure  on  the  part  of  any  such  architect  or  draftsman  to 
perform  such  duty,  shall  subject  such  architect  or  drafts- 
man to  a  fine  of  not  less  than  twenty-five  dollars  ($25.00) 
nor  more  than  two  hundred  dollars  ($200.00)  for  each 
offense. 

§  9.  Any  owner,  contractor,  subcontractor,  fore- 
man or  other  person,  having  charge  of  the  erection,  con- 
struction, repairing,  alteration,  removal,  or  painting  of 
any  building,  bridge,  viaduct  or  other  structure  within 
the  provisions  of  this  act,  shall  comply  with  all  the  terms 


360  STRUCTURAL  ACT 

thereof  and  any  such  owner,  contractor,  subcontractor, 
foreman  or  other  person,  violating  any  of  the  provisions 
of  this  act  shall  upon  conviction  thereof  be  fined  not  less 
than  twenty-five  dollars  ($25.00),  nor  more  than  five 
hundred  dollars  ($500.00)  or  imprisoned  for  not  less  than 
three  (3)  months  nor  more  than  two  (2)  years,  or  both 
fined  and  imprisoned  in  the  discretion  of  the  court. 

And  in  case  of  any  such  failure  to  comply  with  any  of 
the  provisions  of  this  act,  any  State  Factory  Inspector 
may,  through  the  State's  Attorney,  or  any  other  attor- 
ney, in  case  of  his  failure  to  act  promptly,  take  the  neces- 
sary legal  steps  to  enforce  compliance  therewith. 

If  it  becomes  necessary,  through  the  refusal  or  failure 
of  the  State's  Attorney  to  act,  for  any  other  attorney  to 
appear  for  the  State  in  any  suit  involving  the  enforce- 
ment of  any  provision  of  this  act,  reasonable  fees  for  the 
services  of  such  attorney  shall  be  allowed  by  the  board  of 
supervisors  or  county  commissioners  in  and  for  the 
county  in  which  such  proceedings  are  instituted. 

For  any  injury  to  person  or  property,  occasioned  by 
any  wilful  violations  of  this  act,  or  wilful  failure  to  com- 
ply with  any  of  its  provisions,  a  right  of  action  shall  ac- 
crue to  the  party  injured,  for  any  direct  damages  sus- 
tained thereby;  and  in  case  of  loss  of  life  by  reason  of 
such  wilful  violation  or  wilful  failure  as  aforesaid,  a 
right  of  action  shall  accrue  to  the  widow  of  the  person  so 
killed,  his  lineal  heirs  or  adopted  children,  or  to  any 
other  person  or  persons  who  were,  before  such  loss  of 
life,  dependent  for  support  on  the  person  or  persons  so 
killed,  for  a  like  recovery  of  damages  for  the  injuries  sus- 
tained by  reason  of  such  loss  of  life  or  lives. 


OCCUPATIONAL  DISEASE  ACT. 

AN  ACT  to  promote  the  public  health  by  protecting 
certain  employees  in  this  State  from  the  dangers  of  occu- 
pational diseases,  and  providing  for  the  enforcement 
thereof. 

Approved  May  26,  1911,  in  force  July  1,  1911.  Laws 
1911,  p.  330;  Stat.  Ann.  §  5433.  Rev.  Stat.  Ch.  48,  p.  153. 

SECTION  1.  Be  it  enacted  by  the  People  of  the  State 
of  Illinois,  represented  in  the  General  Assembly:  That 
every  employer  of  labor  in  this  State,  engaged  in  carry- 
ing on  any  work  or  process  which  may  produce  any  ill- 
ness or  disease  peculiar  to  the  work  or  process  carried  on, 
or  which  subjects  the  employees  to  the  danger  of  illness 
or  disease  incident  to  such  work  or  process,  to  which  em- 
ployees are  not  ordinarily  exposed  in  other  lines  of 
employment,  shall,  for  the  protection  of  all  employees  en- 
gaged in  such  work  or  process,  adopt  and  provide  reason- 
able and  approved  devices,  means  or  methods  for  the  pre- 
vention of  such  industrial  or  occupational  diseases  as  are 
incident  to  such  work  or  process. 

§  2.  Every  employer  in  this  State  engaged  in  the 
carrying  on  of  any  process  of  manufacture  or  labor  in 
which  sugar  of  lead,  white  lead,  lead  chromate,  litharge, 
red  lead,  arsenate  of  lead,  or  Paris  green  are  employed, 
used  or  handled,  or  the  manufacture  of  brass  or  the  smelt- 
ing of  lead  or  zinc,  which  processes  and  employments  are 
hereby  declared  to  be  especially  dangerous  to  the  health 
of  the  employees  engaged  in  any  process  of  manufacture 
or  labor  in  which  poisonous  chemicals,  minerals  or  other 
substances  are  used  or  handled  by  the  employees  therein 
in  harmful  quantities,  or  under  harmful  conditions,  shall 
provide  for  and  place  at  the  disposal  of  the  employees  en- 
gager1 in  any  such  process  or  manufacture  and  shall  main- 
tain .n  good  condition  and  without  cost  to  the  employees, 
proper  working  clothing  to  be  kept  and  used  exclusively 
for  such  employees  while  at  work,  and  all  employes 


362  OCCUPATIONAL  DISEASE  ACT 

therein  shall  be  required  at  all  times  while  they  are  at 
work  to  use  and  wear  such  clothing ;  and  in  all  processes 
of  manufacture  or  labor  referred  to  in  this  section  which 
are  unnecessarily  productive  of  noxious  or  poisonous 
dusts,  adequate  and  approved  respirators  shall  be  fur- 
nished and  maintained  by  the  employer  in  good  condition 
and  without  cost  to  the  employees,  and  such  employees 
shall  use  such  respirators  at  all  times  while  engaged  in 
any  work  necessarily  productive  of  noxious  or  poisonous 
dusts. 

§  3.  Every  employer  engaged  in  carrying  on  any 
process  or  manufacture  referred  to  in  Section  2  of  this 
act,  shall,  as  often  as  once  every  calendar  month,  cause 
all  employees  who  come  into  direct  contact  with  the  pois- 
onous agencies  or  injurious  processes  referred  to  in  Sec- 
2  of  this  act,  to  be  examined  by  a  competent  licensed 
physician  for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  if  there  exists 
in  any  employee  any  industrial  or  occupational  disease 
or  illness  or  any  disease  or  illness  due  or  incident  to  the 
character  of  the  work  in  which  the  eimployee  is  engaged. 

§  4.  It  is  hereby  made  the  duty  of  any  licensed 
physician  who  shall  make  the  physical  examination  of 
employees  under  the  provisions  of  Section  3  of  this  act, 
to  make  an  immediate  report  thereof  to  the  State  Board 
of  Health  of  the  State  of  Illinois  upon  blanks  to  be  fur- 
nished by  said  Board  upon  request,  and  if  no  such  disease 
or  illness  is  found,  the  physician  shall  so  report,  and  if 
any  such  disease  is  found,  the  report  shall  state  the  name, 
address,  sex  and  age  of  such  employee  and  the  name  of 
such  employer,  and  the  nature  of  the  disease  or  illness 
with  which  the  employee  is  afflicted,  and  the  probable  ex- 
tent and  duration  thereof,  and  the  last  place  of  employ- 
ment: Provided,  that  the  failure  of  any  such  physician 
to  receive  the  blanks  of  the  State  Board  of  Health  for  the 
making  of  such  report,  shall  not  excuse  such  physician 
from  making  the  report  as  herein  provided. 

§    5.     The  Secretary  of  the  State  Board  of  Health 


OCCUPATIONAL  DISEASE  ACT  363 

shall,  immediately  upon  receipt  of  any  report  from  any 
physician  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  Section  4 
of  this  act,  transmit  a  copy  thereof  to  the  Illinois  Depart- 
ment of  Factory  Inspection. 

§  6.  Every  employer  engaged  in  carrying  on  any 
process  or  manufacture  referred  to  in  Section  2  of  this 
act,  shall  provide,  separate  and  apart  from  the  workshop 
in  which  such  employees  are  engaged,  a  dressing  room 
and  lavatory  for  the  use  of  such  employees  who  are  ex- 
posed to  poisonous  or  injurious  dusts,  fumes  and  gases, 
and  such  lavatory  shall  be  kept  and  maintained  in  a  clean 
and  wholesome  manner  and  provided  with  a  sufficient 
number  of  basins  or  spigots,  with  adequate  washing  fa- 
cilities, including  hot  and  cold  water,  clean  towels  and 
soap  and  shower  bath,  and  the  dressing  rooms  shall  be 
furnished  with  clothes  presses  or  compartments,  so  that 
the  ordinary  street  clothes  of  such  employees  shall  be 
kept  separate  and  apart  froim  their  working  clothes. 

§  7.  No  employee  shall  take  or  be  allowed  to  take 
any  food  or  drink  of  any  kind  into  any  room  or  apart- 
ment in  which  any  process  or  manufacture  referred  to  in 
Section  2  of  this  act  is  carried  on,  or  in  which  poisonous 
substances  or  injurious  or  noxious  fumes,  dusts  or  gases 
are  present  as  the  result  of  such  work  or  process  being 
carried  on  in  such  room  or  apartment,  and  the  employees 
shall  not  remain  in  any  such  room  or  apartment  during 
the  time  allowed  for  meals,  and  suitable  provision  shall 
be  made  and  maintained  by  the  employer  for  enabling  the 
employees  to  take  their  meals  elsewhere  in  such  place  of 
employment,  and  a  sufficient  number  of  sanitary  closed 
receptacles  containing  wholesome  drinking  water  shall  be 
provided  and  maintained  for  the  use  of  the  employees 
within  reasonable  access  and  without  cost  to  them. 

§  8.  All  employers  engaged  in  carrying  on  any 
process  or  manufacture  referred  to  in  Section  2  of  this 
act,  shall  provide  and  maintain  adequate  devices  for  car- 
rying off  all  poisonous  or  injurious  fumes  from  any  fur- 


364  OCCUPATIONAL  DISEASE  ACT 

naces  which  may  be  employed  in  any  such  process  or 
manufacture,  and  shall  also  provide  and  maintain  ade- 
quate facilities  for  carrying  off  all  injurious  dust,  and 
the  floors  in  any  room  or  apartment  where  such  work  or 
process  is  carried  on  shall,  so  far  as  practicable,  be  kept 
and  maintained  in  a  smooth  and  hard  condition,  and  no 
sweeping  shall  be  permitted  during  working  hours  except 
where  the  floors  in  such  workshop  are  dampened  so  as  to 
prevent  the  raising  of  dust ;  and  all  ore,  slag,  dross  and 
fumes  shall  be  kept  in  some  room  or  apartment  separate 
from  the  working  rooms  occupied  by  the  employees,  and 
where  practicable,  all  mixing  and  weighing  of  such  ore, 
slag,  dross  or  fume  shall  be  done  in  such  separate  room 
or  apartment,  and  all  such  material  shall,  so  far  as  prac- 
ticable, be  dampened  before  being  handled  or  transported 
by  employees. 

§  9.  When  any  flues  are  used  in  any  such  process  or 
manufacture  referred  to  in  Section  2  of  this  act,  and  such 
flues  are  being  cleaned  out  or  emptied,  the  employer  shall 
in  every  case  provide  and  maintain  a  sufficient  and  ade- 
quate means  or  device,  such  as  canvas  bags  or  other  prac- 
tical device,  or  by  dampening  the  dust,  or  some  other 
sufficient  method  for  catching  and  collecting  the  dust  and 
preventing  it  from  unreasonably  fouling  or  polluting  the 
air  in  which  the  employees  are  obliged  to  work,  and 
wherever  practicable,  the  dust  occasioned  in  any  process 
or  manufacture  referred  to  in  Section  2  of  this  act,  and 
any  polishing  or  finishing  therein,  shall  be  dampened  or 
wet  down,  and  every  reasonable  precaution  shall  be 
adopted  by  the  employer  to  prevent  the  unnecessary  crea- 
tion or  raising  of  dust,  and  all  floors  shall  be  washed  or 
scrubbed  at  least  once  every  working  day ;  and  such  parts 
of  the  work  or  process  as  are  especially  dangerous  to  em- 
ployees, on  account  of  poisonous  fumes,  dusts  and  gases, 
shall,  where  practicable,  be  carried  on  in  separate  rooms 
and  under  cover  of  some  suitable  and  sufficient  device  to 
remove  the  danger  to  the  health  of  such  employees,  as  far 


OCCUPATIONAL  DISEASE  ACT  365 

as  may  be  reasonably  consistent  with  the  manufacturing 
process,  and  the  fixtures  and  tools  employed  in  any  such 
process  or  manufacture,  shall  be  thoroughly  washed  and 
cleaned  at  reasonable  intervals. 

§  10.  All  hoppers  or  chutes  or  similar  devices  used 
in  the  course  of  any  process  or  manufacture  referred  to 
in  Section  2  of  this  act  shall,  where  practicable,  be  pro- 
vided with  a  hood  or  covering,  and  an  adequate  and  suffi- 
cient apparatus  or  other  proper  device  for  the  purpose  of 
drawing  away  from  the  employees  noxious,  poisonous  or 
mj^ious  dusts,  and  preventing  the  employees  from  com- 
ing into  unnecessary  contact  therewith;  and  all  convey- 
ances or  receptacles  used  for  the  transportation  about  or 
the  storage  in  any  place  where  any  such  process  or  manu- 
facture referred  to  in  Section  2  of  this  act  is  carried  on, 
shall  be  properly  covered  or  dampened  in  such  way  as  to 
protect  the  health  of  the  employees,  and  no  refuse  of  a 
dangerous  character  incident  to  the  work  or  process  car- 
ried on  in  any  such  place  shall  be  allowed  to  unnecessarily 
accumulate  on  the  floors  thereof. 

§  11.  It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  State  Department  of 
Factory  Inspection  to  enforce  the  provisions  of  this  act 
and  to  prosecute  all  violations  of  the  same  before  any 
magistrate  or  any  court  of  competent  jurisdiction  in  this 
State,  and  for  that  purpose  such  department  and  its  in- 
spectors are  empowered  to  visit  and  inspect  at  all  reason- 
able times  all  places  of  employment  covered  by  the  provi- 
sions of  this  act.  In  the  enforcement  of  the  provisions 
hereof  the  Department  of  Factory  Inspection  shall  give 
proper  notice  in  regard  to  any  violation  of  this  act  to  any 
employer  of  labor  violating  it,  and  directing  the  install- 
ment of  any  approved  device,  means  or  method  reason- 
ably necessary,  in  his  judgment,  to  protect  the  health  of 
the  employees  therein,  and  such  notice  shall  be  written  or 
printed  and  shall  be  signed  officially  by  the  Chief  State 
Factory  Inspector  or  the  Assistant  Chief  State  Factory 
Inspector,  and  said  notice  may  be  served  by  delivering 
the  same  to  the  person  upon  whom  service  is  to  be  had,  or 
by  leaving  at  his  usual  place  of  abode  or  business  an  exact 
copy  thereof,  or  by  sending  a  copy  thereof  to  such  person 


366  OCCUPATIONAL  DISEASE  ACT 

by  registered  mail,  and  upon  receipt  of  such  notice  calling 
the  attention  of  the  employer  to  such  violation,  he  shall 
immediately  comply  with  all  the  provisions  of  this  act. 

§  12.  If  any  occupational  or  industrial  disease  or  ill- 
ness or  any  disease  or  illness  peculiar  to  the  work  or  proc- 
ess carried  on  shall  be  found  in  any  place  of  employment 
in  this  State  by  the  inspectors  of  the  State  Department  of 
Factory  Inspection,  or  called  to  their  attention  by  the 
State  Board  of  Health,  which  disease  or  illness  shall  be 
caused  in  whole  or  in  part,  in  the  opinion  of  the  inspector, 
by  a  disregard  by  the  employer  of  the  provisions  of  this 
act,  or  a  failure  on  the  part  of  the  employer  to  adopt 
reasonable  appliances,  devices,  means  or  methods  which 
are  known  to  be  reasonably  adequate  and  sufficient  to 
prevent  the  contraction  or  continuation  of  any  such  dis- 
ease or  illness,  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  Department  of 
Factory  Inspection  to  immediately  notify  the'  employer 
in  such  place  of  employment,  in  the  manner  provided  in 
Section  12  of  this  act,  to  install  adequate  and  approved 
appliances,  devices,  means  or  methods  to  prevent  the  con- 
tracting and  continuance  of  any  such  disease  or  illness 
and  to  comply  with  all  the  provisions  of  this  act. 

§  13.  For  the  purpose  of  disseminating  a  general 
knowledge  of  the  provisions  of  this  act  and  of  the  dangers 
to  the  health  of  employees  in  any  work  or  process  covered 
by  the  provisions  of  this  act,  the  employer  shall  post  in  a 
conspicuous  place  in  every  room  or  apartment  in  which 
any  such  work  or  process  is  carried  on,  appropriate  no- 
tices of  the  known  dangers  to  the  health  of  any  such  em- 
ployees arising  from  such  work  or  process,  and  simple  in- 
structions as  to  any  known  means  of  avoiding,  so  far  as 
possible,  the  injurious  consequences  thereof,  and  the 
Chief  State  Factory  Inspector  shall,  upon  request,  have 
prepared  a  notice  covering  the  salient  features  of  this  act, 
and  furnish  a  reasonable  number  of  copies  thereof  to  em- 
ployers in  this  State,  covered  by  the  provisions  of  this 
act,  which  notice  shall  be  posted  by  every  such  employer 
in  a  conspicuous  place  in  every  room  or  apartment  in  such 
place  of  employment.  The  notices  required  by  this  sec- 
tion shall  be  printed  on  cardboard  of  suitable  character 


OCCUPATIONAL  DISEASE  ACT  367 

and  the  type  used  shall  be  such  as  to  make  them  easily 
legible,  and  in  addition  to  English  they  shall  be  printed 
in  such  other  language  or  languages  as  may  be  necessary 
to  make  them  intelligible  to  the  employees. 

§  14.  Any  person,  firm  or  corporation  who  shall,  per- 
sonally or  through  any  agent,  violate  any  of  the  provi- 
sions of  this  act,  or  who  omits  or  fails  to  comply  with  any 
of  its  requirements,  or  who  obstructs  or  interferes  with 
any  examination  or  investigation  being  made  by  the 
State  Department  of  Factory  Inspection  in  accordance 
with  the  provisions  of  this  act,  or  any  employee  who  shall 
violate  any  of  the  provisions  of  this  act  shall  be  deemed 
guilty  of  a  misdemeanor  and  on  conviction  thereof  shall 
be  punished  for  the  first  offense  by  a  fine  of  not  less  than 
Ten  Dollars  ($10.00)  or  more  than  One  Hundred  Dollars 
($100.00),  and  upon  conviction  of  the  second  or  subse- 
quent offenses,  shall  be  fined  not  less  than  Fifty  Dollars 
($50.00)  or  more  than  Two  Hundred  Dollars  ($200.00), 
and  in  each  case  shall  stand  committed  until  such  fine  and 
costs  are  paid,  unless  otherwise  discharged  by  due  proc- 
ess of  law. 

§  15.  For  any  injury  to  the  health  of  any  employee 
proximately  caused  by  any  wilful  violation  of  this  act  or 
wilful  failure  to  comply  with  any  of  its  provisions,  a  right 
of  action  shall  accrue  to  the  party  whose  health  has  been 
so  injured,  for  any  direct  damages  sustained  thereby;  and 
in  case  of  the  loss  of  life  by  reason  of  such  wilful  violation 
or  wilful  failure  as  aforesaid,  a  right  of  action  shall  ac- 
crue to  the  widow  of  such  deceased  person,  his  lineal  heirs 
or  adopted  children,  or  to  any  other  person  or  persons 
who  were,  before  such  loss  of  life,  dependent  for  support 
upon  such  deceased  person,  for  a  like  recovery  of  dam- 
ages for  the  injury  sustained  by  reason  of  such  loss  of  life, 
not  to  exceed  the  sum  of  Ten  Thousand  Dollars:  Pro- 
vided, that  every  such  action  for  damages  in  case  of  death 
shall  be  commenced  within  one  year  after  the  death  of 
such  employee. 

§  16.  The  invalidity  of  any  portion  of  this  act  shall 
not  affect  the  validity  of  any  portion  thereof  which  can 
be  given  effect  without  such  invalid  part. 


BLOWER  ACT. 

AN  ACT  to  compel  the  using  of  blowers  upon  nietal 
polishing  machinery. 

Approved  June  11,  1897 ;  in  force  July  1,  1897.    Rev. 

Stat.  Ch.  48,  §  43. 

SECTION  1.  Be  it  enacted  by  the  People  of  the  State  of 
Illinois,  represented  in  the  General  [Assembly:  That  all 
persons,  companies  or  corporations  operating  any  fac- 
tory or  workshop,  where  emery  wheels  or  emery  belts  of 
any  description  are  used,  either  solid  emery,  leather, 
leather-covered,  felt,  canvas,  linen,  paper,  cotton,  or 
wheels  or  belts  rolled  or  coated  with  emery  or  corundum, 
or  cotton  wheels  used  as  buffs,  shall  provide  the  same 
with  blowers,  or  similar  apparatus,  which  shall  be  placed 
over,  besides  or  under  such  wheels  or  belts  in  such  a  man- 
ner as  to  protect  the  person  or  persons  using  the  same 
from  the  particles  of  the  dust  produced  and  caused  there- 
by, and  to  carry  away  the  dust  arising  from  or  thrown 
off  by  such  wheels  or  belts  while  in  operation,  directly  to 
the  outside  of  the  building,  or  to  some  receptacle  placed 
so  as  to  receive  and  confine  such  dust:  Provided,  that 
grinding  machines  upon  which  water  is  used  at  the  point 
of  the  grinding  contact  shall  be  exempt  from  the  provi- 
sions of  this  act,  and  provided,  this  act  shall  not  apply  to 
small  shops  employing  not  more  than  one  man  in  such 
work. 

§  2.  It  shall  be  the  duty  of  any  person,  company  or 
corporation  operating  any  such  factory  or  workshop  to 
provide  or  construct  such  appliances,  apparatus,  machin- 
ery or  other  things  necessary  to  carry  out  the  purpose  of 
this  act,  as  set  forth  in  the  preceding  section,  as  follows : 
Each  and  every  such  wheel  shall  be  fitted  with  a  sheet  of 
cast  iron  hood  or  hopper  of  such  form  and  so  applied  to 
such  wheel  or  wheels  that  the  dust  or  refuse  therefrom 
will  fall  from  such  wheels,  or  will  be  thrown  into  such 
hood  or  hopper  by  centrifugal  force  and  be  carried  off  by 


BLOWER  ACT  369 

the  current  of  air  into  a  suction  pipe  attached  to  same 
hood  or  hopper. 

$  3.  Each  and  every  such  wheel  six  inches  or  less 
in  diameter  shall  be  provided  with  a  three-inch  suction 
pipe ;  wheels  six  inches  to  twenty-four  inches  in  diameter 
with  four-inch  suction  pipe;  wheels  from  twenty-four 
inches  to  thirty-six  inches  in  diameter  with  five-inch  suc- 
tion pipe;  and  all  wheels  larger  in  diameter  than  those 
stated  above  shall  be  provided  each  with  a  suction  pipe 
not  less  than  six  inches  in  diameter.  The  suction  pipe 
from  each  wheel,  so  specified,  must  be  full  size  to  the  main 
trunk  suction  pipe,  and  the  main  suction  pipe  to  which 
smaller  pipes  are  attached,  shall,  in  its  diameter  and  ca- 
pacity, be  equal  to  the  combined  area  of  such  smaller 
pipes  attached  to  the  same,  and  the  discharge  pipe  from 
the  exhaust  fan,  connected  with  such  suction  pipe  or 
pipes,  shall  be  as  large  or  larger  than  the  sucton  pipe. 

§  4.  It  shall  be  the  duty  of  any  person,  company  or 
corporation  operating  any  such  factory  or  workshop  to 
provide  the  necessary  fans  or  blowers  to  be  connected 
with  such  pipe  or  pipes,  as  above  set  forth,  which  shall 
be  run  at  a  rate  of  speed  as  will  produce  a  velocity  of  air 
in  such  suction  or  discharge  pipes  of  at  least  nine  thous- 
and feet  per  minute  to  an  equivalent  suction  or  pressure 
of  air  equal  to  raising  a  column  of  water  not  less  than  five 
inches  in  a  U-shape  tube.  All  branch  pipes  must  enter 
the  main  trunk  pipe  at  an  angle  of  forty-five  degrees  or 
less,  the  main  suction  or  trunk  pipe  shall  be  below  the 
emery  or  buffing  wheels,  and  as  close  to  the  same  as  pos- 
sible, and  to  be  either  upon  the  floor  or  beneath  the  floor 
on  which  the  machines  are  placed  to  which  such  wheels 
are  attached.  All  bends,  turns  or  elbows  in  such  pipes 
must  be  made  with  easy,  smooth  surfaces,  having  a  radius 
in  the  throat  of  not  less  than  two  diameters  of  the  pipe 
on  which  they  are  connected. 

§  5.  It  shall  be  the  duty  of  any  Factory  Inspector, 
Sheriff,  Constable  or  Prosecuting  Attorney  of  any  coun- 


370  BLOWER  ACT 

ty  in  this  State  in  which  any  such  factory  or  workshop 
is  situated,  upon  receiving  notice  in  writing  signed  by 
any  person  having  knowledge  of  such  facts,  accompanied 
by  the  sum  of  one  dollar  as  compensation  for  his  services, 
that  such  factory  or  workshop  is  not  provided  with  such 
appliances  as  herein  provided  for,  to  visit  any  such  fac- 
tory or  workshop  and  inspect  the  same,  and  for  such  pur- 
pose, they  are  hereby  authorized  to  enter  any  factory  or 
workshop  in  this  State  during  working  hours,  and  upon 
ascertaining  the  facts  that  the  proprietors  or  managers 
of  such  factory  or  workshop  have  failed  to.  comply  with 
the  provisions  of  this  act,  to  make  complaint  of  the  same 
in  writing  before  a  justice  of  the  peace  or  police  magis- 
trate having  jurisdiction,  who  shall  thereupon  issue  his 
warrant,  directed  to  the  owner,  manager  or  director,  in 
such  factory  or  workshop,  who  shall  be  thereupon  pro- 
ceeded against  for  the  violation  of  this  act  as  hereinafter 
mentioned  and  it  is  made  the  duty  of  the  Prosecuting  At- 
torney to  prosecute  all  cases  under  this  act. 

§  6.  Any  such  person  or  persons  or  company,  or 
managers,  or  directors  of  any  such  company  or  corpora- 
tion who  shall  have  the  charge  or  management  of  such 
factory  or  workshop,  who  shall  fail  to  comply  with  the 
provisions  of  this  act,  shall  be  deemed  guilty  of  a  misde- 
meanor and  upon  conviction  thereof  before  any  court  of 
competent  jurisdiction  shall  be  punished  by  a  fine  of  not 
less  than  $25,  and  not  exceeding  $100. 


NOXIOUS  FUMES  ACT. 

AN  ACT  in  relation  to  employments  creating  poison- 
ous fumes  or  dust  in  harmful  quantities,  and  to  provide 
for  the  enforcement  thereof. 

Approved  June  29, 1915 ;  in  force  July  1, 1915.  Laws 
1915,  p.  431. 

SECTION  1.  Be  it  enacted  by  the  People  of  the  State  of 
Illinois,  represented  in  the  General  Assembly:  That  every 
employer  of  labor  in  this  State,  engaged  in  the  manufac- 
ture, repairing  or  altering  of  any  metals,  wares  or  mer- 
chandise which  may  produce  or  generate  poisonous  or 
noxious  fumes  or  dusts  in  harmful  quatities  such  as  metal 
polishing,  grinding,  plating  and  dipping  of  metals  in 
acid  solutions  or  dips,  are  hereby  declared  to  be  espe- 
cially dangerous  to  the  health  of  the  employees  so  en- 
gaged. Such  manufacture,  repairing  or  altering  of  any 
metals  or  merchandise  in  such  processes  and  places  of 
employment  shall  be  conducted  in  rooms  lying  wholly 
above  the  surface  of  the  ground. 

§  2.  It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  Chief  State  Factory 
Inspector,  the  Assistant  State  Factory  Inspector,  and  the 
deputy  factory  inspectors  to  enforce  the  provisions  of 
this  act  and  to  prosecute  all  violations  of  the  same  before 
any  magistrate  or  any  court  of  competent  jurisdiction  in 
this  State,  and  for  that  purpose  such  inspectors  are  em- 
powered to  visit  and  inspect,  at  all  reasonable  hours,  all 
places  that  may  come  under  the  provisions  of  this  act.  In 
the  enforcement  thereof,  said  Chief  State  Factory  In- 
spector, the  Assistant  Chief  State  Factory  Inspector, 
and  the  deputy  factory  inspectors  shall  give  proper  no- 
tice in  regard  to  any  violation  of  this  act  to  any  employer 
of  labor  violating  it,  and  direct  the  proper  changes  to  be 
made  to  protect  the  health  of  the  employees  therein,  and 
such  notice  shall  be  written  or  printed  and  shall  be  signed 
by  the  Chief  State  Factory  Inspector,  or  any  one  of  his 
assistants  authorized  by  him  to  sign  such  orders,  and 
said  notice  may  be  served  by  delivering  the  same  to  the 
person  upon  whom  service  is  to  be  had,  or  by  leaving  at 


372  NOXIOUS  FUMES  ACT 

usual  place  of  abode  or  business  an  exact  copy  thereof, 
or  by  sending  a  copy  thereof  to  such  person  by  mail,  and 
upon  receipt  of  such  notice  calling  the  attention  of  the 
employer  to  such  violation,  he  shall  immediately  comply 
with  the  provisions  of  this  act. 

§  3.  Any  person,  firm  or  corporation  who  shall,  per- 
sonally, or  through  any  agent,  violate  any  of  the  provi- 
sions of  this  act,  or  who  omits  or  fails  to  comply  with  any 
of  its  requirements,  or  who  obstructs  or  interferes  with 
any  examination  or  investigation  being  made  by  the 
Chief  State  Factory  Inspector,  the  Assistant  Chief  State 
Factory  Inspector,  and  the  deputy  factory  inspectors  in 
accordance  with  the  provisions  of  this  act,  or  any  em- 
ployee who  shall  violate  any  of  the  provisions  of  this  act, 
shall  be  deemed  guilty  of  a  misdemeanor,  and,  on  convic- 
tion thereof,  shall  be  punished  for  the  first  offense  by  a 
fine  of  not  less  than  twenty-five  dollars  ($25.00)  nor  more 
than  two  hundred  dollars  ($200.00) ;  and  upon  conviction 
of  the  second  or  subsequent  offense,  shall  be  fined  not  less 
than  one  hundred  dollars  ($100.00)  nor  more  than  five 
hundred  dollars  ($500.00),  and  in  each  case  shall  stand 
committed  until  such  fine  and  costs  are  paid,  unless  other- 
wise discharged  by  due  process  of  law. 

§  4.  For  any  injury  to  the  health  of  any  employee 
proximately  caused  by  any  wilful  violation  of  this  act  or 
wilful  failure  to  comply  with  any  of  its  provisions,  a  right 
of  action  shall  accrue  to  the  party  whose  health  has  been 
so  injured,  for  any  direct  damages  sustained  thereby; 
and  in  case  of  the  loss  of  life  by  reason  of  such  wilful  vio- 
lation or  wilful  failure  as  aforesaid,  a  right  of  action 
shall  accrue  to  the  widow  of  such  deceased  person,  his 
lineal  heirs  or  adopted  children,  or  to  any  other  person  or 
persons  who  were,  before  such  loss  of  life,  dependent  for 
support  upon  such  deceased  person,  for  recovery  of  dam- 
ages for  the  injury  sustained  by  reason  of  such  loss  of 
life,  not  to  exceed  the  sum  of  twenty-five  thousand  dol- 
lars: Provided,  that  every  such  action  for  damages  in 
case  of  death  shall  be  commenced  within  two  (2)  years 
after  the  death  of  such  employee. 


GARMENT  MANUFACTURE  ACT. 

AN  ACT  to  regulate  the  manufacture  of  clothing, 
wearing  apparel  and  other  articles  in  this  State,  and  to 
provide  for  the  appointment  of  State  Inspectors  to  en- 
force the  same  and  to  make  an  appropriation  therefor. 

Approved  June  17,  1893 ;  in  force  July  1,  1893.  Rev. 
Stat.  Ch.  48,  §  21. 

SECTION  1.  Be  it  enacted  by  the  People  of  the  State  of 
Illinois,  represented  in  the  General  Assembly:  That  no 
room  or  rooms,  apartment  or  apartments  in  any  tenement 
or  dwelling  house  used  for  eating  or  sleeping  purposes, 
shall  be  used  for  the  manufacture,  in  whole  or  in  part,  of 
coats,  vests,  trousers,  knee-pants,  overalls,  cloaks,  shirts, 
ladies'  waists,  purses,  feathers,  artificial  flowers  or 
cigars,  except  by  the  immediate  members  of  the  family 
living  therein.  Every  such  workshop  shall  be  kept  in  a 
cleanly  state,  and  shall  be  subject  to  the  provisions  of 
this  act ;  and  each  of  said  articles  made,  altered,  repaired 
or  finished  in  any  such  workshops  shall  be  subject  to  in- 
spection and  examination,  as  hereinafter  provided,  for 
the  purpose  of  ascertaining  whether  said  articles,  or  any 
of  them,  or  any  part  thereof,  are  in  cleanly  condition  and 
free  from  vermin  and  any  matter  of  an  infectious  and 
contagious  nature;  and  every  person  so  occupying  or 
having  control  of  any  workshop  as  aforesaid,  shall  with- 
in fourteen  days  from  the  taking  effect  of  this  act,  or 
from  the  time  of  beginning  of  work  in  any  workshop  as 
aforesaid,  notify  the  Board  of  Health  of  the  location  of 
such  workshop,  the  nature  of  the  work  there  carried  on, 
and  the  number  of  persons  therein  employed. 

§  2.  If  the  Board  of  Health  of  any  city  or  said 
State  Inspector  finds  evidence  of  infectious  or  contagious 
diseases  present  in  any  workshop,  or  in  goods  manufac- 
tured, or  in  process  of  manufacture  therein,  and  if  said 
Board  or  Inspector  shall  find  said  shop  in  an  unhealthy 
condition,  or  the  clothing  and  materials  used  therein  to 
be  unfit  for  use,  said  Board  or  Inspector  shall  issue  such 
order  or  orders  as  the  public  health  imay  require,  and  the 


374  GARMENT  MANUFACTURING  ACT 

Board  of  Health  are  hereby  enjoined  to  condemn  and 
destroy  all  such  infectious  and  contagious  articles. 

§  3.  Whenever  it  shall  be  reported  to  said  Inspec- 
tor or  to  the  Board  of  Health,  or  either  of  them,  that 
coats,  vests,  trousers,  knee-pants,  overalls,  cloaks,  shirts, 
ladies'  waists,  purses,  feathers,  artificial  flowers  or  cigars 
are  being  transported  to  this  State,  having  been  pre- 
viously manufactured  in  whole  or  part  under  unhealthy 
conditions,  said  Inspector  shall  examine  said  goods  and 
the  condition  of  their  manufacture,  and  if  upon  such  ex- 
amination said  goods,  or  any  of  them,  are  found  to  con- 
tain vermin,  or  to  have  been  in  improper  places  or  under 
unhealthy  conditions,  he  shall  make  report  thereof  to  the 
Board  of  Health,  or  Inspector,  which  Board  or  Inspector 
shall  thereupon  make  such  order  or  orders  as  the  public 
health  shall  require  and  the  Board  of  Health  are  hereby 
empowered  to  condemn  or  destroy  all  such  articles. 

§  4.  The  words  "manufacturing  establishment," 
"factory"  or  "workshop,"  wherever  used  in  this  act, 
shall  be  construed  to  mean  any  place  where  goods  or 
products  are  manufactured  or  repaired,  cleaned,  or 
sorted,  in  whole,  or  part,  for  sale,  or  for  wages.  When- 
ever any  house,  room  or  place  is  used  for  the  purpose  of 
carrying  on  any  process  of  making,  altering,  repairing 
or  finishing  for  sale,  or  for  wages  any  coats,  vests, 
trousers,  knee-pants,  overalls,  cloaks,  shirts,  ladies' 
waists,  purses,  feathers,  artificial  flowers  or  cigars,  or 
any  wearing  apparel  of  any  kind  whatsoever  intended  for 
sale,  it  shall  within  the  meaning  of  this  act  be  deemed  a 
workshop  for  the  purposes  of  inspection.  And  it  shall  be 
the  duty  of  every  person,  firm  or  corporation  to  keep  a 
complete  list  of  all  such  workshops,  in  his,  their  or  its 
employ,  and  such  lists  shall  be  produced  for  inspection  on 
demand  by  the  Board  of  Health  or  any  of  the  officers 
thereof,  or  by  the  State  Inspector,  Assistant  Inspector, 
or  any  of  the  deputies  appointed  under  this  act. 

§  5.  Any  person,  firm  or  corporation  who  fails  to 
comply  with 'any  provision  of  this  act  shall  be  deemed 
guilty  of  a  misdemeanor  and  on  conviction  thereof  shall 
be  fined  not  less  than  $3  nor  more  than  $100  for  each 
offense. 


BUTTERINE  AND  ICE  CREAM  MANUFACTURE 

ACT. 

AN  ACT  relating  to  the  manufacture  of  Butterine  and 
Ice  Cream  and  providing  for  the  enforcement  thereof. 

Approved  June  3,  1907 ;  in  force  July  1,  1907. 

SECTION  1.  Be  it  enacted  by  the  People  of  the  State  of 
Illinois,  represented  in  the  General  Assembly:  That  all 
buildings  or  rooms  occupied  by  butterine  and  ice  cream 
manufacturers  shall  be  drained  and  plumbed  in  a  manner 
conducive  to  the  proper  and  healthful  sanitary  condition 
thereof,  and  shall  be  constructed  with  air  shafts,  win- 
dows and  ventilating  pipes  sufficient  to  insure  ventilation. 
The  Factory  Inspector  shall  direct  the  proper  drainage, 
plumbing  and  ventilation  of  such  rooms  or  buildings.  No 
cellar  or  basement  now  used  for  the  manufacture  of  but- 
terine or  ice  cream  shall  be  so  occupied  or  used  unless  the 
proprietor  shall  comply  with  the  sanitary  provisions  of 
this  act.  < 

§  2.  Every  room  used  for  the  manufacture  of  but- 
terine and  ice  cream  shall  be  at  least  eight  feet  in  height, 
and  shall  have,  if  deemed  necessary  by  the  Factory  In- 
spector, an  impermeable  floor,  constructed  of  cement,  or 
of  tiles  laid  in  cement,  or  an  additional  flooring  of  wood, 
properly  saturated  with  linseed  oil.  The  side  walls  of 
such  room  shall  be  plastered  and  wainscoted.  The  Fac- 
tory Inspector  may  require  the  side  walls  and  ceiling  to 
be  whitewashed  at  least  once  in  three  months.  He  may 
also  require  the  woodwork  of  such  walls  to  be  painted. 
The  furniture  and  utensils  shall  be  so  arranged  as  to  be 
readily  cleansed,  and  not  prevent  the  proper  cleaning  of 
any  part  of  the  room.  The  manufactured  butterine  and 
ice  cream  shall  be  kept  in  dry  and  airy  rooms,  so  arranged 
that  the  floors,  shelves  and  all  other  facilities  for  storing 
the  same  can  be  properly  cleaned.  No  domestic  animal 
shall  be  allowed  to  remain  in  a  room  where  butterine  or 
ice  cream  is  manufactured  or  stored,  and  no  water  closets 


376     BUTTERINE  AND  ICE  CREAM  MANUFACTURE  ACT 

or  ash  pit  shall  be  within  or  connected  with  the  rooms 
used  in  the  manufacture  of  butterine  or  ice  cream. 

§  3.  The  State  Factory  Inspector  shall  cause  such 
manufactories  to  be  inspected.  If  it  be  found,  upon  such 
inspection,  that  the  manufactories  so  inspected  are  con- 
structed and  conducted  in  compliance  with  the  provisions 
of  this  act,  the  Factory  Inspector  shall  issue  a  certificate 
to  the  persons  owning  or  conducting  such  manufactories. 

§  4.  If,  in  the  opinion  of  the  State  Factory  Inspec- 
tor, alterations  are  required  in  or  upon  premises  occupied 
and  used  as  butterine  and  ice  cream  manufactories,  in  or- 
der to  comply  with  the  provisions  of  this  act,  a  written 
notice  shall  be  served  by  him  upon  the  owner,  agent  or 
lessee  of  such  premises,  either  personally  or  by  mail,  re- 
quiring such  alterations  to  be  made  within  sixty  days 
after  such  service,  and  such  alterations  shall  be  made  ac- 
cordingly. 

§  5.  Any  person  who  violates  any  of  the  provisions 
of  this  act,  or  refuses  to  comply  with  any  of  the  require- 
ments as  provided  herein,  of  the  Factory  Inspector  or  his 
deputy,  who  are  hereby  charged  with  the  enforcement  of 
this  act,  shall  be  guilty  of  a  misdemeanor,  and  on  convic- 
tion shall  be  punished  by  a  fine  of  not  less  than  fifty  dol- 
lars ($50.00)  nor  more  than  two  hundred  dollars 
($200.00)  nor  more  than  five  hundred  dollars  ($500.00) 
for  the  second  offense,  or  imprisonment  for  not  more  than 
thirty  days,  and  for  a  third  offense  by  a  fine  not  less  than 
five  hundred  dollars  ($500.00)  nor  more  than  sixty  (60) 
days  imprisonment,  or  both. 


HOURS  OF  SERVICE  OF  WOMEN  ACT. 

AN  ACT  to  regulate  and  limit  the  hours  of  employ- 
ment of  females  in  any  mechanical  or  mercantile  estab- 
lishment, or  factory,  or  laundry,  hotel,  or  restaurant,  or 
telegraph  or  telephone  establishment  or  office  thereof,  or 
in  any  place  of  amusement,  or  by  any  express  or  trans- 
portation or  public  utility  business,  or  by  any  common 
carrier,  or  in  any  public  institution,  incorporated  or  unin- 
corporated in  this  State,  in  order  to  safeguard  the  health 
of  such  employees;  to  provide  for  its  enforcement  and  a 
penalty  for  its  violation. 

Approved  June  15, 1909 ;  in  force  July  1, 1909.  Amend- 
ed June  10,  1911;  in  force  July  1,  1911.  Laws  1911,  p. 
328.  Rev.  Stat.  Ch.  48,  §  121.  Stat.  Ann.  $  5289. 

SECTION  1.  Be  it  enacted  by  the  People  of  the  State  of 
Illinois,  represented  in  the  General  Assembly:  That  no 
female  shall  be  employed  in  any  mechanical  or  mercan- 
tile establishment,  or  factory,  or  laundry,  or  hotel,  or  res- 
taurant, or  telegraph  or  telephone  establishment  or  office 
thereof,  or  in  any  place  of  amusement,  or  by  any  person, 
firm  or  corporation  engaged  in  any  express  or  transporta- 
tion or  public  utility  business,  or  by  any  common  carrier, 
or  in  any  public  institution,  incorporated  or  unincorpora- 
ted in  this  State,  more  than  ten  hours  during  any  one  day. 
The  hours  of  work  may  be  so  arranged  as  to  permit  the 
employment  of  females  at  any  time  so  that  they  shall  not 
work  more  than  ten  hours  during  the  twenty-four  hours 
of  any  day. 

§  2.  Any  employer  who  shall  require  or  permit  or 
suffer  any  female  to  work  in  any  of  the  places  mentioned 
in  Section  1  of  this  act  more  than  the  number  of  hours  pro- 
vided for  in  this  act,  during  any  day  of  twenty-four  hours, 
or  who  shall  fail,  neglect  or  refuse  so  to  arrange  the  work 
of  females  in  his  employ  that  they  shall  not  work  more 
than  the  number  of  hours  provided  for  in  this  act,  during 
any  one  day,  or  who  shall  permit  or  suffer  any  overseer, 
superintendent  or  other  agent  of  any  such  employer  to 
violate  any  of  the  provisions  of  this  act,  shall  be  guilty 
of  a  misdemeanor  and  upon  conviction  thereof  shall  be 


378  HOURS  OF  SERVICE  OF  WOMEN  ACT 

fined  for  each  offense  in  a  sum  of  not  less  than  $25.00  or 
more  than  $100.00. 

§  3.  The  State  Department  of  Factory  Inspection 
shall  be  charged  with  the  duty  of  enforcing  the  provisions 
of  this  act,  and  prosecuting  all  violations  thereof. 

§  4.  All  acts  and  parts  of  acts  in  conflict  herewith 
are  hereby  repealed. 

§  5.  Every  employer  to  whom  this  act  shall  apply, 
shall  keep  a  time  book  or  record  showing  for  each  day 
that  his  establishment  is  open  the  hours  during  which 
each  and  every  female  in  his  employ,  to  whom  this  act  ap- 
plies, is  employed.  Such  time  book  or  record  shall  be 
open  at  all  reasonable  hours  to  the  inspection  of  the  offi- 
cials of  the  Factory  Inspection  Department.  The  failure 
or  omission  to  keep  such  record,  or  a  false  statement  con- 
tained therein,  or  any  false  statement  made  by  any  per- 
son to  an  official  of  the  Factory  Inspection  Department,  in 
reply  to  any  question  put  in  carrying  out  the  provisions 
of  this  act,  shall  be  punishable  on  conviction  by  a  penalty 
of  not  more  than  $25.00  for  each  offense. 

Statute  limiting  hours  of  service  of  women  to  eight 
hours — declared  invalid. 

Ritchie  v  People,  155  111.  Sup.  98. 
Contra :  Ritchie  v  Wayman,  244  111.  Sup.  509. 
See :  People  v  City  of  Chicago,  256  HI.  Sup.  558. 
Legislation  which  limits  right  to  contract  as  to  what 
shall  constitute  a  day's  work  was  formerly  declared  in- 
valid by  courts  as  infraction  of  liberty. 

Glover  v  People,  201  111.  Sup.  545. 
Sweet  v  People,  200  111.  536. 

Statute  limiting  day's  service  of  women  to  ten  hours 
in  Massachusetts,  upheld. 

Riley  v  Commonwealth,  232  U.  S.  671. 
Limiting  hours  of  labor ;  see : 

Holden  v  Hardy,  169  U.  S.  366. 
State  v  Buchanan,  29  Wash.  602,  70  Pac.  52. 
Statute  of  California,  prohibiting  excess  over  eight 
hours  per  day  of  service  of  women  does  not  infringe  on 
' '  freedom  to  contract. ' ' 

Miller  v  Wilson,  236  U.  S.  373. 


CHILD  LABOR  ACT. 

AN  ACT  to  regulate  the  employment  of  children  in  the 
State  of  Illinois,  and  to  provide  for  the  enforcement  there- 
of. 

Approved  May  15,  1903;  in  force  July  1,  1903.  Rev. 
Stat.  Ch.  48,  §  20.  Ann.  Stat.  §  5297. 

SECTION  1.  Child  under  14  years. — Be  it  enacted  by 
the  People  of  the  State  of  Illinois,  represented  in  the  Gen- 
eral Assembly:  That  no  child  under  the  age  of  fourteen 
years  shall  be  employed,  permitted  or  suffered  to  work  at 
any  gainful  occupation  in  any  theater,  concert  hall  or 
place  of  amusement  where  intoxicating  liquors  are  sold 
or  in  any  mercantile  institution,  store,  office,  hotel,  laun- 
dry, manufacturing  establishment,  bowling  alley,  passen- 
ger or  freight  elevator,  factory  or  workshop,  or  as  mes- 
senger or  driver  therefor,  within  this  State.  That  no 
child  under  fourteen  years  of  age  shall  be  employed  at 
any  work  performed  for  wages  or  other  compensation,  to 
whomsoever  payable,  during  any  portion  of  any  month 
when  the  public  schools  of  the  town,  township,  village  or 
city  in  which  he  or  she  resides  are  in  session,  nor  be  em- 
ployed at  any  work  before  the  hour  of  seven  o'clock  in 
the  morning  or  after  the  hour  of  six  o'clock  in  the  even- 
ing: Provided,  that  no  child  shall  be  allowed  to  work 
more  than  eight  hours  in  any  one  day. 

§  2.  Register. — It  shall  be  the  duty  of  every  per- 
son, firm  or  corporation,  agent  or  manager  of  any  firm  or 
corporation  employing  minors  over  fourteen  years  and 
under  sixteen  years  of  age  in  any  mercantile  institution, 
store,  office,  hotel,  laundry,  manufacturing  establishment, 
bowling  alley,  theater,  concert  hall  or  place  of  amuse- 
ment, passenger  or  freight  elevator,  factory  or  workshop 
as  as  messenger  or  driver  therefor,  within  this  State,  to 
keep  a  register  in  said  mercantile  institution,  store,  office, 
hotel,  laundry,  manufacturing  establishment,  bowling  al- 
ley, theater,  concert  hall  or  place  of  amusement,  factory 


380  CHILD  LABOR  ACT 

or  workshop  in  which  said  minors  shall  be  employed  or 
permitted  or  suffered  to  work,  in  which  register  shall  be 
recorded  the  name,  age  and  place  of  residence  of  every 
child  employed  or  suffered  or  permitted  to  work  therein, 
or  as  messenger  or  driver  therefor,  over  the  age  of  four- 
teen and  under  the  age  of  sixteen  years;  and  it  shall  be 
unlawful  for  any  person,  firm  or  corporation,  agent  or 
manager,  of  any  firm  or  corporation  to  hire  or  employ, 
or  to  permit  or  suffer  to  work  in  any  mercantile  institu- 
tion, store,  office,  hotel,  laundry,  manufacturing  establish- 
ment, bowling  alley,  theater,  concert  hall  or  place  of 
amusement,  passenger  or  freight  elevator,  factory  or 
workshop,  or  as  messenger  or  driver  therefor,  any  child 
under  the  age  of  16  years  and  over  14  years  of  age,  unless 
there  is  first  produced  and  placed  on  file  in  such  mercan- 
tile institution,  store,  office,  hotel,  laundry,  manufactur- 
ing establishment,  bowling  alley,  factory  or  workshop, 
theater,  concert  hall  or  place  of  amusement,  an  age  and 
school  certificate  approved  as  hereinafter  provided. 

§  3.  Wall  Lists. — Every  person,  firm  or  corpora- 
tion, agent  or  manager  of  a  corporation  employing  or  per- 
mitting or  suffering  to  work  five  or  more  children  under 
the  age  of  sixteen  years  and  over  the  age  of  fourteen  in 
any  mercantile  institution,  store,  office,  laundry,  hotel, 
manufacturing  establishment,  factory  or  workshop,  shall 
post  and  keep  posted  in  a  conspicuous  place  in  every 
room  in  which  such  help  is  employed,  or  permitted  or  suf- 
fered to  work  a  list  containing  the  name,  age  and  place 
of  residence  of  every  person  under  the  age  of  sixteen 
years  employed,  permitted  or  suffered  to  work  in  such 
room. 

§  4.  Age  and  School  Certificate. — No  child  under 
sixteen  years  of  age  and  over  fourteen  years  of  age  shall 
be  employed  in  any  mercantile  institution,  store,  office, 
hotel,  laundry,  manufacturing  establishment,  bowling  al- 
ley, theater,  concert  hall  or  place  of  amusement,  passen- 
ger or  freight  elevator,  factory  or  workshop,  or  as  mes- 


CHILD  LABOR  ACT  381 

senger  or  driver  therefor,  unless  there  is  first  produced 
and  placed  on  file  in  such  mercantile  institution,  store,  of- 
fice, hotel,  laundry,  manufacturing  establishment,  bowl- 
ing alley,  theater,  concert  hall  or  place  of  amusement,  fac- 
tory or  workshop,  and  accessible  to  the  State  Factory  In- 
spector, Assistant  Factory  Inspector  or  Deputy  Factory 
Inspector,  an  age  and  school  certificate  as  hereinafter  pre- 
scribed; and  unless  there  is  kept  on  file  and  produced  on 
demand  of  said  inspectors  of  factories  a  complete  and 
correct  list  of  all  the  minors  under  the  age  of  sixteen 
years  so  employed  who  cannot  read  at  sight  and  write 
legibly  simple  sentences,  unless  such  child  is  attending 
night  school  as  hereinafter  provided. 

§  5.  Age  and  School  Certificate. — How  APPROVED. 
An  age  and  school  certificate  shall  be  approved  only  by 
the  Superintendent  of  Schools  or  by  a  person  authorized 
by  him  in  writing;  or  where  there  is  no  superintendent  of 
schools,  by  a  person  authorized  by  the  School  Board: 
Provided,  that  the  superintendent  or  principal  of  a  paro- 
chial school  shall  have  the  right  to  approve  an  age  and 
school  certificate  and  shall  have  the  same  rights  and 
powers  as  the  superintendent  of  public  schools  to  admin- 
ister the  oaths  herein  provided  for  children  attending 
parochial  schools :  Provided,  further,  that  no  member  of 
a  school  board  or  other  person  authorized  as  aforesaid, 
shall  have  authority  to  approve  such  certificates  for  any 
child  then  in  or  about  to  enter  his  own  establishment,  or 
the  employment  of  a  firm  or  corporation  of  which  he  is  a 
member,  officer  or  employee.  The  person  approving  these 
certificates  shall  have  the  authority  to  administer  the 
oath  provided  herein,  but  no  fee  shall  be  charged  there- 
for. It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  school  board  or  local 
school  authorities  to  designate  a  place  (connected  with 
their  offices,  when  practicable)  where  certificates  shall  be 
issued  and  recorded,  and  to  establish  and  maintain  the 
necessary  records  and  clerical  service  for  carrying  out 
the  provisions  of  this  act. 


382  CHILD  LABOR  ACT 

§  6.  Proof  of  Age. — An  age  and  school  certificate 
shall  not  be  approved  unless  satisfactory  evidence  is  fur- 
nished by  the  last  school  census,  the  certificate  of  birth  or 
baptism  of  such  child,  the  register  of  birth  of  such  child 
with  a  town  or  city  clerk,  or  by  the  records  of  the  public 
or  parochial  schools,  that  such  child  is  of  the  age  stated 
in  the  certificate:  Provided,  that  in  cases  arising  where- 
in the  above  proof  is  not  obtainable,  the  parent  or  guard- 
ian of  the  child  shall  make  oath  before  the  juvenile  or 
county  court  as  to  the  age  of  such  child,  and  the  court 
may  issue  to  said  child  an  age  certificate  as  sworn  to. 

§  7.  Employment  Ticket. — The  age  and  school  cer- 
tificate of  a  child  under  sixteen  years  of  age  shall  not  be 
approved  and  signed  until  he  presents  to  the  person  au- 
thorized to  approve  and  sign  the  same,  a  school  attendance 
certificate,  as  hereinafter  prescribed,  duly  filled  out  and 
signed.  A  duplicate  of  such  age  and  school  certificate 
shall  be  filled  out  and  shall  be  forwarded  to  the  State  Fac- 
tory Inspector's  office.  Any  explanatory  matter  may  be 
printed  with  such  certificate  in  the  discretion  of  the 
school  board  or  superintendent  of  schools.  The  employ- 
ment and  the  age  and  school  certificates  shall  be  sepa- 
rately printed  and  shall  be  filled  out,  signed  and  held  or 
surrendered  as  indicated  in  the  following  forms : 

SCHOOL  CERTIFICATE 
(Name  of  school.)  (City  or  town  and  date.) 

This  certifies  (name  of  minor)  of  the th  grade, 

can  read  and  write  legibly  simple  sentences. 

This  also  certifies  that  according  to  the  records  of  this 
school,  and  in  my  belief,  the  said  (name  of  minor)  was 
born  at  (name  of  city  or  town)  in  (name  of  county)  on 
the  (date)  and  is  now  (number  of  years  and  months)  old. 

(Name  of  parent  or  guardian.) 
(Residence.) 

(Signature  of  teacher)  grade. 

Correct.  (Name  of  principal.) 

(Name  of  school.) 


CHILD  LABOR  ACT  383 

EVENING  SCHOOL  ATTENDANCE  CERTIFICATE 

(Date.) 
This  certifies  that  (name  of  minor)  is  registered  in 

and  regularly  attends  the evening  school. 

This  also  certifies  that  according  to  the  records  of  my 
school  and  in  my  belief  the  said  (name  of  minor)  was 

born  at  (name  of  city  or  town)  on  the day  of 

(year),  and  is  now  (number  of  years  and  months)  old. 

(Name  of  parent  or  guardian.) 

(Residence.) 

(Signature  of  teacher.) 

(Signature  of  principal.) 

AGE  AND  SCHOOL  CERTIFICATE 

This  certifies  that  I  am  (father,  mother,  guardian  or 
custodian)  of  (name  of  minor),  and  that  (he  or  she)  was 
born  at  (name  of  town  or  city)  in  the  (name  of  county,  if 

known)  and  State  or  country  of on  the  (day  of 

birth  and  year  of  birth)  and  is  now  (number  of  years  and 
months)  old. 

(Signature  of  parent,  guardian  or  custodian.) 
(City  or  town  and  date.) 

There  personally  appeared  before  me  the  above  named 
(name  of  person  signing)  and  made  oath  that  the  fore- 
going certificate  by  (him  or  her)  signed  is  true  to  the  best 
of  (his  or  her)  knowledge.  I  hereby  approve  the  forego- 
ing  certificate  of  (name  of  child),  height  (feet  and 

inches),  weight ,  complexion  (fair  or  dark),  hair 

(color),  having  no  sufficient  reason  to  doubt  that  (he  or 
she)  is  of  the  age  therein  certified. 

Owner  of  Certificate. — This  certificate  belongs  to 
(name  of  child  in  whose  behalf  it  is  drawn)  and  is  to  be 
surrendered  to  (him  or  her)  whenever  (he  or  she)  leaves 
the  service  of  the  corporation  or  employer  holding  the 
same;  but  if  not  claimed  by  said  child  within  thirty  days 
from  such  time  it  shall  be  returned  to  the  superintendent 
of  schools,  or  where  there  is  no  superintendent  of  schools 
to  the  school  board. 


384  CHILD  LABOR  ACT 

(Signature  of  person  authorized  to  approve  and  sign 
with  official  character  authority.) 

(Town  or  city  and  date.) 

Illiteracy. — In  the  case  of  a  child  who  cannot  read  at 
sight  and  write  legibly  simple  sentences,  the  certificate 
shall  continue  as  follows,  after  the  word  ' '  sentences ; "  ' '  I 
hereby  certify  that  (he  or  she)  is  regularly  attending  the 
(name  of  public  or  parochial  evening  school)."  This 
certificate  shall  continue  in  force  just  as  long  as  the  regu- 
lar attendance  of  said  child  at  said  evening  school  is  cer- 
tified weekly  by  the  teacher  and  principal  of  said  school. 

Evening  School. — In  any  city  or  town  in  which  there 
is  no  public  or  parochial  evening  school,  an  age  and  school 
certificate  shall  not  be  approved  for  a  child  under  the  age 
of  sixteen  years  who  can  not  read  at  sight  and  write  legi- 
bly simple  sentences.  When  the  public  or  parochial  even- 
ing schools  are  not  in  session  an  age  and  school  certificate 
shall  not  be  approved  for  any  child  who  can  not  read  at 
sight  and  write  legibly  simple  sentences.  The  certificate 
of  the  principal  of  a  public  or  parochial  school  shall  be 
prima  facie  evidence  as  to  the  literacy  or  illiteracy  of  the 
child. 

§  8.  Schooling  Required. — No  person  shall  employ 
any  minor  over  fourteen  years  of  age  and  under  sixteen 
years,  and  no  parent,  guardian  or  custodian  shall  permit 
to  be  employed  any  such  minor  under  his  control,  who 
can  not  read  at  sight  and  write  legibly  simple  sentences, 
while  a  public  evening  school  is  maintained  in  the  town 
or  city  in  which  such  minor  resides,  unless  such  minor  is 
a  regular  attendant  at  such  evening  school. 

§  9.  Duties  of  State  Inspector  of  Factories. — The 
State  Inspector  of  Factories,  his  assistants  or  deputies, 
shall  visit  all  mercantile  institutions,  store,  offices,  laun- 
dries, manufacturing  establishments,  bowling  alleys, 
theaters,  concert  halls  or  places  of  amusement,  factories 
or  workshops,  and  all  other  places  where  minors  are  or 
may  be  employed,  in  this  State,  and  ascertain  whether 


CHILD  LABOR  ACT  385 

any  minors  are  employed  contrary  to  the  provisions  of 
this  act.  Inspectors  of  factories  may  require  that  age 
and  school  certificates,  and  all  lists  of  minors  employed  in 
such  factories,  workshops,  mercantile  institutions,  and 
all  other  places  where  minors  are  employed  as  provided 
for  in  this  act  shall  be  produced  for  their  inspection,  on 
demand. 

And,  Provided  further,  that  upon  written  complaint 
to  the  school  board  or  local  school  authorities  of  any  city, 
town,  district  or  municipality,  that  any  minor  (whose 
name  shall  be  given  in  such  complaint)  is  employed  in 
any  mercantile  institution,  store,  office,  laundry,  manufac- 
turing establishment,  bowling  alley,  theater,  concert  hall 
or  place  of  amusement,  passenger  or  freight  elevator,  fac- 
tory or  workshop,  or  as  messenger  or  driver  therefor,  con- 
trary to  the  provisions  of  this  act,  it  shall  be  the  duty  of 
such  school  board  or  local  school  authority  to  report  the 
same  to  the  State  Inspector  of  Factories. 

§  10.  Hours  of  Labor. — No  person  under  the  age  of 
sixteen  shall  be  employed  or  suffered  or  permitted  to 
work  at  any  gainful  occupation  more  than  forty-eight 
hours  in  any  one  week,  nor  more  than  eight  hours  in  any 
one  day;  or  before  the  hour  of  seven  o'clock  in  the  morn- 
ing or  after  the  hour  of  seven  o'clock  in  the  evening. 
Every  employer  shall  post  in  a  conspicuous  place  in  every 
room  where  such  minors  are  employed  a  printed  notice 
stating  the  hours  required  of  them  each  day  of  the  week, 
the  hours  of  commencing  and  stopping  work  and  the 
hours  when  the  time  or  times  allowed  for  dinner  or  for 
other  meals  begins  and  ends.  The  printed  form  of  such 
notice  shall  be  furnished  by  the  State  Inspector  of  Facto- 
ries, and  the  employment  of  any  such  minor  for  longer 
time  in  any  day  so  stated  shall  be  deemed  a  violation  of 
this  section. 

§  11.  Employments  Forbidden  Children  Under  Six- 
teen Years  of  Age. — No  child  under  the  age  of  sixteen 
years  shall  be  employed  at  sewing  belts,  or  to  assist  in 


386  CHILD  LABOR  ACT 

sewing  belts,  in  any  capacity  whatever;  nor  shall  any 
child  adjust  any  belt  to  any  machinery;  they  shall  not  oil 
or  assist  in  oiling,  wiping  or  cleaning  machinery;  they 
shall  not  operate  or  assist  in  operating  circular  or  band 
saws,  wood-shapers,  wood-jointers,  planers,  sand-paper 
or  wood-polishing  machinery,  emery  or  polishing  wheels 
used  for  polishing  metal,  wood-turning  or  boring  machin- 
ery, stamping  machines  in  sheet  metal  and  tinware  manu- 
facturing, stamping  machines  in  washer  and  nut  facto- 
ries, operating  corrugating  rolls,  such  as  are  used  in  roof- 
ing factories,  nor  shall  they  be  employed  in  operating  any 
passenger  or  freight  elevators,  steam  boiler,  steam  ma- 
chinery, or  other  steam  generating  apparatus,  or  as  pin 
boys  in  any  bowling  alleys;  they  shall  not  operate  or  as- 
sist in  operating  dough  brakes,  or  cracker  machinery  of 
any  description;  wire  or  iron  straightening  machinery; 
nor  shall  they  operate  or  assist  in  operating  rolling  mill 
machinery,  punches  or  shears,  washing,  grinding  or  mix- 
ing mill  or  calendar  rolls  in  rubber  manufacturing,  nor 
shall  they  operate  or  assist  in  operating  laundry  machin- 
ery; nor  shall  children  be  employed  in  any  capacity  in 
preparing  any  composition  in  which  dangerous  or  poison- 
ous acids  are  used,  and  they  shall  not  be  employed  in  any 
capacity  in  the  manufacture  of  paints,  colors  or  white 
lead;  nor  shall  they  be  employed  in  any  capacity  what- 
ever in  operating  or  assisting  to  operate  any  passenger 
or  freight  elevator;  nor  shall  they  be  employed  in  any  ca- 
pacity whatever  in  the  manufacture  of  goods  for  immoral 
purposes,  or  any  other  employment  that  may  be  consid- 
ered dangerous  to  their  lives  or  limbs,  or  where  their 
health  may  be  injured  or  morals  depraved;  nor  in  any 
theater,  concert  hall,  or  place  of  amusement  wherein  in- 
toxicating liquors  are  sold;  nor  shall  females  under  six- 
teen years  of  age  be  employed  in  any  capacity  where  such 
employment  compels  them  to  remain  standing  constantly. 
§  12.  Prima  Facie  Evidence  of  Child's  Employment. 
— The  presence  of  any  person  under  the  age  of  sixteen 


CHILD  LABOR  ACT  387 

years  in  any  manufacturing  establishment,  factory  or 
workshop,  shall  constitute  prima  facie  evidence  of  his 
or  her  employment  therein. 

§  13.  Enforcement  of  Provisions  of  Act. — It  shall  be 
the  special  duty  of  the  State  Factory  Inspector  to  enforce 
the  provisions  of  this  act,  and  to  prosecute  all  violations 
of  the  same  before  any  magistrate  or  any  court  of  compe- 
tent jurisdiction  in  this  State.  It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the 
State  Factory  Inspector,  Assistant  State  Factory  Inspec- 
tor and  Deputy  State  Factory  Inspectors  under  the  super- 
vision and  direction  of  the  State  Factory  Inspector,  and 
they  are  hereby  authorized  and  empowered  to  visit  and 
inspect,  at  all  reasonable  times  and  as  often  as  possible, 
all  places  covered  by  this  act. 

§  14.  Penalty. — Whoever,  having  under  his  control 
a  child  under  the  age  of  sixteen  years,  permits  such  child 
to  be  employed  in  violation  of  the  provisions  of  this  act, 
shall  for  each  offense  be  fined  not  less  than  $5  nor  more 
than  $25,  and  shall  stand  committed  until  such  fine  and 
costs  are  paid. 

A  failure  to  produce  to  the  Inspector  of  Factories, 
his  assistants  or  deputies,  any  age  and  school  certificates, 
or  lists  required  by  this  act,  shall  constitute  a  violation 
of  this  act,  and  the  person  so  failing  shall,  upon  convic- 
tion, be  fined  not  less  than  $5  nor  more  than  $50  for  each 
offense.  Every  person  authorized  to  sign  the  certificate 
prescribed  by  Section  7  of  this  act,  who  certifies  to  any 
materially  false  statement  therein  shall  be  guilty  of  a  vio- 
lation of  this  act,  and  upon  conviction  be  fined  not  less 
than  $5  nor  more  than  $100  for  each  offense,  and  shall 
stand  committed  until  such  fine  and  costs  are  paid. 

Any  person,  firm  or  corporation,  agent  or  manager, 
superintendent  or  foreman  of  any  firm  or  corporation — 
whether  for  himself  or  for  such  firm  or  corporation,  or  by 
himself  or  through  sub-agents  or  foremen,  superintendent 
or  manager,  who  shall  violate  or  fail  to  comply  with  any 
of  the  provisions  of  this  act,  or  shall  refuse  admittance 


388  CHILD  LABOR  ACT 

to  premises  or  otherwise  obstruct  the  Factory  Inspector, 
Assistant  Factory  Inspector  or  Deputy  Factory  Inspec- 
tors in  the  performance  of  their  duties,  as  prescribed  by 
this  act,  shall  be  deemed  guilty  of  a  misdemeanor  and 
upon  conviction  thereof  shall  be  fined  not  less  than  $5  nor 
more  than  $100  for  each  offense,  and  shall  stand  commit- 
ted until  such  fine  and  costs  are  paid. 

§  15.  Repeal.— "An  Act  to  Prevent  Child  Labor," 
approved  June  17,  1891,  in  force  July  1,  1891,  and  all 
other  acts  and  parts  of  acts  in  conflict  with  this  act,  are 
hereby  repealed. 

Prohibition  of  employment  of  children  under  sixteen 
years  of  age  in  hazardous  occupations  does  not  deprive  of 
liberty  or  property  without  due  process  of  law. 

Sturges  &  Burns  Mfg.  Co.  v  Beauchamp,  231  U. 
S.  320;  affg.  250  111.  Sup.  303,  95  N.  E.  204. 
Employer  must  ascertain  true  age  of  child. 

Beauchamp  v  Sturges  &  Burns  Mfg.  Co.,  250  111. 

Sup.  303. 
Violation  of  act — Damages — See : 

Stafford  v  Republic  Iron  &  Steel  Co.,  238  111. 

Sup.  371. 
American  Car  &  Foundry  Co.  v  Armentraut,  214 

EL  Sup.  509. 

Fortier  v  The  Fair,  153  111.  App.  200. 
Frorer  v  Baker,  137  El.  App.  588. 
Nelson  Morris  &Co.v  Stan  field,  81  El.  App.  264. 
Swift  &  Co.  v  Miller,  139  111.  App.  192. 


WASH  ROOM  ACT. 

AN  ACT  to  provide  wash  rooms  in  certain  employ- 
ments to  protect  the  health  of  employees  and  secure  pub- 
lic comfort. 

Approved  June  26,  1913;  in  force  July  1,  1913.  Laws 
1913,  p.  359. 

SECTION  1.  Be  it  enacted  by  the  People  of  the  State  of 
Illinois,  represented  in  the  General  Assembly:  That  every 
owner  or  operator  of  a  coal  mine,  steel  mill,  foundry,  ma- 
chine shop,  or  other  like  business  in  which  employees  he- 
come  covered  with  grease,  smoke,  dust,  grime  and  perspi- 
ration to  such  extent  that  to  remain  in  such  condition 
after  leaving  their  work  without  washing  and  cleansing 
their  bodies  and  changing  their  clothing,  will  endanger 
their  health  or  make  their  condition  offensive  to  the  pub- 
lic, shall  provide  and  maintain  a  suitable  and  sanitary 
wash  room  at  a  convenient  place  in  or  adjacent  to  such 
mine,  mill,  foundry,  shop  or  other  place  of  employment 
for  the  use  of  such  employees. 

§  2.  Such  wash  room  shall  be  so  arranged  that  em- 
ployees may  change  their  clothing  therein,  and  shall  be 
sufficient  for  the  number  of  employees  engaged  regularly 
in  such  employment;  shall  be  provided  with  lockers  in 
which  employees  may  keep  their  clothing;  shall  be  pro- 
vided with  hot  and  cold  water  and  with  sufficient  and 
suitable  places  and  means  for  using  the  same ;  and  during 
cold  weather,  shall  be  sufficiently  heated. 

$  3.  It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  State  and  County 
Mine  Inspectors,  Factory  Inspectors  and  other  inspectors 
required  to  inspect  places  and  kinds  of  business  required 
by  this  act  to  be  provided  with  wash  rooms,  to  inspect 
such  wash  rooms  and  report  to  the  owner  or  operator,  the 
sanitary  and  physical  condition  thereof  in  writing,  and 
make  recommendations  as  to  such  improvements  or 
changes  as  may  appear  to  be  necessary  for  compliance 
with  the  provisions  of  this  act. 


390  WASH  ROOM  ACT 

§  4.  Any  owner  or  employer  who  shall  fail  or  refuse 
to  comply  with  the  provisions  of  this  act  shall  be  deemed 
guilty  of  a  misdemeanor,  and,  upon  conviction  thereof, 
shall  be  fined  not  more  than  one  hundred  dollars. 

§  5.  Any  owner  or  employer  who  shall  be  convicted 
of  a  violation  of  the  provisions  of  this  act  shall  be  sub- 
ject to  a  conviction  for  succeeding  offenses  for  each  and 
every  day  he  shall  neglect  or  refuse  to  comply  herewith. 

Title  of  Act  does  not  embrace  more  than  one  subject. 
People  v  Solomon,  265  111.  Sup.  28, 106  N.  E.  458. 


MISCELLANEOUS  ACTS. 

Statute  requiring  report  by  employer  of  accidents  to 
State  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics  within  30  days,  except 
where  report  made  to  Industrial  Board  under  Workmen's 
Compensation  Act. 

May  24,  1907.  Kev.  Stat.  Ch.  48,  §  43. 
Statute  regulating  motor  vehicles. 

June  10,  1911.  Laws  1911,  p.  487. 
Statute    for   protection    of   delivery    chauffeurs    by 
shield  or  hood. 

June  27,  1913.  Laws  1913,  p.  334. 
Statute  creating  State  Board  of  Arbitration  for  in- 
vestigation of  differences  between  employers  and  em- 
ployees. 

Aug.  28, 1895.    Eev.  Stat.  Ch.  10. 
Statute  establishing  state  employment  agencies. 

May  11,  1913;  amended  June  24,  1915.     Laws 

1915,  p.  414. 
Statute  regulating  private  employment  agencies. 

June  15,  1909.  Eev.  Stat.  Ch.  48,  §  67a. 
Mines. 

June  28,  1915.  Laws  1915,  p.  505. 
Eight  hours  to  constitute  a  legal  day's  work  in  ab- 
sence of  agreement  to  the  contrary. 

March  5,  1867.  Rev.  Stat.  Ch.  48,  §  1.  Ann.  Stat. 

§  5286. 
Fire  escapes. 

Eev.  Stat.  Ch.  55a. 
Conspiracy  and  boycott. 
Eev.  Stat.  Ch.  38. 

See :  Gillespie  v  People,  188  111.  Sup.  176. 
Wages — Garnishment — Exemption  of  $15  to  head  of 
family. 

Eev.  Stat.  Ch.  62. 
Wages — Suit  for — Attorney's  fee. 

Eev.  Stat.  Ch.  108,  §  13.  Stat.  Ann.  §  5285. 


392  MISCELLANEOUS  ACT 

Wages — Assignment  of — Notice. 

Laws  1915,  p.  556. 
Wages — Withholding  by  corporation. 

Rev.  St.  Ch.  48,  §  16. 

Legal  holidays:  January  1;  February  12;  February 
22 ;  May  30 ;  July  4 ;  October  12 ;  December  25 ;  first  Mon- 
day in  September;  Thanksgiving  Day,  and  in  cities  of 
200,000  inhabitants  or  over — from  noon  to  midnight  on 
Saturday. 

Rev.  Stat.  Ch.  98,  §  17. 
Woman's  right. 

March  22, 1872.  Rev.  Stat.  Ch.  48,  p.  3. 


TABLE  OF  COMPENSATION. 


To  find  the  present  value  of  any  sum  payable  weekly,  multiply  that 
sum  by  the  present  value  of  $1  payable  for  the  number  of  weeks  for 
which  such  sum  is  payable. 

Example. — To  find  the  present  value  of  $7.20  payable  at  the  end  of 
each  week  for  100  weeks  multiply  $7.20  by  the  present  value  of  $1  pay- 
able weekly  for  100  weeks  (shown  in  the  tables  to  be  $97.1833).  $7.20 — 
97.1833=$699.72,  present  value. 

PRESENT  VALUE  TABLES. 

Present  value  at  3  per  cent,  compounded  annually,  at  $1.00  per 
week,  payable  at  the  end  of  each  week,  for  any  term  from  one  week 
up  to  eight  years. 


Term  —  week* 

0  years 

1  year 
and  — 
weeks. 

2  years 
and  — 
weeks. 

3  years 
and  — 
weeks. 

4  years 
and  — 
weeks. 

")  years 
and  — 
weeks. 

6  years 
and  -- 
weeks. 

7  years 
and  — 
weeks. 

0.9994 

52.1947 

101.8989 

150.1554 

197.0064 

242.4928 

286.6543 

329.5296 

1,9983 

53.1645 

1<;2.8405 

151.0095 

197.8939 

243.3544 

287.4908 

330.3417 

Three  
Four  

2.9966 
3.9943 
4,9915 

54.1337 
55,1024 
56.0705 

103.7814 
104.7219 
105.6618 

151.9831 
152.8962 
153.8087 

198.7808 
199.6673 
200.5533 

244.2155 
245.0762 
243.11364 

288.3269 
''80  l'i'>ei 
289!9676 

331.1534 
331.9647 
332.7755 

glx  

5,9881 

57.0381 

106.6012 

154.7207 

201.4387 

246.7980 

200.8322 

333.585S 

6.9841 

58.0051 

107.5401 

155.6323 

202.3237 

247.6552 

291.6664 

334.3957 

Eight  

7.9796 

58.9716 

108.4784 

156.5432 

203.2082 

248.5139 

292.5C01 

335.2051 

Nine  

8.9745 

59.0375 

109.4162 

157.4537 

204.0021 

249.3721 

293.3333 

336.0140 

9.9688 

60.9029 

110.3534 

158.3637 

204.8756 

250.22S8 

294.1660 

336.8225 

10.9626 

61.8677 

111.2901 

159.2731 

205.8585 

251.0871 

294.9883 

337.6305 

11.9558 

62.8320 

112.2263 

160.1820 

206.7410 

251.9438 

295.8301 

338.4381 

12,9484 

63.7957 

113.1620 

161.0904 

207.6229 

252.8001 

2S6.6614 

339.2452 

13.940-5 

64.7589 

114.0971 

161.9983 

208.5043 

253.6558 

297.4G22 

340.0518 

Fifteen  

14.9320 

65.7215 

115.0317 

162.9057 

209.3853 

254.5111 

298.3226 

340.8580 

15.9229 

66.6836 

115.9658 

163.8125 

210.2657 

255.3659 

299.1525 

341.663" 

Seventeen  

16.9133 
17.9031 

67.6451 
68.6061 

116.8993 
117.8323 

164.7189 
165.6247 

211.1457 
212.0251 

256.2202 
257.0741 

299.9819 
300.8109 

342.4690 
343.2738 

Nineteen  

1S.8U24 
19.8811 

69.5666 
70.5265 

118.7648 
119.6967 

166.5300 
167.4348 

212.9041 
213.7825 

257.9274 
258.7803 

301.6394 
302.4674 

344.0782 
344.8821 

Twenty  -one  
Twenty-two  .... 
Twenty-three  .  . 
Twenty-four  .  .  . 
Twenty-five  .... 
Twenty-six  .... 
Twenty-  seven  .  . 
Twenty-eight  .  . 
Twenty-nine  .  .  . 
Thirty  

20.86<J-_> 
21.8568 
22.4838 
23.8303 
24.8161 
25.8015 
26.7862 
27.7705 
28.7541 
29.7372 

71.4858 
72.4446 
73.4028 
74.3606 
75.3178 
76.2744 
77.2305 
78.1860 
79.1410 
80.0955 

120.6281 
121.5590 
122.4894 
123.4192 
125.3485 
125.2772 
126.2055 
127.1332 
128.0604 
128.9870 

168.3391 
169.2429 
170.1461 
171.4192 
171.9511 
172.8528 
173.7540 
174.6547 
175.5549 
176.4546 

214.6605 
215.5379 
216.4148 
217.2913 
218.1672 
219.0427 
219.9176 
220.7921 
221.6661 
222.5395 

253.6326 
260.4845 
261.3359 
262.1868 
263.0373 
263.8872 
264.7367 
265.5857 
266.4342 
267.2822 

303.2949 
304.1220 
304.9486 
305.7748 
;:C6.60C4 
307.4256 
308.25C4 
309.0746 
309.8984 
310  7217 

345.6655 
346.4885 
347.2911 
348.0931 
348.4885 
349.6959 
350.4966 
351.2969 
352.0SI67 
352  8960 

Thirty-one  
Thirty-two  
Thirty-  three  .  .  . 
Thirty-four  .... 
Thirty-five  
Thirty-six  
Thirty  -seven  .  .  . 
Thirty-eight  .  .  . 
Thirty-nine  .... 
Forty  

30.7197 
31.7017 
32.6831 
33.6640 
34.6443 
35.6240 
36.6032 
37.5818 
38.5599 
39.5374 

81.0494 
82.0028 
82.9556 
83.9079 
84.8596 
85.8109 
86.7615 
87.7116 
88.6612 
89  6103 

123.9132 
130.8388 
131.7638 
132.6884 
133.6124 
134.5359 
135.4589 
136.3814 
137.3033 
138  2247 

177.3537 
178.2524 
179.1505 
180.0481 
180.9452 
181.8418 
182.7379 
183.6335 
184.5286 
185  4232 

223.4125 
224.2850 
225.1569 
226.0248 
226.8994 
227.7699 
228.6399 
229.5094 
230.3784 
231  2469 

268.1298 
268.9768 
269.8234 
270.6695 
271.5151 
272.3603 
273.2049 
274.0491 
274.SS28 
275  7360 

311.5446 
312.3670 
313.1X89 
314.0103 
314.8313 
315.6519 
316.4719 
317.2615 
318.11C6 
318  ''293 

353.6949 
354.4933 
355.2913 
356.0888 
35B.8S59 
357.682.', 
358.4787 
359.2744 
360.0697 

Forty-one  .... 
Forty-two  .... 
Forty  -three  
Forty-  four  .... 
Forty-five  , 
Forty-six  
Forty-  seven  .... 
Forty-eight  
Forty-nine  .... 
Fifty  

40.5144 
41.4908 
42.4667 
43.4420 
24.8161 
45.3909 
46.3645 
47.3376 
48.3101 
49.2821 

90.5588 
91.5068 
92.4542 
93.4011 
75.3178 
95.2933 
96.2385 
97.1833 
98.1275 
99  0711 

139.1456 
140.0659 
140.9858 
141.9051 
125.3485 
143.7421 
144.6599 
145.5771 
146.4938 
147  4100 

186.3172 
187.2108 
188.1038 
188.9964 
171.9511 
190.7799 
191.6709 
192.5614 
193.4514 
194  3409 

232.1149 
232.9825 
233.8495 
234.7160 
218.1672 
236.4476 
237.3127 
238.1773 
239.0414 
239  9049 

276.5787 
277.4210 
278.2628 
279.1041 
263.0373 
280.7852 
281.6251 
282.4645 
283.3034 
284  1419 

319.7475 
320.5652 
321.3X25 
322.1993 
306.6004 
323.8315 
324.646U 
325.4IU8 
326.2763 
327  0903 

361.6588 
362.4528 
363.2402 
364.0392 
348.8947 
365.623fi 
366.4156 
367.2068 
367.9970 
368  7878 

Fifty-one  
Fifty-two  

50.2536 
51.2244 

100.0143 
100.9569 

148.3257 
149.2408 

195.2299 
196.1184 

240.7680 
241.6307 

284.9788 
285.8173 

327.8039 
328.7169 

369.8777 
370.3671 

PRESENT  VALUE  TABLES— Continued. 

Present  value  at  3  per  cent,  compounded  annually,  of  $1.00  semi- 
monthly, payable  at  the  end  of  each  half  month,  for  any  term  from 
one-half  month  up  to  eight  years. 

(For  method  of  computation,  see  example  given  under  weekly  table.) 


Term—  half- 
monthi. 

0  years 

1  year 
and  — 
months. 

2  years 
and  — 
months. 

3  years 
and  — 
months. 

4  years 
and  — 
months. 

5  years 
and  — 

months. 

6  years 
and  — 
months. 

7  years 
and  — 
months. 

Dine-half    
One    

.9978 
1.9962 

24.6020 
25.5705 

47.5272 
48.4676 

69.7927 
70.7058 

91.4194 
92.3060 

112.4242 
113.2850 

132.8254 
133.6611 

152.6394 
153.4509 

One    and   one-half. 

2.9925 
3.9875 

26.5378 
27.5040 

4S.4068 
50.3450 

71.6178 
72.5288 

93.1915 
94.0761 

114.1449 
115.0038 

134.4961 
135.3301 

154.2616 
155  0714 

Two  and  one-half 

4.9812 
5.9738 

28.4690 
29.4329 

51.2821 
52.2172 

73.4388 
74.3477 

94.9597 
95.8423 

115.8619 
116.7190 

136.1633 
136.9956 

155.8805 

156  0887 

Three  and  one-half 

6.9651 
7.9552 

;jA:{9sij 

31.3571 

53.  1520 
54.0858 

75.2556 
76.1624 

96.7240 
97.6047 

117.5752 
118.4305 

137.8270 
138.6576 

157.4961 
158.3027 

Four   and   one-half 
Five     

8.9441 
9.9317 

32.3175 
33.2767 

55.0186 
55.9502 

77.0683 
77.9731 

98.4844 
99.3631 

119.2848 
120.1383 

139.4873 
140.3162 

159.1085 
159  9134 

Five  and  one-half 
Six    

10.11182 
11.9034 

34.2:;48 

35.1917 

50.8X07 
57.8102 

78.8769 

7!).  77116 

100.2409 
101.1177 

120.9!l<;N 
121.8425 

141.1442 
141.9713 

160.7176 
161  5210 

Six   and   one-half 

12.8874 
13.870-2 

36.1475 
37.1022 

58.7385 
59.6658 

80.6814 
81.5821 

101.9936 
102.8685 

122.6832 
123.5430 

142.7976 
143.6231 

162.3235 
163  1252 

Seven  and  one-half 
Eight     

14.8517 
15  8321 

38.0557 
39  0081 

60.5921 
61  5172 

K2.4818 
83  3806 

103.7424 
104  6154 

124.3920 
125  2400 

144.4477 
145  2714 

163.9262 
164  7263 

Eight  and  one-half 
Nine    

16.8113 
17.7893 

39.9593 
40.S094 

62.4413 
63.3643 

84.2783 
85.1750 

105.4875 
106.3585 

126.0871 
126.9334 

146.0943 
146  9163 

165.5257 
166  3242 

Nine   and   one-half 
Ten    

18.7661 
19  7414 

41.8584 
42  8063 

64.2863 
65.2071 

86.0706 
86  9653 

107.2287 
108  0979 

127.7787 
128  6231 

147.7375 
148  5579 

167.1219 
167  9189 

Ten  and  one-half.  . 
Eleven     

20.7161 
21.6894 

43.7530 
44.6986 

66.1270 
67.0457 

87.8590 
88  7517 

108.9661 
109.8334 

129.4667 
130  3004 

149.3774 
150.1961 

168.7150 
169  5104 

Elev'n   and  one-half 
Twelve    

22.6614 
23.6323 

45.6431 

48.5857 

67.9635 

68.8786 

89.6434 

SO.  5319 

110.6098 
111.5625 

131.1512 

131.9887 

151.0139 
151.8271 

170.30.r.<5 
171.0944 

395 
WRIT  OF  CERTIORARI 


STATE  OP  ILLINOIS, 
County  of 


>  ss. 


The  People  of  the  State  of  Illinois, 

To  Industrial  Board,  GREETING: 

Whereas,  It  has  been  represented  to  our  Circuit  Court  of 

County,  by  the  Praecipe  or  Petition  of ,  filed  in  said  Court, 

that  on  the day  of ,  191 . . ,  in  a  certain  proceed- 
ing, then  pending  before  you,  a  decision  or  award  has  been  rendered 
by  you  in  favor  of and  against  said  for  

And  the  said having  filed  a  Praecipe  or  Petition  for  a 

Writ  of  Certiorari  and  we,  being  willing  that  said  cause  should  be 
brought  before  our  said  Circuit  Court: 

Do  Therefore  Command  You,  that,  without  further  delay,  you 

certify  to  our  said  Circuit  Court  of County,  a  transcript  of 

the  decision  or  award  and  other  proceedings  had  before  you  in  said 
cause  on  or  before  the Monday  of ,  191 . . 

To  the  Sheriff  of  said  County,  to  execute  and  return  in  due  form 
of  law. 

Witness, ,  Clerk  of  our  said  Circuit  Court 

of County,    and    the    Seal    of   said    Court,   at 

,  this day  of 191 .. 

..Clerk. 


PRAECIPE  FOR  CERTIORARI 

The  Clerk  of  said  Court  will  issue  a  Writ  of  Certiorari,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  provisions  of  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act,  to  the 
Industrial  Board  of  Illinois,  directing  said  Board  to  certify  to  this 
Court  a  transcript  of  the  decision,  award  and  other  proceedings  had 
before  it  in  the  above  entitled  cause  on  or  before  the Mon- 
day of ,  191.  .,  and  the  Clerk  of  said  Court  will  also  issue  a 

Writ  of  Scire  Facias  in  said  cause  to  the  aforesaid  petitioner  or  appli- 
cant and  direct  same  to  the  Sheriff  of County  to  execute  and 

make  it  returnable  to  the Term  of  said  Court,  191 . . 

Attorney. 


396 


WRIT  OF  SCIRE  FACIAS 

STATE  OF  ILLINOIS,     / 

vss. 
County  of } 

To  the  People  of  the  State  of  Illinois, 

To  the  Sheriff  of  said  County,  GREETING: 

Whereas,  At  a  session  of  the  Industrial  Board,  held  in  the  County 

of and  State  of  Illinois,  to-wit:  on  the day  of 

191..,  before  the  said  Industrial  Board,  then  sitting  in  the  city  of 

,  in  said  County,  a  decision  or  award  was  rendered  by  said 

Board  in  a  certain  proceeding  then  pending  before  said  Industrial 
Board  against and  in  favor  of 

We  Do  Therefore  Hereby  Command  You,  that  you  summon  the 

said if  he  shall  be  found  in  your  County,  personally  to  be 

and  appear  before  the  said  Circuit  Court  of County,  on  the 

first  day  of  the  next  term  thereof,  to  be  holden  at  the  Court  House, 

in  the  city  of in  said  County,  on  the Monday  of 

,  191 .  . ,  then  and  there  to  show  cause,  if  any  he  have  or  can 

show,  why  the  said  decision  or  award  should  not  be  reversed  and  set 
aside;  and  further  to  do  and  receive  what  shall  then  and  there  be 
adjudged  by  our  said  Court  in  the  premises. 

And  have  you  then  and  there  this  Writ,  and  with  your  return 
thereon  in  what  manner  you  shall  have  executed  the  same. 

Witness,  ,  Clerk  of  our  said  Court,  and  the 

Seal  thereof,  at ,  in  said  County,  this 

day  of ,  191.. 

. .  Clerk. 


INDEX 


A. 

Absence — from  work:     20. 

Acceptance — of  Act:    Election. 

Accident— report  of— by  employer:  41,  270,  282,  294,  296,  298— by 
employee:  270 — notice  of:  34,  266. 

Accidental  injury  arising  out  of  and  in  course  of  employment:  7,  57, 
64,  70,  76,  84,  88,  100,  103,  186-207— burden  of  proof  on  claim- 
ant: 85,  200. 

Acid — corrosive:  10. 

Advance:    251. 

Agreement:  272,  274 — review  of:  32 — settlement  within  seven  days: 
264. 

Action  at  common  law:    63;  Damages. 

Administration:    106,  250-263. 

Address— filing:  32. 

Affidavit:  251,  256,  273. 

Alien — employee — dependent:    11,  217,  218. 

Amicable  adjustment — form:  292. 

Ankle — injury  to:  233:  Foot. 

Annual  earnings:  Earnings. 

Annuity :    36. 

Apoplexy:    236. 

Appearance — special:  250. 

Appliance — safety:  10. 

Arm— injury  to:  16,  17,  233,  235. 

Appeal:  30,  51,  99,  276 — to  County  Court:  139 — from  County  Court: 
261,  263 — to  Circuit  Court:  81,  261,  263,  132 — to  Appellate  Court: 
117,  115 — to  Supreme  Court:  70,  130 — constitutional  question:  61, 
117,  128. 

Appellate  Court — opinions:     45,  99,  117 — appeal — writ  of  error:  30. 

Application  for  adjustment:    270,  271,  285. 

Arbitrator:  14,  50,  68,  88,  100,  129,  250,  271,  272— appointment:  26, 
137,  289 — request  for:  289 — hearing:  27 — waiver:  292 — oath:  275 — 
salary:  23 — decision:  27,  289,  300,  301 — permanent  incapacity:  26 — 
deposit  26 — committee  of:  260 — change  in  membership:  260. 

Assault — Injury  from:  104,  203. 

Assumption  of  risk:    Defense. 

Attachment  proceeding:    24. 

Attorney:    274 — Fees. 

Automobile — Motor  vehicle. 

Award — record  of:  25;  review  of:  32 — not  final:  51 — not  subject  to 
lien:  33 — not  assignable:  33. 


398  INDEX 

B. 

Basis  of  computation:    19. 

Belting:    Safety  Act. 

Beneficiary :    Dependent. 

Benefit  fund:    11,  38— Pension. 

Bicycle — injury  while  riding  on:    104. 

Blood  poisoning:    195,  236,  237,  240,  248. 

Blower  .act:    367. 

Body  politic — employer:    10,  208. 

Bond — to  stay  judgment:     32 — for  compensation:  305. 

Books,  papers  and  records — producing:  24. 

Boycott:      391. 

Bricklayer — injury  to:     104. 

Bridge:     Safety  Act. 

Brief  of  Act:     1. 

Brother:     Dependent. 

Burial  expenses:     13. 

Building:     9,  33,  68,  75,  267— structure:  Structural  Act. 

Bulletin  of  Industrial  Board:    33. 

Butterine  Manufacture  Act:    375. 


Canvasser — injury  to:    104. 

Carpenter — injury  tt:     68,  103,  244,  248. 

Carriage  by  land  and  water:    9,  79,  97,  174. 

Casual  employment:    11,  209. 

Celluloid — injury  from:  117. 

Certified  copy— of  award:    31,  262. 

Certiorari:     29,  68,  70,  72,  122,  261,  395,  396. 

Chancery — suit  in:    30,  125,  261. 

Charitable  association — employer:  10,  208.  * 

Chauffeur:    178,  390. 

Chemist — employee:    209. 

Child:    Minor;  Dependent. 

Child  Labor  Act:    219,  379. 

Circuit  Court:     Court. 

Citing  Act:    43. 

Citizenship:     217,  218,  220;  Alien. 

City— employer:    10,  208. 

Claim — in  six  months:     35 — form:     283. 

Class  legislation:    Constitution. 

Classification:     Constitution. 

Clerk — injury  to:    49. 

Closet:    Safety  Act. 

Collateral  heir:    12,  13;  Dependent. 

Common  law — action  at:    12;  Damages. 


INDEX  399 

Commutation:    19,  106;  Lump  sum. 

Compensation:  19-21,  88,  222-239 — for  death:  12,  222-225,  107 — for 
non-fatal  injury:  14-22,  226-239 — for  partial  incapacity:  15 — con- 
tract liability:  138 — maximum:  14,  18 — double:  242 — claim  in  six 
months:  35 — extinguished  by  death:  33,  34 — refusal  to  pay:  31 — 
securing  payment:  274 — reconsideration:  262,  263 — measure  of 
responsibility:  21 — claim  for— form:  283 — tables:  393,  394. 

Complete  disability:    Disability. 

Compulsory — Act  not:     30,  138,  319;  Election. 

Computation:    19,  240,  242 — present  value  tables:  393,  394. 

Congress:    Federal  Employers'  Liability  Act. 

Conservator:    18,  19;  Incompetent. 

Conspiracy:     391. 

Constitution:  46,  51,  55,  61,  149 — defenses  forfeited:  127,  180 — mode 
of  passage:  81,  90,  117,  133,  136 — police  power:  47,  48 — due  process 
of  law:  72,  74 — deprivation  of  life  and  property:  51,  53 — freedom 
of  contract:  48 — delegation  of  judicial  power:  47,  50 — class  legis- 
lation, 47,  49 — trial  by  jury:  47,  50,  51,  72 — search  and  seizure:  51 — 
equal  protection  of  law:  53 — certiorari  to  Appellate  Court:  117 — 
waiver:  48,  115,  117 — direct  review  by  Supreme  Court:  72 — inval- 
idity of  part:  42,  43 — amendments:  319 — New  York  Act:  325. 

Construction  work:    9,  68;  Structure. 

Construction  of  Act:     77,  100,  103,  105,  107. 

Contempt :    24. 

Continuance:     256,  273. 

Contract — of  employment:  10,  11,  208,  209,  378 — Act  part  of:  7,  50, 
55,  56,  98,  138,  265 — for  extra-hazardous  work:  41 — of  settlement  in 
seven  days:  34 — absolving  employer:  265 — to  assume  risk:  185 — in 
foreign  states:  220 — requiring  employee  to  pay  premium:  38. 

Contractor:    41,  209,  266,  269 — with  public  body:  11. 

Contribution:    222-224;  Dependent. 

Contributory  negligence:     55,  57,  115,  192;  Defenses. 

Country  place:     10;  Farming. 

Coroner — evidence  before:     251,  252,  254. 

Corrosive  acid:    10. 

Costs:    31,  32,  262. 

County — employer:  10,  208. 

Court — appointment  of  arbitrator  by:  137 — concurrent  jurisdiction: 
133 — Supreme — review  by:  70,  72-75,  88 — writ  of  error:  30 — Appel- 
late: certiorari:  117 — Circuit:  petition,  91 — judgment,  31 — review, 
24,  29,  30,  32,  72,  88,  125,  175,  261— certiorari  (blanks  supplied  by 
clerk  of  Cook  Co.):  29,  118,  122,  293,  395 — appeal  to:  81 — certified 
129,  134 — transcript.  276 — County:  100 — claim  in  excess  of  $1,000: 
129,  134 — appeal  from  to  Appellate  Court.  130,  137,  139 — writ  of 
error:  30;  Appeal;  Opinions. 

Crane — Safety  Act. 


400  INDEX 

D. 

Damages — action  for — barred:  12,  59,  63,  221 — suit  for:  37,  113 — 
relief  from:  7,  35 — when  employer  liable  for:  37 — default  of  em- 
ployer: 37*;  Safety  Act. 

Death — compensation  for:  12,  222-225 — before  total  payments:  17,  38, 
262 — from  other  cause:  262 — extinguishes  right:  33 — action  for 
wrongful:  266. 

Decision — of  arbitrator:  27,  29 — of  board  final:  28,  31,  250,  256,  259 — 
form:  304 — when  not  binding:  80. 

Dedimus  protestatem:    253. 

Defenses— forfeited:  9,  48,  49,  55,  56,  57,  61,  62,  63,  64,  66,  67,  127, 
324 — contributory  negligence  reducing  damages:  55,  57. 

Demolishing  structure:    Structure. 

Dependent:  12,  13,  18,  69,  86,  222-226,  239,  240,  241,  242— mother: 
106 — pecuniary  loss:  109 — distribution:  108 — vested  rights  of:  109 — 
death  of:  33,  34 — settlement  with:  34 — pension:  11;  Lump  sum. 

Deposition:    251-253,  273. 

Deposit:  26 — of  commuted  value:  35 — for  committee  of  arbitra- 
tion: 26. 

Deprivation  of  liberty  and  property:     51;  Constitution. 

Digest:    140-269. 

Disability — partial:  15-=-complete,  14,  15,  17,  229,  245 — temporary 
total:  14,  15,  18,  227,  235,  240,  271— permanent:  17,  18,  26,  88— total: 
14,  15,  17,  18,  19,  59,  237 — change  in  review:  32 — subsequent:  32 — 
duration  uncertain:  262 — relief  from:  7 — before  accident:  21 — test 
of:  242— terminating:  262,  263. 

Disfigurement:    14,  227-229. 

Dismissal:    258. 

Disobedience — to  orders:     102 

Disputed  questions  of  law  and  fact:    26. 

Distribution — to  dependents:     13-18. 

Districts— of  State:    313. 

Diversity  of  citizenship:    218. 

Docket:    270. 

Door:    Safety  Act. 

Drink — injury  while  getting:     101;  Intoxication. 

Drags — manufacture  of:    196. 

Due  process  of  law:    Constitution. 

Dust:    Safety  Act. 

Dynamo:    Safety  Act. 

E. 

Earnings— basis  of  computation:     12,  13,  18,  20,  21,  68.  86,  114,  115, 

225,  228,  229,  240,  242— overtime:  20. 
Egress — means  of:    Safety  Act. 
Election — to  accept  or  reject  act:    7,  10,  62,  52,  115 — by  minor:    219 — 

notice  of:  113 — forms:  279 — act  not  compulsory:  7,  48,  50,  51,  55, 

56,  65. 


INDEX  401 

Electric  work — extra-hazardous:  9 — apparatus — transmission:  Safety 
Act. 

Eleemosynary  corporation — employer:     18,  208. 

Elevator:    178;  Safety  Act. 

Emery  wheel:    Safety  Act,  Blower  Act. 

Employment:  7,  20 — offer  of:  241 — arising  out  of,  &c.:  Accident — 
in  same  grade:  20 — casual:  11 — irregular:  241 — return  to:  15 — risk 
incident  to:  108;  statutes  regulating:  334. 

Employer — construed:  10,  208,  209,  268,  269 — to  file,  post  and  serve 
notice:  7 — to  file  financial  statement,  &c.:  36 — measure  of  liability: 
8 — relief  from:  35 — when  liable  for  damages:  37 — to  report  acci- 
dents: 41,  270. 

Employee — construed:  10,  11,  268,  269 — when  deemed  to  have  ac- 
cepted act;  7 — may  elect  only  after  employer:  62,  64 — notice  of  elec- 
tion: 8 — subrogation:  39 — action  for  damages:  37. 

Engine:    Safety  Act. 

English  Act:    100,  103,  202,  317,  324. 

Epilepsy:    236. 

Equal  protection  of  law:    Constitution. 

Evidence— of  injury— burden  of  proof:  85,  198,  200,  201,  234,  251, 
252 — hearsay:  243 — before  arbitration  committee:  250 — of  failure 
to  give  notice:  266 — of  physician:  244,  246,  249,  329 — stenographic 
report:  24 — transcript:  25 — notice  to  introduce — form:  304. 

Examination— of  claimant:  21,  243-246— refusal :  22,  28,  248— request 
for — form:  291 — board  may  appoint  examiner:  28. 

Excavating  work — extra-hazardous:    9,  79. 

Expense — special:  20,  21. 

Explosive — gas — vapor — extra-hazardous :  9. 

Extension  of  time  for  review:    27;  Continuance. 

Extra-hazardous  enterprise:  9,  10,  49,  76,  78,  79,  174,  267— act  auto- 
matically applies:  8,  65,  79 — presumption  of  law:  112 — contract  for: 
41 — posting  notice  of  rejection:  8. 

Extra-territorial  effect:    220. 

Eye— injury  to:  16,  17,  234,  235,  236. 


F. 

Face — injury  to:  14;  Disfigurement. 

Factory  Inspector:     Safety  Act. 

Failing  physical  power:     237. 

False  representation:    206. 

Farming:    10,  75. 

Father:    Dependent. 

Federal  Employers'  Liability  Act:    11,  217,  319. 

Fees — Board  to  fix:  25— for  examination:  28 — for  treatment:  12,  210, 
240,  243,  249— of  attorney:  28,  31,  243,  262— of  physician:  28;  Treat- 
ment. 

Fellow-servant:     224;  Defenses. 


402  INDEX 

Female  employee:     Safety  Act;  Hours  of  Service  Act. 

Fight — injury  in:  204. 

Financial  statement:    36,  274,  275. 

Finding — special:  29;  Decision. 

Fine:    39,  43. 

Finger— injury  to:  15,  16,  230,  232. 

Fire:    117. 

Fire  escape:     391. 

First  aid:     14;  Treatment. 

Fixture:     196. 

Fluid — inflammable:     9;  Safety  Act. 

Fly-wheel:    Safety  Act. 

Food:     Safety  Act. 

Foot— injury  to:  16,  17,  55,  58,  59,  233,  235. 

Foreign  state — employment  in :    220. 

Forge:    Safety  Act. 

Forms:    25,  277-312,  395,  396. 

Fracture:    237. 

Fraud:    29,  42. 

Frost  bite — injury  from :  237. 


G. 

Gamekeeper — injury  to:  204. 

Garment  Manufacture  Act:    373. 

Gas — injurious:  9,  117,  237;  Safety  Act. 

German  legislation:    316. 

Going  home — injury  while:  200. 

Going  to  work:    200. 

Gonorrhea:    237. 

Grandparent:     12,  13,  18,  222;  Dependent. 

Guardian:     18,  19;  Incompetent. 

H. 

Holiday— legal:   392. 

Hauling:     79. 

Health,  Safety  and  Comfort  Act:    335. 

Hearing:    27,  28,  250,  260,  271,  272,  299;  Administration. 

Hand — injury  to:  14,  16,  17,  233,  235;  Finger;  Disfigurement 

Head — injury  to:  236;  Disfigurement. 

Heart  disease:    233-237. 

Heat — injury  from:  105. 

Heir:     12,  13,  18,  222-226;  Dependent. 

Hemorrhage:    90,  236. 

Hernia:    235. 

Historic  review:    316. 

Horse — injury  from:  200. 


INDEX  403 

Hospital — employer:  10,  208;  Treatment. 
Hours  of  Service  Act:    377,  391. 
Hydrocele:     236. 

I. 

Ice  Cream  Manufacture  Act:    375. 

Illness — absence  from  work:  20. 

Impairment  of  health:    236. 

Implied  contract  of  hire:    209. 

Incapacity:    Disability. 

Incompetent:     18,  19,  34. 

Indemnity  bond:    36,  275. 

Industrial  Board — created:  22,  243 — members — salary:  23 — secretary: 
23— seal:  23— powers:  23-33,  69,  72,  75,  80,  97,  243— procedure :  231— 
record:  26,  243 — report:  320 — determination:  25,  244 — forms:  24 — 
administrative  body:  254,  260 — not  judicial  body:  74,  138 — challenge 
of  jurisdiction:  250;  Administration. 

Infectious  disease:    234. 

Inflammable  vapor:     9. 

Injury:  7,  12,  13,  14-22 — determining  nature  and  extent  of:  21 — sub- 
sequent: 21 — third  party  liable  for:  40;  Accident. 

Insanitary  practices:    28,  248,  262;  Treatment. 

Insolvency:    33,  39. 

Installments:    13,  18,  21,  225. 

Instructress — injury  to:  241. 

Instruction:    56,  57,  116. 

Insurance:  36,  41,  266,  267,  275 — existing— not  affected:  38 — of  con- 
tractor: 41. 

Interest — three  per  cent:  19. 

Interstate  commerce:    11,  210-216;  Federal  Employers'  Liability  Act. 

Intoxication:    102,  207. 

Iron  Mangle:    Safety  Act. 

J. 

Jointers:     Safety  Act. 

Joists:     Safety  Act. 

Judgment:    31,  32. 

Judicial  powers:    Industrial  Board;  Constitution. 

Jury  trial:    Constitution. 


Ladder:    Safety  Act. 

Laws  of  United  States:     11,  210-216;  Federal  Employers'  Liability 

Act. 
Lead:     Occupational  Disease  Act. 


404  INDEX 

Leg — injury  to:  16,  17,  233,  235. 

Liability — of  third  party:  39. 

Life  expectancy  table:     315;  Damages. 

Lien — award  not  subject  to:  33 — award  to  constitute:  33,  264. 

Light:     Safety  Act. 

Lightning — injury  from:  104,  237. 

Limitation — of  time:  35,  42 — incompetent:  18. 

Line  of  duty:    12;  Accident. 

Lineal  heir:    12,  13,  18,  222;  Dependent. 

Lineman — injury  to:  126. 

Load — per  square  foot:     Safety  Act. 

Loading — cargo:  9,  105. 

Lockjaw:     68,  197. 

Lump  sum  settlement:    13,  18,  19,  92,  106,  129,  239,  272 — petition  for: 

306 — notice  of:  307 — answer  to:  307 — order  for:  308 — rejection:  309 

— dependent  aged  and  infirm:  111. 
Lunacy:    236. 
Lunch— injury  while  going  to:     189,  190,  199,  200. 


M. 


Machinist — injury  to:   93. 

Machinery — extra-hazardous:  103,  205;  Safety  Act:  335. 

Malpractice :    249. 

Mandamus:    72,  117. 

Master  and  servant:    322,  324. 

Maximum  compensation:    18. 

Measure  of  responsibility:    21. 

Medical  service:    Treatment. 

Mental  incapacity:    34;  Incompetent. 

Mercantile  establishment:    Safety  Act. 

Mileage:    32. 

Mill:    Safety  Act:  335. 

Mining:    9,  53,  60,  87,  102,  103,  114,  191,  192,  194,  391. 

Minor:    11,  219,  222— notice  to:  219;  Child  Labor  Act. 

Mischief — injury  from:  104. 

Misdemeanor:    39,  43. 

Molten  metal:    9;  Safety  Act:  335. 

Mortgage — award  paramount  lien:  33. 

Motor  vehicle:     178,  391. 

Moving  picture  film:    117. 

Mother:     Dependent. 

Monthly  statement  of  accidents:    270. 

Municipal  corporation-— employer:  10,  100,  208,  209. 

Municipal  ordinance:    10. 

Mutual  aid:    Benefit;  Pension. 


INDEX  405 

N. 

Name  and  address — memorandum:  302. 

Negligence:    51-67,  114,  324,  327;  Defenses. 

Nervous  system — injury  to:  237,  244. 

Neurotic  state:    236. 

New  York  Act:    323;  Constitution. 

Notice— of  election:  7-8,  25— of  accident:  15,  34,  35,  266,  283,  284— of 
filing  claim:  288 — of  review:  32 — to  produce:  290 — of  hearing:  299 — 
of  default:  38 — to  minor:  219 — to  foreman:  266 — over  telephone: 
266 — after  return  to  employment:  15. 

Noxious  Fumes  Act:     371. 

Next  of  kin:    12,  13,  34;  Dependent. 

O. 

Oath:    24 — of  arbitrator:  275 — administering:  24. 

Obligation  to  support:    222;  Dependent. 

Obstructing  enforcement  of  Act:     43. 

Occupational  Disease  Act:    361. 

Official:     11,  208,  209. 

Officer:     209. 

Operation — refusal:  248-249 — forcing:  249;  Treatment;  Fees. 

Opinions — Supreme  Court:    44-49,  116-139,  149 — Appellate  Court:  45, 

99-116— Federal  Court:  156-162. 
Option — exercise  of:  37,  299. 
Ordinance:    10;  Safety  Act. 
Oven:    Safety  Act. 
Over-exertion:     236. 
Over-time  earnings:    20. 

P. 

Painter:    209;  Safety  Act. 

Paralysis:     88,  237. 

Parent:    12,  13,  18,  34,  222;  Dependent. 

Paris  Green:    Occupational  Disease  Act. 

Payments — maximum:  18;  Compensation. 

Pecuniary  assistance:     Dependent. 

Penalty:    43;  Safety  Act. 

Pension:     11,  17,  18;  Benefit  Fund;  Disability. 

Personal  representative:    13,  18,  129,  225;  Dependent. 

Phalange:    15,  16,  230-232;  Finger;  Toe. 

Physician:     Treatment;  Fees — employee  may  select:  14 — board  may 

appoint:  28 — unskilled:  249;  Treatment;  Evidence. 
Pleading:      261. 

Police  power:    48,  209,  326;  Constitution 
Poison:    236-239. 
Power-driven  machinery:    Safety  Act. 


406  INDEX 

Precedents:    78,  330. 

Probable  future  payments:    19. 

Procedure:     27;  Administration. 

Proceedings — purely  statutory:  125. 

Process  of  law:    328,  388;  Constitution. 

Public  policy — declaration  of:     48. 

Public  service  corporation — employer:     10,  208. 

Publications:    Reference  Works. 


Q. 

Quarrying — extra-hazardous :  9. 
Quasi-public  service  corporation:    209. 


R. 

Railway:    210,  216;  Federal  Employers'  Liability  Act. 

Record  of  proceedings:     29. 

Receipt:    275,  309,  310. 

Reference  Works:    333. 

Release:    264,  265. 

Religious  association — employer:  10,  208. 

Remanding:    30. 

Remedy — exclusive:  12,  21,  56,  63. 

Removal  to  Federal  Court:     218,  220. 

Removal  of  structure:    9;  Structure. 

Repair  of  structure:    Structure. 

Report  of  accident:    41,  310. 

Residence — repair  work:  197. 

Return  to  employment:    15. 

Review— petition  for:  27,  28,  31,  125,  169,  252,  302— of  agreement  or 

award:  32 — notice  of  hearing:  303 — by  industrial  board:  270-276; 

Administration. 
Robbery:    203. 
Roller:    Safety  Act. 
Rules  of  Board:    270-276. 
Rules  of  law — may  be  repealed:  48-55. 
Rupture:    237. 
Rust — injury  from:  195. 


S. 

Safety  Act:     335. 

Scaffold:    104;  Safety  Act. 

School  district — employer:     10,  208. 

Sciatica:    236. 

Scire  facias:    30,  261,  396. 

Seaman — injury  to:  105,  201;  Carriage. 


INDEX  407 


Settlement:    264,  271,  309. 

Shoulder:    233. 

Sign  painter — injury  to:  209. 

Stairway:     Safety  Act:  191. 

State— employer:  10,  208. 

Statement  of  fact:    28,  29,  250,  251,  252,  258,  260. 

Stenographic  report:    28,  29,  250,  251,  252,  258,  260. 

Stipulation — form:  292. 

Strain:    236,  237. 

Structure:     9,  78;  Structural  Act:  354. 

Subpoena:    24,  70,  273,  290. 

Subsequent  injury:    21,  37. 

Suit  in  chancery:     137. 

Sunstroke:    105,  237. 

Supersedeas:    31. 

Surrogation:    39,  40,  266. 

Suspension  of  business:    172. 


T. 

Teamster— injury  to:  102,  194,  197,  199,  200,  268,  269. 

Teeth — injury  to:  226,  228,  229. 

Telegraph:    126. 

Telephone — notice  over:  266. 

Third  party— when  liable:  39,  266. 

Thumb— injury  to:  15,  230-232. 

Toe — injury  to:  16,  233. 

Transportation:    210-216;  Carriage. 

Treatment:    14,  28,  226,  248,  249,  329. 

Trial  by  jury:    50. 

Trial  de  novo:    132. 


U. 

United  States — laws  of:  11;  Federal  Employers'  Liability  Act. 
University  regents — employers:  209. 
Usual  course  of  trade:    11,  18,  79,  209: 


V. 

Vacancy — in  committee  of  arbitration:  26,  27. 

Vapor — injurious,  inflammable:  9,  84. 

Ventilation:    Safety  Act. 

Violation — of  rules:  205,  206 — of  act:  43. 

Verdict:     85,  87. 

Viaduct:    Safety  Act. 

Village — employer:  10,  208. 

Vision :    Eye. 


408  INDEX 

W. 

Wages:    39,  391,  392. 

Waiver:    34,  264,  265. 

Warehouse :    9. 

Warning  of  danger:    185. 

Washroom  Act:    389. 

Watchman — injury  to:  204;  Assault. 

Water — carriage  by:  210. 

Waterworks:     100. 

Widow:     12,  13,  18,  222;  Dependent. 

Wilful  misconduct:    206. 

Witness:     24,  252-261. 

Writ  of  error:    30,  261,  263;  Courts;  Appeal. 


